JUDGMENT The Hon'ble Mr. Justice A.K. Goswami 1. This appeal is preferred under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, for short, the Act, by the insurer against the award dated 27-10-2006 passed by the Member, Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Nagaland, Dimapur in MAC Case No. 94/2004 directing the Appellant insurer to pay to the claimant an amount of Rs. 2,14,224/- including the interim award of Rs. 25,000/-, which was already paid, within 30 (thirty) days from the date of the order, failing which interest @ 9% per annum is to accrue to the awarded amount from the date of filing of the claim petition. 2. The claimant filed the claim case on 16-8-2004 stating that a Bus bearing registration No. NL-06/B-0132 driven by one Ranjit Dungdung met with an accident on 3-10-2002 in which he was a bona fide fare paying passenger and due to such accident, he sustained severe bodily injuries. 3. It is submitted by both the parties that quite a few claim cases arising out of the aforesaid accident had been filed and one such case was registered as MAC Case No. 93/2004. Mrs. Modi, Learned Counsel for the Appellant submits that the award passed in MAC Case No. 93/2004 has been duly satisfied by the Insurance Company. She has also submitted that the MAC Case No. 93/2004 as well as MAC Case No. 94/2004 were proceeding simultaneously upto a certain stage and there were numbers of orders by the Tribunal indicating that the orders passed in MAC Case No. 93/2004 would also cover MAC Case No. 94/2004. 4. Mr. B.N. Sarmah, Learned Counsel appearing for the claimant Respondent No. 1 submits that in absence of permission granted under Section 170 of the Act permitting the Insurance Company the right to contest the claim on all or any of the grounds that are available to the person against whom the claim has been made and admittedly, the grounds taken in this appeal being not grounds available to the insurer to contest the claim under Section 149(2)(a) and (b), this appeal is not maintainable. The Learned Counsel in order to substantiate his arguments has placed reliance on the decision of the Apex Court in the cases of (1) National Insurance Company Ltd. Chandigarh v. Nicolletta Rohtagi and Ors. reported in (2002) 7 SCC 456 , (2) Shankarayya and Anr. The Learned Counsel in order to substantiate his arguments has placed reliance on the decision of the Apex Court in the cases of (1) National Insurance Company Ltd. Chandigarh v. Nicolletta Rohtagi and Ors. reported in (2002) 7 SCC 456 , (2) Shankarayya and Anr. v. United India Insurance Company Ltd. and Anr. reported in (1998) 3 SCC 140 , and (3) R. Mannakatti and Anr., v. M. Subramanian and Anr., reported in (2005) 11 SCC 389 . 5. Mrs. Modi, Learned Counsel for the Appellant submits that applications were filed in both the MAC Case No. 93/2004 and MAC Case No. 94/2004 before the learned Tribunal under Section170 of the Act. However, the learned Tribunal did not pass any orders on the aforesaid applications filed by the Appellant and therefore, the award passed by the learned Tribunal is vitiated. The Learned Counsel has placed reliance on the decision in the case of National Insurance Company Ltd. v. Smt. Jairani and Ors., reported in 2009 (1) TAC 899 to contend that such an award is a nullity. 6. In response to the aforesaid submission of Mrs. A. Modi, Learned Counsel for the Appellant, Mr. B.N. Sarmah, Learned Counsel for the Respondent No. 1 has submitted that the Insurance Company had filed an application in MAC Case No. 94/2004 on 9-5-2005 under Section 170 of the Act on the grounds that the opposite party No. 1, owner had failed to participate in the proceedings resulting in continuation of proceedings ex-parte against the owner and also that the Insurance Company has very limited rights to defend the claim under the provisions of the Act unless permission is granted under Section 170 of the Act. He has submitted that the owner and driver of the vehicle in question had, after filing of such application, filed written statement and had fully participated in the proceedings and, in fact, at one point of time a prayer was made on behalf of the Insurance Company to keep the application under Section 170 of the Act, pending. He has also submitted that at no point of time, during the trial, the Insurance Company renewed the prayer to implead the Insurance Company in the proceedings under Section 170 of the Act. He has also submitted that at no point of time, during the trial, the Insurance Company renewed the prayer to implead the Insurance Company in the proceedings under Section 170 of the Act. He has submitted that mere filing of an application is not sufficient and the application has to be pressed and at any rate, the application filed by the Insurance Company under Section 170 of the Act had become infructuous after the owner had contested the proceedings. 7. He has submitted that mere filing of an application is not sufficient and the application has to be pressed and at any rate, the application filed by the Insurance Company under Section 170 of the Act had become infructuous after the owner had contested the proceedings. 7. At this stage, it will be relevant to consider the provisions of Section 149(2) of the Act: 149 (2) No sum shall be payable by an insurer under Sub-section (1) in respect of any judgment or award unless, before the commencement of the proceedings in which the judgment or award is given the insurer had notice through the Court or, as the case may be, the Claims Tribunal of the bringing of the proceedings, or in respect of such judgment or award so long as execution is stayed thereon pending an appeal; and an insurer to whom notice of the bringing of any such proceedings is so given shall be entitled to be made a party thereto and to defend the action on any of the following grounds, namely: (a) that there has been a breach of a specified condition of the policy, being one of the following conditions, namely: (i) a condition excluding the use of the vehicle (a) for hire or reward, where the vehicle is on the date of the contract of insurance a vehicle not covered by a permit to ply for hire or reward, or (b) for organized racing and speed testing, or (c) for a purpose not allowed by the permit under which the vehicle is used, where the vehicle is a transport vehicle, or (d) without side-car being attached where the vehicle is a motor cycle; or (ii) a condition excluding driving by a named person or persons or by any person who is not duly licensed, or by any person who has been disqualified for holding or obtaining a driving license during the period of disqualification; or (iii) a condition excluding liability for injury caused or contributed to by conditions of war, civil war, riot or civil commotion; or (b) that the policy is void on the ground that it was obtained by the non-disclosure of a material fact or by a representation of fact which was false in some material particular. 8. 8. On perusal of Section 149(2), it is clear that under the law the insurer is entitled to contest the claim only on the grounds mentioned in Section 149(2) of the Act. In other words, challenge of an insurer must be confined to the statutory defences which are available to the Insurance Company under Section 149(2) of the Act. 9. It will also be necessary to consider and appreciate the provisions contained in Section 170 of the Act and therefore, the same is quoted herein below: 170. Impleading insurer in certain cases.-Where in the course of any inquiry, the Claims Tribunal is satisfied that (a) there is collusion between the person making the claim and the person against whom the claim is made, or (b) the person against whom the claim is made has failed to contest the claim, it may, for reasons to be recorded in writing, direct that the insurer who may be liable in respect of such claim, shall be impleaded as a party to the proceeding and the insurer so impleaded shall thereupon have, without prejudice to the provisions contained in Sub-section (2) of Section 149, the right to contest the claim on all or any of the grounds that are available to the person against whom the claim has been made. 10. Perusal of Section 170 indicates that where in course of an enquiry the Claims Tribunal is satisfied that (a) there is a collusion between the person making a claim and the person against whom the claim has been made, or (b) the person against whom the claim has been made has failed to contest the claim, the Tribunal may, for reasons to be recorded in writing, implead the insurer and in that case it is permissible for the insurer to contest the claim also on the grounds which are available to the insured or to the person against whom the claim has been made. 11. Records of MAC Case No. 93/2004 as well as MAC Case No. 94/2004 have been received from the learned Tribunal. It is true as contended by Mrs. Modi that common orders had been passed on many occasions in respect of MAC Case No. 93/2004 as well as MAC Case No. 94/2004. The order dated 13-6-2005 in MAC Case No. 93/2004 would indicate that applications have been filed under Section 170 of the Act by the insurer. It is true as contended by Mrs. Modi that common orders had been passed on many occasions in respect of MAC Case No. 93/2004 as well as MAC Case No. 94/2004. The order dated 13-6-2005 in MAC Case No. 93/2004 would indicate that applications have been filed under Section 170 of the Act by the insurer. Order dated 29-9-2005 in the same case, though wrongly written as 29-9-2004, shows that the counsel for the opposite party, meaning thereby the Insurance Company had submitted that petitions under Section 170 of the Act may be kept pending till trial as the opposite party Nos. 1 & 2, meaning thereby the owner and driver, had filed their written statement. As has been noted earlier, the impugned award was passed on 27-10-2006. The order sheet does not reflect that any prayer was thereafter made by the Insurance Company to implead them as a party to the proceeding. It is also important to note that no other application was also filed under Section 170 of the Act to satisfy the conditions to enable the Tribunal to implead the Insurance Company as party to the proceeding. This is relevant as though the owner had not entered appearance at the time when the application under Section170 was filed, subsequently, the owner had participated and contested the proceeding. The decision rendered in Jairani (supra) cited by Mrs. Modi was in a different context inasmuch as the application filed under Section 170 of the Act was not at all considered by the learned Tribunal. 12. In the instant case, it is noticed that at the instance of the Insurance Company itself the application under Section 170 of the Act was requested to be kept pending and it does not appear from the records that prayer was made during the course of the proceeding to consider the said application. However, in the written arguments submitted by Mrs. Modi, a submission was also advanced that Insurance Company may be impleaded. In the considered opinion of the Court, even though such an argument has been advanced in the written arguments, having regard to the fact that the very ground on which the application under Section 170 of the Act was founded, was non-existent at that point of time in view of the fact that the owner had entered appearance and had contested the proceedings. If there was any apprehension of collusion between the person making the claim and the person against whom the claim is made and if the claim is not contested in the manner as it should have been contested by the owner, it was incumbent on the part of the Insurance Company to have filed an appropriate application under Section 170 of the Act. It is also noticeable that the second ground in the said application under Section 170 of the Act, viz, that the Insurance Company otherwise under the provisions of the Act has limited grounds, is not a ground to be taken note of while considering the application under Section 170 of the Act. 13. The position that emerges is that there was no permission accorded under Section 170 of the Act to enable the Insurance Company to contest the claim on all or any of the grounds that are available to the person against whom the claim has been made. The submission of Mrs. Modi in assailment of the impugned award to the effect that even after the injuries sustained by the injured, the claimant is still working in the very same post to which he was working prior to the incident and therefore, the amount of compensation ought not to have been granted for such injury sustained, needless to state, is a facet of a challenge to quantum of compensation. The other argument advanced by Mrs. Modi that the claimant has also not been able to prove the injury sustained in accordance with law and therefore, the amount of compensation granted is not justified, is also directly relatable to the quantum of compensation which the Insurance Company cannot question in absence of a permission under Section 170 of the Act. The right of appeal is not an inherent right or common law right but based on statutory right. The law provides that an appeal can be filed by the Insurance Company on limited grounds and the ground of challenge cannot be enlarged. 14. The Apex Court in Nicolletta (supra) stated thus: 26. For the aforesaid reasons, an insurer if aggrieved against an award, may file an appeal only on those grounds and no other. The law provides that an appeal can be filed by the Insurance Company on limited grounds and the ground of challenge cannot be enlarged. 14. The Apex Court in Nicolletta (supra) stated thus: 26. For the aforesaid reasons, an insurer if aggrieved against an award, may file an appeal only on those grounds and no other. However, by virtue of Section 170 of the 1988 Act, where in course of an enquiry the Claims Tribunal is satisfied that (a) there is a collusion between the person making a claim and the person against whom the claim has been made, or (b) the person against whom the claim has been made has failed to contest the claim, the Tribunal may, for reasons to be recorded in writing, implead the insurer and in that case it is permissible for the insurer to contest the claim also on the grounds which are available to the insured or to the person against whom the claim has been made. Thus, unless an order is passed by the Tribunal permitting the insurer to avail the grounds available to an insured or any other person against whom a claim has been made on being satisfied of the two conditions specified in Section 170 of the Act, it is not permissible to the insurer to contest the claim on the grounds which are available to the insured or to a person against whom a claim has been made. Thus where conditions precedent embodied in Section 170 are satisfied and award is adverse to the interest of the insurer, the insurer has a right to file an appeal challenging the quantum of compensation or negligence or contributory negligence of the offending vehicle even if the insured has not filed any appeal against the quantum of compensation. Sections 149, 170 and 173 are part of one scheme and if we give any different interpretation to Section 173 of the 1988 Act, the same would go contrary to the scheme and object of the Act. 15. Similarly, in Shankarayya (supra), the Apex Court had stated thus: 4. Sections 149, 170 and 173 are part of one scheme and if we give any different interpretation to Section 173 of the 1988 Act, the same would go contrary to the scheme and object of the Act. 15. Similarly, in Shankarayya (supra), the Apex Court had stated thus: 4. It clearly shows that the Insurance Company when impleaded as a party by the Court can be permitted to contest the proceedings on merits only if the conditions precedent mentioned in the section are found to be satisfied and for that purpose the Insurance Company has to obtain order in writing from the Tribunal and which should be a reasoned order by the Tribunal. Unless that procedure is followed, the Insurance Company cannot have a wider defence on merits than what is available to it by way of statutory defence. It is true that the claimants themselves had joined Respondent 1, Insurance Company in the claim petition but that was done with a view to thrust the statutory liability on the Insurance Company on account of the contract of the insurance. That was not an order of the Court itself permitting the Insurance Company which was impleaded to avail of a larger defence on merits on being satisfied on the aforesaid two conditions mentioned in Section 170. Consequently, it must be held that on the facts of the present case, Respondent 1, Insurance Company was not entitled to file an appeal on merits of the claim which was awarded by the Tribunal. 16. The view taken in Nicolletta (supra) was reiterated in R. Mannakatti (supra). 17. In view of the aforesaid, this Court is of the considered view that this appeal by the Insurance Company is not maintainable in law and as such the same is liable to be dismissed. 18. The records of MAC Case No. 93/2004 and MAC Case No. 94/2004 be transmitted to the learned MACT, Nagaland, Dimapur. Appeal dismissed