JUDGMENT By Court.- This application is directed against the order dated 28.9.1999, whereby application for discharge filed under Section 227 of the Cr.P.C. by the petitioner was rejected by the learned Additional District-cum-Sessions Judge, Chaibasa. 2. The fact giving rise to this case are that the deceased, namely, Keshav Das, an unskilled labour was employed by this petitioner for cutting an iron structure which had been there at some height. While he was cutting it, he fell down from that height sustaining injuries resulting into his death. On such allegation, F.I.R. was filed under Sections 287, 114, 304 of the Indian Penal Code. After investigation, charge-sheet was submitted upon which cognizance of the offence under Section 304 Part-I of the Indian Penal Code was taken. Thereupon when the case was committed to the Court of Sessions, an application was filed under Section 227 of the Indian Penal Code, praying therein to discharge the petitioner from the case as no offence whatsoever is made out under Section 304 Part-I of the Indian Penal Code as in the face of the allegation made in the F.I.R., the petitioner cannot be said to have committed an offence of culpable homicide not amounting to murder, but the application for discharge was rejected by holding that an offence under Section 304 Part-I is made out. 3. Being aggrieved with that order, this application has been filed. 4. Mr. Dey, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner submits that the petitioner cannot be said to .have committed offence under Section 304 Part-I of the Indian Penal Code by any stretch of imagination as the petitioner cannot be said to have had any intention to commit murder or had done any act with the knowledge that would cause death to the deceased and, therefore, the order, passed by the learned trial court is fit to be set aside. 5. In view of the submission and in context of the allegation made in the F.I.R. it would be proper to take notice of the provision as contained in Section 304 Part-I, which reads as follows:- "304.
5. In view of the submission and in context of the allegation made in the F.I.R. it would be proper to take notice of the provision as contained in Section 304 Part-I, which reads as follows:- "304. Punishment for culpable homicide not amounting to murder.--Whoever commits culpable homicide not amounting to murder, shall be punished with [imprisonment for life], or imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine, if the act by which the death is caused is done with the intention of causing death, or of causing such bodily injury as is likely to cause death; or with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, or with fine, or with both, if the act is done with the knowledge that it is likely to cause death, but without any intention to cause death, or to cause such bodily injury as is likely to cause death." 6. From the perusal of the provision, it does appear that one would be guilty for the offence of culpable homicide not amounting to murder if act done by which death has been caused is with the intention of causing death or of causing bodily injury as is likely to cause death. Further the act would be culpable homicide not amounting to murder, if the act is done with the knowledge that it is likely to cause, but without any intention to cause death or to cause such bodily injury as is likely to cause death. 7. Admittedly, the deceased was employed by the petitioner and was engaged for cutting iron structure which had been placed, at some height, but in absence of any material, it cannot be said that the petitioner did ask the deceased to cut the iron with the intention to cause his death by having knowledge that the deceased would certainly fall down and would die. 8. Accordingly, even if the entire allegations are taken to be true, no offence is made out under Section 304 Part-I of the Indian Penal Code. 9. Under the circumstances, the petitioner is discharged from the case. 10. Accordingly, order dated 28.9.1999, passed by the learned Additional District-cum-Sessions Judge, Chaibasa in S.T. No. 262 of 1998 is hereby, set aside. In the result, this application is allowed.