T. Nandakumar Singh, J.- Heard Mr. Ch. Ngongo, learned counsel for the petitioner, Mr. Modhuchandra, learned GA for respondent Nos. 1,2 and 3 as well as Mr. C. Kamal, learned CGSC for respondent I No.4. 2. The challenge in the present Habeas! Corpus petition is to the detention order being No.Cril/NSA/No.73 of 2011 dated 01.06.2011 passed by the District Magistrate Imphal West (Detaining Authority) in exer­cise of power conferred under sub-section (3) of Section 3 of the National Security Act, I 1980 (for short 'NSA') read with Home Department's order No. 17(1)/49/80-H (Pt-1) dated 09.05.2011, the order of the State Government being No.17(1)116/2011-H dated 08.06.2011 for approving the impugned detention order dated 01.06.2011 and also ; subsequent order of the State Government dated 18.07.2011 for confirming the im­pugned detention order and fixing period of detention for 12 (twelve) months from the date of detention. 3. The petitioner-detenu was arrested by a team of CDO/Imphal West on 23.05.2011 in connection with FIR No.206(5)2011 SJM PS under Section 20 UA(P) A Act and 25 (1-B) A Act and remanded to Police Cus­tody till 01.06.2011 by the concerned Judi­cial Magistrate. While he (detenu) was in Police Custody in connection with the said FIR, copy of the impugned detention order dated 01.06.2011 was furnished to the peti­tioner-detenu alleging that the petitioner was/is acting in a manner prejudicial to the secu­rity of the State and maintenance of public order and the detenu is necessary to be de­tained with a view to prevent him from acting in a manner prejudicial to the security of the State and maintenance of public order w.e.f. 01.06.2011. 4. The main ground for assailing the im­pugned detention order is that in the impugned detention order nothing is indicated as to the subjective satisfaction of the Detaining Au­thority that the petitioner is likely to be re­leased on bail in near future and as a result, the impugned detention order is vitiated. A quick glance of the impugned detention or­der is required to be made. A quick glance of the impugned detention or­der is required to be made. Accordingly, it would be profitable to quote the impugned detention order dated 01.06.2011, which read as follows: "IN THE COURT OF THE DISTRICT MAGISTRATE IMPHAL WEST DISTRICT, MANIPUR ORDER Imphal,thelstJune,2011 No.Cril/NSA/No.73 oF2011: Whereas, a po­lice report has been laid before me that Shri Yumnam Rajen Singh @ Chandra @ Korou (41 yrs) s/o Y.Komol Singh of Langmeidong Mamang Leikai, P.S. - Waikhong, District -Thoubal, Manipur is acting in a manner preju­dicial to the security of the State and mainte­nance of public order; Whereas, I, K.Radhakumar Singh, District Magistrate, Imphal West, Manipur am satisfied that his activities are prejudicial to the security of the State and maintenance of public order under Section 3(2) of National Security Act, 1980; Whereas, it is considered necessary to de­tain Shri Yumnam Rajen Singh @ Chandra @ Korou (41 yrs) s/o Y.Komol Singh of Langmei­dong Mamang Leikai, P.S. - Waikhong, District - Thoubal, Manipur with a view to prevent him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the se­curity of the State and maintenance of public order; And whereas, I am satisfied from police re­port that Shri Yumnam Rajen Singh @ Chandra @ Korou (41 yrs) s/o Y.Komol Singh of Langmeidong Mamang Leikai, P.S. -Waikhong, District - Thoubal, Manipur who is now in Po­lice custody, is likely to continue to act in the manner prejudicial to the security of the State and maintenance of public order, and also that an alternative preventive measure is called for. Now, therefore, I, K. Radhakumar Singh, Dis­trict Magistrate, Imphal West, Manipur in exer­cise of the powers conferred under sub-section 3 of Section 3 of the National Security Act, 1980 read with Home Department's Order No. 17( 1)/49/80-H(Pt) dated 09.05.2011 make this order di­recting that the above said person who is now in Police custody be detained under Section 3(2) of National Security Act, 1980 until further orders. Given under my Hand and Seal of the Court on this first day of June, 2011. Sd/- (K.Radhakumar Singh) District Magistrate, Imphal West." 5. Given under my Hand and Seal of the Court on this first day of June, 2011. Sd/- (K.Radhakumar Singh) District Magistrate, Imphal West." 5. In pursuance of Section 8 of the NSA, the Detaining Authority (District Magistrate, Imphal West) furnished grounds of detention and copies of documents which formed basis of the grounds of detention to the petitioner-detenu under his letter dated 04.06.2011 (An-nexure-A/2 to the writ petition), hi para-1 of the grounds of detention it is stated that the detenu was once arrested by a column of 7 A.R. from Langmeidong Mamang Leikai and produced before the Court on 12.02.2002 in connection with FIRNo.4(2)2002 WKG-PS under Section 10/13 UA(P) Act for judi­cial remand but the detenu was released on bail by the court on the same day. Relying on para-1 of the grounds of detention it is the submission of Mr. Modhuchandra, learned GA appearing for respondent Nos. 1 and 2 that there is material for coming to the subjective satisfaction of the Detaining Authority that the petitioner is likely to be released on bail in connection with new case i.e. FIR No.206 (5) 2011 SJM, PS under Section 20 UA(P) A Act & 25 (1-B) A Act, as the petitioner-detenu had already been released by the Court in connection with the earlier case on the very day of producing the petitioner-detenu be­fore the Court; and this submission of Mr. Modhuchandra, learned G A will be con­sidered at the appropriate place of the judg­ment 6. The detention order dated 01.06.2011 had already been approved by the State Gov­ernment vide impugned approval order dated 08.06.2011 and confirmed by the impugned confirmation order of Government of Manipur dated 18.07.2011. After receiving copies of the impugned detention order dated 01.06.2011 and grounds of detention, the petitioner-detenu filed representations dated 10.06.2010 to the Additional Superintendent of Central Jail, Sajiwa, Manipur to (1) The Secretary to the Government of India, Min­istry of Home Affairs, (Department of Inter­nal Security), North Block, New Delhi-110001, (2) The Chief Secretary, Govern­ment of Manipur and (3) The District Magis­trate, Imphal West District, Manipur, Gov­ernment of Manipur. The said representations filed by the petitioner-detenu had already been rejected by the concerned authorities. 7. As stated above, in the impugned de­tention order which has been quoted in toto there is no indication of subjective satisfac­tion of the Detaining Authority that the peti­tioner-detenu is likely to be released on bail. The said representations filed by the petitioner-detenu had already been rejected by the concerned authorities. 7. As stated above, in the impugned de­tention order which has been quoted in toto there is no indication of subjective satisfac­tion of the Detaining Authority that the peti­tioner-detenu is likely to be released on bail. It is now fairly well settled that in the case of a person in custody, detention order can be validly passed. However, for passing valid detention order for detaining a detenu already in custody, the essential requirements are that (1) if the authority passing the order is aware of the fact that he is actually in custody; (2) if he has reason to believe on the basis of reli­able material placed before him (a) that there is a real possibility of his being released on bail, and (b) that on being so released he would in all probability indulge in prejudicial activity and (3) if it is felt essential to detain him to prevent him from so doing. If the au­thority passes an order after recording his satisfaction in this behalf, such an order can­not be struck down on the ground that the proper course for the authority was to op­pose the bail and if bail is granted notwith­standing such opposition to question it be-fore a higher Court. 8. The Apex Court in Kamarunissa Vs. Union of India & Anr: AIR 1991 SC1640 in clear terms held that if the authority passed an order after recording his satisfaction that the detenu is likely to be released on bail, such an order cannot be struck down on the ground that proper course for the authority was to oppose the bail and if bail is granted notwith­standing such opposition, to question it be­fore a higher Court. Para 13 of the AIR in Kamarunissa's case (supra) read as follows: "13. Para 13 of the AIR in Kamarunissa's case (supra) read as follows: "13. From the catena of decisions referred to above it seems clear to us that even in the case of a person in custody a detention order can validly be passed (1) if the authority pass­ing the order is aware of the fact that he is actu­ally in custody; (2) if he has reason to believe on the basis of reliable material placed before him (a) that there is a real possibility of his be­ing released on bail, and (b) that on being so released he would in all probability indulge in prejudicial activity and (3) if it is felt essential to detain him to prevent him from so doing. If the ] authority passes an order after recording his satisfaction in this behalf, such an order can­not be struck down on the ground that the proper course for the authority was to oppose the bail and if bail is granted notwithstanding such opposition to question it before a higher Court. What this court stated in the case of Ramesh Yadav, ( AIR 1986 SC 315 ) (supra) was that ordinarily a detention order should not be I passed merely to pre-empt or circumvent en­largement on bail in cases which are essentially criminal in nature and can be dealt with under the ordinary law. It seems to us well settled that even in a case where a person is in custody, if I the facts and circumstances of the case so de­mand, resort can be had to the law of preventive detention. This seems to be quite clear from the case law discussed above and there is no need to refer to the High Court decisions to which our attention was drawn since they do not hold otherwise. We, therefore, find it diffi­cult to accept the contention of the counsel for the petitioners that there was no valid and com­pelling reason for passing the impugned orders of detention because the detenus were in cus­tody." 9. Now the question to be decided in the given case is that in the absence of indication of subjective satisfaction of the Detaining Au­thority in the. Now the question to be decided in the given case is that in the absence of indication of subjective satisfaction of the Detaining Au­thority in the. impugned detention order that the detenu is likely to be released on bail, can the court still look into the other materials i.e. grounds of detention for deciding as to whether there is material for coming to the subjective satisfaction of the Detaining Au­thority that the petitioner-detenu is likely to be released on bail. According to Mr. Ngongo, learned counsel for the petitioner, the court cannot look into the grounds of detention in the absence of indication of subjective satis­faction of the Detaining Authority in the im­pugned detention order that the petitioner-detenu is likely to be released on bail, hi other words, when there is no indication of subjec­tive satisfaction of the Detaining Authority in the impugned detention order that the peti­tioner detenu is likely to be released on bail, it is not required to see whether there are materials for coming to the conclusion that the petitioner-detenu is likely to be released on bail. We are of considered view that the sub­mission of Mr.Ngongo, learned counsel for the petitioner has force of law inasmuch as in complete absence of subjective satisfaction of the Detaining Authority in the impugned detention order that the petitioner-detenu is likely to be released on bail, the impugned detention order is vitiated. 10. Mr.Modhuchandra, learned GA ap­pearing for the respondents by drawing at­tention to the decision of this Court (inciden­tally one of us is party) in Loitongbam Manimohon Singh Vs State ofManipur & Ors : 2011 (3) GIT 819 strenuously con­tended that there is material/indication in para 1 of the grounds of detention that the peti­tioner is likely to be released on bail inasmuch as the petitioner, who had been arrested ear­lier in a case similar with the present FIR for which the detenu is arrested, had already been released on bail by the concerned Magistrate on the very day of producing him before the Court. We have also given our anxious con­siderations to the earlier decision of this Court in Loitongbam Manimohon's case (supra) and the impugned detention order of that case which clearly indicated that in similar cases bail had already been granted by the normal criminal courts, and therefore, it is clear that the fact of the present case is different from that of the Loitongbam Manimohon's case (supra). 11. In Ambica Quarry Works Vs. State of Gujarat: (1987) 1 SCC 213 (vide SCC p.221, para 18) Apex Court observed: "18....... The ratio of any decision must be understood in the background of the facts of that case. It has been said long time ago that a case is only an authority for what it actually decides, and not what logically follows from it" In Bhavnagar University Vs Palitana Sugar Mill (P) Ltd: (2003) 2 SCC 111 (vide SCC p. 130, para 59) Apex Court observed: "59.......It is also well settled that a little difference in facts or additional facts may make a lot of difference in the precedential value of a decision." 12. As held in Bharat Petroleum Corpo­ration Ltd. Vs. N.R. Vairamani: (2004) 8 SCC 5 79, a decision cannot be relied on with­out disclosing the factual situation. In the same judgment, the Apex Court also observed: (SCC pp 584-85, paras 9-12). "9. Courts should not place reliance on de­cisions without discussing as to how the factual situation fits in with the fact situation of the decision on which reliance is placed. Ob­servations of Courts are neither to be read as Euclid's theorems nor as provisions of a stat­ute and that too taken out of their context. These observations must be read in the context in which they appear to have been stated. Judg­ments of Courts are not to be construed as stat­utes. To interpret words, phrases and provisions of a statute, it may become necessary for judges to embark into lengthy discussions but the dis­cussion is meant to explain and not to define. Judges interpret statutes, they do not interpret judgments. They interpret words of statutes, their words are not to be interpreted as stat­utes. In London Graving Dock Co Ltd Vs Horton (AC at p.761) 19651 AC 737 Lord Mac Dermott observed (All ER p. 14-C-D). Judges interpret statutes, they do not interpret judgments. They interpret words of statutes, their words are not to be interpreted as stat­utes. In London Graving Dock Co Ltd Vs Horton (AC at p.761) 19651 AC 737 Lord Mac Dermott observed (All ER p. 14-C-D). "The matter cannot, of course be settled merely by treating the Ipsissima verba of Willes, as though they were part of an Act of parliament and applying the rules of in­terpretation appropriate thereto. This is not to detract from the great weight to be given to the language actually used by that most distinguished judge......." 10. In Home Office V Dorset yacht Co Ltd (1970) 2 ALLER294 (HL) All ERp.297 g-h) Lord Reid said, 'Lord Atkin's speech .... Is not to be treated as if it were a statutory definition. It will require qualification in new circumstances,' Megarry, in Shepherd homes Ltd Vs Sandham (No.2), (1971) 2 All ER 1267 observed: (All ER p.127d). "One must not, of course, construe even a reserved judgment of even Russel, L.J. as if it were an Act of Parliament" And, in Herrington Vs British Railways Board Lord Morris (1972) 1 All ER 749 (HL(E)) said: (All ERp.761 c) "There is always peril in treating the words of a speech or a judgment as though they were words in a legislative enactment, and it is to be remembered that judicial ut­terances are made in the setting of the facts of a particular case". 11. Circumstantial flexibility, one additional or different fact may make a world of difference between conclusions in two cases. Disposal of cases by blindly placing reliance on a decision is not proper. 12. The following words of Lord Denning in the matter of applying precedents have become locus classicus: "Each case depends on its own facts and a close similarity between one case and another is not enough because even a single significant denial may alter the entire aspect, in deciding such cases, one should avoid the temptation to decide cases as said by Cardozo) by matching the colour of one case against the colour of another. To decide therefore, on which side the line a case falls, the broad resemblance to another case is not at all decisive. To decide therefore, on which side the line a case falls, the broad resemblance to another case is not at all decisive. Precedent should be followed only so far as it marks the path of justice, but you must cut the dead wood and trim off the side branches else you will find yourself lost in thickets and branches. My plea is to keep the path of justice clear of obstructions which could impede it" (emphasis supplied. 13. The ratio laid down by the Apex Court in Kamarunissa's case (supra) had been fol­lowed by the Apex Court in the subsequent cases i.e. Union of India Vs. Paul Manic-kam & Anr: AIR 2003 SC 4622 . The Apex Court in Paul Manickam's case (supra) held that where the detention order in respect of a person already in custody does not indicate that the detenu was likely to be released on bail, the order would be vitiated. Relevant part of Para 12 of the AIR in Paul Manickam's case (supra) read as follows: "12. So far as this question relating to pro­cedure to be adopted in case the detenue is already in custody is concerned, the matter has been dealt with in several cases. Where deten­tion orders are passed in relation to persons who are already in Jail under some other laws, the detaining authorities should apply their mind and show their awareness in this regard in the grounds of detention, the chances of re­lease of such persons on bail. The necessity of keeping such persons in detention under the preventive detention laws has to be clearly in­dicated. Subsisting custody the detenue by it­self does not invalidate an order of his preven­tive detention, and decision in this regard must depend on the facts of the particular case. Pre­ventive detention being necessary to prevent the detenue from acting in any manner prejudi­cial to the security of the State or to the mainte­nance of public order or economic stability etc ordinarily, it is not needed when detenue is al­ready in custody. The detaining authority must show its awareness to the fact of subsisting custody of the detenue and take that factor into account while making the order. The detaining authority must show its awareness to the fact of subsisting custody of the detenue and take that factor into account while making the order. If the detaining authority is reasonably satisfied on cogent ma­terials that there is likelihood of his release and in view of his antecedent activities which are proximate in point of time, he must be detained in order to prevent him from indulging such, prejudicial activities the detention order can be validly made. Where the detention order in re­spect of a person already in custody does not indicate that the detenue was likely to be re­leased on bail, the order would be vitiated. (See N. Meera Rani v Govt of Tamil Nadu, ( AIR 1989 SC 2027 ): Dharmendra Suganchand v Union India, AIR 1990 SC 1196 ). The point was gone into detail in Kamarunnissa v Union of India ( AIR 1991 SC 1640 ). The principles were set out as follows. Even in the case of a person in cus­tody, a detention order can be validly passed, (1) If the authority passing the order is aware of the fact that he is actually in custody; (2) if he has reason to believe on the basis of reliable material placed before him: (a) that there is a real possibility of his release on bail and (b) that on being released, he would in all probabil­ity indulge in prejudicial activities, and (3) if it is felt essential to detain him to prevent him from so doing. If an order is passed after recording satisfaction in that regard, the order would be valid. In the case at hand the order of detention and grounds of detention show awareness of custody and/or possibility of release on bail." 14. Keeping in view of the ratio laid down by the Apex Court in (1) Kamarunissa's case (supra), (2) Paul Manickam's case (supra) and decision of this Court in Loitongbam Manimohon's case (supra) we have carefully applied our minds in the given case to decide as to whether the impugned detention order dated 01.06.2011, which does not mention anything about the subjective satisfaction of the Detaining Authority that the petitioner-detenu is likely to be released on bail is viti­ated or not for non mentioning of subjective satisfaction in this regard in the impugned de­tention order. We may here recall the deci­sion of the Apex Court in Pebem Ningol Mikoi Devi Vs. State of Manipur & Ors. : (2010) 9 SCC 618 wherein the Apex Court held that the grounds of detention are suffi­cient or not to order detention, is not within the ambit of the discretion of the court but is a matter of subjective satisfaction of the au­thority which is implied. But here in the present case there is no subjective satisfaction of the Detaining Authority in the impugned deten­tion order that the petitioner is likely to be released on bail. Since there is no subjective satisfaction of the Detaining Authority in the impugned detention order that the petitioner-detenu is likely to be released on bail, the impugned detention order itself is vitiated. 15. For the foregoing reasons, we have no alternative except to interfere with the im­pugned detention order dated 01.06.2011, approval order dated 08.06.2011 and con­firmation order dated 18.07.2011 and ac­cordingly the impugned detention order dated 01.06.2011, approval order dated 08.06.2011 and confirmation order dated 18.07.2011 set aside. The petitioner-detenu namely, Shri Yumnam Rajen Singh @ Chandra @ Korou, s/o Y.Komol Singh of Langmeidong Mamang Leikai P.S. Waikhong, District Thoubal, Manipur be set at liberty forthwith, if he is not wanted in connection with any other case. The writ petition is allowed.