JUDGMENT The Hon'ble Mr. Justice A.K. Goswami 1. This appeal is preferred under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, for short, the Act, by the insurer against the award dated 16-5-2007 passed by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Nagaland, Dimapur in MAC Case No.175/2005 directing the appellant insurer to pay to the claimant an amount of Rs. 2,23,550/- including the interim award of Rs. 25,000/-, which is already paid, within a period of 30 (thirty) days from the date of order, failing which interest @ 9% per annum is to accrue. 2. The claimant had filed an application under Sections 140 and 166 of the Act stating that while she was travelling on 29-4-2005 in an auto rickshaw bearing registration No. NL-07/F-0627, the vehicle turned turtle while negotiating a curve and as a result of the said accident, she had sustained grievous injuries on her head, chest and in other parts of her body. 3. Mr. P.B. Paul, learned counsel appearing for the claimant/respondent No.1 submits that the application filed by the Insurance Company under Section 170 of the Act was rejected by the learned Tribunal and therefore, in absence of permission granted under Section 170 of the Act permitting the Insurance Company the right to contest the claim on all or any of the grounds that are available to the person against whom the claim has been made and admittedly, the grounds taken in this appeal being not grounds available to the insurer to contest the claim under Section149(2)(a) and (b), this appeal is not maintainable. 4. In response to the aforesaid submission of Mr. Paul, Mrs. A. Modi, learned counsel for the appellant submits that the application filed by the Insurance Company under Section 170 of the Act was rejected by the learned Tribunal on 27-4-2007 and without granting any opportunity to the Insurance Company to assail such an order of rejection before any higher forum, the award was passed within a period of 18 days thereafter, on 16-5-2007. The learned counsel submits that in this present appeal, the Insurance Company has also prayed for quashing of the order dated 27-4-2007, apart from the award dated 17-5-2007 and therefore, this Court should also consider the legality and validity of the order dated 27-4-2007. 5. Mr. Paul responds to the aforesaid submission of Mrs. The learned counsel submits that in this present appeal, the Insurance Company has also prayed for quashing of the order dated 27-4-2007, apart from the award dated 17-5-2007 and therefore, this Court should also consider the legality and validity of the order dated 27-4-2007. 5. Mr. Paul responds to the aforesaid submission of Mrs. A. Modi by submitting that the Insurance Company cannot assail rejection of the application under Section 170 of the Act in an appeal under Section 173 of the Act and in absence of any independent challenge to the order dated 27-4-2007 rejecting the application under section 170 of the Act by the Tribunal, it is not open for this Court to examine the validity of the said order. He has also submitted that the appeal was filed on 7-8-2007 and therefore, the appeal is time barred so far as the order dated 27-4-2007 is concerned, assuming that the appeal is also with regard to the order dated 27-4-2007. There is no application for condonation of delay and on that count also, merit of the order dated 27-4-2007 cannot be gone into, he contends. 6. At this stage, it will be necessary to consider and appreciate the provision contained in Section170 of the Act and therefore, the same is quoted herein below : 170. Impleading insurer in certain cases.-Where in the course of any inquiry, the Claims Tribunal is satisfied that (a) there is collusion between the person making the claim and the person against whom the claim is made, or (b) the person against whom the claim is made has failed to contest the claim, it may, for reasons to be recorded in writing, direct that the insurer who may be liable in respect of such claim, shall be impleaded as a party to the proceeding and the insurer so impleaded shall thereupon have, without prejudice to the provisions contained in sub-section (2) of section149, the right to contest the claim on all or any of the grounds that are available to the person against whom the claim has been made. 7. 7. Perusal of Section 170 indicates that where in course of an enquiry the Claims Tribunal is satisfied that (a) there is a collusion between the person making a claim and the person against whom the claim has been made, or (b) the person against whom the claim has been made has failed to contest the claim, the Tribunal may, for reasons to be recorded in writing, implead the insurer and in that case it is permissible for the insurer to contest the claim also on the grounds which are available to the insured or to the person against whom the claim has been made. 8. It is noticed that deposition of PW 1 was completed on 10-8-2006. The application filed by the insurer under Section 170 of the Act was not dated. In the body of the application, there is an endorsement of the learned Tribunal dated 27-3-2007 and the order dated 27-3-2007 of the learned Tribunal reflects that 11-4-2007 was fixed for consideration of the said application. On 11-4-2007, while the owner and the claimant were present, the insurer was absent. The learned Tribunal, thereafter, passed the order on 27-4-2007 rejecting the application. 9. It has already been noticed that the present appeal is an appeal under Section 173 of the Act and the appeal presented, as would be clearly evident from the cause title, challenges the final Judgment and Award dated 16-5-2007. In an appeal under Section 173 of the Act, this Court is required to examine the legality and the validity of the award passed and this Court cannot scrutinize the legitimacy of an order passed rejecting an application under Section 170 of the Act. The contention advanced in the memorandum of appeal under Section 173 of the Act that the learned Tribunal committed illegality in rejecting the application filed by the insurer under Section170 of the Act and consequently, prayer made for setting aside of such an order, will not, in the considered opinion of the Court, mean that a challenge has been made to such an order as well in the appeal. It was always open for the Insurance Company to have independently assailed the order of rejection in accordance with law. It was always open for the Insurance Company to have independently assailed the order of rejection in accordance with law. Because of the view that has been taken by this Court that this is not an appeal, also against the order dated 27-4-2007, it is not considered necessary to go into the point of limitation as urged by Mr. P.B. Paul. 10. It will also be relevant to consider the provisions of Section 14(2) of the Act. 149(2) No sum shall be payable by an insurer under sub-section (1) in respect of any judgment or award unless, before the commencement of the proceedings in which the judgment or award is given the insurer had notice through the Court or, as the case may be, the Claims Tribunal of the bringing of the proceedings, or in respect of such judgment or award so long as execution is stayed thereon pending an appeal; and an insurer to whom notice of the bringing of any such proceedings is so given shall be entitled to be made a party thereto and to defend the action on any of the following grounds, namely : (a) that there has been a breach of a specified condition of the policy, being one of the following conditions, namely : (i) a condition excluding the use of the vehicle (a) for hire or reward, where the vehicle is on the date of the contract of insurance a vehicle not covered by a permit to ply for hire or reward, or (b) for organized racing and speed testing, or (c) for a purpose not allowed by the permit under which the vehicle is used, where the vehicle is a transport vehicle, or (d) without side-car being attached where the vehicle is a motor cycle; or (ii) a condition excluding driving by a named person or persons or by any person who is not duly licensed, or by any person who has been disqualified for holding or obtaining a driving license during the period of disqualification; or (iii) a condition excluding liability for injury caused or contributed to by conditions of war, civil war, riot or civil commotion; or (b) that the policy is void on the ground that it was obtained by the non-disclosure of a material fact or by a representation of fact which was false in some material particular. 11. 11. On perusal of Section 149(2), it is clear that under the law the insurer is entitled to contest the claim only on the grounds mentioned in Section 149(2) of the Act. In other words, challenge of an insurer must be confined to the statutory defences which are available to the Insurance Company under Section 149(2) of the Act. 12. The submission of Mrs. A. Modi in assailment of the impugned award is that the learned Tribunal without any acceptable materials on record came to a finding that the claimant had lost 60% of hearing capacity due to the injury caused and had also erroneously taken her monthly income to be Rs. 2000/-. It was also projected by her that the learned Tribunal had saddled liability on the owner as well as on the Insurance Company though no case was made out that the accident occurred due to negligence. These are not grounds available to the insurer to contest the claim under Section 149(2)(a) & (b). 13. The Apex Court in Shankarayya and Anr. v. United India Insurance Company Ltd. and Anr. reported in (1998) 3 SCC 140 , had stated thus : 4. It clearly shows that the Insurance Company when impleaded as a party by the Court can be permitted to contest the proceedings on merits only if the conditions precedent mentioned in the section are found to be satisfied and for that purpose the Insurance Company has to obtain order in writing from the Tribunal and which should be a reasoned order by the Tribunal. Unless that procedure is followed, the Insurance Company cannot have a wider defence on merits than what is available to it by way of statutory defence. It is true that the claimants themselves had joined Respondent 1, Insurance Company in the claim petition but that was done with a view to thrust the statutory liability on the Insurance Company on account of the contract of the insurance. That was not an order of the Court itself permitting the Insurance Company which was impleaded to avail of a larger defence on merits on being satisfied on the aforesaid two conditions mentioned in Section 170. Consequently, it must be held that on the facts of the present case, Respondent 1, Insurance Company was not entitled to file an appeal on merits of the claim which was awarded by the Tribunal. 14. Consequently, it must be held that on the facts of the present case, Respondent 1, Insurance Company was not entitled to file an appeal on merits of the claim which was awarded by the Tribunal. 14. In National Insurance Company Ltd. Chandigarh v. Nicolletta Rohtagi and Ors. reported in (2002) 7 SCC 456 , the Apex Court laid down as follows : 26. For the aforesaid reasons, an insurer if aggrieved against an award, may file an appeal only on those grounds and no other. However, by virtue of Section 170 of the 1988 Act, where in course of an enquiry the Claims Tribunal is satisfied that (a) there is a collusion between the person making a claim and the person against whom the claim has been made, or (b) the person against whom the claim has been made has failed to contest the claim, the Tribunal may, for reasons to be recorded in writing, implead the insurer and in that case it is permissible for the insurer to contest the claim also on the grounds which are available to the insured or to the person against whom the claim has been made. Thus, unless an order is passed by the Tribunal permitting the insurer to avail the grounds available to an insured or any other person against whom a claim has been made on being satisfied of the two conditions specified in Section 170 of the Act, it is not permissible to the insurer to contest the claim on the grounds which are available to the insured or to a person against whom a claim has been made. Thus where conditions precedent embodied in Section 170 are satisfied and award is adverse to the interest of the insurer, the insurer has a right to file an appeal challenging the quantum of compensation or negligence or contributory negligence of the offending vehicle even if the insured has not filed any appeal against the quantum of compensation. Sections 149, 170 and 173 are part of one scheme and if we give any different interpretation to Section 173 of the 1988 Act, the same would go contrary to the scheme and object of the Act. 15. In view of the aforesaid, this Court is of the opinion that this appeal by the Insurance Company is not maintainable in law and as such, the same is dismissed. 16. 15. In view of the aforesaid, this Court is of the opinion that this appeal by the Insurance Company is not maintainable in law and as such, the same is dismissed. 16. The records of MAC Case No.175/2005 be transmitted to the learned Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Nagaland, Dimapur. Appeal dismissed