JUDGMENT : K.M. Thaker, J. Heard Mr. Hathi, learned AGP for the petitioner and Mr.Adeshra, learned advocate for the respondent. Rule. Mr. Adeshra, learned advocate has waived service of notice of Rule on behalf of the respondent No.1. At the request of the respondent and with consent of learned AGP the petition is taken up for hearing and decision today. 2. The petitioner has brought under challenge award dated 15.10.2010 passed by the labour Court, Bhavnagar in Reference (LCB) No.246 of 2001 whereby the labour Court has directed present petitioner to reinstate the respondent herein with 20% backwages and continuity of service. The petitioner is aggrieved by the said award. Hence present petition. 3. So far as the factual background is concerned, it comes out from the record that the petitioner was engaged as class-IV employee with the respondent and he alleged that his service was terminated with effect from 1.11.1986. Aggrieved by the said action of the petitioner the respondent raised industrial dispute. The petitioner resisted the reference proceedings by filing written statement. One of the major objections against the reference proceedings which was raised by the present petitioner before the labour Court was that the dispute and consequently the reference was unsustainable and bad in law because it was raised and referred after inordinate delay of almost 15 years inasmuch as the respondent alleged that his service was terminated in November 1986 whereas the industrial dispute was raised in 2001 and was referred for adjudication vide order passed in April 2001. Another objection raised in present proceedings is that besides the order directing reinstatement the direction to pay backwages @ 20% for the entire period is unsustainable and is arbitrary inasmuch as the direction has been passed without taking in to consideration the delay caused in raising industrial dispute and the subsequent delay caused by the respondent in filing his statement of claim before the labour Court, after order of reference was made. 4. The petitioner has also assailed the award on the ground that the labour Court erred in concluding that the respondent had completed work for 240 days during his tenure. The petitioner herein had resisted the reference proceedings also on the ground that the respondent had not worked for 240 days in any year and that therefore it was not entitled to claim any relief against the petitioner. The petitioner herein had resisted the reference proceedings also on the ground that the respondent had not worked for 240 days in any year and that therefore it was not entitled to claim any relief against the petitioner. The labour Court considered the said objection and also examined the evidence available on record and passed order directing present petitioner to reinstate the respondent. 5. So far as factual background is concerned, the respondent had claimed before the labour Court that his service was illegally terminated in breach of the provisions contained under Section 25(F) (G) of the Act. He also claimed that during tenure of his service he had completed work for 240 days in each year and that therefore his service could not have been terminated without following procedure prescribed under Section 25 (F) of the Act. However before terminating his service neither any disciplinary action was taken nor any compensation was paid and the prescribed procedure under the Act was also not followed and on such ground the respondent herein challenged the action of his termination. 5.1 The petitioner resisted the reference proceeding by filing its reply. In its reply the petitioner herein claimed that the respondent was being engaged only on need basis and his engagement with the petitioner was purely temporary and on ad-hoc and need basis. It was also claimed by the petitioner before the labour Court that the respondent had not worked for 240 days and had not put 5 years service and continuous service as defined under Section 25B of the Act. It was also claimed that since the respondent was engaged on daily wage basis and on need basis, any question of applicability of Section 25F of the Act and/or for payment of compensation did not arise. The petitioner also claimed that the irrigation department or irrigation activity would not fall within the purview of definition of term "industry" under the provisions of Section 2(J) of the Act and that therefore the reference was not competent. Besides the said contentions the petitioner resisted the reference on the ground that the reference was not competent and the respondent was not entitled for any relief because he raised the dispute belatedly i.e. after inordinate delay of almost 15 years inasmuch as his service was allegedly terminated in November 1986 where as he raised industrial dispute in 2001. Besides the said contentions the petitioner resisted the reference on the ground that the reference was not competent and the respondent was not entitled for any relief because he raised the dispute belatedly i.e. after inordinate delay of almost 15 years inasmuch as his service was allegedly terminated in November 1986 where as he raised industrial dispute in 2001. The relief prayed for by the petitioner was also resisted on the ground of delay caused in filing the statement of claim by the respondent inasmuch as though, the order of reference was made ignoring the delay of 15 years, even after such delay when the reference was made, the respondent again neglected proceedings and for almost 9 years he did not file statement of claim which came to be filed in February 2010. On the said ground the petitioner not only opposed the reference and its legality and maintainability but also opposed the relief prayed for by the respondent and claim that in view of the delay caused by the respondent he was not entitled for any relief and his demand was not justified. The petitioner also claimed that at the time when the respondent was engaged he had given a written undertaking that he was informed that his service would come to an end at any time when the work may not be available and he may be engaged only on availability of work and that therefore also the respondent was not justified in raising the dispute at such belated stage. 6. Mr. Hathi, learned AGP reiterated the contentions raised before the labour Court and further submitted that the award passed by the labour Court is unsustainable and arbitrary inasmuch as the labour Court has neither taken into account delay caused in raising the industrial dispute nor has taken into account the delay caused in filing the statement of claim and has also not considered the documentary evidence available on record which demonstrated that the respondent had not worked for 240 days in any year during tenure of his employment with the petitioner. 7. Mr. 7. Mr. Adeshra, learned advocate for the respondent while countering the submission of the learned AGP relied on the observation and conclusion recorded by the labour Court wherein it is recorded by the labour Court that the respondent deposed before the Court that he had worked for 240 days with the petitioner and that before terminating his service prescribed procedure under Section 25 (F) and 25 (G) was not followed. The claimed that having come to the conclusion that the service of the respondent was terminated by the petitioner without following prescribed procedure by law and not by way of disciplinary action, labour Court concluded that the respondent deserved to be reinstated. As regards the backwages, labour Court has awarded 20% backwages in light of the evidence of the respondent that he was not gain fully employed and he and his family survived with aid and alms being extended by the residents of the village. 8. I have heard learned AGP for the petitioner and learned advocate for the respondent and also perused the record. It is not in dispute that the respondent raised industrial dispute after delay of about 14-15 years inasmuch as he alleged that his service was terminated in November 1986 whereas he raised dispute in 2001. 9. Likewise there is also no dispute as regards the fact that though order of reference was passed by the appropriate Government in April 2001, the respondent filed his statement of claim in February 2010 i.e. after delay of about 9 years. Under the circumstances the entire fault so far as the delay from 1986 to 2001 is concerned, it is only the respondent who can be blamed and who must shoulder the burden of consequences for the delay for the said period. 10. Learned AGP for the petitioner has vehemently contended that the delay caused in initiating reference proceedings is itself sufficient evidence to assume that the respondent had abandoned the employment on its own volition and that he was not at all interested in working with the petitioner but he instituted reference proceedings after delay of 15 years with a view to extracting amount from the petitioner and that therefore labour Court ought not have entertained the reference proceedings after such inordinate delay. 11. 11. As mentioned hereinabove the labour Court has directed the petitioner to reinstate the respondent with continuity of service and to pay 20% of the backwages. The said direction is passed by the labour Court in view of the conclusion reached by the Court on the basis of the material available on record that the respondent workman had worked for 264 days in 1985-86 i.e. 12 month preceding the date of his termination and for 317 days in 1984-85, 234 days in 1983-84 and 263 days in 1982-83. The labour Court has come to the conclusion that though in preceding 12 months and also during other previous years the respondent workman had worked for 240 days while terminating his service, the petitioner had not followed procedure prescribed under Section 25 (F) and had not paid any compensation and the service was not terminated by way of any disciplinary action after conducting departmental proceedings. The labour Court, therefore, held that the action of the petitioner amounted to breach and violation of provisions contained under Section 25(F) of the Act. 12. Learned AGP has not been able to successfully assail the said conclusion / findings. He could not dispute that the muster roll and other documents available on record established that the respondent workman had worked for 240 days in the preceding 12 months and during most of the previous years as well and despite the said fact - situation the respondent has not paid any compensation before termination of his service. The petitioner also could not establish that the respondent's service was terminated by way of disciplinary proceedings. Under the circumstances, it is not possible to find fault with the conclusion reached by the labour Court as regards the breach of Section 25(F) of the Act. The question, therefore arises as to whether the direction for reinstatement and payment of backwages is justified or not. Since the learned AGP heavily relied on the ground of delay, it appears appropriate to consider the said contention first. 13. It is not in dispute that the respondent herein raised dispute after inordinate delay i.e. of almost 14-15 years delay. The learned Counsel for the respondent has not disputed the said fact situation. Since the learned AGP heavily relied on the ground of delay, it appears appropriate to consider the said contention first. 13. It is not in dispute that the respondent herein raised dispute after inordinate delay i.e. of almost 14-15 years delay. The learned Counsel for the respondent has not disputed the said fact situation. 13.1 Likewise, it is not in dispute that even after raising dispute, the respondent did not file his statement of claim for long time and he filed statement of claim after almost 9 years. The aforesaid fact situation is also not disputed by the learned Counsel for the respondent workman. 13.2 However, as held by the Apex Court mere delay in raising the dispute, would not justify outright and complete rejection of entire claim of the workman or of the reference only on the ground of delay. The delay may disentitle the workman from various relief, particularly the backwages for the period of delay, and labour Court may be required to mould the relief considering the length of delay, the fact of the case and other circumstances and workman's explanation however rejection of the reference or rejection of the claim in totality merely on the ground of delay in raising the dispute would not be justified or would not be in propriety in all cases and such decision should depend on facts of each case and the material or justification or explanation regarding cause for delay, tendered by the workman and any straight jacket formula for all cases (wherein there might have been delay in raising dispute) cannot be prescribed or applied. In this context it would be appropriate to refer to the observations by the Apex Court in the decision in case of Director Food and Supplies, Punjab and another vs. Gurmit Singh (2007 [5] SCC 727) wherein the Apex Court has, in paragraph No.11 observed that:- "The Tribunal or the Labour Court cannot invalidate the reference on the ground of delay. If the employer makes a grievance that the workman has made a stale claim then an employer can challenge the reference by way of a writ petition and contend that since the claim is belated there was no industrial dispute. The Tribunal or the Labour Court cannot strike down the reference on this ground. As observed in Sapan Kumar Pandit v. U.P. State Electricity Board and Ors. The Tribunal or the Labour Court cannot strike down the reference on this ground. As observed in Sapan Kumar Pandit v. U.P. State Electricity Board and Ors. ( 2001 (6) SCC 222 ) there are cases in which lapse of time had caused fading or even eclipse of the dispute. If nobody had kept the dispute alive during the long interval, it is reasonably possible to conclude in a particular case that the dispute ceased to exist after some time. But when the dispute remained alive though not galvanised by the workmen or the Union on account of other justified reasons it does not cause the dispute to wane into total eclipse. The long delay for making the adjudication could be considered by the Adjudicating Authority while moulding the reliefs. That is a different matter altogether." 13.3 Besides the said decision, on this count reference may also be made to the decision in case of Karsanbhai L. Harijan vs. Western Railway (2001 [1] GLH 441) wherein this Court observed that:- "Now, therefore, so far as the first contention of Mrs. Talati regarding delay in making Reference is concerned, the said ground was negatived in the Special Civil Application preferred by the Railway Administration, which was dismissed summarily, and even the Letters Patent Appeal is also dismissed and now the said ground cannot be allowed to be canvassed again by the Railway Administration as the same point is concluded in the petition filed by the Railway Administration. The only point which is required to be considered in this petition is whether the substitution of penalty from removal to discharge can be said to be an adequate punishment or even that substituted penalty can be said to be on the higher side looking to the facts and circumstances of the case. Even otherwise, so far as the question about delay in making Reference is concerned, the Supreme Court had an occasion to consider almost an identical question in the decision in Ajaib Singh v. The Sirhind Cooperative Marketing-cum-processing Service Society Ltd. and another, AIR 1999 SC 1352, wherein delay of 7 years was shown to be existing and admitted by workman. The Apex Court found that the Court can mould relief by refusing back wages or directing payment of part of back wages. The Apex Court found that the Court can mould relief by refusing back wages or directing payment of part of back wages. The relevant observations of the Apex Court are as under: ".......The provisions of Article 137 of the Schedule to Limitation Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceedings under the Act and that the relief under it cannot be denied to the workmen merely on the ground of delay. The plea of delay if raised by the employer is required to be proved as a matter of fact by showing the real prejudice and not as a merely hypothetical defence. No reference to the Labour Court can be generally questioned on the ground of delay alone. Even in a case where the delay is shown to be existing, the tribunal, labour Court or board, dealing with the case can appropriately mould the relief by declining to grant back wages to the workman till the date he raised the demand regarding his illegal retrenchment /termination or dismissal. The Court may also in appropriate cases direct the payment of part of the back wages instead of full back wages .... " In that view of the matter, I do not accept the argument of Mrs. Talati that in view of the delay in making Reference, the order by the Tribunal is not required to be interfered with." 13.4 So far as present case and the contention raised by the petitioner against the award and so far as the issue related to delay are concerned, while the petitioner is justified in its objection to an extent i.e. to the extent that the labour Court has not taken into account the aspect of delay in raising the dispute and also the delay in filing the statement of claim and has awarded backwages for the entire period, however the petitioner's submission that on ground of delay the entire reference, and the claim in its totality should not have been entertained and should have been rejected only on ground of delay in raising the dispute, does not deserve to be accepted in view of the facts of present case. Therefore, appropriate direction with regard to the defect in the award so far as the decision granting backwages is concerned have been passed in present order and the said direction by the labour Court is appropriately modified by present order. Therefore, appropriate direction with regard to the defect in the award so far as the decision granting backwages is concerned have been passed in present order and the said direction by the labour Court is appropriately modified by present order. However, the petitioner's submission that the award in its entirety deserves to be set aside because the dispute/reference was raised belatedly, is not accepted. 13.5 Thus, so far as the direction requiring the petitioner to reinstate the respondent is concerned, having regard to the fact that the petitioner has not established any circumstances which would persuade the Court to not uphold the direction requiring the petitioner to reinstate the respondent workman e.g. it is not even urged, much less proved that the work has come to an end or that the project having come to an end the requirement of engaging the respondent has come to an end or that the respondent has crossed age of superannuation or that there were complaints against the respondent etc. have not been established by the petitioner, any ground justifying the objection against the direction to reinstate the workman (except the ground of delay) is not pleaded, much less established, by appropriate evidence. Under the circumstances, when the trial Court has, after considering the proved breach of Section 25(F), exercised the discretion to grant the said relief, I do not consider it appropriate to interfere with and disturb the said direction. 13.6 In this context it would be appropriate to take into account the observations by the Apex Court in the decision in case of Anoop Sharma Vs. Executive Engineer, Public Health Div. No. 1 Paniput reported in (2010) 5 SCC 497 wherein, the Apex Court has observed that., 16. An analysis of the above reproduced provisions shows that no workman employed in any industry who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer can be retrenched by that employer until the conditions enumerated in Clauses (a) and (b) of Section 25-F of the Act are satisfied. In terms of Clause (a), the employer is required to give to the workman one month's notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment or pay him wages in lieu of the notice. In terms of Clause (a), the employer is required to give to the workman one month's notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment or pay him wages in lieu of the notice. Clause (b) casts a duty upon the employer to pay to the workman at the time of retrenchment, compensation equivalent to fifteen days' average pay for every completed year of continuous service or any part thereof in excess of six months. 17. This Court has repeatedly held that Section 25-F(a) and (b) of the Act is mandatory and non-compliance thereof renders the retrenchment of an employee nullity - State of Bombay v. Hospital Mazdoor Sabha AIR 1960 SC 610 , Bombay Union of Journalists v. State of Bombay (1964) 6 SCR 22 , State Bank of India v. N. Sundara Money (1976) 1 SCC 822 , Santosh Gupta v. State Bank of Patiala (1980) 3 SCC 340 , Mohan Lal v. Management of M/s. Bharat Electronics Ltd. (1981) 3 SCC 225 , L. Robert D'Souza v. Executive Engineer, Southern Railway (1982) 1 SCC 645 , Surendra Kumar Verma v. Industrial Tribunal (1980) 4 SCC 443 , Gammon India Ltd. v. Niranjan Das (1984) 1 SCC 509 , Gurmail Singh v. State of Punjab (1991) 1 SCC 189 and Pramod Jha v. State of Bihar (2003) 4 SCC 619 . 18. This Court has used different expressions for describing the consequence of terminating a workman's service/employment/engagement by way of retrenchment without complying with the mandate of Section 25-F of the Act. Sometimes it has been termed as ab initio void, sometimes as illegal per se, sometimes as nullity and sometimes as non est. Leaving aside the legal semantics, we have no hesitation to hold that termination of service of an employee by way of retrenchment without complying with the requirement of giving one month's notice or pay in lieu thereof and compensation in terms of Section 25-F(a) and (b) has the effect of rendering the action of the employer as nullity and the employee is entitled to continue in employment as if his service was not terminated. 19. 19. The question whether the offer to pay wages in lieu of one month's notice and retrenchment compensation in terms of Clauses (a) and (b) of Section 25-F must accompany the letter of termination of service by way of retrenchment or it is sufficient that the employer should make a tangible offer to pay the amount of wages and compensation to the workman before he ask to go was considered in National Iron and Steel Company Ltd. v. State of West Bengal (1967) 2 SCR 391 . The facts of that case were that the workman was given notice dated 15.11.1958 for termination of his service with effect from 17.11.1958. In the notice, it was mentioned that the workman would get one month's wages in lieu of notice and he was asked to collect his dues from the cash office on 20.11.1958 or thereafter during the working hours. The argument of the Additional Solicitor General that there was sufficient compliance of Section 25-F was rejected by this Court by making the following observations: "9.The third point raised by the Additional Solicitor-General is also not one of substance. According to him, retrenchment could only be struck down if it was mala fide or if it was shown that there was victimisation of the workman etc. Learned counsel further argued that the Tribunal had gone wrong in holding that the retrenchment was illegal as Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act had not been complied with. Under that section, a workman employed in any industry should not be retrenched until he had been given one month's notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice had expired, or the workman had been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the period of the notice. The notice in this case bears the date November 15, 1958. It is to the effect that the addressee's services were terminated with effect from 17th November and that he would get one month's wages in lieu of notice of termination of his service. The workman was further asked to collect his dues from the cash office on November 20, 1958 or thereafter during the working hours. Manifestly, Section 25-F, had not been complied with under which it was incumbent on the employer to pay the workman, the wages for the period of the notice in lieu of the notice. The workman was further asked to collect his dues from the cash office on November 20, 1958 or thereafter during the working hours. Manifestly, Section 25-F, had not been complied with under which it was incumbent on the employer to pay the workman, the wages for the period of the notice in lieu of the notice. That is to say, if he was asked to go forthwith he had to be paid at the time when he was asked to go and could not be asked to collect his dues afterwards. As there was no compliance with Section 25-F, we need not consider the other points raised by the learned counsel." 20. In State Bank of India v. N. Sundara Money (supra), the Court emphasised that the workman cannot be retrenched without payment, at the time of retrenchment, compensation computed in terms of Section 25-F(b). 21. The legal position has been beautifully summed up in Pramod Jha v. State of Bihar (supra) in the following words: "The underlying object of Section 25-F is twofold. Firstly, a retrenched employee must have one month's time available at his disposal to search for alternate employment, and so, either he should be given one month's notice of the proposed termination or he should be paid wages for the notice period. Secondly, the workman must be paid retrenchment compensation at the time of retrenchment, or before, so that once having been retrenched there should be no need for him to go to his employer demanding retrenchment compensation and the compensation so paid is not only a reward earned for his previous services rendered to the employer but is also a sustenance to the worker for the period which may be spent in searching for another employment. Section 25-F nowhere speaks of the retrenchment compensation being paid or tendered to the worker along with one month's notice; on the contrary, clause (b) expressly provides for the payment of compensation being made at the time of retrenchment and by implication it would be permissible to pay the same before retrenchment. Payment or tender of compensation after the time when the retrenchment has taken effect would vitiate the retrenchment and non-compliance with the mandatory provision which has a beneficial purpose and a public policy behind it would result in nullifying the retrenchment." 22. Payment or tender of compensation after the time when the retrenchment has taken effect would vitiate the retrenchment and non-compliance with the mandatory provision which has a beneficial purpose and a public policy behind it would result in nullifying the retrenchment." 22. If the workman is retrenched by an oral order or communication or he is simply asked not to come for duty, the employer will be required to lead tangible and substantive evidence to prove compliance of Clauses (a) and (b) of Section 25-F of the Act." In the decision - in the case of Harjinder Singh Vs. Punjab State Warehousing Corporation ( AIR 2010 SC 1116 ) the Apex Court has observed that., "17. Before concluding, we consider it necessary to observe that while exercising jurisdiction under Articles 226 and/or 227 of the Constitution in matters like the present one, the High Courts are duty bound to keep in mind that the Industrial Disputes Act and other similar legislative instruments are social welfare legislations and the same are required to be interpreted keeping in view the goals set out in the preamble of the Constitution and the provisions contained in Part IV thereof in general and Articles 38, 39(a) to (e), 43 and 43A in particular, which mandate that the State should secure a social order for the promotion of welfare of the people, ensure equality between men and women and equitable distribution of material resources of the community to sub-serve the common good and also ensure that the workers get their dues. More than 41 years ago, Gajendragadkar, J, opined that "the concept of social and economic justice is a living concept of revolutionary import; it gives sustenance to the rule of law and meaning and significance to the ideal of welfare State" - State of Mysore v. Workers of Gold Mines AIR 1958 SC 923 . 23. Of late, there has been a visible shift in the courts approach in dealing with the cases involving the interpretation of social welfare legislations. The attractive mantras of globalization and liberalisation are fast becoming the raison d'etre of the judicial process and an impression has been created that the constitutional courts are no longer sympathetic towards the plight of industrial and unorganized workers. The attractive mantras of globalization and liberalisation are fast becoming the raison d'etre of the judicial process and an impression has been created that the constitutional courts are no longer sympathetic towards the plight of industrial and unorganized workers. In large number of cases like the present one, relief has been denied to the employees falling in the category of workmen, who are illegally retrenched from service by creating by-lanes and side-lanes in the jurisprudence developed by this Court in three decades. The stock plea raised by the public employer in such cases is that the initial employment/engagement of the workman-employee was contrary to some or the other statute or that reinstatement of the workman will put unbearable burden on the financial health of the establishment. The courts have readily accepted such plea unmindful of the accountability of the wrong doer and indirectly punished the tiny beneficiary of the wrong ignoring the fact that he may have continued in the employment for years together and that micro wages earned by him may be the only source of his livelihood. It need no emphasis that if a man is deprived of his livelihood, he is deprived of all his fundamental and constitutional rights and for him the goal of social and economic justice, equality of status and of opportunity, the freedoms enshrined in the Constitution remain illusory. Therefore, the approach of the courts must be compatible with the constitutional philosophy of which the Directive Principles of State Policy constitute an integral part and justice due to the workman should not be denied by entertaining the specious and untenable grounds put forward by the employer - public or private. 27. Judges and specially the judges of the highest Court have a vital role to ensure that the promise is fulfilled. If the judges fail to discharge their duty in making an effort to make the Preambular promise a reality, they fail to uphold and abide by the Constitution which is their oath of office. In my humble opinion, this has to be put as high as that and should be equated with the conscience of this Court. 44. How stunningly relevant are these words and how deep are the ditches created in our society by the so called advance of globalization." 14. In my humble opinion, this has to be put as high as that and should be equated with the conscience of this Court. 44. How stunningly relevant are these words and how deep are the ditches created in our society by the so called advance of globalization." 14. It is in light of such position that the directions regarding backwages granted by the labour Court are required to be considered. It is obvious that so far as the backwages are concerned, the respondent would not be entitled for any backwages for the period during which he had not raised dispute. Even after raising dispute after inordinate delay the respondent, for long time did not file statement of claim. It is noticed hereinabove earlier that the respondent filed the statement of claim in or around February 2010 i.e. almost 9 years after the order of reference was passed. The said action or rather inaction of the respondent would certainly disentitle him from claiming any wages for the period until February 2010. 15. This leaves behind the issue about the extent of backwages to be granted for the period after February 2010, because so far as direction regarding reinstatement is concerned, it is noticed, as mentioned hereinabove, that in light of the facts of the case, the said direction is not arbitrary or perverse. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, it appears appropriate and necessary to modify the direction regarding backwages. Therefore, it is directed that the respondent will not be entitled to any benefit of backwages until February 2010 and for the period after February 2010 the respondent would be entitled for backwages @ 10% and not 20% as directed by the labour Court. 16. With the aforesaid clarifications and directions, present petition is partly allowed by modifying the direction regarding backwages, while confirming the direction requiring the petitioner to reinstate the respondent workman. Accordingly the petition is partly allowed. Rule is made absolute to the aforesaid extent. Petition partly allowed.