JUDGMENT 1. This Writ Petition is filed for a Mandamus to declare the action of respondents in threatening to demolish the petitioners' shops without passing any final orders on their representation, dated 28-4-2011, as illegal and arbitrary. 2. In their affidavit, the petitioners have, inter alia, pleaded that they are the owners and occupiers of their respective shop rooms in premises bearing No.6-1-1062/5 to 17; that the said premises are situated facing the road from Sant Nirankari Bhavan to Dwaraka Hotel at Lakdikapool, Hyderabad; that in the year 2003, a proposal was initiated for widening the existing road to 100 feet from Sant Nirankari Bhavan to Dwaraka Hotel; that no immediate steps were taken in that regard; that a communication was sent to petitioner No.9 on 10-1-2007 by respondent No.2 informing it that they are proposing to widen the road by acquiring 20 feet from its premises as against 10 feet which was stated to have been proposed in the year 2003; and that Respondent No.2 vide his letter dated 11-3-2011 addressed for the Executive Engineer informed that he was attaching the sketch plans of the properties affected in the road widening and requested him to prepare structural valuations of the properties and that respondent No.2 has shown structures to the extent of 12 feet 3 inches to 13 feet which were proposed to be demolished. The petitioners alleged that while seeking to widen the road, the respondents have ignored the other side of the road abutting which big establishments like Lazarus Hospital, Global Hospital, Collectorate building and several other commercial establishments exist; that the same was on account of political influence being brought upon the respondents; that when inspection has taken place on 1-12-2007 by Additional Commissioner, Chief City Planner and the Assistant City Planner, along with the concerned Section Officer, the road was measured and the existing width of the road was found to be 88.6 feet; that during their recent inspection on 12-4-2011, the respondents have assured that they require only 10 feet and asked the petitioners to give a representation; that on 28-4-2011 they gave a representation to respondent No.1 wherein they have expressed their readiness to handover to the extent of 10 feet without claiming any compensation; that without considering the said representation the respondents are insisting on acquiring to the extent of 20 feet on the road side; and that apprehending demolition of their shops, they filed the present Writ Petition. 3. 3. Respondent No.2 filed a counter affidavit on his behalf and on behalf of respondent No.1 wherein it is, inter alia, stated that there were ten shops in premises bearing No.6-1-1062, Lakdikapool, Hyderabad, which were being affected in the road widening proposals; that negotiations were held with the owners of these shops; that respondent No.1-Greater Hyderabad Municipal Corporation (for short "the Corporation") has taken up proposals to widen the existing road from Nirankari Bhavan to Dwaraka Hotel in two stretches, namely, from Lakdikapool to Nirankari Bhavan and from Niraknari Bhavan to Dwaraka Hotel; that the existing road on the two stretches is not uniform which varies between 60 feet to 70 feet and, accordingly, the affected portions on the two stretches are not uniform; that a road development plan was prepared and approved in the year 2002 and acquisition process was commenced; that the averment of the petitioners that the respondents initially proposed to acquire only 10 feet is incorrect due to variation in the road width; that the second stretch from Nirankari Bhavan to Dwaraka Hotel is having a steep gradient towards Dwaraka Hotel and as such all the vehicles coming from Ayodhya junction and other corners of Panjagutta are likely to converge at Nirankari Bhavan, proceed towards Dwaraka Hotel to take left turn towards Telephone Bhavan; that due to the steep gradient there is a likelihood of heavy vehiclular traffic proceeding with high speed on the left side, invariably necessitating the widening of the road to the extent of 20 feet as against 10 feet and that the petitioners' property is nearer to the junction point and accordingly the splay portions were fixed up by taking into consideration the above mentioned aspects and a decision was taken to acquire the property to the extent of 20 feet; that in the widening of the first stretch i.e., from Lakadikapool to Nirankari Bhavan on which several private and Government properties are situated, most of the private properties acquired on either side were demolished; that the Central Government Department which has P and T quarters has also come forward to cooperate in the road widening; that the Nirankari Bhavan Trust has also surrendered the affected portion and negotiations in respect of the owners of some other properties are also being held; that the second stretch i.e., from Nirankari Bhavan to Dwaraka Hotel, covers several properties including the petitioners' and ends at Dwaraka Hotel; that the Corporation has preferred to hold negotiations first, failing which they are proposing to acquire the land; that the Government is providing a high quality mass transit facility through Metro Rail system; that Corridor No.1 will pass through the road in question; and that keeping in view the future need for this project also, acquisition of property to the extent of 20 feet is found necessary. 4. Respondent No.31 the Special Deputy Collector (Land Acquisition), of Corporation, filed a separate counter affidavit. Shorn of unnecessary details, its contents are as under: 5. In the requisition letter, dated 22-11-2006, of respondent No.2, the premises claimed by the petitioners are shown as Serial No.4, bearing No.6-1-1062/5 to 11, admeasuring 143.56 sq. yards + 139.25 sq. yards = 281.81 sq. yards, out of 2254.09 sq. yards comprising seven premises. The draft notification and the draft declaration were approved by the Collector, Hyderabad District, and the same was published in local daily newspapers on 1-3-2007 and 2-3-2007 respectively. After publication of the draft notification and the declaration, M/s. Margadarsi Chit Fund Ltd. and others filed W.P.No. 5789 of 2007, which was disposed of by this court at the admission stage on 26-3-2007, inter alia, holding that invocation of urgency clause under Section 17(4) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (for short "the Act") is irrational and accordingly it has set aside declaration dated 26-2-2007 with the direction to invite objections from the petitioners under Section 5-A of the Act and consider the same before seeking to proceed further. In pursuance of the said order, notices in Form 3 under Section 5-A of the Act were issued on 13-4-2007 calling for objections and fixing the date of enquiry as 22-5-2007 and after considering the objections and rejecting the same, the draft declaration was approved by the Collector, Hyderabad, District, which was published in the daily newspapers on 21-12-2007. The objection of the petitioners that on the opposite side of their property there is Government property having wide open space which can be acquired was rejected on the ground that widening of both the sides of the road is necessary. The enquiry under Sections 9(3) and 10 of the Act was adjourned on several occasions at the instance of the petitioners and as they have not filed any documents establishing their title/ownership, the compensation awarded could not be apportioned. The Executive Engineer of the Corporation has assessed the value of the structures at Rs. 31,16,587/-, which was accordingly fixed as compensation in the Award. The details of the compensation fixed under Award, dated 19-12-2009, in respect of both the land and the structural value of the premises bearing No.6-1-1062/5 to 11, are as under: 1. Land value @ Rs. 15,000/- per sq. yard. Extent of land Rs. 4,42,150-00 acquired 282.81 sq. 31,16,587/-, which was accordingly fixed as compensation in the Award. The details of the compensation fixed under Award, dated 19-12-2009, in respect of both the land and the structural value of the premises bearing No.6-1-1062/5 to 11, are as under: 1. Land value @ Rs. 15,000/- per sq. yard. Extent of land Rs. 4,42,150-00 acquired 282.81 sq. yards in premises No.6-1-1062/5 to 11 2. 30% solatium of land value as admissible under Rs. 12,72,645-00 Section 23(2) of the L.A.Act 3. 12% Add. Market value on land value from the date Rs. 14,19,783-68 of notification to date of award i.e., from 1-3-2007 to 16-12-2009 i.e., (1021 days) as admissible under Section 23(1-A) of the L.A. Act 4. Structure value Rs. 31,16,587-00 Total Rs. 1,00,51,165-68 The Standing Committee of the Corporation passed resolution, dated 11-8-2010, and the General body passed resolution, dated 22-11-2010, recommending to the Government for administrative sanction for payment of the said amount. The petitioners' request for confining the acquisition to 10 feet was not considered as the property is required for a public purpose and public interest will outweigh the interest of the individuals. 6. In the reply affidavit filed on behalf of the petitioners to the counter affidavit of respondent No.2, the petitioners are critical about lack of uniformity in maintaining the width of the road apart from the failure of the respondents in utilizing the vast open land available in the premises of the District Collectorate situated on the opposite stretch. The petitioners reiterated that if the road widening is restricted to 11.04 feet on their side, the necessity of acquiring the building portion of the petitioners' properties can be avoided. They have submitted that in this regard they made a representation on 28-4-2011 to the Commissioner of respondent No.1-Corporation. The petitioners also pointed out that having not acquired the properties of Lazarus Hospital, Global Hospital and the Collectorate, there is no justification to acquire the petitioners' properties. In paragraph-9, the petitioners stated that they undertake to suffer road widening provided equal distance is taken from the other side of the road and the road widening is confined to 100 feet width, which can be achieved only by acquiring the appropriate extent from the Collectors office and Global Hospital. In paragraph-9, the petitioners stated that they undertake to suffer road widening provided equal distance is taken from the other side of the road and the road widening is confined to 100 feet width, which can be achieved only by acquiring the appropriate extent from the Collectors office and Global Hospital. 7.After hearing of the case was commenced, a reply affidavit was filed to the counter affidavit of respondent No.3 on 15-8-2011 wherein for the first time, the petitioners have stated that in the notification dated 1-3-2007 and the declaration dated 18-12-2007, issued under Sections 4(1) and 6 of the Act respectively, only the premises bearing municipal Nos. 6-1-1062/5 to 11 belonging to some of the petitioners alone was notified and that the rest of the premises, i.e., premises bearing Nos. 6-1-1062/12, 13, 14, 15 and 16 (ground floor) and 6-1-1062/17, 6-1-1062/10/B (second floor) and 6-1-1062/2/A (terrace) belonging to some other petitioners and which form part of the same building complex, were not included. On the basis of this plea, the petitioners have taken the stand that the land acquisition proceedings, on which reliance is placed by the respondents, are incomplete; and that it is not practically possible to segregate the shops which are notified and which are not notified. It is also pleaded that the notification mentioned M/s. Margadarsi as the owner of the premises bearing municipal No.6-1-1062/5 to 11 while the said agency is the owner of a part of the premises of the same building in the second floor and some of the petitioners are owners of the remaining part of the premises. It is further pleaded that petitioner Nos. 5 to 10 who are the owners of their respective shops bearing municipal Nos. 6-1-1062/12 to 17 and 6-1-1062/2/A (terrace) cannot be compelled to part with their properties as they are not covered by the land acquisition proceedings. 8. Having regard to the new pleas raised by the petitioners in the above mentioned reply affidavit, this court directed the respondents to file an additional counter affidavit clarifying the pleadings contained in the said reply affidavit. Accordingly, the Special Deputy Collector (Land Acquisition) of respondent No.1-Corporation filed an additional counter affidavit along with additional material. It is stated in the said additional counter affidavit that petitioner Nos. 1, 2, 3, 5 and 9 were arrayed as petitioner Nos. Accordingly, the Special Deputy Collector (Land Acquisition) of respondent No.1-Corporation filed an additional counter affidavit along with additional material. It is stated in the said additional counter affidavit that petitioner Nos. 1, 2, 3, 5 and 9 were arrayed as petitioner Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4 and 9 in W.P.No. 5789/2007, wherein they were shown as owners of premises bearing municipal Nos. 6-1-1062/2 to 17, and that the said Writ Petition was allowed by this court directing holding of enquiry under Section 5-A of the Act. It is further averred that objections were filed by 8 of the owners of the building premises bearing municipal Nos. 6-1-1062/5 to 17 and 6-1-1063/B from which it is clear that all the owners of the above mentioned premises have participated in the award enquiry. It is further stated that the Assistant City Planner, Circle-5, ,has sent proposals in respect of building bearing Nos.6-1-1062/5 to 11 to the Executive Engineer, Project Division of the Corporation, for preparation of structural valuation along with other properties on the same road together with a sketch showing the proposed affected portions to a depth of 20 feet all along 130 feet length which covers all the shops in the building known as Margadarsi building; that vide his letter dated 27-3-2008, the Assistant City Planner, Circle-10 of the Corporation, has requested the Executive Engineer, PD-1 of the Corporation, to prepare structural values of all the portions of the building, wherein M/s. Margadarsi Chit Fund Limited is located; that this proposal includes building bearing No.6-1-1062/5 to 17 as most of the owners have submitted their ownership documents; and that in the said letter petitioner Nos. 3, 4, 5, 8 and 9 are shown at Serial Nos. 6, 9, 3, 1 and 10 as the owners of the premises bearing Nos. 61-62 (sic.1062)/5 to 17. It is further explained that since the building is popularly known as Margadarsi building, the property is accordingly described in the land acquisition proceedings, including the award, as such; that the Engineering section of the Corporation has also considered the structural valuations covering all the floors of the properties and assessed the value at Rs. 31,16,587/-, which is also reflected in the award passed by the Land Acquisition Officer. 31,16,587/-, which is also reflected in the award passed by the Land Acquisition Officer. The answering respondent stated that as it was decided to refer the dispute to the Civil Court under Section 30 of the Act for adjudication, the compensation will be apportioned among all the original owners. The additional counter affidavit pleaded the actual as well as constructive knowledge of the petitioners and consequently the doctrine of estoppel. On the plea of alleged discrimination, the additional counter affidavit submitted that in the stretch from Sant Nirankari Bhavan to Dwaraka Hotel, proposed for road widening, the building bearing municipal Nos. 6-1-1063/1 to 17 belonging to Smt. Farzana Begum also comes under the road widening proposal; that a part of the said building, which is falling under splay portion of the road and converging point from the road coming from Khairtabad to Secretariat, will be acquired; and that the proposals for the same are under contemplation. It is stated that seven properties In the row have already been acquired in the premises and Dwaraka Hotel premises is also acquired which is included in the award wherein the same is shown as property bearing No.6-1-1981 and 1082. 9. I have heard Sri Vedula Venkatramana, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioners, and the learned Advocate General appearing for the respondents and perused the record. 10. From the pleadings of the parties and the contentions raised by the learned counsel representing them, the following Points arise for consideration: 1. Whether the respondents have discriminated against the petitioners in seeking to acquire their properties? 2. Whether the property bearing premised No.6-1-1062/12 to 17, 6-1-1062/B and 6-1-1062/2/A are covered by the acquisition? 3. Whether the petitioners had knowledge of the acquisition proposals in respect of their properties and they have acquiesced and they have acquiesced in raising objection for the first time by way of a reply affidavit in this Writ Petition? 4. Whether the acquisition proceedings are liable to be interfered with on the ground of hardship to the petitioners? Re Point No.1: 11. From the contents of the counter affidavits of respondent Nos. 2 and 3, it is clear that the width of the road between Sant Nirankari Bhavan and Lakdikapool and vice versa varies from 88.6 feet to 74 feet. Whether the acquisition proceedings are liable to be interfered with on the ground of hardship to the petitioners? Re Point No.1: 11. From the contents of the counter affidavits of respondent Nos. 2 and 3, it is clear that the width of the road between Sant Nirankari Bhavan and Lakdikapool and vice versa varies from 88.6 feet to 74 feet. The plea of discrimination raised by the petitioners is based on two circumstances, namely, that the respondents are not acquiring the land in equal proportion on the opposite stretch i.e., from Lakdikapool to Sant Nirankari Bhavan. The petitioners' main grievance is against non-acquisition of the property belonging to Global Hospital and non-utilisation of the vacant land situated in the District Collector's complex. As regards the properties on the stretch on which the petitioners' properties are located, it is their grievance that the building bearing municipal No.6-1-1063/1 to 7 belonging to Smt. Farzana Begum is not being acquired and similarly the building in which Dwaraka Hotel is located is also not proposed for the road widening. With respect to the first mentioned objection of the petitioners, it is explained in the counter affidavit of respondent No.3 that the same objection raised by the petitioners was rejected in the enquiry held under Section 5-A of the Act and that therefore the petitioners cannot be permitted to raise the said ground at this stage. At the hearing, the learned Advocate General submitted that the petitioners cannot insist on the acquisition of the properties situated on either side of the road in an uniform manner because the necessity of acquiring the land depends upon the traffic pattern. The learned Advocate General explained that on the stretch from Sant Nirankari Bhavan to Lakdikapool which has a down gradient, the vehicles come at a high speed to turn towards the Secretariat and there is more inflow of traffic on the said stretch compared to the opposite side where majority vehicles proceed towards the Ravindra Bharathi. He has also submitted that as and when the exigencies warrant, the properties on the opposite stretch including that of the Global Hospital will also be acquired. With regard to the properties on the side on which the petitioners' properties are situate, as noted above, the Dwaraka Hotel property is already acquired and the property belonging to Smt. Farzana Begum is under proposal for acquisition. 12. With regard to the properties on the side on which the petitioners' properties are situate, as noted above, the Dwaraka Hotel property is already acquired and the property belonging to Smt. Farzana Begum is under proposal for acquisition. 12. In my opinion, while exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, it is neither possible nor appropriate for this Court to sit over the decision of a statutory authority and examine the same as an appellate body. Once the Government is satisfied that the properties are needed for a "public purpose", it is not open to the owner or the person interested in the property to contend that some other property is more suitable. In Union of India v. K. Balaji Jaya Rama Rao (1) (2007) 15 SCC 791 the Supreme Court held as under: "19.... It is for the Government to decide whether this property is to be acquired or some other property is to be acquired. It is not open to an owner to say that some other property is more suitable. If that were to be permitted then every owner will say that some other property is better and that that property must be acquired instead of his own. So long as the property was required for a public purpose, the mere fact that some other property could have been acquired is not a ground on which the High Court can say that the reasoning for acquisition is not sufficient". This Court is concerned with the decision making process and not with the merits of the decision. (See: Tata Cellular v. Union of India (2) (1994) 6 SCC 651 ). 13. In Sooram Pratap Reddy v. District Collector (3) 2008 (7) SCJ 641 = (2008) 9 SCC 552 , the Supreme Court while dealing with the contours of judicial review of policy decision of the State in case of land acquisition for "public purpose" discussed relevant case law as under: "119. In our judgment, in deciding whether acquisition is for 'public purpose' or not, prima facie, the Government is the best judge. Normally, in such matters, a writ Court will not interfere by substituting its judgment for the judgment of the Government. 120. In Hamabai (AIR 1914 PC 20), the Judicial Committee of Privy Council stated: "... In our judgment, in deciding whether acquisition is for 'public purpose' or not, prima facie, the Government is the best judge. Normally, in such matters, a writ Court will not interfere by substituting its judgment for the judgment of the Government. 120. In Hamabai (AIR 1914 PC 20), the Judicial Committee of Privy Council stated: "... all that remains is to determine whether the purpose here is a purpose in which the general interest of the community is concerned. Prima facie the Government are good judges of that. They are not absolute judges. They cannot say: 'sic volo sic jubeo' but at least a Court would not easily hold them to be wrong". (Emphasis supplied). 121. This Court, in R.S. Nanji ( AIR 1956 SC 294 ), reiterated the principle laid down by the Privy Council. The Constitution Bench observed: "11... Prima facie the Government is the best judge as to whether 'public purpose' is served by issuing a requisition order, but it is not the sole judge. The courts have the jurisdiction and it is their duty to determine the matter whenever a question is raised whether a requisition order is or is not for a 'public purpose". (Emphasis supplied). 122. In Somawanti ( AIR 1963 SC 151 ), this Court interpreted sub-section (3) of Section 6 of the Act and held that the declaration made under Section 6 of the Act is 'conclusive evidence' that the land is needed for public purpose. It was contended that the declaration can be made by the Government arbitrarily and if such declaration is irrational, unreasonable, mala fide or de hors the Act, it should be open to a Court to decide the question. Dealing with the submission, the majority stated: "36. Now whether in a particular case the purpose for which land is needed is a public purpose or not is for the State Government to be satisfied about. If the purpose for which the land is being acquired by the State is within the legislative competence of the State the declaration of the Government will be final, subject, however, to one exception. That exception is that if there is a colourable exercise of power the declaration will be open to challenge at the instance of the aggrieved party. If the purpose for which the land is being acquired by the State is within the legislative competence of the State the declaration of the Government will be final, subject, however, to one exception. That exception is that if there is a colourable exercise of power the declaration will be open to challenge at the instance of the aggrieved party. The power committed to the Government by the Act is a limited power in the sense that it can be exercised only where there is a public purpose, leaving aside for a moment the purpose of a company. If it appears that what the Government is satisfied about is not a public purpose but a private purpose or no purpose at all the action of the government would be colourable as not being relatable to the power conferred upon it by the Act and its declaration will be a nullity". (Emphasis supplied). The majority concluded: "40. Though we are of the opinion that the courts are not entitled go behind the declaration of the Government to the effect that a particular purpose for which the land is being acquired is a public purpose we must emphasise that the declaration of the Government must be relatable to a .public purpose as distinct from a purely private purpose. If the purpose for which the acquisition is being made is not relatable to public purpose then a question may well arise whether in making the declaration there has been, on the part of the Government fraud on the power conferred upon it by the Act. In other words, the question would then arise whether that declaration was merely a colourable exercise of the power conferred by the Act, and, therefore, the declaration is open to challenge at the instance of the party aggrieved. To such a declaration the protection of Section 6(3) will not extend. For, the question whether a particular action was the result of a fraud or not is always justiciable, provisions such as Section 6(3) notwithstanding". (Emphasis supplied). 123. In Srinivasa Co-operative House Building Society Ltd. v. Madam Gurumurthy Sastry and others, (1994) 4 SCC 675 , this Court held that a token contribution from public revenue cannot ipso facto be treated as colourable exercise of power by the State in acquisition of land. (Emphasis supplied). 123. In Srinivasa Co-operative House Building Society Ltd. v. Madam Gurumurthy Sastry and others, (1994) 4 SCC 675 , this Court held that a token contribution from public revenue cannot ipso facto be treated as colourable exercise of power by the State in acquisition of land. Each case must furnish its backdrop whether the action is for public purpose or for a private purpose. 124. In Bajirao T. Kote v. State of Maharashtra, (1995) 2 SCC 442 , this Court held that satisfaction of the State Government regarding existence of public purpose is not open to judicial scrutiny unless there is mala fide or colourable exercise of power. The Court stated: "10. ... It is primarily for the State Government to decide whether there exists public purpose or not, and it is not for this Court or the High Courts to evaluate the evidence and come to its own conclusion whether or not there is public purpose unless it comes to the conclusion that it is a mala fide or colourable exercise of the power. In other words the exercise of the power serves no public purpose or it serves a private purpose". (Emphasis supplied). 125. In Laxman Rao Bapurao Jadhav v. State of Maharashtra, (1997) 3 SCC 493 , this Court held that it is for the State government to decide whether the land is needed or is likely to be needed for a public purpose and whether it is suitable or adaptable for the purpose for which the acquisition was sought. The mere fact of empowering the authorized officer to inspect and find out whether the land would be adaptable for the public purpose does not take away the power of the Government to take a decision ultimately". 14. As rightly pointed out by the learned Advocate General, the necessity of acquisition of the land depends upon the ground realities and no straight-jacket formula or uniform principles can be evolved in this regard. The petitioners have not denied the stand of the respondents that compared to the opposite stretch from Lakdikapool to Sant Nirankari Bhavan, the traffic from Sant Nirankari Bhavan to Lakdikapool, on which the petitioners' properties are situated, is heavier and the road takes a left curve near Dwaraka Hotel which is described as a splay portion and which evidently causes traffic snarls. Therefore, keeping these factors in view, the respondents apparently have decided to acquire more land on that stretch. In the light of these uncontroverted facts, this Court is unable to accept the plea of the petitioners that the respondents' have indulged in discrimination against the petitioners. This Point is accordingly answered. Re Points 2 and 3: 15. It is not in dispute that the petitioners own shops bearing Nos. 6-11062/5 & 6, 6-1-1062/7, 6-1-1062/8 and 9, 6-1-1062/10 and 11 (First floor); 6-1-1062/ 12 and 13, 6-1-1062/15, 6-1-1062/16, 6-1-1062/17 (Second floor); and 6-1-1062/10/ Band 6-1-1062/2/A (Terrace), Rajbhavan Road, Lakdikapool, Hyderabad. The notice issued in Form 2-A under Section 4(1) of the Act mentioned premises bearing Nos. 6-1-1062/5 to 11 showing the name of the owner as per requisition as M/s. Margadarshi and the extent of the land is shown as 139.25 Square yards. Same position is reflected in Section 6 declaration, Form-7 notice issued under Sections 9(3) and 10 of the Act and even in the order, dated 26-11-2007, of the Special Deputy Collector, Land Acquisition of the Corporation, disposing of the petitioners' objections and so also in the Award, dated 19-12-2009. It is significant to note that the award was made both for the land and the structures. In respect of the land, the total extent of 282.81 Square yards, comprising 143.56 Square yards + 139.25 Square yards, is shown as the "extent notified". 16. During the hearing, the learned Advocate General explained that omission of the sub-numbers from 12 to 17 and the two shop premises bearing sub-numbers 10/B and 2/A on the terrace portion is due to sheer inadvertence. He further submitted that even though the notification, declaration and all other subsequent proceedings have mentioned the premises question at Serial No: 4 as 6-1-1062/5 to 11 with extent shown as 139.25 Square yards, the extent of 143.56 Square yards shown at Serial No.3 against the premises bearing No.6-1-1062/1 to 4 also forms part of the same premises and that due to mistake the said extent of 143.56 Square yards is shown against the property mentioned at Serial No.3 instead of at Serial No.4. This submission of the learned Advocate General is not controverted by the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioners. 17. This submission of the learned Advocate General is not controverted by the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioners. 17. It is not disputed that the total extent of land over which all the shop rooms, including that of the petitioners, are located is 282.81 Square yards. As noted above, in the Award the said mistake was rectified by adding the extent of 143.56 Square yards to 139.25 Square yards and treating the entire land as 282.81 Square yards. It is of significance that even though the above mentioned mistakes were in the knowledge of the petitioners, at no point of time they have raised the plea that their properties are not covered by the said acquisition proceedings except by way of a reply affidavit filed on 15-8-2011, much after the commencement of the hearing of the case. M/s. Margarsi Chit Fund Limited, which is the owner of a part of the property, and some others, who included some of the present petitioners, filed Writ Petition No. 5789 of 2007 assailing the notification issued under Section 4(1) of the Act. They have not raised this plea in the said Writ Petition. Indeed nine, out of the ten petitioners have filed objections on 31-3-2007. In their objections, they have referred to Letter Nos. 2025/AC(P & P)/MCH/2002/L6, dated 1-2-2003; 5/RW/ACP/C5/MCH/07, dated 10-1-2007; and 7/RW/ACP/CS/MCH/07, dated 10-1-2007, issued by the officials of the Municipal Corporation, and inter alia stated that in the first of the notices the Corporation has proposed to widen the road by taking the petitioners' property to the depth of 10 feet while in the subsequent notices the proposal has been changed to 20 feet. The petitioners have pleaded therein that the existing width of the road was 80 feet and there is a foot path of the width of 10 feet; and that if 10 feet on the opposite side is acquired, there will be no necessity to acquire any part of their property. These objections were considered and conclusively rejected by the Special Deputy Collector for Land Acquisition of the Corporation and disposed of vide his proceedings No.B/181/2oo7, dated 26-11-2007. The petitioners have not chosen to question the said proceedings, which have attained finality. Consequently, Award was passed, vide: No.B/181/2007, dt. 19-12-2009, whereunder a sum of Rs. These objections were considered and conclusively rejected by the Special Deputy Collector for Land Acquisition of the Corporation and disposed of vide his proceedings No.B/181/2oo7, dated 26-11-2007. The petitioners have not chosen to question the said proceedings, which have attained finality. Consequently, Award was passed, vide: No.B/181/2007, dt. 19-12-2009, whereunder a sum of Rs. 69,34,578-68 ps., was awarded as compensation towards the value of the land admeasuring 282.81 Square yards, which includes solatium at 30% and additional market value at 12%, and a sum of Rs. 31,16,587/- was awarded towards the value of the structures. The petitioners failed to question the Award. More than 1½ years later they have filed the present Writ Petition when, obviously, there was threat of dispossession. A perusal of the A ward shows that as there were no claimants for compensation, the land acquisition officer has referred the case to the Civil Court for apportionment under Section 31 of the Act by depositing the award amount in the Civil Court. 18. As recent as 28-4-2001 i.e., a few days before filing the present Writ Petition, all the petitioners have submitted a representation, wherein they have requested the Commissioner of the Corporation to take 10 feet from their side subject to the petitioners foregoing compensation and being given T.D.R. Certificates in lieu thereof. All this material would overwhelmingly establish that even though the sub-numbers beyond 11 have not found a place in the notification, declaration and the other official proceedings, they are indeed covered by the acquisition proceedings. If these properties are not covered, there was no necessity for the petitioners to file their objections, the earlier Writ Petition in the year 2007 and make the recent representation referred to above. Having allowed the Award to become final and not even raised this issue either in their affidavit filed in support of the Writ Petition or the reply affidavit, dated 28-6-2011, they have raised the same for the first time in their reply affidavit, dated 16-8-2011. In my opinion, this attempt is only intended as a last ditch effort to somehow protect their property from acquisition. The conclusion is, therefore, irresistible that the petitioners had full knowledge of the fact that their property was involved in acquisition and that they have been making their efforts from the year 2007 to get the said property excluded from acquisition. 19. The conclusion is, therefore, irresistible that the petitioners had full knowledge of the fact that their property was involved in acquisition and that they have been making their efforts from the year 2007 to get the said property excluded from acquisition. 19. In K. Balaji Jaya Rama Rao (1 supra), the Apex Court held that the purpose of Section 4(1) of the Act is two fold, viz., (1) that there must be public announcement by the Government that the land specified therein is needed for a public purpose; and (2) that it authorizes the officers to do all such acts as are set out in Section 4(2) of the Act. 20. The first of the aforementioned two purposes is fully served in the present case as the petitioners not only acquired knowledge of the proposed acquisition of their properties, but also left no stone unturned to resist the acquisition. In the light of these undeniable facts, it needs to be held that the petitioners have acquiesced in canvassing the formal defects crept in the acquisition proceedings at this far, too belated stage where the Award has been passed and the acquisition proceedings got concluded. The petitioners have not questioned any of these proceedings, such as notification under Section 4(1), declaration under Section 6 of the Act and the Award in this Writ Petition. These two points are, accordingly, held against the petitioners. Re Point No.4: 21. Indubitably, acquisition of private properties against their will causes pain and hardship to the owners' of such properties. But the State is conferred with the power of "eminent domain". The Supreme Court in Sooram Pratap Reddy (3 supra) traced the origin of this phrase and explained its concept. It is apt to extract here the relevant portion: "44. 'Eminent domain' is thus inherent power of a governmental entity to take privately owned property, especially land and convert it to public use, subject to reasonable compensation for the taking [vide P. Ramanatha Aiyar's Advanced Law Lexicon, Volume 2, page 1575]. 45. The term 'eminent domain' is said to have originated by Grotius, legal scholar of the seventeenth century. He believed that the State possessed the power to take or destroy property for the benefit of the social unit, but he believed that when the State so acted, it was obligated to compensate the injured property owner for his losses. 45. The term 'eminent domain' is said to have originated by Grotius, legal scholar of the seventeenth century. He believed that the State possessed the power to take or destroy property for the benefit of the social unit, but he believed that when the State so acted, it was obligated to compensate the injured property owner for his losses. In his well known work De Jure, Belli et Pacis, the learned author proclaimed: "The property of subject is under the eminent domain of the State, so that the State or he who acts for it may use, alienate and even destroy such property, not only in the case of extreme necessity, in which even private persons have a right over the property of other, but for the ends of public utility, to which ends those who founded civil society must be supposed to have the intended the private ends should give way". 46. Blackstone too believed that the State had no general power to take private property of land-owners, except on the payment of a reasonable price. The right of the State or the sovereign to its or his own property is absolute while that of the subject or citizen to his property is only paramount. The citizen holds his property subject always to the right of the sovereign to take it for a public purpose. The power of eminent domain is merely a means to an end viz. larger public interest. 47. The power of eminent domain does not depend for its existence on a specific grant. It is inherent and exists in every sovereign State without any recognition thereof in the Constitution or in any statute. It is founded on the law of necessity. The power is inalienable. No Legislature can bind itself or its successors not to exercise this power when public necessity demands it. Nor it can be abridged or restricted by agreement or contract". 22. In Jayabheri Properties (P) Ltd., v. State of A.P. (4) 2010 (4) SCJ 287 = (2010) 5 SCC 590 the Supreme Court held that private interests should always yield to public interest when acquisition of the private property is found necessary. The hardship suffered by the individual will certainly outweigh the hardship to public at large. It requires to take judicial notice of some of the ground realities in this connection. The hardship suffered by the individual will certainly outweigh the hardship to public at large. It requires to take judicial notice of some of the ground realities in this connection. With the intense urbanization, population of all major cities in the country is increasing multi-fold. Policies of liberalization being pursued by the State increased the buying capacity of the people. With the Banking sector and other financial agencies making money available to the people by way of loans, as never before, the number of motor vehicles is on steep increase year after year. The existing road width of the cities is becoming insufficient and thoroughly inadequate to meet the growing traffic demands. Hyderabad is no exception to this appalling situation. Even though the administration is coming out with mass transportation projects, such as, Mass Rail Transport System and Metro Rail Project, till they are completed and successfully implemented, the traffic congestion continues to cause miseries to the urban populace. During peak hours traffic jams for hours have become the order of the day. The woes of the commuters are compounded during rainy days. These bare realities need to be borne in mind, while weighing the competing interest of the individuals, vis-a-vis, the general public. The acquisition of the petitioners' property for easing the traffic has, therefore, to be viewed as in overwhelming public interest, which pitted against the petitioners' interests far too outweighs and outscores the latter. Viewed from any angle, the acquisition proceedings are not liable for interference on the ground of hardship to the petitioners. 23. Before parting with this case, it needs to be noted that this Court has enquired with the learned Advocate General, at the hearing, as to whether the petitioners stand to suffer disadvantage on account of non-mentioning of the sub-numbers of their premises i.e., 12 to 17 and 10/B and 2/A on the terrace portion. 23. Before parting with this case, it needs to be noted that this Court has enquired with the learned Advocate General, at the hearing, as to whether the petitioners stand to suffer disadvantage on account of non-mentioning of the sub-numbers of their premises i.e., 12 to 17 and 10/B and 2/A on the terrace portion. The learned Advocate General stated that since all these properties are covered by the acquisition proceedings and the award was passed with reference to these properties also, even though there is no specific reference to these sub-numbers in the acquisition proceedings, they will concede to this effect before the Civil Court in which the reference under Section 31 of the Act for apportionment of compensation is pending, and that if any legally insurmountable situation arises, the respondents will issue appropriate corrigendum to the relevant land acquisition proceedings to ensure that the petitioners will not be deprived of their share of compensation. This submission of the learned Advocate General is, accordingly, placed on record. 24. In the light of the discussion undertaken above, this Court finds no merit in the Writ Petition and the same is, accordingly, dismissed. 25. As a sequel, interim order dated 10-6-2011 is vacated and W.P.M.P. No. 17301 of 2011 is disposed of as infructuous.