Judgment : At the interlocutory stage, the writ petition is taken up for hearing and disposal with the consent of the learned counsel for the parties. 2. This writ petition is filed for a certiorari to quash order in R.No.2340/A5/2011, dated 21.06.2011, of respondent No.1, confirming order in R.No.2340/A5/2010, dated 07.09.2010, of respondent No.2. 3. I have heard Sri A.Ravinder, learned counsel for the petitioner, the learned Assistant Government Pleader for Transport appearing for respondent Nos.1 and 2, and Sri Ravi Kumar Vadlakonda, learned counsel representing respondent No.3. 4. The petitioner claims to be the owner of the tractor and trailer bearing registration Nos.AP15-T-1648 and 1649. Respondent No.3 approached respondent No.2 on 18.10.2004 for issuance of duplicate certificate of registration and transfer of ownership in respect of said tractor and trailer. The petitioner alleged that respondent No.3 has filed the said application with the former’s forged signatures and got the duplicate registration certificate and transfer of ownership effected in the name of respondent No.3 on 23.10.2004. On the petitioner’s approaching respondent No.2, he has issued notices to both the parties. A criminal case was registered in C.C.No.508 of 2006 in the Court of the learned Judicial Magistrate of First Class (Excise), Karimnagar, which ended in acquittal of respondent No.3. Respondent No.3 filed an application before respondent No.2 to decide on the ownership of the tractor and trailer. By order, dated 07.09.2010, respondent No.2 has declared respondent No.3 as the owner of the tractor and trailer. The petitioner filed an appeal before respondent No.1 along with an application to condone delay. On 06.01.2011, respondent No.1 granted stay of the order of respondent No.2. However, by order, dated 21.06.2011, respondent No.1 confirmed the order of respondent No.2. 5. Apart from challenging the order of respondent No.1 on merits, the petitioner has raised the plea that the incumbent of the offices of respondent Nos.1 and 2 is one and the same. It is the pleaded case of the petitioner that the primary order was passed by the same Officer in his capacity as the Regional Transport Officer & Registering Authority and the same Officer acting on behalf of the Regional Transport Authority, which is the appellate authority, has confirmed his own order. 6. No counter affidavits are filed by the respondents. Therefore, the averments referred to above remained uncontraverted. 6. No counter affidavits are filed by the respondents. Therefore, the averments referred to above remained uncontraverted. Even at the hearing it is not dissented that the person, who passed the primary and the appellate orders is one and the same. 7. The rule against bias came to be recognized as a facet of principles of natural justice. It comprises two principles – Nemo judex in causa sua, nemo debet esse judex in propria causa, namely, an adjudicator must be unbiased, a man should not be a Judge in his own cause and justice must not only be done but seemed to have been done. A litigant should not have a reasonable suspicion of bias that he may not get an impartial verdict. In a case such as this, where the same authority, against whose order appeal has been preferred, has dealt with the appeal, there is a real likelihood of bias as the authority which passed the order is ordinarily expected to confirm its own view sitting as an appellate authority. In Financial Commissioner (Taxation) Vs. Harbhajan Singh ( (1996) 9 SCC 281 ), the Supreme Court held that the Settlement Officer who sat over his own order as an appellate authority was incompetent to decide the appeal. In Amar Nath Chowdhury Vs. Braithwaite and Co. Ltd. and others ( (2002) 2 SCC 290 ), the Chairman-cum-Managing Director of a Company removed an employee. The same person presided over and participated in the deliberations of the meeting of the Board which was the appellate authority and which confirmed the order of the Chairman-cum-Managing Director. In view of the above administrative law principles, the Supreme Court set aside the said order. 8. For the above-mentioned reasons, the impugned order cannot be sustained and the same is accordingly set aside. The Deputy Commissioner of Transport, who is the Secretary of the Regional Transport Authority, which is the appellate authority, is directed to consider the appeal of the petitioner afresh and pass an order after hearing the petitioner and respondent No.3 within a period of two months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. 9. The writ petition is accordingly allowed to the extent indicated above. 10. As a sequel to disposal of the writ petition, W.P.M.P.No.26742 of 2011 is disposed of as infructuous.