JUDGMENT : R.M. Chhaya, J. By way of this petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner Bank has challenged the legality and validity of the order passed by respondent No.1 Tribunal dated 29.7.2011 passed in Review Application No. 52 of 2009. 2. The facts arising out of the petition can be summarised as under : 3. The petitioner, a Cooperative Bank (now in liquidation) registered under the provisions of the Gujarat Cooperative Societies Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”), had given various financial assistance to one Minaxi Enterprise to the tune of Rs.20 lacs and Rs.25 lacs towards term loan. It transpires from the record that respondent No.3 created a mortgage in favour of Bank by deposit of title deeds of the mortgaged property and also gave a personal guarantee for the said loan. 4. It is an admitted position that the original borrower committed default in payment for which the petitioner Bank filed a suit being Lavad Case No.457 of 2001 before the Board of Nominees at Ahmedabad under Section 96 of the Act to recover the outstanding amount from the borrowers and guarantors including respondent No.3 herein. The Board of Nominees, Ahmedabad vide its judgment and award dated 6.1.2003 passed decree in favour of the petitioner Bank to the tune of Rs.90,95,448/- with interest at the rate of 23% per annum and also awarded cost of Rs.3,000/-. However, the Board of Nominees came to the conclusion that the original defendant No.5 and the present respondent No.3 – original defendant No.6 were discharged from the said loan account. 5. The petitioner Bank, being aggrieved by the said order of discharge of original defendant Nos.5 and 6, filed an appeal before the Gujarat State Cooperative Tribunal being Appeal No.497 of 2003. The Tribunal vide its judgment and order dated 30.6.2009 was pleased to allow the appeal and modified the judgment and award of the Board of Nominees dated 6.1.2003 and hold that original defendant Nos.5 and 6 were jointly liable with original defendant Nos.1 and 4 and also granted injunction against respondent No.3 herein restraining her from dealing with the mortgaged property till the recovery of the award amount. 6. Thereafter, original defendant No.6 – respondent No.3 herein preferred a Review Application before the Tribunal which came to be registered as Review Application No.52 of 2009. 6. Thereafter, original defendant No.6 – respondent No.3 herein preferred a Review Application before the Tribunal which came to be registered as Review Application No.52 of 2009. The Tribunal vide order dated 29.7.2011 was pleased to review its earlier judgment and order dated 30.6.2009 and confirmed the judgment and award passed by the Board of Nominees in Lavad Case No.457 of 2001 dated 6.1.2003. The said order passed in Review Application No.52 of 2009 dated 29.7.2011 is impugned in the present petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. 7. Heard Mr. Sunit Shah, learned counsel with Mr. N.V. Gandhi for the petitioner, Mr. Amit Panchal, learned counsel with Ms. Shivani Rajpurohit for respondent No.3 and Mr. Mehul Shah, learned counsel for respondent No. 4. 8. Mr. Sunit Shah, learned counsel for the petitioner has taken this Court through the first order passed by the Board of Nominees dated 6.1.2003, the order passed in Appeal No.497 of 2003 by the Gujarat Cooperative Tribunal dated 30.6.2009 and has also taken me through the order impugned passed in Review Application No.52 of 2009 dated 29.7.2011 by the Tribunal. Mr. Shah has also taken me extensively through the documents relied upon by the petitioner in the present petition. 9. Mr. Sunit Shah vehemently submitted that the order impugned in the present petition lacks jurisdiction, inasmuch as, that the power of review as contemplated under Section 151 of the Act are akin to power of review of a Civil Court as provided under Order 47 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Mr. Sunit Shah has further submitted that none of the grounds raised in the review application would fall under the scope and ambit of Section 151 read with Order 47 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Mr. Sunit Shah submitted that the Tribunal in the appeal filed by the petitioner Bank has in detail dealt with many aspects and has given reasons for rejecting the contentions raised by respondent No.3 herein. Mr. Sunit Shah submitted that the Tribunal has applied its mind to all the contentions raised by both the parties and nothing has gone unnoticed and after assigning reasons, has been pleased to allow the said appeal vide judgment and order dated 30.6.2009. Mr. Mr. Sunit Shah submitted that the Tribunal has applied its mind to all the contentions raised by both the parties and nothing has gone unnoticed and after assigning reasons, has been pleased to allow the said appeal vide judgment and order dated 30.6.2009. Mr. Sunit Shah further submitted that the grounds for review provided under Section 151 of the Act are similarly to the grounds for review provided under Order 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Mr. Sunit Shah further submitted that considering the Review Application filed by the respondents, it is crystal clear that the same is filed on the ground that there has been some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record. The respondents have not alleged any other grounds and especially have not raised any ground based on discovery of new and important material of evidence for any other sufficient reason. Mr. Sunit Shah, therefore, submitted that none of the averments made in the application for review would fall within the purview of Section 151 of the Act. Mr. Sunit Shah relied upon the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of State of West Bengal & Ors. v. Kamal Sen Gupta & Anr., reported in (2008) 8 SCC 612 and submitted that as held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of West Bengal v. Kamal Sen Gupta (supra), the averments made in the Review Application before the Tribunal would not fall within 'any sufficient reasons' as provided in Section 151 of the Act. Mr. Sunit Shah further submitted that therefore, in view of the principles culled out by the Apex Court, a decision can be reviewed only on three grounds mentioned therein and for any other sufficient reason are to be interpreted in light of the other specific grounds. Mr. Sunit Shah further submitted that the powers of review cannot be exercised on the ground that the decision is erroneous and the Tribunal must confine its adjudication with reference to the material available at the time of decision. Referring to the facts of the case, Mr. Sunit Shah submitted that the Tribunal in its earlier decision has taken into consideration all the facts that were on record. Mr. Referring to the facts of the case, Mr. Sunit Shah submitted that the Tribunal in its earlier decision has taken into consideration all the facts that were on record. Mr. Sunit Shah submitted that the Tribunal in its earlier judgment and order dated 30.6.2009 has referred to the letter dated 29.5.1997 and has given reasons as to why it cannot help respondent No.4 in getting discharge from personal guarantee. Mr. Sunit Shah also drawn attention of this Court that it is not the case of the respondents that the arguments advanced by the respondents were not considered and/or not dealt with by the Tribunal. The Tribunal had already referred to the deposition of the Bank's witness and has come to the conclusion that the oral evidence is contrary to the documentary evidence available and therefore, the same cannot be relied upon. Mr. Sunit Shah also submitted that the Tribunal has also taken into consideration the resolution No.3. Mr. Sunit Shah also pointed out that the Tribunal has recorded that there is no dispute with the memorandum of agreement which was registered and that no registered release deed was executed thereafter and therefore, the findings arrived at by the Tribunal that the said resolution has not been implemented, cannot be faulted with and therefore, only because of the reason that the said contention of the respondents is not accepted by the Tribunal, it cannot be construed as an error apparent on the record or a mistake and that the only remedy available to the respondents was to approach the higher forum. Mr. Sunit Shah further submitted that even if it is presumed that the findings arrived at by the Tribunal in the appeal were erroneous, review cannot lie and that the Tribunal was not exercising appellate powers against its own judgment under Section 151 of the Act. Mr. Sunit Shah, therefore, submitted that the order is bad in law and on facts and the Tribunal has wrongly exercised the jurisdiction and has considered the same facts which are considered by the Tribunal earlier in its original judgment and order dated 30.6.2009. Mr. Sunit Shah, therefore, submitted that the order dated 29.7.2011 impugned in the present petition deserves to be quashed and set aside and the petition deserves to be allowed. 10. As against this, learned counsel Mr. Mr. Sunit Shah, therefore, submitted that the order dated 29.7.2011 impugned in the present petition deserves to be quashed and set aside and the petition deserves to be allowed. 10. As against this, learned counsel Mr. Mehul Shah for respondent No.4 supported the impugned judgment and order passed in Review Application No.52 of 2009 by the Tribunal dated 29.7.2011. Mr. Mehul Shah submitted that on bare reading of Section 151, it is clear that ultimately the Tribunal is empowered to exercise jurisdiction and the manner in which it has been exercised in the present case as is deemed fit, just and proper to exercise its power of review in the facts and circumstances of the present case. Mr. Mehul Shah further submitted that the Tribunal also has an equitable jurisdiction under Section 151 and the words “any other sufficient reason” would cover the issues which are raised by respondent No.3 herein–original defendant No.6 in the Review Application. Mr. Mehul Shah further submitted that in fact in the Review Application, respondent No.4– applicant before the Tribunal in the Review Application has taken three fold contentions and each one of is apparent on the face of the record. Mr. Mehul Shah further elucidating the contentions so raised in the Review Application, submitted that the wrong reading of resolution No.3 amounts to an error apparent on the face of the record. Mr. Mehul Shah further submitted that even though letter dated 29.5.1997, as referred to by the Tribunal in its earlier order, is produced on record. The Tribunal has not given any finding on it. Similarly, there is an express admission on the part of the witnesses of the petitioner Bank at Exh.24 – Kaushaben, that the mortgage has been released qua respondent No.3. Mr. Mehul Shah, therefore, submitted that there is an apparent error that the Tribunal has rightly exercised jurisdiction of review. Mr. Mehul Shah submitted that the words “any other sufficient reasons” would cover within its sweep, the contentions which are raised by respondent No.3 in the Review Application. Mr. Mehul Shah submitted that in fact the provision of review is for such purpose and therefore, the argument put forward by the present petitioner to the effect that the contentions raised by respondent No.3 in the Review Application are beyond the scope and ambit of Section 151 of the Act is wholly misconceived. Mr. Mr. Mehul Shah submitted that in fact the provision of review is for such purpose and therefore, the argument put forward by the present petitioner to the effect that the contentions raised by respondent No.3 in the Review Application are beyond the scope and ambit of Section 151 of the Act is wholly misconceived. Mr. Mehul Shah further submitted that the application for review before the Tribunal was essentially made on three-fold main grounds – (1) Apparent misreading of resolution No.3 passed by the Bank, (2) Failure to give any finding as regards the effect of Bank's letter dated 25.9.1997, and (3) Non-consideration/ non-reading of clear admission of witness of the Bank–Kaushaben (Exh.24). Mr. Mehul Shah further submitted that the three fold grounds can be established merely by referring to the record of the case and the same do not require any elaborate discussion/argument/ appreciation of evidence in detail and therefore, the Tribunal was justified and well within its power to review its earlier order and the same does not call for any interference by this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India in its extraordinary, equity and supervisory jurisdiction. Mr. Mehul Shah further submitted that in fact the Bank has already returned all the title deeds and the petitioner has suppressed this material fact in the petition and therefore, even under the provisions of Section 60 of the Transfer of Property Act, the equitable mortgage alleged to have been created in favour of Bank has come to an end. Mr. Mehul Shah further submitted that the conduct of the Bank also establishes the fact that the petition is an afterthought and the same is filed for some oblique purpose as the Bank did not raise any objection to the public notice dated 26.3.2000. 11. Mr. Mehul Shah raised a specific plea to the effect that as the concerned respondent who has mortgaged the property by creation of equitable mortgage is in possession of the original document of the property so mortgaged would mean that the right of mortgage has been redeemed as provided under Section 60. 12. Mr. Mehul Shah also relied upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Board of Control for Cricket, India & Anr. 12. Mr. Mehul Shah also relied upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Board of Control for Cricket, India & Anr. v. Netaji Cricket Club & Ors., reported in AIR 2005 SC 592 and particularly, para 88 to 90 in order to buttress his argument that the power of review of the Tribunal under Section 151 of the Act are wide enough to include a misconception of fact or law by a Court or even an Advocate and that has put harmonious interpretation on words “other sufficient reason” in Section 151 of the Act. Mr. Mehul Shah further submitted that as such the review is also permissible under sound exercise of discretion by the Tribunal on the grounds for doing justice between the parties which would also include equitable consideration. Mr. Mehul Shah, therefore, submitted that if some error or mistake is ex-facie shown from the record itself and that it does not require any further elaboration on facts as well as law, the exercise of review jurisdiction is permissible. Mr. Mehul Shah, therefore, submitted that the petition is devoid of any merits and the same deserves to be dismissed. 13. Mr. Amit Panchal, learned counsel with Ms. Shivani Purohit appearing for respondent No.3 also adopted the arguments made by Mr. Mehul Shah, learned counsel for respondent No.4 and has supported the judgment and order passed by the Tribunal. Mr. Amit Panchal also submitted that respondent No.3 was discharged as guarantor and had nothing to do with the claim of Bank on the issue of public money and therefore, the petition deserves to be dismissed with heavy exemplary costs. 14. Before adverting to the contentions raised by rival side, it would be appropriate to refer to the provisions of Section 151 of the Act, which reads as under :- “151. 14. Before adverting to the contentions raised by rival side, it would be appropriate to refer to the provisions of Section 151 of the Act, which reads as under :- “151. Review of orders of Tribunal.- (1) The Tribunal may, either on the application of the Registrar, or on the application of any party interested, review its own order in any case, and pass in reference thereto such order as it thinks just: Provided that, no such application made by the party interested shall be entertained, unless the Tribunal is satisfied that there has been discovery of new and important matter of evidence, which after the exercise of due diligence was not within the knowledge of the applicant or could not be produced by him at the time when its order was made, or that there has been some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record, or for any other sufficient reasons : Provided further that, no such order shall be varied or revised, unless notice has been given to the parties interested to appear and be heard in support of such order. (2) An application for review under sub-section (1) by any party, shall be made within ninety days from the date of the communication of the order of the Tribunal." 15. On considering the bare facts arising out of this petition, it transpires that the suit filed by the Bank for recovery of outstanding amount from the borrowers and guarantors including respondent No.3 was decreed in favour of the petitioner Bank vide judgment and award dated 6.1.2003 as stated herein above, wherein the Board of Nominee was pleased to discharge original defendant Nos.5 and 6. The petitioner Bank preferred an appeal as contemplated under Section 102 of the Act against the order of discharge of original defendant Nos.5 and 6 and the Tribunal vide judgment and order dated 30.6.2009 was pleased to allow the appeal and modified the judgment and award of Board of Nominees and came to the conclusion that original defendant Nos.5 and 6 were jointly liable with original defendant Nos.1 to 4 and also granted further injunction as narrated herein above. It is worthwhile to note that the said judgment and order passed in appeal was not challenged before the higher forum available under the law. It is worthwhile to note that the said judgment and order passed in appeal was not challenged before the higher forum available under the law. However, the Review Application has been filed being Review Application No.52 of 2009 on 25.7.2009 and in para 4 thereof has contended that the appeal is allowed on the ground that as per resolution No.3 (mark 20/23), the applicant i.e. original defendant No.6 was to bring a new guarantor, which has not been brought. The applicant has further stated in the Review Application that such finding is contrary to the record of the Bank and is not in consonance with the resolution. The Bank in its resolution has nowhere stated that the guarantor would be discharged only on bringing a new guarantor and therefore, there is ex-facie error and interpretation. It was also further averred in the Review Application that the letter dated 29.5.1997 written by the Bank to the applicant i.e. original defendant No.6 informing that she has been discharged, is not taken into consideration by the Tribunal and no reasons are assigned for not accepting the same and therefore, there is an error apparent on record. It is also further averred in the Review Application that the deposition of Bank witness Kaushaben, Exh.24 in the admission made by Bank witness is not taken into consideration and therefore, there is an error in the order. It is also further averred in the Review Application that the conclusion arrived at as regards the equitable mortgage and that the property belonging to the applicant therein i.e. original defendant No.6 is erroneous. It is further averred in the said Review Application that the deposition of Bank witness Kaushaben, Exh.24 in an admission that no property belonged to defendant No.6 is mortgaged, is not taken into consideration, whereas taking into consideration the document of equitable mortgage, the conclusion is rendered by the Tribunal and such conclusion is an error apparent on record. It was further averred that there is no mention about the document and the plaintiff has not put the said documents on record and no reliance can be placed on a xerox copy of the said document and therefore, an erroneous order is passed, which is an error of law and an error apparent on the face of the record. The Tribunal, by the impugned order while considering the averments, has allowed the said application. 16. The Tribunal, by the impugned order while considering the averments, has allowed the said application. 16. This Court finds that the grounds stated in the Review Application do not refer to any new evidence, but as aforesaid the applicant before the Tribunal has pointed out the facts which have been dealt with by the Tribunal earlier and no new or important matter has been brought on record in the Review Application. Though learned counsel Mr. Mehul Shah has urged before this Court that the grounds enumerated in the Review Application would fall within the scope and ambit of “any other sufficient reason”, the Review Application itself discloses that the three-fold submissions made in para 4 relate to the material which was already on record. 17. This Court (Coram: Jayant Patel, J.) in the case of Kusumben Narandas Patel v. Swami Gunatitnagar Co.op. Housing Society Ltd., reported in 2008 (2) GLH 123 , while examining the scope and ambit of Section 151 and powers of the Tribunal to exercise the power of review under the said Section, has observed thus : “4. The examination of the aforesaid contention mainly arises for considering the scope and ambit of the review powers of the Tribunal. Housing Society Ltd., reported in 2008 (2) GLH 123 , while examining the scope and ambit of Section 151 and powers of the Tribunal to exercise the power of review under the said Section, has observed thus : “4. The examination of the aforesaid contention mainly arises for considering the scope and ambit of the review powers of the Tribunal. Section 151 of the Gujarat Cooperative Societies Act (hereinafter ‘the Act’ for short) reads as under : “Review of orders of Tribunal : (i) The Tribunal may, either on the application of the Registrar, or on the application of any party interested, review its own order in any case, and pass in reference thereto such order as it thinks just : Provided that, no such application made by the party interested shall be entertained, unless the Tribunal is satisfied that there has been discovery of new and important matter of evidence, which after the exercise of due diligence was not within the knowledge of the applicant or could not be produced by him at the time when its order was made, or that there has been some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record, or for any other sufficient reasons : Provided further that, no such order shall be varied or revised, unless notice has been given to the parties interested to appear and be heard in support of such order, (ii) An application for review under subsection (1) by any party, shall be made within ninety days from the date of the communication of the order of the Tribunal.” The aforesaid provision as such can be said as akin to the provisions of Section 114 of the Civil Procedure Code read with the provisions of Order XLVII Rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Code. Rule 1 of Order XLVII reads as under : “1. Rule 1 of Order XLVII reads as under : “1. Application for review of Judgment- (1) Any person considering himself aggrieved- (a) by a decree or order from which an appeal is allowed, but from which no appeal has been preferred, (b) by a decree or order from which no appeal is allowed, or (c) by a decision on a reference from a Court of Small Causes, and who, from the discovery of new and important matter of evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence was not within the knowledge or could not be produced by him at the time when the decree was passed or order made, or on account of some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record, or for any other sufficient reason, desires to obtain a review of the decree passed or order made against him, may apply for a review of judgment to the Court which passed the decree or made the order. (2) A party who is not appealing from a decree or order may apply for a review of judgment notwithstanding the pendency of an appeal by some other party except where the ground of such appeal is common to the applicant and the appellant, or when, being respondent, he can present to the appellate Court the case on which he applies for the review.” 5. Therefore, if the language of the aforesaid Section 151 of the Act is considered, the Tribunal can exercise the power of review only if : (i) There is discovery of new and matter of evidence which after exercise of due diligence was not within the knowledge of the applicant or could not be produced by him at the time when the order was made. (ii) Or that there has been some mistake or error apparent on the face of record. (iii) Or for any other sufficient reasons. As regards the provisions of Order XLVII Rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Code is concerned, the language provides for review, if the conditions are : (i) Discovery of new and important matter or evidence which after exercise of due diligence was not within the knowledge of the applicant or could not be produced by him at the time when the decree was passed or order was made. (ii) Or on account of some mistake or apparent error on the face of record. (ii) Or on account of some mistake or apparent error on the face of record. (iii) For any sufficient reasons. Therefore, in view of the similar language for satisfaction of condition for exercise of the powers for review under Section 151 of the Act and of Order XLVII Rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Code, the principles which are settled for exercise of the power by the Court for review under Order XLVII Rule 1 can be made applicable for the exercise of the power by the Tribunal under Section 151 of the Act. 7. In the case of Haridas v. Smt. Usha Rani Banik & Ors. reported at 2006(4) SCC 78 , the Apex Court did consider the scope and ambit of the review powers under Section 114 read with Order XLVII of the Civil Procedure Code and it was inter alia observed at para 13 as under : “In order to appreciate the scope of a review, Section 114 of the CPC has to be read, but this section does not even adumbrate the ambit of interference expected of the Court since it merely states that it "may make such order thereon as it thinks fit." The parameters are prescribed in Order XLVII of the CPC and for the purposes of this lis, permit the defendant to press for a rehearing "on account of some mistake or error apparent on the face of the records or for any other sufficient reason". The former part of the rule deals with a situation attributable to the applicant, and the latter to a jural action which is manifestly incorrect or on which two conclusions are not possible. Neither of them postulate a rehearing of the dispute because a party had not highlighted all the aspects of the case or could perhaps have argued them more forcefully and/or cited binding precedents to the Court and thereby enjoyed a favourable verdict. This is amply evident from the explanation in Rule 1 of the Order XLVII which states that the fact that the decision on a question of law on which the judgment of the Court is based has been reversed or modified by the subsequent decision of a superior Court in any other case, shall not be a ground for the review of such judgment. Where the order in question is appeal able the aggrieved party has adequate and efficacious remedy and the Court should exercise the power to review its order with the greatest circumspection.” 18. Similarly, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of State of West Bengal v. Kamal Sen Gupta (supra) in para 35 has culled out the principles of review as under : “35. The principles which can be culled out from the above noted judgments are : (i) The power of the Tribunal to review its order/decision under Section 22(3)(f) of the Act is akin/analogous to the power of a Civil Court under Section 114 read with Order 47 Rule 1 of CPC. (ii) The Tribunal can review its decision on either of the grounds enumerated in Order 47 Rule 1 and not otherwise. (iii) The expression “any other sufficient reason” appearing in Order 47 Rule 1 has to be interpreted in the light of other specified grounds. (iv) An error which is not self-evident and which can be discovered by a long process of reasoning, cannot be treated as an error apparent on the face of record justifying exercise of power under Section 22(3)(f). (v) An erroneous order/decision cannot be corrected in the guise of exercise of power of review. (vi) A decision/order cannot be reviewed under Section 22(3)(f) on the basis of subsequent decision/judgment of a coordinate or larger bench of the Tribunal or of a superior Court. (vii) While considering an application for review, the Tribunal must confine its adjudication with reference to material which was available at the time of initial decision. The happening of some subsequent event or development cannot be taken note of for declaring the initial order/decision as vitiated by an error apparent. (viii) Mere discovery of new or important matter or evidence is not sufficient ground for review. The party seeking review has also to show that such matter or evidence was not within its knowledge and even after the exercise of due diligence, the same could not be produced before the Court/Tribunal earlier.” 19. (viii) Mere discovery of new or important matter or evidence is not sufficient ground for review. The party seeking review has also to show that such matter or evidence was not within its knowledge and even after the exercise of due diligence, the same could not be produced before the Court/Tribunal earlier.” 19. On reading Section 151 of the Act, this Court finds that the power of review under the Act clearly provides that such powers can be exercised only if there is discovery of new and important matter of evidence which was not within the knowledge of the applicant even after exercise of due diligence or could not be produced by the applicant when the previous order was made or that there has been some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record or for any other sufficient reason which this Court finds that are akin to the power of review as provided under Order 47 Rule 1 of the C.P.C. 20. As aforesaid in the Review Application itself, the applicant – respondent No.3 herein has averred that the Tribunal has wrongly interpreted resolution No.3, letter dated 25.9.1997 which was on record but was not taken into consideration by the Tribunal and the deposition of Bank witness Kaushaben, Exh.24 is also not taken into consideration and has in fact averred that there is an error apparent on the face of the record. Mr. Mehul Shah, learned counsel for respondent No.4 herein has, as aforesaid, argued that it would fall within the sufficient reason. On the basis of the ratio laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of State of West Bengal v. Kamal Sen Gupta (supra) as well as decision of this Court in the case of Kusumben Narandas Patel v. Swami Gunatitnagar Co.op. Housing Society Ltd. (supra), this Court finds that the Tribunal has wrongly exercised jurisdiction under Section 151 of the Act. The Tribunal, while dealing with the appeal, has dealt with resolution No.3, the letter dated 29.5.1997 as well as the deposition of Bank witness Kaushaben, Exh.24 and has given a definite finding. Therefore, no new facts or evidence has been brought on record. The Tribunal, while dealing with the appeal, has dealt with resolution No.3, the letter dated 29.5.1997 as well as the deposition of Bank witness Kaushaben, Exh.24 and has given a definite finding. Therefore, no new facts or evidence has been brought on record. The judgment cannot be corrected merely because it is erroneous in law or on the ground that the different view could have been taken by the Tribunal on the point of fact or law and the Tribunal while exercising powers of review under Section 151 cannot sit in appeal over its own judgment and the same cannot be corrected by exercising powers of review under Section 151 of the Act. 21. From the above facts, it is clear that the review is not sought on the ground of discovery of any new matter or evidence, but even as per the contentions raised by Mr. Mehul Shah, learned counsel for respondent No.4, the review was sought on the ground of other sufficient reasons. However, any other sufficient reasons should be analogous to the other conditions of the provisions of Section 151 of the Act. 22. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Ajit Kumar Rath v. State of Orissa and others, reported in (1999) 9 SCC 596 has observed thus:- “30. The provisions extracted above indicate that the power of review available to the Tribunal is the same as has been given to a court under Section 114 read with Order 47 CPC. The power is not absolute and is hedged in by the restrictions indicated in Order 47. The power can be exercised on the application of a person on the discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence, was not within his knowledge or could not be produced by him at the time when the order was made. The power can also be exercised on account of some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record or for any other sufficient reason. A review cannot be claimed or asked for merely for a fresh hearing or arguments or correction of an erroneous view taken earlier, that is to say, the power of review can be exercised only for correction of a patent error of law or fact which stares in the face without any elaborate argument being needed for establishing it. A review cannot be claimed or asked for merely for a fresh hearing or arguments or correction of an erroneous view taken earlier, that is to say, the power of review can be exercised only for correction of a patent error of law or fact which stares in the face without any elaborate argument being needed for establishing it. It may be pointed out that the expression "any other sufficient reason" used in Order 47 Rule 1 means a reason sufficiently analogous to those specified in the rule. 31. Any other attempt, except an attempt to correct an apparent error or an attempt not based on any ground set out in Order 47, would amount to an abuse of the liberty given to the Tribunal under the Act to review its judgment.” Therefore, as per the ratio laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of State of West Bengal v. Kamal Sen Gupta (supra), any other sufficient reason is to be interpreted in light of other specific grounds. 23. Mr. Mehul Shah has relied upon the case of Board of Control for Cricket, India v. Netaji Cricket Club (supra), wherein the powers of review under Section 114 read with Order 47 Rule 1 of the CPC came to be exercised on the ground that there was mistake on the part of the Court which would include the mistake in nature of undertaking which has come across the bar. In the instant case, this Court finds that from what was sought to be averred in the Review Application, it cannot be said that there was an error apparent on the face of the record and any other sufficient reason has to be interpreted in light of other specific grounds as held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of State of West Bengal v. Kamal Sen Gupta (supra). In addition to this, the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of State of West Bengal v. Kamal Sen Gupta (supra) in Para 22 has observed thus : “22. The term 'mistake or error apparent' by its very connotation signifies an error which is evident per se from the record of the case and does not require detailed examination, scrutiny and elucidation either of the facts or the legal position. The term 'mistake or error apparent' by its very connotation signifies an error which is evident per se from the record of the case and does not require detailed examination, scrutiny and elucidation either of the facts or the legal position. If an error is not self-evident and detection thereof requires long debate and process of reasoning, it cannot be treated as an error apparent on the face of the record for the purpose of Order 47 Rule 1 CPC or Section 22(3)(f) of the Act. To put it differently an order or decision or judgment cannot be corrected merely because it is erroneous in law or on the ground that a different view could have been taken by the Court/Tribunal on a point of fact or law. In any case, while exercising the power of review, the concerned Court/Tribunal cannot sit in appeal over its judgment/decision.” 24. However, in the instant case, the power of review is exercised for upsetting a finding given by the Tribunal in its earlier order. The error for misreading a document on record and the other averments made in para 4 of the Review Application, as aforesaid, cannot constitute valid grounds for exercising power of review under Section 151 of the Act and if such powers are read instead of resorting to the remedy of challenging the order passed in appeal before a higher forum to reverse such decision, it would get frustrated. In the instant case, the earlier Bench of the Tribunal had considered the matter on merits and a final view has been expressed and the same cannot be upset or reversed by another Bench of the Tribunal while exercising its powers under Section 151 of the Act. 25. In view of the above, this Court finds that the exercise of powers under Section 151 in the instant case are beyond the scope and ambit of Section 151 of the Act. The order impugned passed in Review Application No.52 of 2009 dated 29.7.2011 by respondent No.1 Tribunal deserves to be quashed and set aside. Thus, the Tribunal while exercising the powers under Section 151 of the Act cannot sit in an appeal over its own judgment. The contention raised by Mr. The order impugned passed in Review Application No.52 of 2009 dated 29.7.2011 by respondent No.1 Tribunal deserves to be quashed and set aside. Thus, the Tribunal while exercising the powers under Section 151 of the Act cannot sit in an appeal over its own judgment. The contention raised by Mr. Mehul Shah, learned counsel for respondent No.4 that the original documents are with respondent No.2 is not even pleaded in the Review Application and considering the facts of this case, that would not ipso facto give power of review to the Tribunal. 26. In view of the above, the order passed by respondent No.1 Tribunal in Review Application No.52 of 2009 dated 29.7.2011 cannot be sustained and the same is hereby quashed and set aside. The petition is allowed to the aforesaid extent. Rule is made absolute accordingly with no order as to costs. Petition allowed.