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2011 DIGILAW 868 (MP)

Cadila Health Care Ltd. v. Additional Commissioner, Commercial Tax

2011-08-03

ALOK ARADHE, S.R.ALAM

body2011
ORDER S.R. Alam, C. J. 1. The short question which arises for consideration in the instant writ petition is whether GRD powder and GRD Bix would fall within the expression "non-alcoholic drink and beverage" as employed by the legislature in Entry 20(ii) of Part - IV of the Schedule of the Madhya Pradesh Commercial Tax Act, 1994 (hereinafter referred to as 'the 1994 Act') and under Entry 14 of the Schedule- II of the Madhya Pradesh Sthaniya Kshetra Me Mal Ke Pravesh Par Kar Adhiniyam, 1976 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Entry Tax Act'), so as to attract a higher rate of tax @ 10% and 2% respectively. 2. Facts, necessary for determination of the aforesaid question briefly stated are that the petitioner-company is a pharmaceutical company registered under the provisions of Companies Act, 1956. The petitioner-company deals in drugs and medicines and food supplements carrying brand names "GRD Powder and GRD Bix". The petitioner company is registered as a dealer under the provisions of the 1994 Act. The petitioner company filed the return and paid commercial tax @ 8% of total turn-over in respect of GRD Powder and GRD Bix, treating the same as goods falling under residuary clause in Part IV of Schedule II of the Act as goods not included in any other part of Schedule - II or Schedule - I of the 1994 Act. 3. During course of assessment proceedings for the period from 1.4.1997 to 31.3.1998, an explanation was sought from the petitioners as to why sales of GRD Powder and GRD Bix be not taxed @ 10% being covered under Entry 20(ii) of Part-IV of. Schedule-II of the 1994 Act. The petitioners filed their response to the explanation inter pointing out that products in question are not covered under the aforesaid entry. It was stated that products in question are food supplements which are sold by licensed chemists on prescription of doctors and are not available in grocery or general goods shop. 4. The Assistant Commissioner vide orders of assessment dated 07.4.2001 (Annexures-P-2 & P-3) rejected the explanation submitted by the petitioners and followed the order of Commissioner in the case of Bourn vita as well as decisions of Gujrat and Madras high Courts and assessed the petitioners to commercial tax @ 10% with surcharge and held that items in question fall under Entry 20(ii) of Part-IV of Schedule-II of the 1994 Act. The Assistant Commissioner also levied entry tax @ 2% and held that items sold by the petitioners are covered under Entry 14 of Scheduled-II of the Entry Tax Act. Being aggrieved by the aforesaid orders of assessment, the petitioners filed revision before Additional Commissioner of Commercial Tax. The Additional Commissioner vide common order dated 30.9.2002 (Annexure-P/8) upheld the order of assessment of Assistant Commissioner. 5. Shri H.S.Shrivastava, learned senior counsel appearing for assessee has argued that if the words employed in the Entry 20(ii) of Part-TV of Schedule II of 1994 Act are read in its entirety it is clear that beverage has to be in liquid form. He has also been argued that it is a well settled principle of statutory interpretation that if certain words are used in the statute which are capable of construed in a popular sense; their common parlance meaning has to be taken in account. It has been further argued that in order to fall under the special entry, item should clearly come within the ambit and scope of the entry failing which it will fall under the residuary entry. In support of his submissions learned senior counsel has relied on decisions of the Supreme Court reported in Commissioner of Central Excise, Mumbai vs. Amar Dey & Chemical Ltd., (2003) 1 STJ 318 (SC), Commissioner of Sales Tax vs. Food Specialists Ltd., (1995) 97 STC 407, Brooke Bond India Limited vs. State of Kerala. (1992) 84 STC 334 and Deputy Commissioner of Sales Tax (Law), Board of Revenue (Taxes), Ernakulam, (1989) 74 STC 185. 6. On the other hand, Mr.Naman Nagrath, learned Additional Advocate General has taken us through the orders passed by the Assistant Commissioner as well as the order passed in revision by Additional Commissioner and has submitted that Assessing and Revisional Authorities have considered the matter in detail and have given cogent reasons. All aspects of the issue have been elaborately considered. It is also submitted that from perusal of documents filed by the petitioner itself, it is clear that petitioner is marketing the product as beverage. A beverage is not required necessarily to be in liquid form, and the end use of product will determine the nature of product. He has further submitted that relevant entries are broad and inclusive. It is also submitted that from perusal of documents filed by the petitioner itself, it is clear that petitioner is marketing the product as beverage. A beverage is not required necessarily to be in liquid form, and the end use of product will determine the nature of product. He has further submitted that relevant entries are broad and inclusive. In support of his submission, learned Additional Advocate General has relied on decisions reported in Collector of Central Excise, Bombay-I and Another v. M/s. Parle Exports (P) Ltd., (1989) 1 SCC 345 , Hamdard (Wakf) Laboratories vs. Collector of Central Excise, Meerut, (1999) 6 SCC 617 , Pioma Industries and Others vs. State of Kerala, (2008) 12 SCC 695 , S.Samuel, M.D.Harrisons Malayalam and Another vs. Union of India and Others, (2004) 1 SCC 256 . 7. We have-considered the submissions made on both sides. It is well established rule of statutory interpretation that a taxing statute has to be construed strictly. In this connection we reproduce the relevant extracts from pages 815, 819 and 821 of Principles of Statutory Interpretation by Justice G.P.Singh, 12th Edition. The well-established rule in the familiar words of Lord WENSLEYDALE, reaffirmed by LORD HALSBURY and LORD SIMONDS, meians: "The subject is not to be taxed without clear words for that purpose; and also that every Act of Parliament must be read according to the natural construction of its words' Bhagwati. J, stated the principle as follows: "In construing fiscal statutes and in determining the liability of a subject to a tax one must have regard to the strict letter of the law. If the revenue satisfies the court that the case falls strictly within the provisions of of the law, the subject can be taxed. If on the other hand, the case is not covered within the four corners of the provisions of the taxing statute, no tax can be imposed by inference or by analogy or by trying to prove into the intentions of the Legislature and by considering what was the substance of the matter. Shah, J., has formulated the principle thus: In interpreting a taxing statute, equitable consideration are entirely out of place. Nor can taxing statutes be interpreted on any presumptions or assumptions. The court must look squarely at the words of the statute and interpret them. Shah, J., has formulated the principle thus: In interpreting a taxing statute, equitable consideration are entirely out of place. Nor can taxing statutes be interpreted on any presumptions or assumptions. The court must look squarely at the words of the statute and interpret them. It must interpret a taxing statute in the light of what is clearly expressed; it cannot imply anything which is not expressed; it cannot import provisions in the statute so as to supply any assumed deficiency. And K.Iyer, J., more recently observed: "Taxation consideration may stem from administrative experience and other factors of life and not artistic visualization or neat logic and so the literal, though pedestrain interpretation must prevail." Before taxing any person it must be shown that he falls within the ambit of the charging section by clear words used in the section. Therefore, if the words used are ambiguous and reasonably open to two interpretations benefit of interpretation is given to the subject. 8. The question which arose for consideration before the Supreme Court in Commissioner of Central Excise, Mumbai vs. Amar Dye & Chemical Ltd., (2003) 1 STJ 318 (SC) was whether 'Sharbat Rooh Afza' can be treated as beverage. In the aforesaid context, in paragraph 5, the Supreme Court held that beverage broadly speaking, are liquid for drinking, other than water, which may be consumed neat or after dilution. Similarly, Division Bench of Bombay High Court in a decision reported in Commissioner of Sales Tax vs. Food Specialities Ltd., (1995) 97 STC 407 held that beverage as commonly understood means any liquid for drinking other than water. The Division Bench of High Court of Kerala while considering the question whether Coffee which is sold under the brand name of 'Bru' can be treated as a beverage, answered the aforesaid question in the negative and held that words in everyday use when come up for interpretation before the Court have to be understood in their popular sense. 9. Another Division Bench of High Court of Kerala, in Deputy Commissioner of Sales Tax (Law), Board of Revenue (Taxes), Ernakulam, (1989) 74 STC 185 has held that since 'Rasna is only a concentrate and not a liquid, therefore, it would not come within the ambit of the expression beverage. 10. 9. Another Division Bench of High Court of Kerala, in Deputy Commissioner of Sales Tax (Law), Board of Revenue (Taxes), Ernakulam, (1989) 74 STC 185 has held that since 'Rasna is only a concentrate and not a liquid, therefore, it would not come within the ambit of the expression beverage. 10. In the backdrop of well settled Principles of Interpretation of Taxing Statutes and case law referred to supra following orincioles of law emerge: (i) A taxing statute has to be strictly construed. The subject is not to be taxed without clear words for that purpose. (ii) The provisions of the Act must be read according to natural construction of its words. (iii) No tax can be imposed by inference or by analogy or by trying to probe into the intention of the legislature. (iv) Before taxing any person, it must be shown that he falls within the ambit of charging section by clear words used in the section. (v) If certain words are used in the statute which are capable of construed in a popular sense, their common parlance meaning has to be taken into account. 11. Now we may advert to facts of the case. For facility of reference, relevant entries are reproduced below: Commercial Tax Act Schedule H Part IV 20 (ii) All kinds of non alcoholic drinks and beverages including syrups, cordials, distilled juice, ark and essences when sold in seales or capsuled or cork bottles or jars. Entry Tax Act: Schedule II 14 All kinds of non-alcoholic drinks and beverages, ice creams, Kulfi and ice-candy. 12. In Lazarus Alosious v. State of Kerala, (2006) 144 STC 210 (Ker.) the Full Bench of Kerala High Court held that in a generic sense any potable liquid except water is a 'beverage'. From perusal of the language employed by the legislature in Entry 20 (ii) of part IV of the 1994 Act, the intention of the legislature is clear that an item in order to fall under the aforesaid entry has to be in the liquid form which is manifest from the words "beverages including syrups, cordials, distilled juice, ark and essences when sold in sealed or capsuled or cork bottles or jars". In South Bihar Sugar Mills Ltd. V. Union of India, AIR 1968 SC 922 it has been held that Act does not define goods, the Legislature must be taken to have used that word in its ordinary, dictionary meaning. The dictionary meaning is that to become goods it must be something which can ordinarily come to the market to be bought and sold and known to the market. In order to ascertain meaning of word 'Beverage' in common parlance, we may refer to its meaning as described in dictionaries, as the same has not been described in the Act. In Random House Unabridged Dictionary, Second Edition, word 'beverage' has been described to mean any potable liquid especially one other than water, as tea, coffee, beer or milk. In New English Dictionary and Theasuraus published by Geddes and Grosset, 'Beverage' is described a drink especially one other than water. Similarly Chambers 21st Centuary Dictionary, word 'Beverage' has been described a prepared drink especially a hot drink i.e. tea or coffee or an alcoholic drink. In New Concise Oxford English Dictionary 11th Edition, 'Beverage' is described as a drink other than water. 13. Thus, the expression' Beverage' as is common understood means any liquid other than water, which may be consumed neat or after dilution. Thus, the products in question, namely, GRD Powder and GRD Bix which are admittedly not in liquid form cannot be said to fall within the relevant entries namely Entry 20(ii) of Part IV of Schedule II of 1994 Act and Entry 14 of Schedule II of Entry Tax Act. 14. The decision relied upon by the learned counsel for revenue are clearly distinguishable. In Collector of Central Excise, Bombay-1 and Another vs. M/s Parle Exports (P) Ltd. (1989) 1 SCC 345 , the question which arose for consideration before Supreme Court was whether non-alcoholic beverages bases are food products or food preparations. In Pioma Industries and Others Vs. State of Kerala, (2008) 12 SCC 695 , Supreme Court considered the question whether Rasna in a concentrate form would be a beverage in the context of Entry 87 of the relevant Act which include products like Horlicks, Boost Bourn vita in beverage specifically in Entry 87. Therefore the aforesaid decision is also distinguishable. In Pioma Industries and Others Vs. State of Kerala, (2008) 12 SCC 695 , Supreme Court considered the question whether Rasna in a concentrate form would be a beverage in the context of Entry 87 of the relevant Act which include products like Horlicks, Boost Bourn vita in beverage specifically in Entry 87. Therefore the aforesaid decision is also distinguishable. Counsel for revenue also placed reliance on S.Samuel, M.D. Harrisons Malayalam and another vs. Union of India and Others, (2004) 1 SCC 256 to contend that Tea has been considered to be a beverage. Learned counsel for the respondent has drawn our attention of observation made by the Supreme Court in para 15 of the aforesaid judgment to contend that in a wider sense food may include not only solid substance but also a drink. However, the issue which was involved in the aforesaid case whether Tea is a food-stuff under the provisions of Essential Commodities Act, 1955. From perusal of para 17 of the judgment, it is apparent that Tea by itself is not a beverage until and unless water is added. 15. In view of the preceding analysis, the writ petition is allowed. The orders passed by the Assessing Authority as well as Revisional Authority contained in Annexures P-2 and P-3 dated 7.4.2001 and Annexures P/8 dated 30.9.2002 are hereby quashed. The respondents are directed to refund the tax collected in excess for the relevant period along with interest at the rate of 6% p.a.