JUDGMENT: The petitioner is aggrieved against the order of detention dated 20.11.2010, Annexure-2, passed by the District Magistrate, Ranchi u/s 12 of the Jharkhand Control of Crimes Act, 2002 and he has given grounds for passing the order, Annexure-3, of the same date. The order of the District Magistrate, Ranchi referred above has been approved by the State Government u/s 12 (2) of the said Act, 2002 on 29th November, 2010. The detention was approved by the Advisory Board in its meeting dated 16.12.2010. 2. Learned counsel for the petitioner vehementally submitted that the District Magistrate, Ranchi has taken into consideration absolutely irrelevant facts as well as misread even report of the police and, therefore, without application of mind has passed the order of detention of the writ petitioner. The State Government also without noticing these grave mistakes confirmed the detention order u/s 12(2) of the Act of 2002. The said mistake has also not been addressed by the Advisory Board as is apparent from the decision of the Advisory Board. 3. It is also submitted that the matter should have been placed before the Advisory Board within a period of three weeks from the date of detention of the writ petitioner and the matter was not infact placed before the Advisory Board as mandatorily required by Section 19 of the Act. Learned counsel for the petitioner relied upon a Division Bench Judgement of this Court wherein it has been held that mere presention of a matter before any officer of the Advisory Board is not sufficient compliance of Section 19 of the Act of 1981 as rendered in W.P. (Cr.) No. 220 of 1988 in the case of Dinesh Yadav – vs.-The State of Bihar & Ors. decided on 05.10.1988 by a Division Bench of Patna High Court. 4. It is also submitted that all the authorities failed to draw difference between “Law & Order” and “Public Order” and they proceeded that in a case of disturbance of “Law & Order” the detention order can be passed which is in contravention of the statutory provision u/s 12 of the Act of 2002. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioner also relied upon a judgement of the Hon'ble Apex Court delivered in the case of Rekha -vs.-State of Tamil Nadu Tr. Sec. To Govt. & Anr. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioner also relied upon a judgement of the Hon'ble Apex Court delivered in the case of Rekha -vs.-State of Tamil Nadu Tr. Sec. To Govt. & Anr. wherein the distinction between the “Public Order” and “Law & Order” has been considered in detail i.e. in Criminal Appeal No. 755 of 2011. 6. Learned counsel for the petitioner also drew our attention to the fact that in one of the criminal case, facts of which were taken into consideration in the order for detention, the petitioner was already acquited and in another order passed by this Court bail has been granted to the writ petitioner to submit that all the allegations levelled against the petitioner were false and he has been granted bail after considering the merit of the case by the competent Court and, therefore, the orders which have been passed ignoring the bail orders suffers from the patent error on the face of the record as well as in fact proves non-application of mind. 7. It is submitted that the authorities should have considered all the facts if, they were against the writ petitioner as well as the facts which were in favour of the petitioner so as to judge the desirability of detention of the writ petitioner. 8. Learned counsel for the State submitted that so far as the decision of a Division Bench of Patna High Court in the case of Dinesh Yadav (Supra) is concerned, that has been specifically over-ruled by the Full Bench of the Patna High Court in the case of Raj Kumar Gupta – vs.-The State of Bihar and others reported in 1990 East India Criminal Cases 212 and it has been specifically held that the law laid down in the case of Dinesh Yadav (Supra) is not correct intrepretation of law and the word “placed before” the Advisory Board does not mean the placing of the matter before the entire Advisory Board. 9. Learned counsel for the State also drew our attention to Section 12-A to indicate that where detention order contains severable grounds and if one or some grounds are vague and some of them are non-existent and some of them are non-relevant and some of them are not connected or not proximately connected with such person or invalid for any other reason shall be no ground for setting aside the order of detention. 10. 10. Learned counsel for the State also drew our attention to the reasons given in the order of detention and submitted that all these criminal cases, in which the petitioner was involved were not the matters relating to the problem of “Law & Order” but it was in relation to the “Public Order” as the petitioner has been alleged to be involved in demand of ransom and committing of loot etc. 11. We considered the submissions of the learned counsel for the parties and perused the facts of the case. 12. In the case of Raj Kumar Gupta – vs.-The State of Bihar and others (Supra), in para-8 the issue has been considered in detail for interpreting the words “placed before” the Advisory Board. We would like to quote para-8 which is as under:- 8. “ The first point which requires consideration although not pressed by the learned counsel for the petitioner in view of decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Raisuddin Alias Babu Tamchi v. The State of Uttar Pardesh and another (AIR 1984 Supreme Court 46) is that what should be the meaning of the words 'placed before' the Advisory Board as used under Section 19 of the Act. It has become necessary to give a decision on this point since a view contrary to the view taken by the Supreme Court in the case of Raisuddin Alias Babu Tamchi (supra) has been expressed by the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Dinesh Yadav (supra). It was contended on behalf of the petitioner before the Hon'ble single Judge as well as the Division Bench that the case of petitioner has not been placed before the Advisory Board within three weeks within the meaning of Section 19 of the Act since the order of detention was passed on 26.5.1988. Reference was made by the State Government on 16.6.1988 but the Advisory Board considered the case of the petitioner on 20.6.1988. Hence, according to the learned counsel of the petitioner, it was placed before the Advisory Board after the expiry of three weeks. According to his submission, the reference made by the State Government of the case of the petitioner on 16.6.1988 on which date the Exofficio Secretary to the Advisory Board received the materials along with the grounds will not be deemed to be placement before the Advisory Board. According to his submission, the reference made by the State Government of the case of the petitioner on 16.6.1988 on which date the Exofficio Secretary to the Advisory Board received the materials along with the grounds will not be deemed to be placement before the Advisory Board. According to the learned counsel for the petitioner as argued before the Hon'ble single Judge and the Division Bench relying on the case of Dinesh Yadav (supra) the case of the petitioner should have been considered by the Advisory Board on or before 16.6.1988 and thus there had been infraction of Section 19 of the Act. In the case of Dinesh Yadav (supra) it has been held that placement before the Advisory Board means that the Advisory Board must sit to consider within three weeks otherwise the detention of the detenu shall stand vitiated as being in contravention of Section 19 of the Act. But in my view, this does not appear to be a sound proposition. In view of the fact that the heading of Section 19 itself is “reference to Advisory Board” from which it can be inferred that the intention of the legislature was that within the stipulated period the State Government must refer the order of detention with grounds and other materials within three weeks to the Advisory Board. This time limit obviously appears to bind down the State Government to discharge its own duty within the period as specified in Section 19 of the Act. Exofficio Secretary is the functionary of the Advisory Board. As soon as it is received by the functionary of the Advisory Board it will be deemed that the case has been placed before the Advisory Board. Therefore, mere despatch of the detention order along with grounds and other materials by the State Government for being placed before the Advisory Board will mean placing of the matters before the Advisory Board.This view finds support from the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Raisuddin alias Babu Tamchi (supra). Although this case arose out of an order passed under the National Security Act but the principle laid down on the point in question is fully applicable in the circumstances of this case since the procedural provisions in both the laws are quite similar. Although this case arose out of an order passed under the National Security Act but the principle laid down on the point in question is fully applicable in the circumstances of this case since the procedural provisions in both the laws are quite similar. In the aforesaid case it has been laid down that Sec. 10 of the National Security Act does not enjoin the State Government to take steps to see that the case of the detenu is considered by the Advisory Baord within three weeks from the date of detention. It only casts a duty on the appropriate to 'place before' the Advisory Board constituted under Sec. 9 of the Act within three weeks from the date of detention the grounds on which the order of detention has been made and the representation, if any, made and the person affected by the order. It has further been clarified that the words “before” cannot be interpreted to mean anything more than forward to or to submit before Advisory Board the relevant papers relating to the detention of the detenu. It has further been observed that the Advisory Board is not an entity subordinate to the Government. It is a wholly independent body consisting of persons whom are or have been or are qualified to be appointed as the Judges of the High Court and it is entirely for the Advisory Board to regulate its schedule of holding meetings and conducting its business in accordance with the procedure laid down under the law. The provisions as contained in Section 19 of the Act are quite similar to Section 10 of the National Security Act. Hence, the same meaning has to be attached to the words “place before” occurring in Section 19 of the Act as has been expressed by the Supreme Court in the case of Raisuddin alias Babu Tamchi (supra). It can, therefore, be safely concluded that the ratio decidendi of the decision of Division Bench of this Court in the case of Dinesh Yadav (supra) to this extent is not correct and is, therefore, overruled in order to set the above principle at naught.” 13. In view of this decision of the Full Bench of the Patna High Court, we are of the considered opinion that the judgement of Dinesh Yadav – vs.-The State of Bihar & Ors.(Supra) is not holding the field. In view of this decision of the Full Bench of the Patna High Court, we are of the considered opinion that the judgement of Dinesh Yadav – vs.-The State of Bihar & Ors.(Supra) is not holding the field. In the present case, it is not disputed that the papers were placed before the Member of the Advisory Board for consideration of the Advisory Board as required u/s 19 of the Act of 1981 adopted by the State of Jharkhand, therefore, the ground raised by the writ petitioner is contrary to the judgement of the Full Bench and, therefore, is liable to be rejected. 14. The contention of the learned counsel for the writ petitioner that there must be a counter-affidavit of the officer who has passed the order of detention to indicate that he passed the order on the basis of his subjective satisfaction and relied upon two judgements of Patna High Court delivered in the case of Sanat Kumar Roy – vs.-State of Bihar & Ors. reported in 1996 (1) East India Criminal Cases 606, a Single Bench decision and another delivered in a judgement by a Division Bench of Patna High Court in the case of Sharda Singh -vs.-State of Bihar & Ors. reported in 1996 (2) P.L.J.R. 508. The judgement delivered in the case of Sharda Singh -vs.-State of Bihar & Ors. (supra) is a proved judgement and para-4 is relevant which is quoted as under : 4. “In paragraph3 of the writ petition the petitioner has clearly averred that the petitioner was languishing in Gopalganj jail since 10.4.1995 in connection with a criminal case against him. In paragraph 4(D)of the counter affidavit it is stated that the petitioner was undoubtedly under custody on the day the said order was passed, but there was likelihood of his release on bail and that would have resulted in a panic in the area of his criminal activities. The counter affidavit has been affirmed by Mr. Arun Kumar Singh who has been posted as Deputy Collector, Gopalganj. The counter affidavit has not been affirmed by the detaining authority and therefore, it does not have much value so far as the question of satisfaction of the detaining authority is concerned.” 16. The counter affidavit has been affirmed by Mr. Arun Kumar Singh who has been posted as Deputy Collector, Gopalganj. The counter affidavit has not been affirmed by the detaining authority and therefore, it does not have much value so far as the question of satisfaction of the detaining authority is concerned.” 16. The emphasis of the learned counsel for the petitioner is on this para and it has been submitted that for proving a subjective satisfaction of the authority, the authority himself is required to file affidavit and in this case the affidavit has not been filed by the officer who has passed the order of detention and gave the grounds for detention. We are of considered opinion that observation of Division Bench in the case of Sharda Singh's case has been over stretched. The observation “the counter-affidavit has not been affirmed by the detaining authority and therefore, it does not have much value so far as the question of satisfaction of the detaining authority is concerned” does not mean that detaining authority's satisfaction is when apparent from the reasons given in the order itself or can be proved from the material placed before him and considered by him and thereafter authority has passed the order even then affidavit of detaining authority is required. The affidavit can be with respect to the facts in the specific knowledge of a person. It is settled law that nothing can be added or subtracted or supplemented in any order by other pleadings or affadavit. Therefore, in a matter where order is passed by an authority then that order itself must indicate some reasons to justify the order. The affidavit of any officer supporting an order passed by himself, normally is a admission in his own favour which itself even may not be evidence and, therefore, also that affidavit may not be relevant. If there are allegations of malafide, those allegations can be rebuted only by the persons against whom the allegations are there. In the order of nature which is under consideration before us, the reasons are sufficient in the order itself, those reasons can justify the order and inference can be drawn about the subjective satisfaction of the officer for passing the order. In the order of nature which is under consideration before us, the reasons are sufficient in the order itself, those reasons can justify the order and inference can be drawn about the subjective satisfaction of the officer for passing the order. Not only this, the materials which were placed before the authority can also be considered while examining the issue of subjective satisfaction of the officer and it can be found out whether there was sufficient material for passing the order by the authority or not. Therefore, the judgements referred above including the Division Bench judgement of the Sharda Singh -vs.-State of Bihar & Ors. (supra) has no application to the facts of this case. 17. In view of the above reasons, we cannot accept the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that because the affidavit has not been filed by the officer, who has passed the order of detention and gave the grounds in writing in support of the order is not sufficient to judge the subjective satisfaction of the officer. 18. In the case in hand, the detaining authority has considered the facts of five criminal cases wherein undisputedly writ petitioner is accused. The detaining authority gave the facts of the cases in the reasons for order which were the facts mentioned in the First Information Report or as mentioned in the challan paper submitted after investigation. The detaining authority had no right to accept or reject the allegation levelled in the First Information Report or made in the challan. He was supposed to look into the allegations and to satisfy for the purpose of finding out whether the detention of such accused is necessary in a view to prevent him from acting in any manner prejudicial to maintenance of “Public Order” and there is a reason to fear that activities of anti-social elements cannot be prevented otherwise than by immediate order of detention of such person. Sub-section-1 of Section 12 nowhere provides that for arriving at such conclusion referred above, he has to record a finding of complete guilt of the accused in a criminal case. What is required is that the detaining authorities satisfaction with respect to the person concerned and his activities which are “likely to be affecting” the “Public Order” necessitating his immediate detention. What is required is that the detaining authorities satisfaction with respect to the person concerned and his activities which are “likely to be affecting” the “Public Order” necessitating his immediate detention. The grant of bail may not be relevant factor and is not of much importance because of the simple reason that the Court may pass the order of bail as in the opinion of the Court the detention of the accused in that particular case may not be necessary. A person against whom several allegations are there and he may escape the conviction in one of criminal case that itself is not any indication that there cannot be apprehension of involving himself in activities detrimental to the “Public Order”. 19. There are five cases registered against the petitioner, one was registered on 9th April, 2006, where in allegation of demanding of ranson for plying the vehicle and when act of the writ petitioner was resisted, the victim was beaten by lathi resulting into injuries in both hands, both legs, back & nose. In another case registered on 12.04.2006, there are allegations that in Manda Mela which was to be held on 13.04.2006, the petitioner and his associates fired at police party. In the case registered on 25.12.2009, there is allgation that on receiving information by Senior Superintendent of Police about gathering of some notorious criminals a raid was conducted and several persons were arrsested wherein the petitioner was also arrested. In case registered on 14.8.2009, though the writ petitioner alleged to have not been arrested on spot but the detaining authority mentioned that he was arrested on spot. This fact has been highlighted by the learned counsel for the petitioner to indicate that the officer did not apply his mind. We are unable to accept the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that mere because of this reason, the entire order stands vitiated and this order cannot be vitiated because of the acquittal of the petitioner in the first criminal case referred above. We are unable to accept the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that mere because of this reason, the entire order stands vitiated and this order cannot be vitiated because of the acquittal of the petitioner in the first criminal case referred above. In further more incident of 24.02.2009, there are serious allegations against the writ petitioner and his not naming in one of the First Information Report is absolutely irrelevant because of the simple reason that First Information Report is not necessarily required to be a complete narration of the fact and investigation is conducted for the purpose to find out who are the culprits in the alleged offence and during investigation the others may also be found involved. Name was not mentioned in the First Information Report that itself is not a ground in a matter where the authorities are required to examine with respect to the antecedent as well as the present character of the person while dealing u/s 12 of the Act of 2002. 20. In view of the above reasons, we in a writ jurisdiction challenging the order passed by the competent authority u/s 12 of Act of 2002 are not hearing the matter as an Appellate Court and so far as the matter of subjective satisfaction of the authorities are concerned, the jurisdiction of the Court is narrow and we are of the considered view that there is no merit in this writ petition, hence, this writ petition is dismissed.