JUDGMENT : N.K. Mody, J.- 1. Being aggrieved by the judgment dated 28-2-2005 passed by XXI ADJ, Indore in Civil Regular Appeal No. 48-B/2003 whereby suit filed by the respondent for recovery of Rs. 77,000/-alongwith interest @ 6% per annum was decreed, the present appeal has been filed. 2. Short facts of the case are that respondent filed a suit on 26-10-2002 for recovery of Rs. 77,000/-alleging that respondent is Proprietor of M/s Kailash Finance Agency and is in the trade of finance. It was alleged that appellant took a loan from the respondent and executed Hundi in favour of respondent. It was alleged that on 10-7-1999 appellant acknowledged in his own hand-writing about the Hundi. It was alleged that total transactions which took place between the parties were 12 in number of amount which was outstanding against the appellant was Rs. 62,160/-. It was alleged that vide document dated 10-7-1999 appellant promised to pay the amount of each of the Hundi on every month. In the suit it was alleged that transaction took place between appellant and respondent for which Hundis were executed are w.e.f. 3-10-1992 to 25-2-1993. It was alleged that on account of repayment of loan amount cheques were given by the appellant on 4-2-1998, 6-4-1998 and 12-11-1999 which were dishonoured. In the suit it was alleged that on 10-10-2002 appellant made demand of dishonoured cheques which was amounting Rs. 14,147/-. It was alleged that after deducting the aforesaid amount outstanding amount has to be paid. It was prayed that decree be passed. The suit contested by the appellant by filing the written statement wherein all the plaint allegations were denied. It was denied that any amount is outstanding against the appellant. It was prayed that suit be dismissed. After framing of issues and recording of evidence learned Court below decreed the suit filed by the respondent against which present appeal has been filed. 3. Learned Counsel for the appellant submits that the impugned judgment passed by learned Court below is illegal, incorrect and deserves to be set aside. It is submitted that the transaction which took place between the appellant and respondent is for the period from 3-10-1992 to 25-2-1993. 3. Learned Counsel for the appellant submits that the impugned judgment passed by learned Court below is illegal, incorrect and deserves to be set aside. It is submitted that the transaction which took place between the appellant and respondent is for the period from 3-10-1992 to 25-2-1993. It is submitted that the alleged acknowledgment is dated 10-7-1999 since the amount was repayable within 3 years and there was no acknowledgment within that period, therefore, even if it is assumed that document dated 10-7-1999 was executed by the appellant, then too, since it was after expiry of period of limitation, therefore, limitation cannot be extended on the basis of that document. Learned Counsel placed reliance on a decision in the matter of Sampuran Singh Vs. Niranjan Kaur, AIR 1999 SC 1047 , wherein Hon'ble Apex Court held that acknowledgment if any, has to be prior to the expiration of the prescribed period for filing the suit, in other words, if the limitation has already expired, it would not revive under this section. It is only during subsistence of period of limitation, if any such document is executed, the limitation would be revived fresh from the said date of acknowledgment. It is submitted that appeal filed by the appellant be allowed and the impugned judgment passed by learned Court below be set aside. 4. Learned Counsel for the respondent submits that since it was the fresh agreement, therefore, no error is committed by the learned Court below in decreeing the suit. Learned Counsel placed reliance on a decision in the matter of Bhansarlal Paramsukh Vs. Navalkishor Mungalal, reported in AIR 1958 MP 21 , wherein Division Bench of this Court held that the acknowledgment of liability contained an express promise to pay the debt and even if it was made after the expiry of limitation it constituted a fresh promise to pay within the meaning of Section 25 (3) of Contract Act and as such the suit based thereon was maintainable. It was further held that it is well settled that a time-barred debt is a good consideration for a fresh promise to pay. Further reliance is placed on a decision in the matter of Gorilal Baldeodas Vs. It was further held that it is well settled that a time-barred debt is a good consideration for a fresh promise to pay. Further reliance is placed on a decision in the matter of Gorilal Baldeodas Vs. Ramjeelal Bhuralal, reported in AIR 1961 MP 346 , wherein it was held that passing a cheque written by a borrower is payment for the purpose of Section 20 and if other conditions are fulfilled, a fresh term of limitation starts from the date of the handing over of the cheque whether or not it is subsequently honoured. Further reliance is placed on a decision in the matter of Govirid Prasad Patel Vs. Dhani Ram Patel, reported in 2001(4) M.P.H.T. 64 = 2002 (1) MPLJ 356 , wherein this Court held that promise to pay time barred debt furnishes a fresh cause of action. It was further held that it depends upon the language of the document under consideration whether a statement contained in it is a mere acknowledgment within the meaning of Section 18 of the Limitation Act, 1963 or whether it is a promise to pay within the meaning of Section 25 (3) of the Contract Act. On the strength of aforesaid position of law learned Counsel submits that appeal filed by the appellant has no merit and the same be dismissed. 5. In the plaint filed by the respondent on 26-10-2002 respondent has specifically stated that the loan, which was taken by the appellant was against Hundis. Details of Hundis of which the amount has not been paid are stated in the plaint, which are 12 in number of which details are as under:- Sl. No. Date of Hundis Amount 1. 03/01/1992 Rs.4,500/- 2. 03/01/1993 Rs.4,164/- 3. 03/01/1993 Rs.3,805/- 4. 20/12/1992 Rs.5,172/- 5. 20/01/1993 Rs.5,172/- 6. 20/02/1993 Rs.5,172/- 7. 07/01/1993 Rs.5,172/- 8. 07/02/1993 Rs.5,172/- 9. 07/03/1993 Rs.5,172/- 10. 25/02/1992 Rs.6,205/- 11. 25/12/1993 Rs.6,205/- 12. 25/02/1993 Rs.6,205/- 6. Thus, these Hundis are between 3-10-1992 to 25-2-1993. Further case of the respondent is that on 10-7-1999 appellant has executed a document wherein appellant has acknowledged the non-payment of Hundis. It was further alleged that appellant agreed that amount of Hundis which comes to Rs. 62,116/-shall be paid by the appellant on monthly basis by depositing the amount of each of the Hundi per month. Sub-section (1) of Section 18 of the Limitation Act reads as under: - “18. It was further alleged that appellant agreed that amount of Hundis which comes to Rs. 62,116/-shall be paid by the appellant on monthly basis by depositing the amount of each of the Hundi per month. Sub-section (1) of Section 18 of the Limitation Act reads as under: - “18. Effect of acknowledgment in writing.- (1) Where, before the expiration of the prescribed period for a suit or application in respect of any property or right, an acknowledgment of liability in respect of such property or right has been made in writing signed by the party against whom such property or right is claimed, or by any person through whom he derives his title or liability, a fresh period of limitation shall be computed from the time when the acknowledgment was so signed. 7. From bare perusal of Section 18 of the Limitation Act, it is evident that the acknowledgment must be before the expiration of the prescribed period for a suit. In the present case, if the document are treated as acknowledgment, then, undoubtedly it was not before the expiration of prescribed period for a suit from the date of transaction which are between 3-1-1992 to 25-2-1993. 8. Section 25 of the Indian Contract Act, 1972 deals with the agreement without consideration. Sub-section (3) of Section 25 of the Indian Contract Act reads as under: - “25. Agreement without consideration, void, unless it is in writing and registered or is a promise to compensate for something done or is a promise to pay a debt barred by limitation law. - An agreement made without consideration is void, unless:- (1).***.***.*** (2) *** *** *** (3) It is a promise, made in writing and signed by the person to be charged therewith, or by his agent generally or specially authorized in that behalf, to pay wholly or in part a debt of which the creditor might have enforced payment but'fejr the law for the limitation of suits.” In any of these cases such an agreement is a contract. 9. The illustration (e) of Section 25 reads as under: - “(e) A owes B Rs. 1,000, but the debt is barred by the Limitation Act. A signs a written promise to pay B Rs. 500 on account of the debt. This is a contract.” 10. In the present case by the document (Exh. 9. The illustration (e) of Section 25 reads as under: - “(e) A owes B Rs. 1,000, but the debt is barred by the Limitation Act. A signs a written promise to pay B Rs. 500 on account of the debt. This is a contract.” 10. In the present case by the document (Exh. P-1), dated 10-7-1999 appellant agreed to pay the amount of debt for which the Hundis were executed by the appellant from time to time between 3-1-1992 to 25-2-1993 by clearing payment of each of the Hundi on monthly basis. Appellant also agreed that appellant undertook to clear the account in one stroke if possible. In the said letter appellant also stated that after payment of the amount reasonable amount of interest shall be paid as agreed mutually. From perusal of the aforesaid document (Exh. P-1), it is evident that the debt was barred by law of limitation on the date when the document (Exh. P-1) was executed, however, by this document appellant promised to pay the amount on account of debt which is a fresh contract, therefore, the learned Court below committed no error in decreeing the suit. 11. From perusal of the record, it is evident that Exh. P-1 is dated 10-7-1999, which contains 12 transactions, which took place between the parties between 3-10-1992 to 25-2-1993. Suit was filed by the respondent on 26-10-2002, which is not within 3 years from the date of execution of document dated 10-7-1999. Since the document (Exh. P-1) contains the terms of repayment in monthly instalments, therefore, the amount was required to be repaid in twelve months. Articles 36 and 37 of Limitation Act deals with the law of limitation relating to money suit for recovery of money where the loan has to be repaid in instalments which reads as under:- Articles 36 and 37 Description of suit Period of limitation Time from which period begins to run 36. On a promissory note or bond payable by installments. Three years The expiration of the first term of payment to the part then payable; and for the other parts, the expiration of the respective terms of payment. 37. On a promissory note or bond payable by installments, which provides that, if default be made in payment of one or more installments, the whole shall be due. Three years The expiration of the first term of payment to the part then payable; and for the other parts, the expiration of the respective terms of payment. 37. On a promissory note or bond payable by installments, which provides that, if default be made in payment of one or more installments, the whole shall be due. Three years When the default is made, unless where the payee or obligee waives the benefit of the provision and then when fresh default is made in respect of which there is no such waiver. 12. In the matter of Bhagwant Rao Vs. Mohammad Khan, 1977 JLJ 751 , wherein the money was repayable in instalments this Court has held that plaintiff has no right to bring the suit for the whole amount before expiry of 10 months from the date of demand, therefore, the cause of action accrued by the plaintiff after expiry of 10 months. In the matter of United Law Publisher Vs. Mohammad Hussain, 1986 (II) MPWN 146, this Court has held that right to sue accrues after expiry of full period of instalments. 13. Since the amount was repayable in instalment and the first instalment was due on or before 10-8-1999 and last instalment was due on 10-7-2000 and the suit was filed on 26-7-2002, therefore, the suit filed by the respondent was in time. In view of this appeal filed by the appellant deserves to be dismissed and is hereby dismissed. No order as to costs.