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2011 DIGILAW 876 (GAU)

Miss Purnima Dey v. Union of India

2011-11-04

A.C.UPADHYAY

body2011
JUDGMENT Arun Chandra Upadhyay, J. 1. This writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India has been filed by the petitioners above named, claiming compensation of Rs. 25,00,000/- (rupees twenty-five lakhs) under the public law remedy for violation of fundamental rights and for committing rape on the victim i.e. petitioner No. 1 by respondent No. 6, Shri H.S. Tewari, the then Principal, Jawahar Novodaya Vidyalaya, Kakraban, South Tripura District, when she was residing in the boarding school, run by the Novodaya Vidyalaya Samity, a Government of India undertaking. The petitioners have also prayed for initiating appropriate action against the respondents in terms of the direction issued by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Bishakha & Ors. v. State of Rajasthan & Ors. reported in (1997) 6 SCC 241 . The petitioner No. 2, namely, the Tripura Commission for Women, which has been created in terms of the provisions of Section 11(1) of the Tripura Commission for Women Act, 1993 (in short, the Act). The Commission, being empowered to take up cases of violation of the constitutional and other rights relating to women in the State with the appropriate authority, in terms of the provisions of Section 11(1)(C) of the Act and Section2(C) of the aforesaid Act, which also includes adolescent girls or female child. The victim, petitioner No. 1, is presently in the custody of the Tripura Commission for Women in pursuance of the order dated 16.02.1999, passed by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, South Tripura, Udaipur. 2. I have heard Mr. P. Roy Barman, learned counsel for the petitioners and Mr. A. Nandi, learned counsel, representing the respondents-Union of India as well as Mr. B. Dutta, learned State counsel for the respondent-State. 3. The facts, leading to the filing of this writ petition, may be stated, in brief, as follows : The father of petitioner No. 1 was an employee of the NAH, Belonia, South Tripura. He had three children. Father of petitioner No. 1 died on 03.04.2004. However, during his lifetime he was very keen to ensure that his daughters were provided with best education to ensure their bright and prosperous future. He tried his level best to ensure that quality education was provided to his children and thus provided backgrounds to his children to maintain disciplined and industrious life. 4. Petitioner No. 1 was a student of Class V in a primary school under Belonia Sub-Division. He tried his level best to ensure that quality education was provided to his children and thus provided backgrounds to his children to maintain disciplined and industrious life. 4. Petitioner No. 1 was a student of Class V in a primary school under Belonia Sub-Division. Apart from being disciplined, energetic and amiable, in nature, since the period of her primary education, she could show her brilliancy in study. 5. The then Principal, Jawahar Novodaya Vidhalaya (hereinafter, in short referred to as the JNV, Kakraban, South Tripura, issued an advertisement, seeking applications for admission to Class VI at JNV, Kakraban, from the students, residing within the territorial limits of South Tripura District. The father of petitioner No. 1 responded to the advertisement and took necessary steps for admission of her daughter, i.e. petitioner No. 1 to Class VI at JNV, Kakraban, South Tripura. 6. It would be pertinent to mention herein that the Jawahar Novodaya Vidyalaya (JNV) has been established under the National Education Policy, 1986, and in pursuance thereof Government of India established Jawahar Novodaya Vidyalayas in 23 States and 7 Union Territories. The object of Novodaya Vidyalaya Scheme was to promote national integration and also to encourage and promote talents predominantly from the rural and weaker sections of India. It would also be pertinent to mention herein that the Novodaya Vidyalayas are under the Ministry of Human Resources Development, Department of Education, Government of India and the activities of the Novodaya Vidyalayas are financed by the Government of India, through an autonomous organization, i.e. Novodaya Vidyalaya Samiti (in short, the NVS). Thus the NVS is under the deep and pervasive control of the Union of India to discharge its constitutional obligation of making access to the education, as well as quality education, possible to the rural and backward people of the country. 7. It is not disputed by the respondents-Union of India that the NVS, can be safely held to be State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India, and accordingly, it is amenable to the writ jurisdiction of this Court, as provided under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 8. The JNV, Kakraban, South Tripura is a residential co-educational school and all the students, admitted to the JNV, Kakraban are required to stay in the boarding house/hostel of the said institution. The hostel of JNV situated in the campus itself. 8. The JNV, Kakraban, South Tripura is a residential co-educational school and all the students, admitted to the JNV, Kakraban are required to stay in the boarding house/hostel of the said institution. The hostel of JNV situated in the campus itself. The Principal of JNV, Kakraban and other teachers are responsible for protection and safety of the children, residing in the hostel of JNV, Kakraban. The Principal and other teachers are also duty bound to ensure safety and security of each and every student, either girl or boy, and they are also duty bound to ensure that each and every student is not subjected to any sorts of physical or mental torture, trauma, violence and intimidation. Naturally, they are duty bound to take utmost care and caution in discharging their entrusted tasks for developing future citizens of the country. 9. Petitioner No. 1 was admitted in JNV, Kakraban, South Tripura, and accordingly, after admission, she continued to study by staying in the school hostel. She was promoted to Class VIII in the year 1998. The elder sister of petitioner No. 1 was also a student of Class XI of JNV, Kakraban, South Tripura in the year 1998. 10. Miss Puja Tewari, the daughter of respondent No. 6, Shri H.S. Tewari, the then Principal of JNV, Kakraban, South Tripura, was also a classmate of petitioner No. 1. Petitioner No. 1 had to visit the quarters of respondent No. 6 to bring books from the minor daughter of respondent No. 6. On 27.04.1998, at about 2.00 p.m., when petitioner No. 1 went to the quarters of respondent No. 6, unfortunately, at that time, his daughter, was not in the quarter and only respondent No. 6, Shri H.S. Tewari, was present in the quarter. However, Shri H.S. Tewari, by taking advantage of this situation, dragged petitioner No. 1 to his bed and committed rape upon her. As a result, petitioner No. 1 sustained severe pain in her private parts. She was shocked by the incident and she did not even understand the extent and magnitudes of what had been done to her. 11. At the time of occurrence, petitioner No. 1 was only 14 years old child and when she started crying, respondent No. 6, Shri H.S. Tewari, threatened her with dire consequences and also cautioned her not to tell the incident to anybody whatsoever. 12. 11. At the time of occurrence, petitioner No. 1 was only 14 years old child and when she started crying, respondent No. 6, Shri H.S. Tewari, threatened her with dire consequences and also cautioned her not to tell the incident to anybody whatsoever. 12. Petitioner No. 1 returned to the school hostel after the incident in her state of shock. As she was suffering from pain on her private parts she could not go to school for two days consecutively. Out of fear she could not even say anything to anybody. 13. During summer vacation, petitioner No. 1 went to her house and stayed with her parents, for the entire months of May and June. After summer vacation, she returned to the hostel in the first week of July. After few days of her return from her house, she had gone to a shop, which was in front of the quarter of respondent No. 6, to purchase some materials, and on that day, respondent No. 6 forcibly took her to his quarter and again committed the barbaric offence of rape upon her. The barbaric offence of rape upon petitioner No. 1 by respondent No. 6 continued for the whole month of January, 1999. 14. Petitioner No. 1, a teenaged girl living in a school hostel, was so shocked that she was not in a position to discuss the incident with anybody. Naturally, she was not also in a position to understand what had actually been committed on her, and as being minor, she was not matured enough to understand the implications and consequences thereof. 15. Suddenly, on 2.2.1999, petitioner No. 1 experienced abnormal pain in her abdomen and she informed the matter to respondent No. 9, Smt. Moutoshi Deb, House Mistress of JNV, Kakraban. Petitioner No. 1 was then sent to Dr. Tribedi, respondent No. 8 by respondent No. 9 and one Group-D employee of JNV, Kakraban. At about 7:00 p.m., Dr. Tribedi examined petitioner No. 1 and after examination, he told petitioner No. 1 that she had been carrying nine months pregnancy. When he enquired who did it, then petitioner No. 1 told him that Shri H.S. Tewari, the Principal of JNV, Kakraban, had done this to her. On that night at about 9:00 p.m., petitioner No. 1 gave birth to a female child in the hostel. When he enquired who did it, then petitioner No. 1 told him that Shri H.S. Tewari, the Principal of JNV, Kakraban, had done this to her. On that night at about 9:00 p.m., petitioner No. 1 gave birth to a female child in the hostel. Respondent No. 9, Moutoshi Deb and respondent No. 10, Mita Datta, House Mistresses, pressurized her to make her father responsible for the incident of birth of a female child. 16. On that night, father of the petitioner No. 1 was informed that his daughter was seriously ill and he was brought to school at about 2.00 a.m., in the morning. When the father of petitioner No. 1 arrived, she was brought to the campus and put her in a car with her father and sent home. At that point of time, a signature, in blank paper, was also obtained from the father of petitioner No. 1 by respondent Nos. 7, 9 and 10, Sri Rajkumar Shukla, Smt. Moutoshi Deb and Smt. Mita Datta respectively. 17. The unfortunate incident shocked all the family members of petitioner No. 1. The health as well as mental condition of petitioner No. 1 also deteriorated drastically. The prestige and reputation of the entire family was at stake. 18. However, petitioner No. 1 lodged a written complaint to the Officer In-charge, R.K. Pur P.S., South Tripura. Petitioner No. 1 with her new born baby attended by a disreputable fact of barbarism, became vulnerable to all kind of exposure to public criticism. The whole particulars of petitioner No. 1 was widely circulated in all the newspapers and Medias all over the country. The news not only cast stigma on the character and reputation of petitioner No. 1, but also her entire family suffered humiliation, lowering of esteem, as well as reputation and prestige in the society at large. 19. Having no alternative, the father of the petitioner No. 1 visited the Tripura Commission for Women and placed the entire matter to the Commission. The father of petitioner No. 1 informed the Commission about the barbaric crime committed on petitioner No. 1, which ultimately led to the birth of a child. 20. 19. Having no alternative, the father of the petitioner No. 1 visited the Tripura Commission for Women and placed the entire matter to the Commission. The father of petitioner No. 1 informed the Commission about the barbaric crime committed on petitioner No. 1, which ultimately led to the birth of a child. 20. The Tripura Commission for Women intervened and took petitioner No. 1 as well as the newly born baby into their custody for the purpose of welfare and security of the newly born baby" and accordingly an order was obtained from the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, South Tripura, Udaipur for entrusting the custody of the petitioner No. 1 and the new born baby to the custody of the Commission since then. 21. On the other hand, on the basis of the written complaint, received from petitioner No. 1, the Officer In-charge, R.K. Pur P.S. registered a case under Sections 376/201, IPC and commenced investigation, and on completion of the investigation, submitted charge-sheet against the accused, Shri H.S. Tewari, the then Principal of JNV, Kakraban and also against Shri R.K. Shukla, Moutoshi Deb and Mita Datta, who were employees of the JNV, Kakraban at the relevant time. 22. It has been stated on behalf of the petitioners that shifting of petitioner No. 1 and her newly born baby from the hostel of the JNV, Kakraban, within a few hours after delivery of the child was against the medical advice. Dr. Tribedi, who was the attending physician, also opined that the child mother and her new born baby ought not to be removed under any circumstances at that hour of the day, but unfortunately, petitioner No. 1 as well as her new born baby, were removed from the hostel within a few hours against medical advice. 23. After filing of the charge-sheet in the police case, the case was committed for trial to the Court of learned Sessions. Accordingly, trial commenced against the respondents. Charge was framed against Shri H.S. Tewari, alleging commission of offence under Sections 376/506, IPC as well as against Shri R.K. Sukla, Smt. Moutoshi Deb and Smt. Mita Datta under Sections 506/201/34, IPC. 24. The prosecution side examined as many as 55 charge-sheeted witnesses. On completion of the trial, the judgment was delivered on 07.06.2003 by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, South Tripura, Udaipur. 24. The prosecution side examined as many as 55 charge-sheeted witnesses. On completion of the trial, the judgment was delivered on 07.06.2003 by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, South Tripura, Udaipur. The learned trial Court found respondent No. 6, Shri H.S. Tewari, the then Principal of JNV, Kakraban, guilty of committing offence, punishable under Sections 376(2)(b), IPC and accordingly on conviction, he was sentenced to suffer imprisonment for life and to pay a fine of Rs. 10,000/- (rupees ten thousand), in default, to suffer additional imprisonment for six months. The respondent No. 6, Shri H.S. Tewari also convicted under Section 506, IPC and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for ten years and also to pay a fine of Rs. 10,000/- (rupees ten thousand) with default stipulation. In addition, learned Addl. Sessions Judge also directed respondent No. 6 to pay an amount of Rs. 1,00,000/- (rupees one lakh), as compensation, to the victim within a period of three months. 25. An appeal was preferred by respondent No. 6, Shri H.S. Tewari before the High Court against the order passed by the learned Addl. Sessions Judge. The State of Tripura also preferred an appeal against the acquittal of respondent Nos. 7, 9 and 10 by the learned Addl. Sessions Judge. 26. In the High Court, the appeal preferred by the respondent No. 6 was disposed of by affirming the conviction and sentence of respondent No. 6 and the appeal against acquittal was also allowed by convicting and sentencing respondent Nos. 7, 9 and 10 herein, for committing offence under Section 201, IPC. Shri R.K. Sukla, respondent No. 7 was sentenced to suffer RI for six months and respondent Nos. 9 and 10 were also sentenced to suffer RI for two months. All the three respondents were also made liable to pay a fine of Rs. 5,000/- (rupees five thousand) each, and in default to suffer RI for one month. The SLP preferred by the respondent No. 6, before the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India was rejected. 27. It has been stated on behalf of the petitioners that regular medical checkup of all the students, as per the prevalent procedure, is a must. Appropriate health record ought to be maintained with ready reference by the authority of the school hostel. The teachers, particularly, the house mistresses and the assistant mistresses, ought to have continuous communications with the girl students, residing in the hostel. Appropriate health record ought to be maintained with ready reference by the authority of the school hostel. The teachers, particularly, the house mistresses and the assistant mistresses, ought to have continuous communications with the girl students, residing in the hostel. But all these measures were not observed by the respondents. More so, the respondents tried their utmost to hush up the matter in order to save the culprits from the clutches of the law and justice. When petitioner No. 1 gave birth to a child, the then Principal of the JNV, Kakraban i.e. respondent No. 6 was duty bound to report the incident to the police and to his higher authorities. The very motive of the respondents is an indication of guilty mind. Because of which petitioner No. 1 had to experience the abnormal pain and had to bear the trauma of being a mother when she herself was a child. 28. Learned counsel for the petitioners has further submitted that an enquiry was also conducted by the District Magistrate & Collector, Dhalai District, Ambassa, who happened to be the Chairman of Jawahar Novodaya Vidyalaya, 82 Miles, Nalkata. After making inspection of the JNV, 82 Miles, Nalkata, and after threadbare discussions with the representatives of the students as well as teachers and guardians, regarding the moral character of Shri H.S. Tewari, who at that time happened to be the Principal of JNV, 82 Miles, the then OM & Collector, Dhalai 'District, Ambassa, made a communication to the Deputy Director, Novodaya Vidyalaya Samiti, Regional Office, Shillong, informing inter alia, therein, that a few girls students complained against respondent No. 6 regarding his unacceptable behaviour, towards them. By the aforesaid letter, the DM & Collector, Dhalai District, Ambassa, recommended removal of Shri H.S. Tewari from the JNV, 82 Miles. 29. It has also been submitted by the petitioners that respondent Nos. 2, 3, 4 and 5 were duty bound to act in furtherance of the interest of the students of the Novodaya Vidyalaya. They were also under obligation to ensure that the offence committed against the minor child was dealt with in accordance with law, so that perpetrator of such heinous offence/crime does not escape legal punishment. But they were acting in collusion and in connivance with the accused-respondent No. 6 and they were misusing their official power to save the culprits from the clutches of law. But they were acting in collusion and in connivance with the accused-respondent No. 6 and they were misusing their official power to save the culprits from the clutches of law. By the letter vide No. 1/PF/RKS/90/NVS(SHR)/6773 dated 09.03.2000, the Deputy Director, Novodaya Vidyalaya Samiti, i.e. respondent No. 5 directed to render all assistance to Shri R.K. Shukla, i.e. the respondent No. 7, by providing him with all the official documents. What was most surprising in the aforesaid letter was that the Deputy Director i.e. respondent No. 5 made the following comments : The case is prestigious for the institution therefore no lacuna is to be left in defending the case 30. It has been alleged on behalf of the petitioners that due to non-availability of medical aid in the JNV, Kakraban, pregnancy of petitioner No. 1 could not be detected earlier. As per sick report of petitioner No. 1, for the period of 17.1.1998 to 02.02.1998, it appears that petitioner No. 1 was examined on 19.07.1998 and 05.11.1998 by the doctor. On examination on 19.07.1998 it was observed that she suffered from abnormal pain and on 05.11.1998 she was suffered from respiratory trouble. Petitioner No. 1 gave birth to a baby on 02.02.1999. The doctor ought to have diagnosed a woman, carrying a baby, at an early stage. Had it been so, then petitioner No. 1 could have been saved from being unwanted mother in her teenage. The pregnancy of petitioner No. 1 could have been terminated to save her from the danger of becoming mother and also from the, subsequent trauma of being mother in her teenage and also loss of her career and future life. Virtually, the respondents, who were entrusted to ensure safety, security, well being both physical and mental of the petitioner No. 1, who was under their care and custody, betrayed her and they miserably failed to discharge their duties, in consequence of which, the entire life of petitioner No. 1, was ruined. 31. The perpetrator of such heinous crime have been duly punished by the Court of law, but petitioner No. 1 had become a mother at her teenage and that incident of barbaric rape altered the course of her life and had become irreversible course of her life, The intolerable physical and mental suffering undergone by petitioner No. 1 cannot be compensated by damages. The damage caused to her life and future wellbeing for becoming a mother at her teenage, is irretrievable. 32. It has been submitted on behalf of the petitioners that the legal and constitutional right of petitioner No. 1 have been infringed and violated by respondents and for this reason the respondents are liable to pay adequate compensation to her under public law remedy available to petitioner No. 1 in addition to remedy in tort. 33. Learned counsel for the petitioners further submitted that the extent of damage suffered by petitioner No. 1 for the incident of rape and subsequent motherhood is beyond calculation. However, any attempt to quantify the extent of damage and injury sustained by petitioner No. 1 due to the infringement of her legal and constitutional right would be futile. However, the petitioners have quantified the loss suffered by her to the extent of Rs. 25,00,000/- (rupees twenty-five lakhs). 34. It has been further contended on behalf of the petitioners that due to the incident of rape and subsequent motherhood, her educational career had been discontinued and she had become drop out. Petitioner No. 1 was a good student and had she not been raped and subsequently given birth to a female child then she would have certainly continued her educational career. She would have at least certainly graduated and after graduation she would have been able to secure her livelihood by pursuing vocation, as per her qualification and eligibility. But now sequence of event has changed. She has to remain as a semi-illiterate person through out the course of her life. Her mental and intellectual development has been arrested by the tragic incident and for this reason she has been deprived from enjoying life in its various manifestations. Her personality has become dwarfed and she has been deprived from attaining/developing faculties. Petitioner No. 1 has to bear the scare of incident through out her entire life and this has left an indelible imprint on her person and character, which cannot be erased by any means. She would have to live a life of seclusion. Her marriage prospect has been doomed forever, like other girls of her age, she cannot even dream of marriage and leading normal conjugal life. Her social standing has been very much affected. 35. She would have to live a life of seclusion. Her marriage prospect has been doomed forever, like other girls of her age, she cannot even dream of marriage and leading normal conjugal life. Her social standing has been very much affected. 35. Over and above, the entire incident has apparently caused loss of reputation and good will of the family in the society. The entire family has become social outcast. The petitioner No. 1 has also been deprived of the company of her mother. It has been stated that after the incident the mother of petitioner No. 1 has become mentally deranged and she has lost her mental equilibrium. She was so much shocked that she could not cope with it and fell victim of it. As a result she ceased to be a normal human being capable of taking care of her children and others. As such, petitioner No. 1 has also been deprived of the care and comfort of her loving mother. 36. It has been stated on behalf of the petitioner that the entire family of petitioner No. 1 has been continuing to be the subject of ridicule in the society and for this reason they have been undergoing mental trauma. Learned counsel for the petitioner contended that all these facts are to be taken into account to quantify extent of losses and damage suffered by petitioner No. 1, for violation of her legal and fundamental right by the respondents. 37. Fact remains that the Petitioner No. 1 was raped by the Principal of the school within the campus of the school in which she was residing and that too while she was in the custody of the respondents. All the respondents were duty bound to protect the minor girl students as they were acting as custodian of the minors being entrusted with all the responsibilities of the minor. But all of them miserably failed in this regard. The respondents owed duty to petitioner No. 1. It is beyond any doubt that what was caused to petitioner No. 1 was not a mere violation of personal right of a person but the violation of fundamental rights of a person. Rape is an offence, which is in violation of fundamental right of a person guaranteed under Article 21of the Constitution of India. It is beyond any doubt that what was caused to petitioner No. 1 was not a mere violation of personal right of a person but the violation of fundamental rights of a person. Rape is an offence, which is in violation of fundamental right of a person guaranteed under Article 21of the Constitution of India. Rape is a crime not only against person or a woman; it is a crime against the entire society. It destroys the entire psychological frame of a woman and pushes her into deep emotional crisis. Rape is therefore most hated crime, it is a crime against basic human rights and is violative of the victim's most cherished right namely the right to life, which includes right to live with human dignity contained under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. 38. It has also been submitted that the right to life includes all these aspects of life which makes a life meaningful complete and worth living. Article 39(f) of the Constitution of India stipulates that State should strive towards securing that children are given opportunities and facilities to develop in a healthy manner with freedom and dignity and their childhood and youth are protected against exploitation against moral and material abandonment. Petitioner No. 1 was a child, at the time of commission of offence. The respondents were duty bound to protect her against exploitation and to ensure that she developed in a healthy manner and in conditions of freedom and dignity Moreover the petitioner No. 1 was in the custody of the respondents who were Government servants and this very fact imposed further responsibility and obligation on the respondents in addition to the direction given in Article 39(f) of the. Constitution of India. 39. Learned counsel for the petitioner pointed out that right to life cannot be meaningful unless there is right to health. The petitioner No. 1 was denied right to health. The respondents made infringement on her right to health. The very fact that when the petitioner No. 1 was pregnant and when she was in her labour pain she was not shifted to the nearly hospital, makes it abundantly clear that the respondents denied her access to medical facilities in such a crucial juncture of her life when she was experiencing trauma of labour pain. This resulted utter violation of her right to life. 40. This resulted utter violation of her right to life. 40. Learned counsel for the petitioners has relied on the following decisions, in support of his contention, in order to justify the relief sought for in the writ petition : (i) AIR 2000 SC 988 , Chairman, Railway Board & Ors. v. Mrs. Chandrima Das & Ors., (5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 11, 20, 37, 38, 43); (ii) (1993) 2 SCC 746 , Nilabati Behera v. State of Orrisa, (10, 16, 17, 19, 31, 33, 34); (iii) 1995 (1) SCC 14 , Delhi Domestic Working Women's Forum v. UOI, (13, 14, 15); (iv) (1996) 1 SCC 490 , Bodhishattawa Gautam v. Subhra Chakraborty (6, 8, 9, 10, 18); (v) (1997) 6 SCC 241 , Vishaka & Ors. v. State of Rajasthan & Ors., (7, 15); (vi) AIR 2007 SC 1067 , Vikram Dhillon v. State of Haryana & Ors., (28, 29, 35, 36); (vii) (2004) 3 GLR 540, Lilabati Baisya v. State of Assam & Ors., (6, 10, 16, 17); (viii) (2004)1 GLR 448, Sutendra Debbarma v. UOI, (9, 10, 11). 41. In Chairman, Railway Board & Ors. v. Mrs. Chandrima Das & Ors. AIR 2000 SC 988 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court discussed and decided whether or not commission of the offence by the person who was working in the Railways, would make the Railway or the Union of India liable to pay compensation to the victim of the offence. Reiterating the same theme in Chairman, Railway Board and Ors. v. Chandrima Das and others (supra), the Supreme Court held that the public law remedies have also been extended to the realm of tort. It was a case of gang rape of a Bangladeshi national by the employees of the Indian Railways in a room at Yatri Niwas at Howrah Station. These employees managed the Yatri Niwas. The Government contended that it could not be held liable under the law of torts, as the offence was not committed during the course of official duty. However, the Court did not accept this argument and stated as under : The employees of the Union of India, who are deputed to run the railways and to manage the establishment, including the railway stations and the yatri niwas, are essential components of the government machinery which carries on the commercial activity. However, the Court did not accept this argument and stated as under : The employees of the Union of India, who are deputed to run the railways and to manage the establishment, including the railway stations and the yatri niwas, are essential components of the government machinery which carries on the commercial activity. If any of such employees commits an act of tort, the Union Government, of which they are the employees, can, subject to other legal requirements being satisfied, be held vicariously liable in damages to the person wronged by those employees. 42. There is no dispute at the Bar that the Hon'ble Supreme Court laid the distinction between "Public Law" and "Private Law" in Common Cause A Regd. Society v. Union of India, (1999) 3 SCR 1279, in which it was, inter alia, observed that under Article 226 of the Constitution, the High Court has been given the power and jurisdiction to issue appropriate Writs in the nature of Mandamus, Certiorari, Prohibition, Quo-Warranto and Habeas Corpus for the enforcement of Fundamental Rights or for any other purpose. Thus, the High Court has jurisdiction not only to grant relief for the enforcement of Fundamental Rights but also for "any other purpose" which would include the enforcement of public duties by public bodies. 43. Basically, under public law, it is the dispute between the citizen or a group of citizens on the one hand and the State or other public bodies on the other, which is resolved. This is done to maintain the rule of law and to prevent the State or the public bodies from acting in an arbitrary manner or in violation of that rule. The exercise of constitutional powers by the High Court and the Supreme Court under Article 226 or 32 has been categorized as power of "judicial review". Every executive or administrative action of the State or other statutory or public bodies is open to judicial scrutiny and the High Court or the Supreme Court can, in exercise of the power of judicial review under the Constitution, quash the executive action or decision which is contrary to law or is violative of Fundamental Rights guaranteed by the Constitution. With the expanding horizon of Article 14 read with other Articles dealing with Fundamental Rights, every executive action of the Govt. With the expanding horizon of Article 14 read with other Articles dealing with Fundamental Rights, every executive action of the Govt. or other public bodies, including Instrumentalities of the Govt., or those which can be legally treated as "Authority" within the meaning of Article 12, if arbitrary, unreasonable or contrary to law, is now amenable to the writ jurisdiction of this Court under Article 32 or the High Courts under Article 226 and can be validly scrutinized on the touchstone of the Constitutional mandates." 44. In Life Insurance Corporation of India v. Escorts Limited, SC/0015/1985 : 1986 (8) ECC 189, Hon'ble Supreme Court observed as under : Broadly speaking, the Court will examine actions of State if they pertain to the public law domain and refrain from examining them if they pertain to the private law field. The difficulty will lie in demarcating the frontier between the public law domain and the private law field. It is impossible to draw the line with precision and we do not want to attempt it. The question must be decided in each case with reference to the particular action, the activity in which the State or the instrumentality of the State is engaged when performing the action, the public law or private law character of the action and a host of other relevant circumstances was relied upon. 45. The Apex Court in its various decisions, has on a number of occasions and has awarded compensation to the petitioners, who had suffered personal injuries at the hands of the officers of the Govt. The causing of injuries, which amounted to tortuous act, was compensated by the Apex Court in many of its decisions beginning from Rudul Sah v. State of Bihar 1983 Cri LJ 1644. [See also Bhim Singh v. State of Jammu and Kashmir SC/0064/1985 :1986 Cri LJ 192; People's Union for Democratic Rights v. State of BiharSC/01 04/1986 :1987 Cri LJ 528; People's Union for Democratic Rights Thru. Its Secy. [See also Bhim Singh v. State of Jammu and Kashmir SC/0064/1985 :1986 Cri LJ 192; People's Union for Democratic Rights v. State of BiharSC/01 04/1986 :1987 Cri LJ 528; People's Union for Democratic Rights Thru. Its Secy. v. Police Commissioner, Delhi Police Headquarters, SC/0409/1989 : (1989) 4 SCC 730 ; Saheli, A Women's Resources center v. Commissioner of Police, Delhi, SC/0478/1989 AIR 1990 SC 513 ; Arvinder Singh Bagga v. State of U.P. AIR 1995 SC 117 ; P. Rathinam v. Union of IndiaSC/0365/1988 ; In re : Death of Sawinder Singh Grower (2); Inder Singh v. State of Punjab, 1995 Cri LJ 3235; D.K. Basu v. State of West Bengal PH/0889/1996 : 1997 Cri LJ 43]. 46. The Apex Court observed where public functionaries are involved and the matter relates to the violation of Fundamental Rights or the enforcement of public duties, the remedy would still be available under the Public Law notwithstanding that a suit could be filed for damages under Private Law. 47. In Bodhisatwa's case ( AIR 1996 SC 922 (supra), the Apex Court pointed out that "rape" amounts to violation of the Fundamental Right guaranteed to a woman under Article 21 of the Constitution. 48. The petitioner No. 1, who was a student at her teens was a citizen of this country, all the same, entitled to all the constitutional rights available to a citizen. She was entitled to the protection of her person, as guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution. As a promising citizen of this country, she could not be subjected to a treatment which was below dignity nor could she be subjected to physical violence at the hands of her own teacher, who not only outraged her modesty, but also ravished her and ruined completely, her future. The right guaranteed to the petitioner No. 1 under Article 21 of the Constitution was thus defiled and disfigured Consequently, the respondent was under the Constitutional responsibility to pay compensation to her under the public law remedy. 49. Learned counsel for the respondent Union of India submitted that the Navodaya Vidyalayas are located all over the Country. Running of Navodaya Vidyalayas is a benevolent activity for development of the people. The chain of Navodaya Vidyalayas is managed by Navodaya Vidyalaya Samiti, which is an organization of the Ministry of Human Resources Development, Department of Secondary Education and Higher Education. 50. Running of Navodaya Vidyalayas is a benevolent activity for development of the people. The chain of Navodaya Vidyalayas is managed by Navodaya Vidyalaya Samiti, which is an organization of the Ministry of Human Resources Development, Department of Secondary Education and Higher Education. 50. The Samiti functions through an Executive Committee under the Chairmanship of the Union Minister of Human Resource Development. Union Minister of State for Education is the Vice- Chairman of the Samiti. The Executive Committee is assisted by Finance Committee and Academic Advisory Committee in its functions. The scheme of Management of the Navodaya Vidyalays, clearly spell out that the Union of India has deep and pervasive control over the entire institution. 51. The Samiti has eight Regional Offices for administration of Vidyalayas under their respective regions. These offices are located at places in different States. For each Vidyalaya, there is a Vidyalaya Advisory Committee and a Vidyalaya Management Committee for the general supervision of the Vidyalaya. District Magistrate of the concerned district is the Chairman of the Vidyalaya level Committees with local educationists, public representatives and officials from the District as members. NVS headquartered is presently located at A-28, Kailash Colony, New Delhi-110 048. 52. Objectives of Scheme envisaged by the Government of India are to provide good quality modern education to the talented children predominantly from the rural areas, without regard to their family's socio-economic condition; to ensure that all students of Navodaya Vidyalayas attain a reasonable level of competence, as focal points for improvements in quality of school education in general through sharing of experiences and facilities. Establishing Jawahar Navodaya Vidyalayas at various locations in the country is a part of activity of the Union of India. The employees of the Union of India, who are deputed to run the organization and to manage the establishment, including the Jawahar Navodaya Vidyalayas and its hostels/boarding houses of the schools, are essential mechanism of the Govt. apparatus, to carry on with the activity. If any of such employees commits an act of tort, the Union Govt., of which they are the employees, can, subject to other legal requirements being satisfied, is vicariously liable in damages to the person wronged by those employees. 53. apparatus, to carry on with the activity. If any of such employees commits an act of tort, the Union Govt., of which they are the employees, can, subject to other legal requirements being satisfied, is vicariously liable in damages to the person wronged by those employees. 53. In (1993) 2 SCC 746 , Nilabati Behera v. State of Orissa, laid the principle on which the liability of the State arises in such cases, for payment of compensation and the distinction between this liability and the liability in private law for payment of compensation in an action on tort. The observations made by the Hon'ble Supreme Court read as follows :-- 10. In view of the decisions of this Court in Rudul Sah v. State of Bihar and Am.,1983 Cri LJ 1644, Sebastian M. Hongray v. Union of India and Ors., SC/0381/1983 : (1984) 1 SCR 904 , Bhim Singh v. State of J & K SC/0064/1985 :1986 Cri LJ 192, Saheli, A Women's Resources center and Ors. v. Commissioner of Police, Delhi Police Head-quarters and Ors. AIR 1990 SC 513 and State of Maharashtra and Ors. v. Ravikant S. Patil (1991) 2 SCC 373 , the liability of the State of Orissa in the present case to pay the compensation cannot be doubted and was rightly not disputed by the learned Additional Solicitor General. It would, however, be appropriate to spell out clearly the principle on which the liability of the State arises in such cases for payment of compensation and the distinction between this liability and the liability in private law for payment of compensation in an action on tort. It may be mentioned straightway that award of compensation in a proceeding under Article 32 by this Court or by the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution is a remedy available in public law, based on strict liability for contravention of fundamental rights to which the principle of sovereign immunity does not apply, even though it may be available as a defence in private law in an action based on tort. This is a distinction between the two remedies to be borne in mind which also indicates the basis on which compensation is awarded in such proceedings. This is a distinction between the two remedies to be borne in mind which also indicates the basis on which compensation is awarded in such proceedings. Thus, on this principle, the view was unanimous, that enforcement of the constitutional right and grant of redress embraces award of compensation as part of the legal consequences of its contravention. 17. It follows that 'a claim in public law for compensation' for contravention of human rights and fundamental freedoms, the protection of which is guaranteed in the Constitution, is an acknowledged remedy for enforcement and protection of such rights, and such a claim based on strict liability made by resorting to a constitutional remedy provided for the enforcement of a fundamental right is 'distinct from, and in addition to, the remedy in private law for damages for the tort' resulting from the contravention of the fundamental right. The defence of sovereign immunity being inapplicable and alien to the concept of guarantee of fundamental rights, there can be no question of such a defence being available in the constitutional remedy. It is this principle which justifies award of monetary compensation for contravention of fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution, when that is the only practicable mode of redress available for the contravention made by the State or its servants in the purported exercise of their powers, and enforcement of the fundamental right is claimed by resort to the remedy in public law under the Constitution by recourse to Articles 32 and 226 of the Constitution, This is what was indicated in Rudul Sah and is the basis of the subsequent decisions in which compensation was awarded Under Articles 32 and226 of the Constitution, for contravention of fundamental rights. 33. The old doctrine of only relegating the aggrieved to the remedies available in civil law limits the role of the Courts too much as protector and guarantor of the indefeasible rights of the citizens. The Courts have the obligation to satisfy the social aspirations of the citizens because the Courts and the law are for the people and expected to respond to their aspirations. 34. The public law proceedings serve a different purpose than the private law proceedings. The Courts have the obligation to satisfy the social aspirations of the citizens because the Courts and the law are for the people and expected to respond to their aspirations. 34. The public law proceedings serve a different purpose than the private law proceedings. The relief of monetary compensation, as exemplary damages, in proceedings under Article 32 by this Court or under Article 226 by the High Courts, for established infringement of the indefeasible right guaranteed under Article 21of the Constitution is a remedy available in public law and is based on the strict liability for contravention of the guaranteed basic and indefeasible rights of the citizen. The purpose of public law is not only to civilize public power but also to assure the citizen that they live under a legal system which aims to protect their interests and preserve their rights. Therefore, when the Court moulds the relief by granting "compensation" in proceedings under Article 32 or 226 of the Constitution seeking enforcement or protection of fundamental rights, it does so under the public law by way of penalising the wrongdoer and fixing the liability for the public wrong on the State which has failed in its public duty to protect the fundamental rights of the citizen. The payment of compensation in such cases is not to be understood, as it is generally understood in a civil action for damages under the private law but in the broader sense of providing relief by an order of making 'monetary amends' under the public law for the wrong done due to breach of public duty, of not protecting the fundamental rights of the citizen. The compensation is in the nature of 'exemplary damages' awarded against the wrong doer for the breach of its public law duty and is independent of the rights available to the aggrieved party to claim compensation under the private law in an action based on tort, through a suit instituted in a Court of competent jurisdiction or/and prosecute the offender under the penal law. 54. In Delhi Domes tic Working Women's Forum v. Union of India & Ors. 1995 (1) SCC 14 , the Apex Court observed rape is an experience which shakes the foundations of the lives of the victims. For many, its effect is a long-term one, impairing their capacity for personal relationships, altering their behavior and values and generating endless fear. 54. In Delhi Domes tic Working Women's Forum v. Union of India & Ors. 1995 (1) SCC 14 , the Apex Court observed rape is an experience which shakes the foundations of the lives of the victims. For many, its effect is a long-term one, impairing their capacity for personal relationships, altering their behavior and values and generating endless fear. In addition to the trauma of the rape itself, victims have had to surfer further agony during legal proceedings. 55. Mr. Roy Barman, learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that offences of rape are an offence against basic human rights as also the Fundamental Right of Personal Liberty and Life. In support of his contention relied on the decision, reported in Bodhisattwa Gautam v. Subhra Chakraborty (1996) 1 SCC 490 , where in the Apex Court observed as follows : 8. This Court has, innumerable times, declared that "Right to Life" does not merely mean animal existence but means something more, namely, the right to live with human dignity, (See : Francis Coralie Mullin v. The Administrator, Union Territory of Delhi and Ors. ; State of Maharashtra v. Chandrabhan,(1983) II LLJ 256 (SC); Olga Tellis and Ors, v. Bombay Municipal Corporation and Ors. SC/0039/1985 : AIR 1986 SC 180 and Delhi Transport Corporation v. D.T.C. Mazdoor Congress and Ors. SC/0031/1991 : (1991) I LLJ 395 (SC). Right to Life would, therefore, include all those aspects of life which to make a life meaningful, complete and worth-living. 9. Unfortunately, a woman, in our country, belongs to a class or group of society who are in a disadvantaged position on account of several social barriers and impediments and have, therefore, been the victim of tyranny at the hands of men with whom they, fortunately, under the Constitution enjoy equal status. Women also have the right to life and liberty; they also have the right to be respected and treated as equal citizens. Their honour and dignity cannot be touched or violated. They also have the right to lead an honourable and peaceful life. Women, in them, have many personalities combined. They are Mother, Daughter, Sister and Wife and not play things for center spreads in various magazines, periodicals or newspapers nor can they be exploited for obscene purposes. Their honour and dignity cannot be touched or violated. They also have the right to lead an honourable and peaceful life. Women, in them, have many personalities combined. They are Mother, Daughter, Sister and Wife and not play things for center spreads in various magazines, periodicals or newspapers nor can they be exploited for obscene purposes. They must have the liberty, the freedom and, of course, independence to live the roles assigned to them by Nature so that the society may flourish as they alone have the talents and capacity to shape the destiny and character of men anywhere and in every part of the world. 10. Rape is thus not only a crime against the person of a woman (victim), it is a crime against the entire society. It destroys the entire psychology of a woman and pushes her into deep emotional crises. It is only by her sheer will power that she rehabilitates herself in the society which, on coming to know of the rape, looks down upon her in derision and contempt. Rape is, therefore, the most hated crime. It is a crime against basic human rights and is also violative of the victim's most cherished of the Fundamental Rights, namely, the Right to Life contained in Article21. 56. In Vishaka & Ors. v. State of Rajasthan & Ors., (1997) 6 SCC 241 , referring to the decision reported in Nilabati Behera v. State of Orissa, SC/0307/1993 :1993 Cri LJ 2899, Hon'ble Supreme Court emphasized its observation as follows : 7. In the absence of domestic law occupying the field, to formulate effective measures to check the evil of sexual harassment of working women at all work places, the contents of International Conventions and norms are significant for the purpose of interpretation of the guarantee of gender equality, right to work with human dignity in Articles 14, 15, 19(1)(g) and 21 of the Constitution and the safeguards against sexual harassment implicit therein. Any International Convention not inconsistent with the fundamental rights and in harmony with its spirit must be read into these provisions to enlarge the meaning and content thereof, to promote the object of the constitutional guarantee. Any International Convention not inconsistent with the fundamental rights and in harmony with its spirit must be read into these provisions to enlarge the meaning and content thereof, to promote the object of the constitutional guarantee. This is implicit from Article 51 (c) and the enabling power of the Parliament to enact laws for implementing the International Conventions and norms by virtue of Article 253 read with Entry 14 of the Union List in Seventh Schedule of the Constitution. Article 73also is relevant. It provides that the executive power of the Union shall extend to the matters with respect to which Parliament has power to make laws. The executive power of the Union is, therefore, available till the Parliament enacts legislation to expressly provide measures needed to curb the evil. 15. In Nilabati Behera v. State of Orissa SC/0307/1993 :1993 Cri LJ 2899, a provision in the ICCPR was referred to support the view taken that 'an enforceable right to compensation is not alien to the concept of enforcement of a guaranteed right', as a public law remedy under Article 32, distinct from the private law remedy in torts. There is no reason why these international conventions and norms cannot, therefore, be used for construing the fundamental rights expressly guaranteed in the Constitution of India which embody, the basic concept of gender equality in all spheres of human activity. 57. In Vikram Dhillon v. State of Haryana & Ors. AIR 2007 SC 1067 , the Apex Court quoted with approval the following observations in M.S. Grewal v. Deep Chand Sood Chairman, (supra), Railway Board v. Chandrima Das (supra): 35. In M.S. Grewal v. Deep Chand Sood SC/0506/2001 : AIR 2001 SC 3660 , Dalhousie Public School organized a picnic of young students at the bank of River Beas. Due to negligence of teachers, 14 students lost their lives. Teachers were convicted for an offence under Section304A, IPC. In a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, the High Court awarded compensation of Rs. Due to negligence of teachers, 14 students lost their lives. Teachers were convicted for an offence under Section304A, IPC. In a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, the High Court awarded compensation of Rs. 5 lakhs to each of the parents with interest @ 12% p.a. When the matter came up before this Court at the instance of the School Authorities, dismissing the appeal, the Court quoted with approval the following observations from D.K. Basu v. State of West Bengal SC/0157/1997 :1997 Cri LJ 743; The Courts have the obligation to satisfy the social aspirations of the citizens because the Courts and the law are for the people and expected to respond to their aspirations, A Court of law cannot close its consciousness and aliveness to stark realities. Mere punishment of the offender cannot give much solace to the family of the victim civil action for damages is a long drawn and a cumbersome judicial process. Monetary compensation for redressal by the Court finding the infringement of the indefeasible right to life of the citizen is, therefore, useful and at time perhaps the only effective remedy to apply balm to the wounds of the family members of the deceased victim, who may have been the breadwinner of the family. 36. In Chairman, Railway Board v. Chandrima Das SC/0046/2000 :2000 Cri LJ 1473, a poor lady was taken by railway employee to a railway guest house (Yatri Niwas) and was raped. Holding the Union of India vicariously liable, this Court held that for an act of Railway Authorities, a direction can be issued to the authorities to pay compensation to the victim and, accordingly, compensation was awarded. 58. Mr. A. Nandi, learned C.G.S.C. for the respondent Nos. 1 to 5, Union of India, has submitted that the Novodaya Vidyalaya Samiti was not responsible for the deplorable condition of petitioner No. 1 as it was an individual act of respondent No. 6. As per voluntary statement furnished by petitioner No. 1 to Dr. Trivedi in presence of two house mistresses, pregnancy of petitioner No. 1 was caused by the father and as such petitioner No. 1 is not responsible for such ill fate. It is submitted on behalf of respondents that the Principal or any staff of JNV were not guilty or responsible in the matter. It has been further stated that petitioner No. 1 suffered due to her own fault. It is submitted on behalf of respondents that the Principal or any staff of JNV were not guilty or responsible in the matter. It has been further stated that petitioner No. 1 suffered due to her own fault. It has been contended on behalf of the respondents that the JNV authority was not held responsible for the condition and the state of affairs of petitioner No. 1. It is not disputed that the accused has been convicted and sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life after having found him guilty of the offence alleged rape and criminal intimidation and the Apex Court has also turned down the appeal preferred by the respondent Principal. Other responsible employees of the school at the relevant time were also found guilty for different offences and accordingly they 'were convicted and sentenced. Therefore, there is no doubt about the complicity and connivance of the respondent public servants in committing the heinous offence alleged against them. 59. The law regarding compensation for recognized breach of fundamental rights has now been established by an extensive streak of pronouncements condensed by the Apex Court. The Apex Court in D.K. Basu v. State of W.B. (supra) also laid down that the claim in public law, for compensation for unconstitutional deprivation of fundamental right to life and liberty, the protection of which is guaranteed under the Constitution, is a claim based on strict liability and is in addition to the claim available in private law, for damages, for tortious acts of the public servants. Public law proceedings serve a different purpose than the private law proceedings. Award of compensation for established infringement of the indefeasible rights guaranteed under Article 21 is a remedy available in public law since the purpose of public law is not only to civilize public power but also to assure the citizens that they live under a legal system wherein their rights and interests shall be protected and preserved. Grant of compensation in proceedings under Article 32 or Article 226 of the Constitution of India for the established violation of the fundamental rights guaranteed under Article 21, is an exercise of the Courts under the public law jurisdiction for penalizing the wrongdoer and fixing the liability for the public wrong on the State which failed in the discharge of its public duty to protect the fundamental rights of the citizen. 60. 60. The Apex Court has clarified on a number of occasions to hold held that Court of law cannot close its awareness and aliveness to stark realities. Mere punishment of the offender cannot give much solace to the family of the victim--civil action for damages is a long drawn and a cumbersome judicial process. Monetary compensation for redressal by the Court finding the infringement of the indefeasible right to life of the citizen is, therefore useful, and at time perhaps the only effective remedy to apply balm to the wounds of the family members of the deceased victim, who may have been the breadwinner of the family. 61. Mr. Roy Barman, learned counsel for the petitioners by referring to the decision reported in (2004) 3 GLR 540, Lilabati Baisya v. State of Assam & Ors., submitted that any form of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment would fall within the inhibition of Article 21. 62. If the functionaries of the Government become lawbreakers, it is bound to breed contempt of law and would encourage lawlessness. Consequently, every man would have the tendency to become law unto himself thereby leading to anarchy. The relevant extract of the decision reads as follows : 10. The Apex Court in the case of O.K. Basu (supra) reiterated that the expression "life or personal liberty" in Article 21 of the Constitution of India includes within itself a guarantee against torture and assault by the State or its functionaries. Any, form of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment would fall within the inhibition of Article 21. The Apex Court observed that if the functionaries of the Government become law breakers, it is bound to breed contempt for law and would encourage lawlessness and every man would have the tendency to become law unto himself thereby leading to anarchy. It further observed that no civilized nation can permit that to happen. Torture, rape, death in police custody infringes Article 21 as well as basic human right and strikes a blow at rule of law. Torture of any kind involves not only physical suffering but also mental agony. It is naked violation of human dignity and destructive of human personality. 63. The Union of India and its instrumentalities are vicariously liable for the commission and lapse on the part of its employees, for whatever had happened with the petitioner No. 1. Torture of any kind involves not only physical suffering but also mental agony. It is naked violation of human dignity and destructive of human personality. 63. The Union of India and its instrumentalities are vicariously liable for the commission and lapse on the part of its employees, for whatever had happened with the petitioner No. 1. In the circumstances, it is now obligatory to be decided as to what should the amount of compensation to be paid to the petitioner. In the case of Chandrima Das (supra), the Apex Court upheld the awarding of compensation to the victim woman. While it is true that no amount of compensation would bring back the honour and dignity of the petitioner No. 1. More particularly her bright career as a student, which she lost in the hands of the criminal, who incidentally was the Principal of the School, working under the respondents. But awarding of some amount of compensation, in whatever manner it is described, would bring back some of her vanity, self-respect and honour. Obviously, the petitioner No. 1 has already endured profound emotional crisis publicized and tried in the hands of justice, never the less, with some amount of compensation so received, she would be able guide herself to a better-quality rehabilitation in future with a comfort that she would be able to take care of her liability. 64. The petitioner No. 1, was a bright student ardently pursuing her course of study in a school established by the Union of India. Admittedly she was brutally ravished and shabbily treated by the Principal of her School. In view of this, the respondent Nos. 1 to 4 are vicariously liable, for tortious act of the respondent, Public servants and, as such, any compensation payable to the victim is liable to be paid by the respondents. Coming now to the quantum of compensation to be paid to the petitioner, it may be noted that the petitioner will have to support a life with a child, which she mothered unknowingly. Her educational career had been discontinued since she had become a school drop out. Petitioner No. 1 was a good student and had she not been raped and subsequently given birth to a female child, then she would have certainly continued her educational career. Her educational career had been discontinued since she had become a school drop out. Petitioner No. 1 was a good student and had she not been raped and subsequently given birth to a female child, then she would have certainly continued her educational career. She would have at least certainly graduated and after graduation she would have been able to secure her livelihood by pursuing vocation, as per her qualification and eligibility. Now, she would remain as a semi-illiterate through out her life. Her mental and intellectual development has been arrested by the tragic incident and for this reason she has been deprived from enjoying life in its various manifestations. 65. As a matter of fact, her personality has become dwarfed and she has been deprived from attaining/developing faculties in life. Learned counsel for the petitioner No. 1 submitted that the petitioner No. 1 will have to bear the scar of incident throughout her entire life and this has left an indelible imprint on her person and character, which cannot be erased by any means. She would have to live a life of seclusion. Her marriage prospect has been doomed forever, like other girls of her age, she may not be able to dream of marriage and leading a normal conjugal life. Her social standing has been very much affected. The entire family has suffered loss of reputation and good will for the said incident. The entire family has become social outcast. The petitioner No. 1 has also been deprived of the company of her mother. After the incident the mother of petitioner No. 1 has become mentally deranged and she has lost her mental equilibrium. She was so much shocked that she could not cope with it and fell victim. As a result the mother of the petitioner ceased to be a normal human being capable of taking care of her children. The father of the petitioner has also expired in the meantime. As such, petitioner No. 1 has also been deprived of the care and comfort of her mother loving and father. The entire family of petitioner No. 1 has been continuing to be the subject of ridicule and scare by the society and for this reason they have been undergoing mental trauma and cruel treatment. As such, petitioner No. 1 has also been deprived of the care and comfort of her mother loving and father. The entire family of petitioner No. 1 has been continuing to be the subject of ridicule and scare by the society and for this reason they have been undergoing mental trauma and cruel treatment. Learned counsel for the petitioner contended that all these factors are to be taken into account to quantify extent of losses and damage suffered by petitioner No. 1 for violation of her legal and fundamental right by the respondents. She has been compelled to leave her roots and live a deserted and isolated life. Family members and society have discarded her. The petitioner No. 1, having lost and deprived of future prospect in life, is now living by the grace of others; it is not very difficult to imagine the maladies and struggle of the petitioner No. 1. 66. The claim in public law for compensation for unconstitutional deprivation of fundamental right to life is a claim based on strict liability and it is in addition to the claim available in private law for damages for tortious acts of the public servants. 67. On consideration of the totality of the circumstances, I am of the view that payment of compensation of a sum of Rs. 10 lakhs (Rupees ten lakhs) only to the petitioner No. 1 will meet the ends of justice. In the result, the Respondent Nos. 1 to 4 are hereby directed to pay a sum of Rs. 10 lakhs (Rupees ten lakhs) only by way of compensation to the petitioner No. 1 within a period of three months from the date of receipt of this order from the petitioner. No order as to costs. 68. Before parting with the record, I consider it apposite to issue directions to prevent recurrence of these types of incidents in future in the boardinghouses of educational institutions run by the State, where girl child of poor and weaker sections of society are provided accommodation, which permits them to continue their educational pursuit in State run institutions. These boardinghouses are well-known for their assistance to the children of the poor and economically backward sections of people. These boardinghouses are well-known for their assistance to the children of the poor and economically backward sections of people. In order to prevent recurrence of such incidents in future instead of this Court venturing to jot down a few precautions, a detailed study by some experts in the field would be more apposite. The constitutional obligations placed on the State, not only guarantees right to life and right to education to all children below 14 years, but also require the State to secure a social order for the promotion of welfare of the people and to ensure that tender aged children are not abused in state run institutions. The State has the duty to raise the level of safety to the girl child living ill such boarding houses. In no case such boarding houses of the educational institutions run by the states which are well-known for recognizing the above constitutional objectives, can be expected to be crime dens. Complaints of sexual abuse, lack of medical facilities to the inmates and physical exploitation of girl child reflects poor maintenance. The incident that had happened reflects a remorseful and regrettable situation of the functioning of the State run hostels for girl students. The incident is an eye opener which provides a warning that there is requirement for appropriate procedure to supervise and regulate the functioning of the boardinghouses. I am more concerned with such case which may go unreported. Any kind of laxity in such matters, would steal away the conceived goals. The very purpose, for which they have been established, would be a mirage. The educational institutions run by the State, rather than advancing the cherished goal of educating the poor children, would create problems for the society. Parent of the girl child would not be willing to send their children to the State run boardinghouses. The resultant effect would be that the children of the poor, economically and socially weaker sections of the society, would discontinue their studies, thereby affecting the very foundation of the scheme for educating girl child, who are future of the Nation. 69. Parent of the girl child would not be willing to send their children to the State run boardinghouses. The resultant effect would be that the children of the poor, economically and socially weaker sections of the society, would discontinue their studies, thereby affecting the very foundation of the scheme for educating girl child, who are future of the Nation. 69. It is, therefore, essential that the Secretary, Department of Human Resources and Development, Government of India, constitutes an Expert Committee in consultation with the Director Navoday Vidyalay Samity to examine the issue in question and to recommend measures to prevent recurrence of such notorious incidents of abuse of girl child in boardinghouses and provide a congenial atmosphere, for continuing their education etc. Founded on such recommendations, given by the Committee as aforesaid the Government shall issue necessary orders directing the concerned authority to implement them in right perspective. The Director, Navoday Vidyalay Samity will also make arrangement for conducting periodical checkups and take tough actions against the erring officials. The respondent authority concerned would take up the issue on a priority basis and do the needful as directed above.