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Kerala High Court · body

2011 DIGILAW 889 (KER)

Sree Ramananda Asram v. P. Asokan

2011-08-10

THOMAS P.JOSEPH

body2011
Judgment :- The following questions arise for a decision in this Original Petition: (1) Whether, if the plaintiffs who obtained the leave of court under Sec.92 of the Code of Civil Procedure (for short, “the Code”) either died or opted out of the suit, the suit will abate or is otherwise liable to be dismissed? (2) What is the course open to the court when the plaintiffs who obtained the leave under Sec.92 of the Code either died or opted out of the suit?’ (3) Whether in such a situation any other person who has an interest in the trust can seek impleadment as additional plaintiff without obtaining fresh leave under Sec.92 of the Code and continue with the suit? (4) Whether respondents 1 and 2 are persons having an interest in the trust so that they could be impleaded as additional plaintiffs in the suit? And; (5) Whether the person who has represented the first defendant – (Sreeramananda Ashramam) is competent to do so? 2. Facts necessary for a decision of the above questions are: Petitioner-first defendant, is a trust created for public purposes of a charitable or religious nature coming under Sec.92 of the Code. Two persons having obtained the leave of court instituted the suit under Sec.92 of the Code. While so, one of the plaintiffs opted out of the suit and the other expired on 26.07.2009. Respondents filed I.A.No.1134 of 2010 on 26.03.2010 claiming to be persons having an interest in the trust and requesting that they be impleaded as additional plaintiffs in the suit. To that application, petitioner-trust, represented by its then Matathipathi, Maheswarananda Swami filed objection on 07.10.2010. Learned Additional Sub Judge, by the impugned order (Ext.P3) held that respondents could be impleaded as additional plaintiffs under Order 1 Rule 10(2) of the Code. The said order is under challenge in this proceeding. 3. Shri O. Ramachandran Nambiar, the learned counsel for petitioner has contended that since of the two plaintiffs who were granted leave under Sec.92 of the Code, one opted out and the other expired, there is no plaintiff surviving to sustain the suit. In that situation it was not open to the respondents to seek impleadment as additional plaintiffs either under Order 1 Rule 10 (2) or any other provision of the Code. In that situation it was not open to the respondents to seek impleadment as additional plaintiffs either under Order 1 Rule 10 (2) or any other provision of the Code. It is contended that on the death of the surviving plaintiff, the suit abated and hence the question of impleadment of respondents does not arise. At any rate respondents are not persons having an interest in the trust (petitioner) as is evident from the counter statement filed by Maheswarananda Swami who was representing petitioner-trust where, he has contended that respondents have no interest in the trust. It is also contended by the learned counsel that though respondents claimed to be members of the Grihasthashishya Committee (resident ‘deciples’ Committee – for short, “the Committee”), Maheswarananda Swami had dissolved the said Committee on 08.08.2010. As such, respondents not being persons having an interest in the trust could not be impleaded as additional plaintiffs in the suit. 4. Shri R. Manikantan, learned counsel for respondents contended that the person who is now representing petitioner has no interest in the trust and hence, is not entitled to file this Original Petition challenging the impugned order. It is contended that so far as the interest of respondents in the petitioner (trust) is concerned, even in the original written statement filed by Maheswarananda Swami in the year, 1999, he has stated in paragraph 5 that the suit is bad for non-joinder of necessary parties due to non-impleadment of persons mentioned therein who include respondents as well (serial Nos.10 and 13 in paragraph 5 of the original written statement). It is also contended by the learned counsel that in the counter statement filed by Maheswarananda Swami on 07.10.2010 in I.A.No.1134 of 2010 there is no contention raised by him that the Committee was dissolved by him on 08.08.2010 as claimed by petitioner. Further contention is that since the suit is one instituted under Sec.92 of the Code after obtaining the leave of court, the suit cannot abate on the death of all or any of the plaintiffs. It is contended that since the suit is instituted by and on behalf of the class of persons who have an interest in the trust, the suit would remain alive and it is open to any person having an interest in the trust to seek impleadment as additional plaintiff within a reasonable time. It is contended that since the suit is instituted by and on behalf of the class of persons who have an interest in the trust, the suit would remain alive and it is open to any person having an interest in the trust to seek impleadment as additional plaintiff within a reasonable time. It is not necessary for such person to again obtain the leave of court under Sec.92 of the Code, it is contended by the learned counsel. 5. Under Section 92 of the Code, in the case of breach of any express or constructive trust created for public purposes of a charitable or religious nature, or where a direction of the court is deemed necessary for administration of any such trust, the Advocate General or two or more persons having an interest in the trust and having obtained the leave of court may institute a suit in the manner provided in the said provision seeking all or any of the reliefs mentioned therein. The provision was brought into the Code of 1882 in Sec.539 under which the suit could be brought either by the Advocate General acting ex officio, or by two or more persons having an interest in the trust and having obtained the consent in writing of the Advocates General. The power conferred by the section on the Advocate General could, outside the presidency towns, with the previous sanction of the Local Government, be exercised also by the Collector or by such Officer as the Local Government may appoint in that behalf. It is said that the language of the section was borrowed in part from the statute of George III (52, George III, Cap. 10) known as Sir Samuel Romilly’s Act (See Rangasami Naickan v. Varadappa Naickan – (ILR 1894 (XVII) Madras 462 at page 467). In Veeraragava Thathachariar v. Srinivasa Thathachariar (1912 (16) Ind, Cases 225) it is held that Sec.539 was enacted in the Code (of 1882) after the Trustees Act was passed in England and according to which the court had the power to appoint new trustees. In Veeraragava Thathachariar v. Srinivasa Thathachariar (1912 (16) Ind, Cases 225) it is held that Sec.539 was enacted in the Code (of 1882) after the Trustees Act was passed in England and according to which the court had the power to appoint new trustees. Learned judges in Veeraragava Thatchariar’s case agreed with the decision in Prayag Dossaji Varu Mahant v. Thirumala Srirangacharlavaru (1905 (285) Madras 319) that the Courts of Chancery had, independent of any statute the power to appoint new trustees and that Indian courts have always exercised the same powers in the matter of charities as the Chancery Courts of England. In England, the ordinary mode of obtaining redress with regard to charities was by way of information given by the Attorney General. In His Majesty’s Attorney General at the relation of George Westcott (Informant) v. William Douglas Brodie and Others (defendant) – (1846 (4) Moores Ind. App. 190 at page 195) it is held: “What however was the nature of jurisdiction of the Court of Chancery, in matters of charity, prior to the Statute, 43 Eliz., C.4z – It is mentioned by Lord Commissioner Jeykl, in Eyre v. Countess of Shaftsbury (2 P.Will. 118), “that the right, which the King has, as pater patriae, to take care of his subjects in cases of charities, & c., falls under the direction of the Court of Chancery”. It is part of the general equitable jurisdiction …. (Lord Langdale: The question then is, whether there is a law-officer in India, properly constituted to represent the Crown) – The Advocate General is competent to represent the public, by virtue of his position as principal law officer of the Government as also by the Statute, 53 Geo, 111, C.155, S.111, which authorizes the Advocate General to exhibit, in the Supreme Court, any information or informations in the nature of an action or actions at law….” The position of the Advocate General in India corresponded by statutory enactments to the position held by the Attorney General in England. The Advocate General acting ex officio was authorized by Sec.539 of the Code of 1882 either to bring the action on his own or permit two or more persons in writing to bring the action in the case of breach of any express or constructing trusts created for public charitable or religious purposes or whenever a direction of the court was deemed necessary for the administration of such trust. When the Code of 1908 was enacted, the provision was incorporated in Sec.92 with substantial changes. Instead of the Advocate General acting “ex officio” or granting permission to two or more persons to institute the suit Sec.92 provided that the Advocate General or two ore more persons having an interest in the trust and having obtained the consent in writing of the Advocate General may institute the suit. In order to remove the misconception that the word, “public” is co-ordinate with the word, ‘charitable’ or ‘religious’, the words “public purposes of a charitable or religious nature” were introduced in Sec.92, instead of the words “public charitable or religious purposes” as it occurred in Sec.539 of the Code of 1882. In the present Code, under Sec.92 the power of the Advocate General to bring the action is retained but the power to grant leave to two or more persons having an interest in the trust to bring the action is conferred on the court before which such action is to be brought. 6. The necessity of obtaining consent in writing of the Advocate General (now, the leave of court) was insisted with a view to prevent indefinite number of reckless and harassing suits being brought against the trust by different persons interested in the trust. In Ramdas Bhagat v. Krishna Prasad Tewari and others (AIR 1940 Patna 425) it was held that the suit to come under Sec.92 of the Code must be a representative one on behalf of and in the interest of the public. The suit should fundamentally be on behalf of the public for the vindication of a public right (see also Sherfuddin Sahib v. Ammermigh Sahib (1971 (84) Madras L.W. 555). 7. The Supreme Court had occasion to consider the reason for providing restrictions for a suit under Sec.92 of the Code. The suit should fundamentally be on behalf of the public for the vindication of a public right (see also Sherfuddin Sahib v. Ammermigh Sahib (1971 (84) Madras L.W. 555). 7. The Supreme Court had occasion to consider the reason for providing restrictions for a suit under Sec.92 of the Code. It was held in Madappa v. Mahanthadevaru (AIR 1966 SCC 878) that “the main purpose of Sec.92(1) of the Code is to give protection to public trusts of a charitable or religious nature from being subjected to harassment by suits being filed against them. The object is that before the Advocate General files the suit or the court grants leave to two or more persons to do so, the Advocate General or the court as the case may be is satisfied, prima facie that a case of breach of trust or of the necessity for obtaining direction of the court is made out. 8. The question as to the fate of a suit instituted by two or more persons having obtained the consent in writing of the Advocate General (or the leave of court) when one or all except one such plaintiff dies or opts out of the suit was always a moot question for consideration of the courts; whether, the suit in such circumstances would abate or fail or the surviving plaintiff could continue prosecution of the suit, or not? 9. Tudball and Rafique, JJ., who decided Chhabila Ram v. Durga Prasad (1915 (28) Allahabad 681) were of the opinion that the suit if brought by two persons in their capacity as members of the public interested in the trust, it is necessary for the continuance of the suit that there should be at least two plaintiffs holding sanction to carry on the suit and that if one of the two plaintiffs dies, it is open to another member of the public interested in the trust to come forward to take his place and thus prevent the suit abating but such person should also obtain the necessary sanction. That view was criticized and dissented by the Madras High Court in Parameswaran Munpu v. Narayanan Namboothiri (1916 (40) Madras 110), the Lahore High Court in Gopi Das v. Lal Das (97 PR 1918) and the Judicial Committee in Anand Rao v. Ramdas Daduram (AIR 1921 PC 123). That view was criticized and dissented by the Madras High Court in Parameswaran Munpu v. Narayanan Namboothiri (1916 (40) Madras 110), the Lahore High Court in Gopi Das v. Lal Das (97 PR 1918) and the Judicial Committee in Anand Rao v. Ramdas Daduram (AIR 1921 PC 123). In Parameswaran Munpu’s case, one of the two plaintiffs who having obtained the consent and brought the suit died. An additional plaintiff was added after six years of death of the (deceased) plaintiff. Answering the contention of defendant that the suit abated as the application for impleadment was not filed within the prescribed time, the court held: “the court has the power to add worshipers as parties not because they are the legal representatives of the two persons who instituted the suit with the Advocate General’s sanction but because they had become parties to the representative suit as soon as it was brought on behalf of all the worshipers and the court has power under Order 1, Rule 10, clause (2) of the CPC to add persons as additional parties “whose presence may be necessary in order to enable the court effectually and completely to adjudicate upon the questions involved in the suit….” The Madras High Court in the above said case dissented from the view of the Allahabad High Court (referred supra) that in such cases, the suit would abate and that for another person to come on record the consent of Advocate General (under Sec.539 of the old Code) was required. The Privy Council in Mt. Ali Begum v. Ali Khan (AIR 1938 PC 184) opined: “There is no provision whatsoever in the Code (CPC) for recourse being had to the Advocate General or Collector during the course of a suit or of any proceeding in appeal. As sub-sec.(2) of Sec.92 sufficiently shows, the consent in writing is a condition of the valid institution of a suit and has no relevance to any other stage. When once validly instituted it is a representative suit subject to all the incidents affecting suits in general and representative suits in particular. As sub-sec.(2) of Sec.92 sufficiently shows, the consent in writing is a condition of the valid institution of a suit and has no relevance to any other stage. When once validly instituted it is a representative suit subject to all the incidents affecting suits in general and representative suits in particular. Their Lordships cannot accept the doctrine of Jai Lal J., in the present case that the persons who have instituted the suit with the leave of the Collector are to be deemed to be one plaintiff; nor do they see any reason why one of several plaintiffs in such a suit should not appeal on the same terms and conditions as are applicable to suits in general.” 10. In the case before the Privy Council, two out of the three plaintiffs who, on obtaining consent of the Advocates General had brought the suit, died. The Privy Council held that the suit did not become defective or incompetent. Their Lordships opined that consent is a condition for institution of the suit alone and that it has no reference to any other stage of the suit (i.e., once consent is given and the suit is validly instituted). 11. In Bapiraji v. Ramachandra (AIR 1933 Madras 854) a Division Bench considered the scope of Sec.92 of the Code and the consequence of some of plaintiffs opting out of the suit. Madhavan Nair, J., wrote thus for the Division Bench: “Then it is said that two of the plaintiffs having dropped out it is not competent for one plaintiff alone to proceed with the suit under Sec.92 of the Code. This point has already been decided in this Court in H.K. Sayyad Gulam Ghouse v. Dost Mohammed Khan Sahib (AIR 1925 Madras 244) where it was held that a suit under Sec.92 CPC or an appeal arising out of such a suit does not abate on the death of one of the plaintiffs who obtained sanction for instituting the suit. It cannot therefore be said that the present suit is incompetent because there is only one person left to conduct the suit.” 12. In Iashim Haroon v. Gounsalishah (AIR 1942 Sind 137) referring to Sec.92 of the Code it was held that the necessity of two persons suing is restricted to the institution of the suit. It cannot therefore be said that the present suit is incompetent because there is only one person left to conduct the suit.” 12. In Iashim Haroon v. Gounsalishah (AIR 1942 Sind 137) referring to Sec.92 of the Code it was held that the necessity of two persons suing is restricted to the institution of the suit. There is nothing which requires that all the plaintiffs to whom sanction is given for filing the suit should, after filing the suit continue actively to prosecute the suit. The same view was taken in Golam Rabbani v. Abdul Khahir (ILR 62 Calcutta 1132). The Division Bench held that in a suit or appeal instituted by certain set of plaintiffs or appellants with the consent of the Advocate General or Collector under Sec.92 of the Code, consent of the Advocate General or Collector to each addition of a party is not necessary as a suit under Sec.92 is not prosecuted by individuals for their own interest but as representatives of the general public interested in the endowment. In Kidar Nath Datt & Others v. Kishan Das & Others (AIR 1957 Punjab 106) it was held that in a suit under Sec.92, if the scope of the suit is substantially altered or enlarged by the addition of a new defendant, previous sanction of the Advocate General is necessary and that the scope of the suit is enlarged when there is a totally different cause of action against the new defendant or when he is stated to be the real trustee. If scope of the suit remains unaltered and unchanged, no sanction is needed (for continuance of the suit) after it is validly instituted by two or more persons having obtained the leave. 13. In Pragdasji v. Ishwarlalbhai (AIR 1952 SC 143), eight out of the nine plaintiffs died pending the suit (under Sec.92 of the Code). Nobody came forward with the objection that the sole surviving plaintiff could not continue the proceeding. This circumstance was raised before the Punjab and Haryana High Court in J.S. Singh v. Charan Singh (AIR 1972 P&H 347). There, it was argued that the decision Pragdasji’s case (supra) has no application since in that case there was no objection to the surviving sole plaintiff continuing with the suit. The High Court observed, referring to the said contention: “It is obvious that the objection was considered not worth raising. There, it was argued that the decision Pragdasji’s case (supra) has no application since in that case there was no objection to the surviving sole plaintiff continuing with the suit. The High Court observed, referring to the said contention: “It is obvious that the objection was considered not worth raising. I therefore do not agree with Shri Mittal that the appeal has abated with the death of appellant No.1 or respondents 3 or 4 when both sides are litigating in a representative capacity.” 14. The Rajasthan High Court in Suraj Narain v. Manglal (AIR 1972 Rajasthan 172) also considered the question. There, three members of the public brought a representative suit under Sec.92 of the Code after obtaining the consent of the Advocate General and one each of them died during the pendency of the suit and the appeal, respectively and their names were struck off. The appeal by the remaining member alone was found maintainable. The Supreme Court in Charan Singh v. Darshan Singh (AIR 1972 SC 371) referring to Sec.92 and Order XXII Rule 1 of the Code held that when a suit is filed in a representative capacity, death of one of the plaintiffs during pendency of second appeal does not abate the appeal. 15. As per Sec.92 of the Code, obtaining consent in writing of the Advocate General (as per the 1908 Code) or the leave of court (as per the present Code) is a sine qua non for the valid institution of the suit but that condition is only for the valid institution of the suit and not for its continuance after it is validly instituted. Once the suit is validly instituted, it is a suit brought by and on behalf of the public who have an interest in the trust though all of them do not actually join in the plaint. In that situation if any one of the plaintiffs who obtained the consent of Advocate General (or the leave of court as the case may be) survives, he can continue the suit. The question of abatement or failure of the suit does not arise for the reason that other plaintiffs died or opted out of the suit. In that situation if any one of the plaintiffs who obtained the consent of Advocate General (or the leave of court as the case may be) survives, he can continue the suit. The question of abatement or failure of the suit does not arise for the reason that other plaintiffs died or opted out of the suit. Any other person who has an interest in the trust can also come on record as additional plaintiff and for that, he is not required to obtain the leave of court as provided under Sec.92 of the Code. That is the view taken in the above referred decisions except by the Allahabad High Court in Chhabila Ram’s case (supra) which in the light of the wordings of Sec.92 of the Code and weight of authorities cited above, I am unable to accept. 16. The next question is whether, if after a suit is validly instituted under Sec.92 of the Code either all the plaintiffs opted out or expired, there is a failure or abatement of the suit, whether in such a situation it is open to any person having an interest in the trust to seek impleadment and proceed with the suit and if so, he needs to get the leave of court under Sec.92. I referred to the nature and character of the suit under Sec.92 of the Code as being in a representative capacity brought by and on behalf of the class of people having an interest in the trust and that once leave is granted and the suit is validly instituted, it is a suit instituted by and on their behalf though all of them have not actually joined the suit. I also stated how the King of England thought it necessary to protect charities coming under the purview of the Trustees Act as Pater Patriae and the power conferred on the Attorney General to institute the suit when it was found that there was mismanagement of the trust. In short, it was considered the duty of the State to protect trusts of the nature coming under Sec.539 of the Code of 1882 and Sec.92 of the present Code. The Advocate General was to bring the suit or give consent to two or more persons to bring the suit. In short, it was considered the duty of the State to protect trusts of the nature coming under Sec.539 of the Code of 1882 and Sec.92 of the present Code. The Advocate General was to bring the suit or give consent to two or more persons to bring the suit. And now, the court is authorized to grant leave to two or more persons who have an interest in the trust to bring the action. The Advocate General (if he brings the action) or, two or more persons who have obtained the leave of court, does so on behalf of all who have an interest in the trust. That being the nature of the suit under Sec.92 of the Code, even if all the plaintiffs after the suit is validly instituted either opted out or expired, that by itself cannot put an end to the suit by abatement or otherwise. For, the public who have interest in the trust is involved. It is not a suit prosecuted by individuals for establishing individual rights. The suit can survive. 17. How then can the suit survive when all the plaintiffs either opted out or expired? The Privy Counsel had occasion to refer to this aspect in Anand Rao v. Ramdas Daduram and others (supra). There, the suit was validly instituted under Sec.539 of the Code of 1882. Lord Dunedin giving the opinion of the Privy Council held at page 124: “There was also a point that the persons who originally raised the suit got the sanction having died the suit could not go on, but there does not seem any force in that point either, it being a suit which is not prosecuted by individuals for their own interest but as representatives of the general public. There Lordships are of opinion that for the purpose of determining on a scheme the suit was properly revived against the present Raja….” (emphasis supplied) No doubt, that was a case where death of the surviving plaintiff was after framing of the scheme. But it was held that where persons who initially obtained permission died during the pendency of the suit, other members of the public can continue the suit. In Kadri v. Khubmiya (AIR 1931 Bombay 388) a scheme was framed with reference to a religious institution by the District court with right to apply for modification. But it was held that where persons who initially obtained permission died during the pendency of the suit, other members of the public can continue the suit. In Kadri v. Khubmiya (AIR 1931 Bombay 388) a scheme was framed with reference to a religious institution by the District court with right to apply for modification. The applicants for modification were not parties to the original suit. Patkar J., observed, “I think, however, that the proper persons who can apply under the liberty reserved in the scheme are the parties to the suit. If however the previous parties are dead or are colluding with the defendants or negligent in applying it would be permissible for the court to bring the applicants on record under Rule 10 of Order I and I think for such an application the consent of the Advocate General is not necessary.” (emphasis supplied) In Atma Ram v. Beni Prasad (AIR 1935 PC 185) the suit was filed by the Collector (as Sec.539 of the Code of 1882 permitted with respect to areas outside the presidency towns) for possession of property representing two widows under the U.P. Courts of Wards Act (Act 4 of 1912). It was held that plaintiff may go out of the suit, but that does not put an end to the litigation where other people are interested in it and have a right to come in and continue the litigation. In Saithu Mustava v. Althrose Ali (1951 KLT 342), referring to Sec.72 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Travancore) corresponding to Sec.92 of the Code (in substance), the main point raised in the appeal was that as one of the original parties to whom sanction was accorded by the Government had died and the other was not for prosecuting the suit at all the court should have dismissed the suit altogether and not proceeded with the suit and passed a decree. It was held: “There is in our opinion little or no substance in this contention. The trend of the rulings is to the effect that where persons initially obtaining permission die during the pendency of the suit, other members of the public can continue the suit.” In holding so, reliance was placed on the decisions in Anand Rao v. Ramdas Daduram (AIR 1921 PC 123) and Lakshmana Perumal Pillai v. Ulakanatha Pillai (28 TLJ 932). The trend of the rulings is to the effect that where persons initially obtaining permission die during the pendency of the suit, other members of the public can continue the suit.” In holding so, reliance was placed on the decisions in Anand Rao v. Ramdas Daduram (AIR 1921 PC 123) and Lakshmana Perumal Pillai v. Ulakanatha Pillai (28 TLJ 932). Then came the decision in Abdul Satar v. Kunhu Moidu (AIR 1953 TC 390 – Vol.40 Case No.153). There the trial court had held that where persons initially obtaining permission die during the pendency of the suit, competency of other members of the public to continue the suit cannot be questioned. In that case the status of petitioners as persons interested in the trust was questioned. Trial court allowed the application for impleadment without entering a finding whether petitioners were persons interested in the trust. The said order was challenged in the High Court. It was held: “If all the plaintiffs who obtained the sanction died after the valid institution of the suit, there is no doubt that the members of the public interested in the trust can get themselves impleaded in the case and prosecute it.” The order of the trial court (in that case) was set aside as there was no finding that petitioners were persons having an interest in the trust. 18. The above discussion leads me to the following conclusions: (1) Once leave is granted under Sec.92 of the Code and the suit is validly instituted, even if some of the plaintiffs opted out of the suit or died with only one plaintiff surviving the question of failure or abatement of the suit does not arise. The sole surviving plaintiff can continue the suit. (2) Even if after a valid institution of the suit the sole surviving plaintiff or all the plaintiffs opted out of the suit or the surviving plaintiff or all the plaintiffs died, the suit cannot fail for that reason or abate. (3) In such situations, it is open to one or more persons who have an interest in the trust to come forward and continue with the suit by getting himself/themselves impleaded in the suit under Rule 10(2) of Order 1 of the Code. It is not necessary for such person/persons to obtain the leave of court under Sec.92 of the Code to continue with the suit. 19. It is not necessary for such person/persons to obtain the leave of court under Sec.92 of the Code to continue with the suit. 19. What then is the procedure the court has to adopt when all or the surviving plaintiff opted out of the suit or died and no other person having an interest in the trust has come forward to continue with the suit? I stated that under the scheme of a suit under Sec.92 of the Code once leave is granted and the suit is validly instituted, it is by and on behalf of the public who have an interest in the trust. I also stated that it is the function of the State to protect the trust of the nature coming under Sec.92 and that is why the State has taken care to entrust the power to institute the suit to its prime Law Officer, the Advocate General. In other words it is the concern of the State to protect the trust of the nature coming under Sec.92 of the Code from mismanagement. In such a situation assuming that all or the sole surviving plaintiff opted out of the suit or died and no other person having an interest in the trust has come forward to continue with the suit, the court has to follow any of the following courses. (1) It is open to the court to intimate the Advocate General about the case and the situation and await his response. The Advocate General, if he thinks it fit can intervene and continue prosecution of the suit impleading himself as additional plaintiff. (2) The court may, if within a reasonable time either the Advocate General or any other person/persons having an interest in the trust has/have not come forward to get implead as additional plaintiff/plaintiffs to continue with the suit, close the suit so that, it is open to the Advocate General for any person/persons interested in the trust to seek revival of the suit within a reasonable time and continue with the suit. (3) In case the suit is thus closed, it is not necessary for the court to draw up a decree as there is no adjudication of the dispute raised in the suit (this has no reference to a disposal after notice is given as provided under Rule 8(4) of Order 1 of the Code). 20. (3) In case the suit is thus closed, it is not necessary for the court to draw up a decree as there is no adjudication of the dispute raised in the suit (this has no reference to a disposal after notice is given as provided under Rule 8(4) of Order 1 of the Code). 20. Having answered the questions of law formulated as above, next question is whether the learned Sub Judge was justified in allowing I.A.No.1134 of 2010? Learned counsel for petitioner contends that respondents are not persons having any interest in the trust since Maheswarananda Swami, the Madathipathi of petitioner-trust had on 08.08.2010 dissolved the committee of which respondents were members and hence respondents have no interest in the trust. It is argued by the learned counsel for respondents that even in the counter filed by Maheswarananda Swami in I.A.No.1134 of 2010 on 07.10.2010 there was no contention that the Committee was dissolved on 08.08.2010 as petitioner alleges. It is also contended by the learned counsel that even in the written statement filed by Maheswarananda Swami in paragraph 5, there is reference to the respondents being members of the Committee and they being necessary parties to the suit. Hence the contention of petitioner that respondents are not persons having any interest in the trust cannot be accepted. It is contended that even otherwise respondents are persons having an interest in the trust and hence entitled to be impleaded as additional plaintiffs. In response, learned for petitioner pointed out that Maheswarananda Swami had filed the written statement in the year 1999, dissolution of the Committee of which respondents claimed to be members was on 08.08.2010 and hence there was no possibility of the said aspect being mentioned in the written statement filed in the year 1999. It is also pointed out by the learned counsel from paragraph 3 of the counter statement filed by Maheswarananda Swami on 07.10.2010 to I.A.No.1134 of 2010 that according to Maheswarananda Swami, respondents have no right or interest in the trust. Thus the question whether respondents are persons having an interest in the trust is disputed and which requires an enquiry before a finding is arrived at. 21. The same is the situation with respect to Soprakashananda Swami who has represented petitioner-trust in this proceeding. Thus the question whether respondents are persons having an interest in the trust is disputed and which requires an enquiry before a finding is arrived at. 21. The same is the situation with respect to Soprakashananda Swami who has represented petitioner-trust in this proceeding. Learned counsel for respondents contended that Soprakashananda Swami has no right or interest in the trust and that he claims right under a Will said to be executed by Maheswarananda Swami. Thus the locus standi of Soprakashananda Swami to represent petitioner is also under challenge. 22. As I stated above, unless the person/persons seeking impleadment to continue with the suit has/have an interest in the trust, question of the court impleading them as additional plaintiffs and permitting them to continue with the suit does not arise. Therefore it is necessary to decide whether respondents are persons having an interest in the trust. At the same time the court has to consider whether Soprakashananda Swami who seeks to represent petitioner is entitled to do so. In the view of that, I am inclined to think that the order on I.A.No.1134 of 2010 has to go and that application has to be remitted to the court below for fresh decision. Subject to the findings I have entered on the questions of law formulated first above, this Original Petition is allowed and Ext.P3, order on I.A.No.1134 of 2010 is set aside. That application is remitted to the court of learned Sub Judge for fresh decision on the questions whether respondents have (whether they are members of the Committee or not) any interest in the trust and hence are entitled to continue with the suit and whether Soprakashananda Swami is entitled and competent to represent petitioner-defendant trust). Learned Sub judge shall conduct an enquiry in the above matter as early as possible and reach appropriate conclusions.