ORDER D.N. Patel. J. This writ petition has been preferred mainly for the reason that the petitioners are waiting list candidates for the post of Lady Supervisor and they want appointment. In all there were selection of 12 Lady Supervisors. In pursuance of the public advertisement for 12 vacancies all the candidates who were selected• have already joined. The petitioners are in the waiting list and under the hope that waiting list will be operated but it has not been operated at all. The petitioners have recounted the vacancy for the post so advertised namely. Lady Supervisor and have pointed out that instead of 12 there were 16 vacancies. This information was obtained under the Right to Information Act. 2005 and as per Annexure-3 to the memo of the petition there were 4 more vacancies for the post of Lady Supervisor as on May 2009. 2. It is submitted by learned counsel for the petitioners that at least 4 waiting list candidates who are the petitioners before this Court ought to have been in the selected list for the post of Lady Supervisor. There is a wrong calculation of the vacancy of the post by the respondents. Learned counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the advertisement issued by the respondents for the post in question which is at Annexure-A to the counter affidavit. As per Clause 6 of the advertisement especially second paragraph thereof for all the vacant posts of Lady Supervisor the merit list will be operated and on the basis of this Clause 6 of the advertisement also it is claimed by the petitioners that in all there were 16 vacancies and. therefore all the 4 waiting list candidates ought to have been appointed on the post of Lady Supervisor. It is further submitted by learned counsel for the petitioners that there were no statutory rules not to operate the waiting list and hence also the petitioners who are in the waiting list for the post of Lady Supervisor should have been appointed like those selected candidates because there were already 4 vacancies with the respondents. It is further submitted by learned counsel for the petitioners that there were no statutory rules not to operate the waiting list and hence also the petitioners who are in the waiting list for the post of Lady Supervisor should have been appointed like those selected candidates because there were already 4 vacancies with the respondents. Learned counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the decision rendered by the Honble Supreme Court in the case of Naseem Ahmad and others v. State of Uttar Pradesh and another, reported in (2011) 2 SCC 734 especially upon paragraphs 21, 22 and 23 thereof and it is thus concluded that even though the petitioners are in the waiting list because of four more vacancies' available at the relevant time for the post in question these petitioners could not have been enlisted in the waiting list but they ought to have been enlisted in the selected list candidates and they ought to have been appointed on the post of Lady Supervisor and therefore this petition may kindly be allowed. 3. Learned counsel for the respondents submitted that there is no legitimate right vested in the petitioners to get themselves to be appointed as they are in the waiting list and the waiting list has not been operated by the State. There was public advertisement for 12 posts of Lady Supervisor. All those who have been selected have joined the services and therefore no question of operating the waiting list whatsoever arises. It is further submitted by learned counsel for the respondents that waiting list is not reservoir of the candidates who can be appointed even against the future vacancies. The waiting list can be operated only for the posts for which advertisement was given. The waiting list can be operated only in certain contingency like if any selected candidate has not joined the services or if any candidate who has joined the services and left for any reason whatsoever or if any selected candidate has expired or in such other similar situated conditions then only waiting list can be operated. In the facts of the present case all the 12 candidates who were selected for the post of Lady Supervisor have joined the services and none of them have resigned or left the services. In that situation waiting list cannot be operated for the vacancy which has not been advertised at all. In the facts of the present case all the 12 candidates who were selected for the post of Lady Supervisor have joined the services and none of them have resigned or left the services. In that situation waiting list cannot be operated for the vacancy which has not been advertised at all. It is further submitted by learned counsel for the respondents that even if there is more vacancy but if the advertisement has been given only for 12 posts there is no legitimate right vested in the waiting list candidates to be appointed against the posts which are never advertised. It is left at the discretion and wisdom of the employer. There is no public duty vested in the State that all the vacant posts must be filled up. Looking to the public need administrative exigency administrative requirement including financial capability an employer may not fill up all the vacant posts. Those reasons cannot be brought under the judicial review much less by the writ petition and therefore assuming without admitting that there were 4 vacancies over and above 12 vacancies, which were advertised, the petitioners cannot claim upon those posts for which, no advertisement was given. Nonetheless, the fact remains that there was correct calculation of vacancies by the respondents and rightly they were advertised for filling up 12 posts of Lady Supervisor. The so called information given at Annexure-3 is not creating any estoppel on the part of the State under Section 114 of the Evidence Act. 1872. In fact additional affidavit has been filed to the effect that the information supplied under the Right to Information Act 2005 was slightly inaccurate. Thus no castle of hope can be constructed by the petitioners on the basis of so called alleged vacancy, fortified by Annexure-3, which was never advertised. The only right at the most vested in the waiting list candidates is that if any of the candidates from the selected list has not joined the services or if has resigned thereafter or if left the services or in case of their death, the waiting list can be operated. Thus, there is no legitimate right vested in these petitioners to get themselves to be appointed for the post of Lady Supervisor. Thus, there is no legitimate right vested in these petitioners to get themselves to be appointed for the post of Lady Supervisor. Learned counsel for the respondents has relied upon the decisions rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Rakhi Ray and others v. High Court of Delhi and others, reported in (2010) 2 SCC 637 and in the case of State of Orissa & another v. Rajkishore Nanda & others, reported in (2010) 6 SCC 777 and the decision rendered by this Court in the case of Pravas Kumar Singh & others v. The State of Jharkhand & others, reported in 2011 (2) JLJR 207 . 4. Having heard learned counsel for both the sides and looking to the facts and circumstances of the case, I see no reason to entertain this writ petition mainly for the following facts and reasons: (1) A public advertisement was given by the respondent-State authorities on 27th January, 2008 for filling up the posts of Lady Supervisor. The public advertisement is at Annexure-A to the counter affidavit, filed by the State. Looking to this public advertisement the employer namely the State wanted to fill up 12 vacancies for the post of Lady Supervisor. (ii) It further appears from the facts of the case that candidates including the petitioners applied undergone the selection process and ultimately the select list was prepared Minutes of the meeting held by the respondents was prepared wherein the list of the selected candidates has been given and the petitioners were enlisted in then waiting list. The Minutes of the meeting is at Annexure-C to the counter affidavit filed by the respondent-State which is dated 22nd May, 2008. Thus 12 candidates were enlisted in the select list and the petitioners were enlisted in the waiting list. (iii) The petitioners are at serial numbers 1, 2, 3 and 4 respectively in the waiting list. All the 12 selected candidates have joined the services and it is not the case of the petitioners that any of the selected candidates have not joined the services or has subsequently resigned or terminated or has expired. In this set of circumstance no question of operating the waiting list whatsoever arises. Select list got exhausted no sooner did State appoints select list candidates. Thereafter select list cease to exist and has outlived its utility. In this set of circumstance no question of operating the waiting list whatsoever arises. Select list got exhausted no sooner did State appoints select list candidates. Thereafter select list cease to exist and has outlived its utility. The currency of select list had expired as soon as the number of posts advertised are filled up. thereafter appointments beyond, the number of posts advertised would amount to filling up future vacancies (2009) 1 SCC paragraph 33. Waiting list can be operated only in certain contingencies. viz.: (a) if any selected candidates have not resumed the services; (b) if there is some extreme exigency, the Government may as a matter of policy decide to appoint persons, in order of merit from waiting list [as per para 9 of 1994 Supp (2) SCC 591]. (iv) Waiting list cannot be operated by the State authorities for the future vacancies. The vacancies for which no advertisement has been given cannot be filled up from the candidates who are in the waiting list. Waiting list is not reservoir of the candidates to be appointed for all time to come. Otherwise, the chance of fresh eligible candidates to get the public employment under Article 16 of the Constitution of India will be violated. (v) If the advertisement has been given for "X" number of post then the waiting list cannot be operated for "X" + "Y" number of post. Future vacancies cannot be filled up from waiting list candidates. No vacancy can be filled up from the existing unexhausted select list which arose subsequent to issue of advertisement. Once the selection of candidates for the advertised post is over, rest of the list of candidates cannot be used as reservoir, or as infinite stock to fill up future vacancy. (vi) It has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Rakhi Ray v. High Court of Delhi, reported in (2010) 2 SCC 637 in paragraphs 7, 11 and 12 as under:- "7. (vi) It has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Rakhi Ray v. High Court of Delhi, reported in (2010) 2 SCC 637 in paragraphs 7, 11 and 12 as under:- "7. It is a settled legal proposition that vacancies cannot be filled up over and above the number of vacancies advertised as "the recruitment of the candidates in excess of the notified vacancies is a denial and deprivation of the constitutional right under Article 14 read with Article 16(1) of the Constitution", of those persons who acquired eligibility for the post in question in accordance with the statutory rules subsequent to the date of notification of vacancies. Filling up the vacancies over the notified vacancies is neither permissible nor desirable for the reason that it amounts to "improper exercise of power and only in a rare and exceptional circumstance and in emergent situation such a rule can be deviated from and such a deviation is permissible only after adopting policy decision based on some rationale" otherwise the exercise would be arbitrary. Filling up of vacancies over the notified vacancies amounts to filling up of future vacancies and thus is not permissible in law. 11. In Mukul Saikia v. State of Assam this Court dealt with a similar issue and held that "if the requisition and advertisement was only for 27 posts the State cannot appoint more than the number of posts advertised." The select list "got exhausted when all the 27 posts were filled." Thereafter the candidates below the 27 appointed candidates have no right to claim appointment to any vacancy in regard to which selection was not held. The "currency of select list had expired as soon as the number of posts advertised are filled up therefore appointments beyond the number of posts advertised would amount to filling up future vacancies" and said course is impermissible in law. 12. In view of above the law can be summarised to the effect that any appointment maid beyond the number of vacancies advertised is without jurisdiction being violative of Articles 14 & 16(1) of the Constitution of India thus a nullity in executable and unemforceable in law. In case the vacancies notified stand filled up the process of selection comes to an end. Waiting list etc. In case the vacancies notified stand filled up the process of selection comes to an end. Waiting list etc. cannot be used as a reservoir to fill up the vacancy which comes into existence after the issuance of notification/ advertisement. The unexhausted select list/waiting list becomes meaningless and cannot be pressed in service any more." (Emphasis supplied) (vii) It has been held by the Honble Supreme Court in the case of Surinder Singh v. State of Punjab reported in (1997) 8 SCC 488 in Paragraphs 14 & 16 as under: "14. A waiting list prepared in an examination conducted by the Commission does not furnish a source of recruitment. It is operative only for the contingency that if any of the selected candidates does not join then the person from the waiting list may be pushed up and be appointed in the vacancy so caused or if there is some extreme exigency the Government may as a matter of policy decision pick up persons in order of merit from the waiting list. But the view taken by the High Court that since the vacancies have not been worked out properly, therefore, the candidates from the waiting list were liable to be appointed does not appear to be sound. This practice may result in depriving those candidates who become eligible for competing for the vacancies available in future. If the waiting list in one examination was to operate as an infinite stock for appointments, there is a danger that the State Government may resort to the device of not holding an examination for years together and pick up candidates from the waiting list as and when required. The constitutional discipline requires that this Court should not permit such improper exercise of power which may result in creating a vested interest and perpetrate waiting list for the candidates of one examination at the cost of entire set of fresh candidates either from the open or even from service. 16. Exercise of such power has to be tested touchstone of reasonableness....It is not as a matter of course that the authority can fill up more posts than advertised." (Emphasis supplied) (viii) It has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Rakhi Ray v. High Court of Delhi reported in (2010) 2 SCC 637 in paragraph 22 as under :- "22. In view of the above we do not find any force in the submissions that the High Court have filled vacancies over and above the vacancies advertised on 19.05.2007 as per the directions issued by this Court in Malik Mazhar Sultan case. More so no explanation could be furnished by Shri Ranjit Kumar learned Senior Counsel for the appellants as to why the appellants could not challenged the advertisement itself if it was not in conformity with the directions issued by this Court in the said case;" (Emphasis supplied) (ix) It has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Prem Singh v. Haryana State Electricity Board, reported in (1996) 4 SCC 319 in Paragraphs 23 to 26 as under: "23. In State of Bihar v. Madan Mohan Singh this Court has in terms held that if the advertisement and the consequent selection process were meant only to fill up a certain number of vacancies then the merit list will hold good for the purpose of filling up those notified vacancies and no further. In that case 32 vacancies were advertised but a select list of 129 candidates were prepared. A question arose whether more candidates could be appointed on the basis of the said select list. This Court held that once the 32 vacancies were filled up the process of selection for those 32 vacancies got exhausted and came to an end. It was further held that if the same list has to be kept subsisting for the purpose of filling up other vacancies also that would naturally amount to deprivation of rights of other candidates who would have become eligible subsequent to the said advertisement and selection process. 24. One of the questions which fell for consideration in Madan Lal v. State of J & K was whether preparation of merit list of 20 candidates was bad as the vacancies for which the advertisement was issued by the Commission were only 11 and the requisition that was sent by the Government for selection was also for those 11 vacancies. This Court held that the said action of the Commission by itself was not bad but at the time of giving actual appointments the merit list had to be so operated that only 11 vacancies were filled up. This Court held that the said action of the Commission by itself was not bad but at the time of giving actual appointments the merit list had to be so operated that only 11 vacancies were filled up. The reason given by this Court was that as the requisition was for 11 vacancies the consequent advertisement and requirement could also be for 11 vacancies and no more. This Court further observed: . "It is easy to visualize that if requisition is for 11 vacancies and that results in the initiation of recruitment process by way of advertisement whether the advertisement mentions filling up of 11 vacancies or not the prospective candidates can easily find out from the office of the Commission that the requisition for the proposed recruitment is for filling up 11 vacancies. In such a case a given candidate may not like to compete for diverse reasons but if requisition is for larger number of vacancies for which recruitment is initiated he may like to compete. Consequently the actual appointments to the posts have to be confined to the posts for recruitment to which requisition is sent by the Government. In such an eventuality candidates in excess of 11 who are lower in the merit list of candidates can only be treated as wait-listed candidates in order of merit to fill only the 11 vacancies for which recruitment has been maid in the event of any higher candidate not being available to fill the 11 vacancies for any reason. Once the 11 vacancy are filled by candidates taken in order of merit from the select list that list will get exhausted having served its purpose." It may also be stated that while making the aforesaid observations this Court agreed with the contention that while sending a requisition for recruitment to posts the Government can keep in view not only actual vacancies then existing but also anticipated vacancies. 25. From the above discussion of the case law it becomes clear that the selection process by way of requisition and advertisement can be started for clear vacancies and also for anticipated vacancies but not for future vacancies. If the requisition and advertisement are for a certain number of posts only the State cannot make more appointments than the number of posts advertised even though it might have prepared a select list of more candidates. If the requisition and advertisement are for a certain number of posts only the State cannot make more appointments than the number of posts advertised even though it might have prepared a select list of more candidates. The State can deviate from the advertisement and make appointments on posts falling vacant thereafter in exceptional circumstances only or in an emergent situation and that too by taking a policy decision in that behalf. Even when falling up of more posts than advertised is challenged the Court may not while exercising its extraordinary jurisdiction invalidate the excess appointments and may mould the relief in such a manner as to strike a just balance between the interest of the State and the interest of persons seeking public employment. What relief should be granted in such cases would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. 26. In the present case as against the 62 advertised posts the Board made appointments on 138 posts. The selection process was started for 62 clear vacancies and at that time anticipated vacancies were not taken into account: Therefore strictly speaking the Board was not justified in making more than 62 appointments pursuant to the advertisement published on 02.11.1991 and the selection process which followed thereafter. But as the Board could have taken into account not only the actual vacancies but also vacancies which were likely to arise because of recruitment etc. by the time the selection process was completed it would not be just and equitable to invalidate all the appointments made on posts in excess of 62. However the appointments which were made against future vacancies in this case on posts which were newly created must be regarded as invalid. As stated earlier after the selection process had started 13 posts had become vacant because of recruitment and 12 because of deaths. The vacancies which were likely to arise as a result of recruitment could have been reasonably anticipated by the Board. The Board through oversight had not taken them into consideration while a requisition was made for filling up 62 posts. Even with respect to the appointments made against vacancies which arose because of deaths a lenient view can be taken and on consideration of expediency and equity they need not be quashed. The Board through oversight had not taken them into consideration while a requisition was made for filling up 62 posts. Even with respect to the appointments made against vacancies which arose because of deaths a lenient view can be taken and on consideration of expediency and equity they need not be quashed. Therefore in view of the special facts and circumstances of this case we do not think it proper to invalidate the appointments made on those 25 additional' posts. But the appointments made by the Board on posts beyond 87 are held invalid. Though the High Court was right in the view it has taken we modify its order to the aforesaid extent. These appeals are allowed accordingly. No order as to costs." (Emphasis supplied) (x) It has been held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Gujrat State Dy. Executive Engineers' Association v. State of Gujrat and others reported in 1994 Supp (2) SCC 591 in Paragraphs 9 arid 10 as under :- "9. A waiting list prepared in an examination conducted by the Commission does not furnish a source of recruitment. It is operative only for the contingency that if any of the selected candidates does not join then the person from the waiting list may be pushed up and be appointed in the vacancy so caused or if there is some extreme exigency the Government may as a matter of policy decision, pick up persons in order of merit from the waiting list. But the view taken by the High Court that since the vacancies have not been worked out properly therefore the candidates from the waiting list were liable to be appointed does not appear to be sound. This practice may result in depriving those candidates who become eligible for competing for the vacancies available in future. If the waiting list in one examination was to operate as an infinite stock for appointments there is a danger that the State Government may resort to the device of not holding an examination for years together and pick up candidates from the waiting list as and when required. If the waiting list in one examination was to operate as an infinite stock for appointments there is a danger that the State Government may resort to the device of not holding an examination for years together and pick up candidates from the waiting list as and when required. The constitutional discipline requires that this Court should not permit such improper exercise of power which may result in creating a vested interest and perpetrate waiting list for the candidates of one examination at the cost of entire set of fresh candidates either from the open or even from service. 10. How a waiting list is to operate in the State is clear from a circular issued by the State Government on 27-12-1983. The relevant portion of the circular is extracted below: "According to the instructions issued by the department often and often waiting list prepared by the Gujarat Public Service Commission over and above the number of posts requisitioned shall remain in force up to 2 years or under circumstances up to the declaration of the result of next examination. The basic purpose of the preparation of waiting list is when sufficient candidates are not available from the merit list prepared for requisition of particular year shortfall can be met with from waiting list or for making recruitment during emergent condition, waiting list cannot be considered as merit list for that year or of next year similarly waiting list cannot be used as a substitute to the requisition of next year. Further as the requisition statement for the particular year is sent for the post allocable to direct recruitment for that year as per provision in relevant rules naturally the requirement of subsequent year cannot be incorporated. Considering on the above facts it is not fair to stop the regular procedure of recruitment or not to give new advertisement for the reason that merit list or waiting list prepared as part of merit list of previous year is in force." Although the circular was issued in 1983 but it only attempted to clarify what was the implied purpose of a waiting list. Even without it the operation of a waiting list should be confirmed to the vacancies notified for that examination and not for any vacancy arising in future unless a policy decision is taken by the Government to that effect. Even without it the operation of a waiting list should be confirmed to the vacancies notified for that examination and not for any vacancy arising in future unless a policy decision is taken by the Government to that effect. Appointment in future vacancies from waiting list prepared by the Commission should be exception rather than the rule. It has many ramifications. In any case the High Court should not have assumed upon itself the role of Appointing Authority unless it found that the Government was acting arbitrarily. No rule has been shown that selection of direct recruits was to take place every year. In absence of such rule the proviso could not apply. However its validity was not challenged either in the High Court or in this Court. It has therefore to be construed so as not to defeat the objective of its enactment. For its working reasonably it has to be understood that once recruitment by direct selection has been made in any year then the quota of direct recruits till then should be deemed to have been exhausted and if any vacancy could not be filled for any reason then it should be deemed to have lapsed and could not be carried forward. Read in this manner the quota of direct recruits till 1980 got exhausted. But it could not affect quota of 1981-82 and 1982-83 therefore no appointments on the quota of direct recruits for 1981-82 and 1982-83 could be made from the waiting list of 1980. The entire exercise undertaken by the High Court of finding out number of vacancies was thus an exercise in futility. Further what the High Court has done is that it has not worked out the vacancies only till the examinations were held but it went further to hold that since the result of the next examination was declared in 1983 the vacancies for direct recruits arising between the date the result of 1980 examination was declared and before the result of 1982 was declared could be filled from the waiting list of 1980. In other words the waiting list instead of being a list for filling the vacancy in exigencies arising out of non-joining of a candidate for the year for which the examination was held became a source of recruitment for the vacancies which were to arise between 1980 and 1983. In other words the waiting list instead of being a list for filling the vacancy in exigencies arising out of non-joining of a candidate for the year for which the examination was held became a source of recruitment for the vacancies which were to arise between 1980 and 1983. And if the vacancies which arose in 1981-82 and 1982-83 are filled by this' method then the examination of 1982 was held for which vacancy as normally the Government sends the requisition for the vacancies existing on the date of sending the requisition. We can appreciate the anxiety of the High Court that if examinations are not held regularly as has happened between 1983 to 1993 it may result in depriving fresh candidates from being selected and their post may be filled by promotes. But such concern could not result in nullifying entire procedure. The better course would have been to direct the Government to work out the vacancies and fill them by holding an examination if necessary in addition to the examination already held. But the procedure adopted by the High Court of giving such vacancies to candidates who were in the waiting list does not appear to be correct. There was no contingency nor the State Government had taken any decision to fill the vacancies from the waiting list as it was not possible for it to hold the examination nor any emergent situation had arisen except the claim of some of the candidates from the waiting list that they should be given appointment for vacancies which arose between 1980 and 1983 and between 1983 and 1993. Such claim of the appellants who had appeared in a particular examination and were placed in the waiting list could not be sustained. In fact, the action of the State Government in not sending the requisition every year or at the most every second year to the Commission for holding an examination for vacancies which had arisen or were likely to arise was liable to be commented upon and the State Government should have been directed to take care in future that the examinations are held regularly. But in no case the vacancies arising in future should have been offered to the candidates in the waiting list of the earlier year. But in no case the vacancies arising in future should have been offered to the candidates in the waiting list of the earlier year. The direction of the High Court, therefore to appoint the candidates from the waiting list in the vacancies which, according to its calculation arose between the years 1980 to 1983 and between 1983 to 1993 cannot be upheld." (emphasis supplied) In the aforesaid decisions also, the petitioners before the concerned Hon'ble High Court recalculated the vacancy but the advertisement was given for lesser number of vacancies. Those were the posts of Engineers. The concerned Hon'ble High Court recalculated the vacancies and allowed the writ petition before the High Court. The State preferred an appeal and the appeal preferred by the State was allowed and it has been held that the vacancies might not have been properly calculated but, if the advertisement is given for "X" number of post then waiting, list cannot be operated for "X"+"Y" posts. In the facts of the present case also, assuming without admitting that there were 4 more vacancies for the post of Lady Supervisor, as per Annexure-3 to the memo of the petition, then also no waiting list can be operated for 4 posts which were never advertised. There may be vacancies, but, for financial constrains, the State may not be in a position to initiate the selection process for making appointments (2010) 6 SCC 777 (Para 16). It is thus, left at the discretion and wisdom of the employer as to how many vacancies are to be filled up. Looking to the public need administrative exigency financial capability, availability of infrastructure for the post in question, and/or such other relative aspects the employer may not think it fit to fill up all the vacancies and therefore there might have been public advertisement for lesser number of vacancies to be filled up but that will not give any right to the waiting list candidates to be appointed for the posts which were vacant. Thus vacancy of the post is one thing and advertisement to fill up the vacancy is altogether another thing. Thus vacancy of the post is one thing and advertisement to fill up the vacancy is altogether another thing. It is not obligatory on the part of the State that whatever is the vacancy of the post must be filled up and correspondingly there is no right vested in the petitioners that even they are in waiting list they can recalculate the vacancies and transgress waiting listed candidates into the list of the selected candidates. This transgression of the candidates from waiting list to selected list is not permissible unless there are contingencies as stated hereinabove. (xi) Learned counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the decision reported in (2011) 2 SCC 734 . The ratio decided in the aforesaid decision is not applicable to the facts of the present case. Looking to paragraph 23 it has been observed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court that "to be more precise this waiting list should broadly be correlated to the number of vacancies if available in the year of recruitment or likely to become available in the succeeding year and the proportion qua the existing and anticipated vacancies". Learned counsel for the petitioner has mainly relied upon this observation but as stated hereinabove the facts of the present case that all the selected candidates for 12 posts of Lady Supervisor have resumed their duties and looking to the supplementary counter affidavit filed by the respondent State the reply given under the Right to Information Act. 2005 at Annexure-3 to the memo of the petition was factually incorrect. These facts make the present case different from the facts of the reported decision and hence the said decision is not helpful to the petitioners. 5. As a cumulative effect of the aforesaid facts reasons and judicial pronouncements as stated hereinabove there is no substance in this writ petition and hence the same is hereby dismissed. Petition dismissed.