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2011 DIGILAW 902 (KAR)

B. v. Harinarayana Reddy VS Kumari Chukki Nanjunda Swamy

2011-09-12

K.SREEDHAR RAO

body2011
Judgment :- 1. The petitioner is one of the plaintiffs in O.S.No.49/1992 on the file of the Family Court, Bangalore for partition against the father, who is the respondent No.3 and two others. An application under Order 7 Rule 11 C.P.C. was filed by the first defendant before the Family court that it has no jurisdiction to try a suit for partition. The Family Court over-ruled the objection. The first defendant aggrieved by the said order filed W.P.No.13839/1999. In the writ proceedings, the matter was referred to Lok Adalath for settlement. The parties arrived at a compromise and filed a compromise petition vide Annexure - ‘A’. The Lok Adalath vide Annexure- ‘B’ passed an order in the following manner: “The parties are present and confirm that the entire pending dispute among the parties have been settled in terms of the joint memo dated 14.03.2001 and it is also given effect by registering a partition deed in terms of the joint memo in the office of the Sub-Registrar, Bagepalli. It is also stated that the joint petition under Section 13-B of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 has also been filed. Parties submit that they will make joint efforts in dispose of the Bangalore property in terms of the joint memo. Recording the said submission, the matter is closed in accordance with the said joint memo”. 2. The bone of contention between the parties is the house property situated in Bangalore, which is shown in Para – 2 of the compromise petition, which is extracted hereunder: “The parties have settled the said suit as follows: i) Parties agree that there are no joint family properties as described in schedule ‘B’ and ‘E’. Therefore, the claim of plaintiff in O.S.No.49/1992 in regard to moveable properties specified in schedule ‘B’ and ‘E’ are given up: ii) Schedule ‘A’ relates to house property at Rajarajeswari Nagar, Bangalore. After mutual discussions, the parties have agreed that it is not convenient to divide the said property by metes and bounds. Therefore, the parties have agreed that the said property shall be sold and the sale consideration shall be divided equally, that in 50% to parties I (B V Raghurama Reddy) and 50% to parties 1 to 3 of III party (B V Harinarayana Reddy, B.V. Anupama Reddy and B.V. Meerareddy). All are entitled to search and identify a purchaser for the property. All are entitled to search and identify a purchaser for the property. Any of the parties is at liability to bring a prospective purchaser and parties agree to sell the property to the person who offers highest price”. 3. The first defendant after the settlement at Lok Adalath has sold the Bangalore property to one Nanjundaswamy who is the father of respondents 1 & 2 in this petition without information to the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs filed final decree proceedings before the Family Court to pass a final decree in terms of the award passed by the Lok Adalath. The defendant raised an objection that first decree proceedings are not maintainable and also contended that by virtue of the compromise decree, he holds 50% share in the property in question and that he has executed the sale deed in favour of one Nanjundaswamy. Therefore, submits that the question of drawing up of a final decree does not arise and also that appointment of Commissioner for the sale of the property does not arise. 4. The Family Court by order dated 18.09.2003 vide Annexure- ‘C’ over-ruled the objection and held that F.D.P. is maintainable. The Family Court appointed a Commissioner for effecting the sale of the property in terms of the compromise petition. The Commissioner after due publication of the sale, sold the property in auction. The petitioner took permission of the Court to bid and he was the highest bidder. The Court confirmed the bid of the petitioner and directed the Commissioner to execute the sale deed and that sale certificate was also issued. Respondents 1 & 2 subsequent to the sale in favour of the petitioner, the Court issued delivery warrant. The respondents 1 & 2 at that stage made applications to get impleaded under Order 1 Rule 10 and application under order 47 objecting the delivery warrant. The Family Court rejected the applications vide order at Annexures ‘E’ and ‘F’. the Family Court vide orders at Annexures – ‘E’ and ‘F’ also held that plaintiff is not entitled to file F.D.P. and he has to apply for the execution for seeking delivery warrant and held that the F.D.P. is closed. 5. The plaintiff/petitioner later on filed an application under Section 151 CPC to re-open the F.D.P. and to hear the application for re-issuance of the delivery warrant. 5. The plaintiff/petitioner later on filed an application under Section 151 CPC to re-open the F.D.P. and to hear the application for re-issuance of the delivery warrant. The Family Court in view of the orders passed under Annexures- ‘E’ and ‘F’ and for the reasons stated therein dismissed the applications. The petitioner aggrieved by the said order filed these writ petitions. 6. Heard the counsel for the petitioner for sometime. It appears that the objection taken with regard to jurisdiction of the Family Court to entertain a suit for partition is sound and valid. 7. Under Section 7(1)(c) provides “a suit or proceeding between the parties to a marriage with respect to the “property of the parties” or of “either of them”. The Division Bench of this Court in Genu @ Ganu and others –vs- Jalabai and others reported in ILR 2009 KAR 612 has held that, “a suit filed by the wife against her husband for partition and separate possession against his family property is not maintainable in the Family Court since the other parties who are not parties to the marriage also have interest in the said property. In the cited case, the daughters have filed a suit against the father for partition before the Family Court. In the instant case also, apart from the wife along with her children had filed a suit against her husband. Therefore, evidently, the Family Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit. 8. In the writ petition, arising out of the suit filed before the Family Court, this Court had referred the matter to Lok Adalath for settlement and the matter ended in compromise before the Lok Adalath. The order of the Lok Adalath vide Annexure – ‘B’ may not formally declare that award is passed nonetheless on the proper consideration of the order and attending circumstances and keeping in view the written terms of the compromise filed by the parties, it is to be held that the order passed by the Lok Adalath vide Annexure – ‘B’ is indeed an award made by Lok Adalath. In may be un-necessary at this length of time to remit the mater to the Lok Adalath for passing a formal order in Annexure – ‘B’ to declare that it is an award, it should be indeed construed as an award. In may be un-necessary at this length of time to remit the mater to the Lok Adalath for passing a formal order in Annexure – ‘B’ to declare that it is an award, it should be indeed construed as an award. The fact that the Family Court was lacking jurisdiction to entertain the suit for partition is not a ground by itself to hold that the award of the Lok Adalath is vitiated. Since the Lok Adalath is an independent statutory Forum to competently adjudicate the dispute between the parties and to pass an award irrespective of the fact that the nature of the proceedings of origin of the Court. In that view of the matter, it cannot be held that the award passed by the Lok Adalath suffers from lack of exercisable jurisdiction. 9. Sri Ananth Mandagi, Senior Counsel appearing for Respondents 1 & 2 referred to the provisions of Section 22E of the Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987, which reads as follows: “22E: Award of Permanent Lok Adalat to be final – (1) Every award of the permanent Lok Adalat under this Act made either on merit or in terms of a settlement agreement shall be final and binding on all the parties thereto and on persons claiming under them. (2) Every award of the Permanent Lok Adalat under this Act shall be deemed to be a decree of a Civil Court. (3) The award made by the Permanent Lok Adalat under this Act shall be by a majority of the persons constituting the Permanent Lok Adalat. (4) Every award made by the Permanent Lok Adalat under this Act shall be final and shall not be called in question in any original suit, application or execution proceeding. (5) The Permanent Lok Adalat may transmit any award made by it to a Civil Court having local jurisdiction and such Civil Court shall execute the order as if it were a decree made by that Court”. Sri Ananth Mandagi further with reference to sub section (5) contended that the filing of F.D.P. would be bad in law and that award passed by the Lok Adalath in terms of the compromise should only be executed and no final decree proceedings can be entertained. 10. Sri Ananth Mandagi further with reference to sub section (5) contended that the filing of F.D.P. would be bad in law and that award passed by the Lok Adalath in terms of the compromise should only be executed and no final decree proceedings can be entertained. 10. The Code of Civil Procedure in view of the complexities in a partition suit envisage passing of a preliminary decree declaring the rights of the parties with reference to the quantum of their share they are entitled in the property, which could be subject matter for partition. It is well and good if parties by a compromise in a partition suit also agreed for final determination of division of their properties by metes and bounds, then the question of initiating final decree proceedings does not arise, otherwise in the final decree proceedings, there should be a judicial order as to in which property, a party will have a share and to what extent. In partition suits, in respect of dwelling houses, the question of application of provisions of Partition Act would also arise. The question of working out equities, application of provisions of the Partition Act cannot be a subject matter that could be dealt by an Executing Court. The Executing Court can only execute a decree when it has become final and binding on the parties. 11. The Supreme Court in (2007) 2 Supreme Court Cases 355 (Hasham Abbas Sayyad –vs- Usman Abbas Sayyed and others) in Para – 20 has made the following observation: “20. It is true that the house property was found to be an impartible one; but a preliminary decree having been passed, the valuation thereof and final allotment of the property could have been done only in a final decree proceeding. Only when final allotments were made or a determination is made that the property should be put on auction-sale, a final decree in respect thereof should have been passed. It is appealable. Only a final decree could be put to execution”. The ratio laid by the Supreme Court makes it abundantly clear that, only when final allotments were made or a determination is made that the property should be put on auction-sale, are all matters, which have to be decided in the final decree proceedings. It is appealable. Only a final decree could be put to execution”. The ratio laid by the Supreme Court makes it abundantly clear that, only when final allotments were made or a determination is made that the property should be put on auction-sale, are all matters, which have to be decided in the final decree proceedings. In the context of the above proposition of law, the provision of sub-section (E) of Section 22 should be harmoniously read to mean that whenever a permanent Lok Adalath passes a preliminary decree, the said preliminary decree would be binding on the parties. However, they have to work out their rights by way of final decree proceedings. The terms of compromise in question in respect of the Bangalore house property, makes it clear that all the parties are entitled to scout for purchasers and any of the parties are at liberty to bring a prospective purchaser and the parties are agreed to sell the property to the person who offers the highest price who obviously would be the competitive purchaser. The terms of compromise does not enable anyone of the parties to effect sale without consent and reference to the other party who has a joint interest. The provisions of Partition Act gives equitable rights to the parties who are the members of the family in respect of a dwelling house. The object of the Partition Act is to see that whenever any member of the family is willing and capable to purchase the dwelling house in accordance with the terms of the Partition Act, an outsider should not be permitted to purchase the dwelling house. In that context, it is incumbent on the party to initiate the final decree proceedings to give effect to the terms of compromise. If the property is purchased by the family member in terms of the provisions of the Partition Act, a final decree is to be drawn accordingly, otherwise if a public auction is to be held and highest bid is to be accepted, accordingly a final decree is to be drawn, as the case may be and that final decree would also be subject to the appeal. The final decree drawn by the Trial Court subject to the order in the appeal would become executable. For the reasons and discussions made above, the impugned order of the Family Court is set aside. The final decree drawn by the Trial Court subject to the order in the appeal would become executable. For the reasons and discussions made above, the impugned order of the Family Court is set aside. The sale held by the Family Court in the final decree proceedings is set aside. The respondents 1 & 2 shall have to be impleaded in the final decree proceedings. The plaintiff/petitioner is entitled to approach the Civil Court for final decree. Accordingly, writ petitions are disposed of. The Civil Court is directed to draw a final decree in terms of the compromise.