T. Nandakumar Singh, J.:- By this writ petition, filed by the petitioner-detenu, Shri Toijam Bhogendro Singh @ Bhogen @ Tachou @ Achouba is question­ing the legality or otherwise of the detention order dated 01.03.2011 issued by the Dis­trict Magistrate, Imphal East District in exer­cise of the power conferred upon him by sub Section (3) of Section 3 of the National Se­curity Act, 1980 read with Home Department order No.17 (1)/49/80-H (Pt-1) dated 07.02.2011 for detaining the petitioner-detenu, who was/is now in judicial custody, order of Governor of Manipur dated 10.03.2011 and also order of Governor of Manipur dated 16.04.2011 for confirming the detention order and fixing the period of de­tention for 12 months from the date of deten­tion. 2. Facts sufficient for deciding this writ petition, are briefly noted. The petitioner-detenu was earlier detained under the order of the District Magistrate, Imphal West dated 16.10.2001 and he had undergone the complete period of detention and also he had been arrested earlier in con­nection with FIR numbers: (1) FIR No. 374 (9)97 IPS under Section 121/121-AIPC, 13 UA(P) Act& 5 Expl Subs Act; (2) FIR No. 110(3)98 IPS under Section 13 UA (P) Act & 25 (1-B) A Act; (3) FIR No.26 (4) 2001 YPK PS under Section 121/121-A/307/34 IPC, 25 (1-B) A Act and (4) FIR No. 275 (9) 2002 IPS under Section 10/13 UA (P) Act & 25 (1-B) A Act. In the earlier deten­tion order, it was the case of the Detaining Authority that the petitioner-detenu is a mem­ber of the banned organization i.e. UNLF (United National Liberation Front) and for his activities as a member of the banned organi­zation which were prejudicial to the security of the State and maintenance of public order, he was placed under detention under the ear­lier order dated 16.10.2002 for preventing him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the security of the State and maintenance of public order. 3. On 04.01.2011, a team of CDO/Tmphal West arrested the petitioner-detenu and handed over to the O/C PRT P.S., who drew up an FIR being FIR No.2 (1) 2011 PRTP.S., under Section 20 UA(P) A Act and formally arrested him in connection with the said FIR. The learned concerned Magistrate had re­manded the petitioner-detenu to police cus­tody till 14.01.2011. 3. On 04.01.2011, a team of CDO/Tmphal West arrested the petitioner-detenu and handed over to the O/C PRT P.S., who drew up an FIR being FIR No.2 (1) 2011 PRTP.S., under Section 20 UA(P) A Act and formally arrested him in connection with the said FIR. The learned concerned Magistrate had re­manded the petitioner-detenu to police cus­tody till 14.01.2011. On 14.01.2011 when the petitioner-detenu was produced before the learned Judicial Magistrate, he was for­mally arrested in connection with FIR No. 11 (7)2004 LTN PS under Section 326/307/302/400 IPC, 25 (1-B) AAct & 5 Expl. Subs Act. Later on he was arrested formally in connection with another FIR being FIR No.6( 1)2001 YPK PS under Section 121/121-A/307/34 IPC, 25 (1-B) A Act & 13 UA (P) Act. On 19.01.2011, the learned Magistrate remanded him to police custody till 22.01.2011. Again arrested on 22.01.2011 in connection with FIR No.3 0 (4)2000 LLI PS under Section 121/121-A/12-BIPC, 107 13/20 UA (P) AAct, 25(1-A)(1-B) A Act and the learned Judicial Magistrate remanded him to police custody till 28.01.2011; and again arrested on 28.01.2011 in connection with FIRNo.9(4)2000 SKL PS under Sec­tion 121/121-A/302/34 IPC, 25(1-A) AAct & 13 UA (P) AAct and the learned Magis­trate remanded him to police custody till 31.01.2011. 4. While the petitioner-detenu was in po­lice custody in connection with the said FIRs petitioner-detenu was served with a copy of the impugned detention order dated 01.02.2011. In accordance with the provi­sions of Section 8 of the NSA, 1980, the learned District Magistrate, Imphal West (De­taining Authority) under his letter dated 05.03.2011 furnished not only the grounds of detention but also copies of the documents which formed the basis of the grounds of de­tention to the petitioner-detenu. In accordance with the provi­sions of Section 8 of the NSA, 1980, the learned District Magistrate, Imphal West (De­taining Authority) under his letter dated 05.03.2011 furnished not only the grounds of detention but also copies of the documents which formed the basis of the grounds of de­tention to the petitioner-detenu. In para 8 of the writ petition, it is categorically stated that when the petitioner was arrested on 16.09.2002 in connection with FIR No.275(9) 2002 IPS under Section 10/13 UA(P) A Act & 25( 1 -B) A Act and remanded to police custody till 21.09.2002, the peti­tioner-detenu did not disclose his involvement with the earlier FIRs i.e. (i) FIR No. 30 (4) 2000 Lamlai PS (ii) FIRNo.9(4)2000 SKL PS and (iii) FIRNo.6( 1)2001 YPKPS, therefore, his past activities, for which the said three FIRs i.e. (1) FIR No.6(1)2001 YPK PS under Section 121/121-A/307/34 IPC, 25 (1-B) A Act & 13 UA (P) Act; (2) FIR No.30 (4)2000 LLI PS under Section 1217 121-A/12-B IPC, 10/13/20UA(P)A Act, 25(1-A)(1-B) A Act and (3) FIR No. 9(4)2000 SKL PS under Section 121/121-A/302/34IPC,25(l-A)A Act & 13 UA(P) A Act had been registered, had been taken into consideration for coming to the subjec­tive satisfaction of the Detaining Authority for detaining him under the impugned detention order dated 01.03.2011. 5. The copies of the said FIRs i.e. (1) FIR No.6 (1) 2001 YPK PS; (2) FIR No. 30 (4) 2000 LLI PS and (3) FIRNo.9(4)2000 SKL PS which formed the basis of the grounds of detentions were also furnished to the peti­tioner-detenu under the said letter of the Detaining Authority dated 05.03.2011. It is the case of the petitioner-detenu that the occurrences of the said three FIRs took place be­fore the earlier detention order dated 16.10.2002 and therefore; the said three FIRs are stale and have no proximity with the alleged activities of the petitioner-detenu for which he has been detained under the present impugned detention order dated 01.03.2011. It is the case of the petitioner-detenu that the occurrences of the said three FIRs took place be­fore the earlier detention order dated 16.10.2002 and therefore; the said three FIRs are stale and have no proximity with the alleged activities of the petitioner-detenu for which he has been detained under the present impugned detention order dated 01.03.2011. It is also further case of the petitioner-detenu that the FIRNo.275(9) 2002 IPS under Sec­tion 10/13 UA(P) A Act & 25(1-B) A Act for which petitioner-detenu was alleged to have been arrested by the police personnel and interrogated him was not the one of the documents which formed the basis of the grounds of detention for the impugned de­tention order dated 01.03.2011, therefore, the sponsoring authority did not place the every materials i.e. FIR No.275(9) 2002 IPS under Section 10/13 UA(P) A Act & 25(1-B) A Act before the Detaining Authority. In the result, it is the case of the petitioner-detenu that the impugned detention order is vitiated because of non-placing of the important ma­terials before the Detaining Authority. 6. The petitioner-detenu by his represen­tation dated 14.03.2011 requested the Dis­trict Magistrate, Imphal East (Detaining Au­thority) to supply material particulars and a copy of the FIR No.275(9) 2002 IPS under Section 10/13 UA(P) A Act & 25(1-B) A Act. The learned District Magistrate Imphal East (Detaining Authority) under his letter dated 18.03.2011 furnished the copy of the said FIR i.e. FIR No.275(9) 2002 IPS un­der Section 10/13 UA(P)AAct&25(l-B) A Act to the petitioner-detenu. One of the grounds for assailing the impugned detention order is that because of non-placing of the said FIRNo.275(9) 2002 IPS by the spon­soring authority before the Detaining Author­ity, the subjective satisfaction of the Detain­ing Authority is only an ipse dixit of the De­taining Authority and, therefore, his subjec­tive satisfaction that the activities of the petitioner-detenu are prejudicial to the security of the State and maintenance of public order is not on the objective basis. 7. For ascertaining the fact as to whether the said FIR i.e. FIR No. 275(9) 2002 IPS was placed by the sponsoring authority be­fore the Detaining Authority or not, this court perused the relevant records of the Detaining Authority placed before us by the learned Government Advocate. On such perusal, it is clear that the said FIR i.e. FIR No.275(9) 2002 IPS was placed before the Detaining Authority by the sponsoring authority. 8. On such perusal, it is clear that the said FIR i.e. FIR No.275(9) 2002 IPS was placed before the Detaining Authority by the sponsoring authority. 8. The Apex Court in Ahmed Nassar Vs. State of Tamil Nadu & Ors.: (1999) 8 SCC 473 held that 'every conceivable materials which is relevant and vital which may have a bearing on the issue should be placed before the detaining authority. The sponsoring author­ity should not keep it back, based on his in­terpretation that it would not be of any help to a prospective detenu. The decision is not to be made by the sponsoring authority. The law on this subject is well settled; a detention order vitiates if any relevant document is not placed before the detaining authority which reasonably could affect his decision'. The ra­tio laid down in that case in Ahmed Nassar's case (supra) is that the sponsoring authority should not keep any conceivable material back on his interpretation that it would not be any help to a prospective detention. In the present case, the sponsoring authority did not keep the said FIR back while sending all the conceivable materials to the Detaining Author­ity; therefore, the said ground for assailing the impugned detention order is of no force. Para 20 and 21 of the SCC in Ahmed Nassar's case (supra) read as follows: "20. So far as the stand of the respondent with reference to the advocate's letter dated 19.4.1999 is concerned it cannot be held to be a justifiable stand. These technical objections must be shunned where a detenu is being dealt with under the preventive detention law. A man is to be detained in the prison based on the subjective satisfaction of the detaining author­ity. Every conceivable material which is relevant and vital which may have a bearing on the is­sue should be placed before the detaining au­thority. The sponsoring authority should not keep it back, based on his interpretation that it would not be of any help to a prospective detenu. The decision is not to be made by the sponsoring authority. The law on this subject is well settled; a detention order vitiates if any relevant document is not placed before the de­taining authority which reasonably could af­fect his decision. 21. In Ashadevi VK. The decision is not to be made by the sponsoring authority. The law on this subject is well settled; a detention order vitiates if any relevant document is not placed before the de­taining authority which reasonably could af­fect his decision. 21. In Ashadevi VK. Shivraj, Addl.Chief Secy to the Govt of Gujarat: (1979) 1 SCC 222 the Court held: (SCC Headnote) "If material or vital facts which would influ­ence the mind of the detaining authority one way or other on the question whether or not to make the detention order are not placed before or are not considered by the detaining author­ity, it would vitiate its subjective satisfaction rendering the detention order illegal." 9. As stated above, it is the case of the petitioner-detenu that the said 4(four) FIRs i.e. (i) FIR No. 11 (7) 2004 LTN PS under Section 326/307/302/400 IPC, 25 (1-B) A Act & 5 Expl. Subs Act, (ii) FIR No. 6(1) 2001 YPK PS under Section 121/121-A/307/34 IPC, 25 (l-B)A Act & 13 UA(P) Act; (iii) FIR No.30 (4)2000 LLI PS under Section 121/121-A/12-B IPC, 10/13/20 UA(P) A Act, 25(1-A)(1-B) A Act; (iv) FIR No.9 (4)2000 SKL PS under Section 1217 121-A/302/34 IPC, 25(1-A) A Act& 13 UA (P) A Act are stale and have no proximity with the activities for which the petitioner-detenu is placed under detention under the detention order dated 01.03.2011. 10. What is required to see in this case is, if the offences in respect of which petitioner-detenu is accused are so interlinked and continuous in character and are of such nature that this affects the continuous maintenance of public order and shall also affect the security of the State. The said FIR No.30 (4)2000 LLI PS under Section 121/121-A/12-BIPC, 10/13/20 UA (P) A Act, 25(1 -A)(l -B) A Act was for an encounter between the police team of Imphal East District and UNLF members on 03.04.2000 at 11.00 a.m. at Nongada Makha Leikai. It is all along the case of the Detaining Authority that the petitioner-detenu is a member of the UNLF. It is all along the case of the Detaining Authority that the petitioner-detenu is a member of the UNLF. The said second FIRs i.e. FIR No. 9 (4)2000 SKL PS under Section 121/121-A/302/34 IPC, 25(1-A) A Act & 13 U A (P) A Act was for an encounter between KNF (MC) and combined force and UNLF, NKF (P) and KLA at Aigijang vil­lage on 13.04.2000 at 05.30 a.m. and the third FIR i.e. FIR No. 6 (1)2001 YPK PS under Section 121/121-A/307/34 IPC, 25 (1-B) A Act & 13 UA (P) Act was for an encounter between the Thoubal District Po­lice and UNLF members on 11.01.2000 at 3 p.m. at Thoubal barrage. 11. The Apex Court in Suraj Pal Sahu Vs. State of Maharashtra & Ors. : AIR 1986 SC 2177 held that the order of deten­tion can be passed where the offence in re­spect of which detenu is accused are so interlinked and continuous in character and are of such nature that these affect continu­ous maintenance of public order. Relevant portion (para 28) of the AIR in Suraj Pal Sahu's case (supra) read as follows: "28. In Ratnesh Yadav v District Magistrate, Etah, (1985)4 SCC 232 : ( AIR 1986 SC 315 ) it was held that merely on the ground that an accused in detention as an under-trial prisoner was likely to get bail, an order of detention under the Na­tional Security Act should not ordinarily be passed. If the apprehension of the detaining authority was true, Court observed, the bail application had to be opposed and in case bail was granted, challenge against that order in the higher forum had to be raised. We respectfully agree with this conclusion. But this principle will have to be judged and applied in the facts an circumstances of each case. If the apprehension of the detaining authority was true, Court observed, the bail application had to be opposed and in case bail was granted, challenge against that order in the higher forum had to be raised. We respectfully agree with this conclusion. But this principle will have to be judged and applied in the facts an circumstances of each case. Where a person accused of certain offences whereunder he is undergoing trial or has been acquitted, the ap­peal is pending and in respect of which he may be granted bail may not in all circumstances entitle an authority to direct preventive deten­tion and the principle enunciated by the afore­said decision must apply but where the offences in respect of which the detenu is accused are so interlinked and continuous in character and are of such nature that these affect continuous maintenance of essential supplies and thereby jeopardize the security of the State, then sub­ject to other conditions being fulfilled, a man being in detention would not detract from the order being passed for preventive detention. Merugu Satyanarayana v State of Andhra Pradesh. (1983) 1 SCR 635 : ( AIR 1982 SC 1543 ) was a case dealing with an order under S.3(2) of the Act............." The said three FIRs are so interlinked and continuous in character and also for the incidents in which members of UNLF were al­leged to have been involved; and the petitioner-detenu, according to the Detaining Authority is a member of the UNLF. 12. Mr.Rajeetchandra, learned counsel for the petitioner-detenu strenuously contended that some of the grounds which formed the basis of the grounds of detention, as stated above i.e., the said three FIRs i.e. (1) FIR No.6 (1) 2001 YPK PS; (2) FIR No. 30 (4)2000 LLI PS and (3) FIR No. 9 (4)2000 SKL PS are stale, and therefore the impugned detention order is vitiated. In support of his de­tention he placed heavy reliance on the deci­sion of the Apex Court in Shiv Prasad Bhatnagar Vs State of Madhya Pradesh & Ann : AIR 1981 SC 870 wherein the Apex Court held that "grounds of detention must be pertinent and not irrelevant, proximate and not stale, precise and not vague. Irrelevance, staleness and vagueness are vices any single one of which is sufficient to vitiate a ground of detention. Irrelevance, staleness and vagueness are vices any single one of which is sufficient to vitiate a ground of detention. And a single vicious ground is sufficient to vitiate an order of detention." Relevant portion (para 2) of the AIR in Shiv Prasad Bhatnagar's case (supra) read as follows: "..........A perusal of the incidents enumer­ated to substantiate the second ground show that apart from the vice of staleness from which they appear to suffer, the incidents are related to "law and order" and not to the maintenance of public order. The incidents appear to bear a striking resemblance to the grounds of deten­tion which were considered in Re: Sushanta Goswami(1969)3 SCR 138: (AIR 1969 SC1004), particularly in the cases of Debendra Nath Das, Abdul Wahen, Anil Das, Dilip Kumar Chakraborty and Ashoka Kumar Mukherjee. It is now well settled that grounds of detention must be pertinent and not irrelevant, proximate and not stale, precise and not vague. Irrelevance, staleness and vagueness are vices any single one of which is sufficient to vitiate a ground of detention. And, a single vicious ground is suf­ficient to vitiate an order of detention. In the present case we are satisfied that the second ground of detention suffers both from the vice of staleness, because of the passage of time since the happening of some of the incidents and the vice of irrelevance because they relate to 'law and order' and not to 'the maintenance of public order'..........." 13. The ratio laid down in Shiv Prasad Bhatnagar Shiv Prasad Bhatnagar's case (su­pra) was before the insertion of Section 5 A intheNSA, 1980 by the Act 60 of 1984 w.e.f. 21.06.1984. Section 5 A of the NSA in a clear and unequivocal term provides that the detention order shall not be deemed to be invalid or inoperative merely because one or some of the grounds is or are vague, non-existent, not relevant and not connected or not proxi-mately connected with such person and also that the order of detention shall deem to have been made under Section 3 of the NSA with reference to the remaining grounds which are valid. Regarding this point, we may refer to the decision of the Apex Court (9 Judges) in Attorney General for India & Ors. Vs. Amartlal Prajivandas & Ors : (1994) 5 SCC 54 . Regarding this point, we may refer to the decision of the Apex Court (9 Judges) in Attorney General for India & Ors. Vs. Amartlal Prajivandas & Ors : (1994) 5 SCC 54 . The Apex Court in para Nos.46, 47,49 and 50 of the SCC in Attorney Gen­eral for India's case (supra) held that: "46. Section 5-A of COFEPOSA may be re­produced here for ready reference. It reads: "5-A. Grounds of detention severable.-Where a person has been detained in pursu­ance of an order of detention under sub-sec­tion (1) of Section 3 which has been made on two or more grounds, such order of detention shall be deemed to have been made separately on each of such grounds and accordingly- (a) such order shall not be deemed to be invalid or inoperative merely because one or some of the grounds is or are- (i) vague, (ii) non-existent, (iii) not connected or not proximately connected with such person, or (iv) invalid for any other reason what­soever, and it is not therefore possible to hold that the Government or officer mak­ing such order would have been satis­fied as provided in sub-section (1) of Section 3 with reference to the remain­ing ground or grounds and made the or­der of detention; (b) the Government or officer making the order of detention shall be deemed to have made the order of detention under the said sub-section (1) after being satisfied as pro­vided in that sub-section with reference to the remaining ground or grounds." 47. The section is in two parts. The first part says that where an order of detention is made on two or more grounds, "such order of deten­tion shall be deemed to have been made sepa­rately on each of such grounds", while the sec­ond part says that such order shall not be deemed to be invalid or inoperative merely for the reason that one or some of the grounds are either vague, non-existent, irrelevant or uncon­nected. That the second part is merely a continuation of and consequential to the first part is evident from the connecting words "and ac­cordingly". The second part goes further and says that the order of detention must be deemed to have been made on being satisfied with the remaining good ground or grounds, as the case may be. Both the parts are joined by the word "and". 49. The second part goes further and says that the order of detention must be deemed to have been made on being satisfied with the remaining good ground or grounds, as the case may be. Both the parts are joined by the word "and". 49. Now, take a case, where three orders of detention are made against the same person under COFEPOSA. Each of the orders is based upon only one ground which is supplied to the detenu. It is found that the ground of detention in support of two of such orders is either vague or irrelevant. But the ground in support of the third order is relevant, definite and proximate. In such a case, while the first two orders would be quashed, the third order would stand. This is precisely what the first part (the main part) of Section 5-A seeks to do. Where the order of detention is based on more than one ground, the section creates a legal fiction, viz., it must be deemed that there are as many orders of de­tention as there are grounds which means that each of such orders is an independent order. The result is the same as the one in the illustra­tion given by us hereinabove. The second part of it is merely clarificatory and explanatory, which is evident from the fact that it begins with the word "accordingly" -apart from the fact that it is joined to the first part by the word "and", in such a situation, we are unable to see how can the section be characterized as incon­sistent with Article 22(5). Had there been no first part, and had the section consisted only of the second part, one can understand the con­tention that the section is in the teeth of Article 22(5) as interpreted by this Court- this was in­deed the situation in K. Yadigiri Reddy v. Com­missioner of Police : ILR 1972 AP 1025 as we shall presently indicate. It is difficult to con­ceive any inconsistency or conflict between Article 22(5) and the first- the main-part of Sec­tion 5-A. Parliament is competent to create a legal fiction and it did so in this case. Article 22(5) does not in terms of otherwise prohibit making of more than one order simultaneously against the same person, on different grounds. No decision saying so has been brought to our notice. Article 22(5) does not in terms of otherwise prohibit making of more than one order simultaneously against the same person, on different grounds. No decision saying so has been brought to our notice. Be that as it may, we do not see why Parliament is not competent to say, by creating a legal fiction, that where an order of detention is made on more than one ground, it must be deemed that there are as many orders of deten­tion as there are grounds. If this creation of a legal fiction is competent, then no question of any inconsistency between the section and Article 22(5) can arise. 50. It is true that validity of section 5-A - or for that matter, or Section 5-A of National Secu­rity Act, 1980, which is in identical terms- does not appear to have been questioned in this Court so far, though it has been applied in sev­eral decisions. Three of the reported decisions are brought to our notice, viz., State of Gujarat Vs Chaman Lal Munjibhai Soni: (1981) 2 SCC 24 , Prakash Chandra Mehta Vs Commissioner & Secretary, Govt of Kerala : 1985 Supp SCC 144 and Meera Rani Vs Govt of T.N.: (1989) 4 SCC 418 . Actually, in the last-mentioned deci­sion, there are observations affirming its valid­ity, though no final opinion has been expressed on the question because it was not canvassed in that case. It is also brought to our notice that a Bench of Gujarat High Court has affirmed and applied the said provision in a case arising un­der COFEPOSA." 14. The Apex Court in Suraj Pal Sahu's case (supra) which is a case under the NSA clearly held that: "22. As mentioned hereinbefore, before the High Court also the insertion of Section 5 A of the Act by the National Security (Second Amendment) Act, 1984 was challenged under which even the existence of one ground is suf­ficient. Before us no ground was canvassed about the validity of the said Amendment and inclusion of Section 5 A of the Act. 23. It must therefore be held that even the existence of one ground was sufficient to sustain the detention order." 15. No doubt, the doctrine of preventive power of the Administrative/Executive authority, constitutionally validate preventive proc­ess for the maintenance of public order, security of the State, national security, defence of India and relations of India with the foreign " power. 23. It must therefore be held that even the existence of one ground was sufficient to sustain the detention order." 15. No doubt, the doctrine of preventive power of the Administrative/Executive authority, constitutionally validate preventive proc­ess for the maintenance of public order, security of the State, national security, defence of India and relations of India with the foreign " power. The Apex Court in Amit Shad Khan Vs. L. Kmingliana & Ors: (1991) 4 SCC 39 held that- "The law of preventive detention is harsh to the person detained and, therefore, there can be no doubt that it must be strictly construed. Article 22(3)(b) denies to a person who is ar­rested or detained under any law providing for preventive detention the protection of clauses (1) and (2) of the said article. Clause (4) thereof enjoins that the preventive detention law must conform to the limitations set out thereunder. Clause (5) of Article 22 reads as under: "22.(5) When any person is detained in pursuance of an order made under any law providing for preventive detention, the au­thority making the order shall, as soon as may be, communicate to such person the grounds on which the order has been made and shall afford him the earliest opportu­nity of making a representation against the order." (Ref: Para 3 of the SCC in Amir Shad Khan's case (supra). 16. In Shiv Ratan Makim Vs Union of India : (1986) 1 SCC 404 : ( AIR 1986 SC 610 ) it is was stressed that the jurisdiction to make orders for preventive detention was different from that of judicial trial in courts for offences and of judicial orders for prevention of offences. Even unsuccessful judicial trial or proceeding would not operate as a bar to a detention order or render it mala fide. A for­tiori therefore the mere fact that a criminal prosecution can be instituted cannot operate as a bar against the making of an order of detention. 17. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the State of Maharastra Vs. Bhaurao Punjabrao Gawande: (2008) 3 SCC 613 held that the Court must be conscious and mindful of the fact that jurisdiction of preventive detention is "suspicious jurisdiction" based on suspicion and an action is taken with a view to prevent­ing a person from acting in any manner preju­dicial to the certain activities enumerated in the detention law. Bhaurao Punjabrao Gawande: (2008) 3 SCC 613 held that the Court must be conscious and mindful of the fact that jurisdiction of preventive detention is "suspicious jurisdiction" based on suspicion and an action is taken with a view to prevent­ing a person from acting in any manner preju­dicial to the certain activities enumerated in the detention law. Interference by a court of law at that stage must be an exception rather than a rule because the exercise can be un­dertaken by a writ court with extreme care, caution and circumspection. Para No.63 of the SCC in Bhaurao Punjabrao Gawande (supra) reads as follows:- "63. From the foregoing discussion, in our judgment, the law appears to be fairly well set­tled and it is this. As a general rule, an order of detention passed by a detaining authority un­der the relevant "preventive detention" law cannot be set aside by a writ court at the pre-execution or pre-arrest stage unless the court is satisfied that there are exceptional circum­stances specified in Addl. Secy. To the Govt. of India vs. Alka Subhash Gadia, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 496: 1992 SCC (Cril) 301. The Court must be consicious and mindful of the fact that this is a "suspicious jurisdiction" i.e. jurisdiction based on suspicion and an action is taken "with a view to preventing" a person from acting in any manner prejudicial to certain activities enu­merated in the relevant detention law. Interfer­ence by a court of law at that stage must an exception rather than a rule and such an exer­cise can be undertaken by a writ court with ex­treme care, caution and circumspection. A detenu cannot ordinarily seek a writ of mandamus if he does not surrender and is not served with an order of detention and the grounds in support of such order. 18. The Hon'ble Apex Court (3 Judges) in Rekha Vs. State of T.N. 20114 Scale 387 also reiterated that the preventive detention is often described as jurisdiction of suspicion. Para No.40 of the SCC in Rekha's case (su­pra) reads as foliows:- "40. It must be remembered that in cases of preventive detention no offence is proved and the justification of such detention is suspicion or reasonable probability, and there is no con­viction which can only be warranted by legal evidence. Preventive detention is often de­scribed as a 'jurisdiction of suspicion', (Vide State of Maharashtra Vs. It must be remembered that in cases of preventive detention no offence is proved and the justification of such detention is suspicion or reasonable probability, and there is no con­viction which can only be warranted by legal evidence. Preventive detention is often de­scribed as a 'jurisdiction of suspicion', (Vide State of Maharashtra Vs. Bharurao Punjabrao Gawande, (supra) - para 63). The detaining au­thority passes the order of detention on sub­jective satisfaction. Since clause (3) of Article 22 specifically excludes the applicability of clauses (1) and (2), the detenu is not entitled to a lawyer or the right to be produced before a Magistrate within 24 hours of arrest." 19. From the ratio laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Bhaurao Punjabrao Gawande's case (supra) and Rekha Devi's case (supra), it is clear that jurisdiction to or­der preventive detention is a suspicious juris­diction i.e. jurisdiction based on suspicion and an action is taken with a view to preventing a person from acting in any manner prejudicial to the certain activities enumerated in the rel­evant detention law. The interference of Court of law at that stage must be an exception rather than a rule. It is quite well settled that the suspicion should be based on materials i.e. on the objective basis. 20. The Hon'ble Apex Court in Pebam Ningol Mikoi Devi Vs. State ofManipur & Ors: (2010) 9 SCC 618 held that there must be a reasonable basis for the detention order. There must be material to support the same and Court is entitled to scrutinize the material relied upon by the authority in coming to its conclusion and accordingly determined if there is any objective basis for the subjective satisfaction. The Hon'ble Apex Court further held that the grounds stated in the order of detention and the grounds of detention are sufficient or not is not within the ambit of the discretion of the Court. It is the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority which is implied. ParaNo.26 of the SCC in Mikoi's case (supra) reads as foliows:- "26. What emerges from these rulings is that, there must be a reasonable basis for the deten­tion order, and there must be material to sup­port the same. The Court is entitled to scruti­nize the material relied upon by the authority in coming to its conclusion, and accordingly de­termine if there is an objective basis for the sub­jective satisfaction. What emerges from these rulings is that, there must be a reasonable basis for the deten­tion order, and there must be material to sup­port the same. The Court is entitled to scruti­nize the material relied upon by the authority in coming to its conclusion, and accordingly de­termine if there is an objective basis for the sub­jective satisfaction. The subjective satisfaction must be twofold. The detaining authority must be satisfied that the person to be detained is likely to act in any manner prejudicial to the security of the State or from acting in any man­ner prejudicial to the maintenance of the public order and the authority must be further satis­fied that it is necessary to detain the said per­son in order to prevent from so acting." 21. This Court (one of us is the party) in Lourembam Sana Singh Vs. State of Manipur & Ors.: 2008 (2) GLT813, held that- "13. It is well settled law that subjective sat­isfaction of the detaining authority arrived at for detaining the detenu as a preventive meas­ure under the preventive law is invalid if such satisfaction is based on non-existent or irrel­evant ground only. Reference in Dwarika Prasad Sahu vs. State of Bihar & Ors. reported in AIR 1975 SC 134 . The subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority arrived at while consider­ing the materials and records was the cumula­tive result of all the grounds of detention and the involvement of the detenu in different ac­tivities. Reference may be made in A.P. Saravanan vs. State of Tamil Nadu reported in (2001) 10 SCC 212. There is no set standards laid down by the NSA for arriving at subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority on the basis of all the materials placed before it by the police. In the present case as stated above, the detaining authority had arrived at, on subjec­tive satisfaction, for detaining the detenu un­der the NSA on the basis of the materials and the information placed by the Superintendent of Police, Imphal West. Therefore, the deten­tion order cannot be said to be illegal on the ground of non application of mind. Reference in Gurudayal Singh vs. Union of India reported in (2002) 1 SCC 545 . Therefore, the deten­tion order cannot be said to be illegal on the ground of non application of mind. Reference in Gurudayal Singh vs. Union of India reported in (2002) 1 SCC 545 . The Apex Court in Union of India vs. Paul Manikham reported in (2003) 8 SCC 342 held that: "Preventive detention is an anticipatory measure and does not relate to an offence while the criminal proceedings are to pun­ish a person for an offence committed by him. They are not parallel proceedings. The object of the law of preventive detention is not punitive but only preventive. It is re-sorted to when the executive is convinced on the materials available and placed before it that such detention is necessary in order to prevent the person detained from acting in a manner prejudicial to certain objects which are specified by the law. The action of the executive in detaining a person being only precautionary, the matter has neces­sarily to be left to the discretion of the ex­ecutive authorities. It is not practicable to lay down objective rules of conduct, the failure to confirm to which alone should lead to detention." 22. This Court in Thongam (Ongbi) Sanatombi Devi Vs. District Magistrate, Imphal West & Ors: 2007 (4) GLT931 also held- "13. It is a settled position of law that the nature of satisfaction of the detaining author­ity in issuing the detention order under National Security Act for preventing a detenu from in­dulging in such activities which are prejudicial to the maintenance of the public order and the security of the State is only a subjective satis­faction but subjective satisfaction should not be on no material. 14. The subjective satisfaction of the de­taining authority arrived at while considering the materials and records was the cumulative result of all the grounds of detention in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in (2001) 10 SCC 212 (A.P. Saravanan Vs. State of Tamil Nadu). According to the learned counsel for the respondents no set standards have been laid down by the Act for arriving at subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority. The sub­jective satisfaction in the present case had been arrived at by the detaining authority on the ba­sis of all the materials placed before him. State of Tamil Nadu). According to the learned counsel for the respondents no set standards have been laid down by the Act for arriving at subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority. The sub­jective satisfaction in the present case had been arrived at by the detaining authority on the ba­sis of all the materials placed before him. There­fore, the detention order cannot be said to be illegal on the grounds of non-application of mind in view of the principles laid down in Gurdev Singh Vs. Union of India (2002) 1 SCC 545 . 19. As we have discussed above, the satis­faction of the (sic) authority for issuing the detention order is only a subjective satisfaction. We, within the four corners of law laid down by the Apex Court in the cases discussed above, perused the materials available on record to see as to whether the relevant materials were placed before the detaining authority at the time of passing the detention order or not be effective to prevent him from the commission of further prejudicial activities." 23. We again recall the decision of the Constitution Bench of the Apex Court made more than half a century ago in State of Bom­bay Vs. Atma Ram Shridhar Vaidya : AIR (38) 1951 SC 757 that subjective satisfac­tion of the detaining authority must be based on some grounds. The question whether such grounds can give rise to the subjective satisfaction required for making the order is out­side the scope of the inquiry of the court. 24. Keeping in view of the ratios laid down by this Court as well as the Apex Court discussed above, we have given our anxious considerations as to whether, for coming to the said subjective satisfaction of the Detain­ing Authority there is objective basis or not. On such consideration we are of considered view that for coming to the said subjective satisfaction, even though some of the grounds are stale, there is objective basis. We also reiterate that because of Section 5-A of the NS A, 1980, which we have discussed above, the detention order cannot be interfered with only because, some of the grounds are stale. Accordingly, the present writ petition is devoid of merit and hereby dismissed.