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2011 DIGILAW 914 (GAU)

Ashok Kumar Dasgupta v. United Bank of India

2011-11-22

BIPLAB KUMAR SHARMA

body2011
JUDGMENT B.K. Sharma, J. 1. The challenge made in this writ petition is the order dated 22.08.2001 (Annexure XIII) by which the petitioner has been imposed with the penalty of dismissal from service pursuant to a departmental enquiry. The appeal against the said order was preferred by the petitioner on 05.10.2001 but the same having not evoked any response, the petitioner filed the writ petition challenging the same. The petitioner has also challenged the enquiry proceeding including the charge-sheet and the enquiry report. Briefly stated, the facts are as follows. 2. The petitioner while was serving as Officer in the respondent Bank i.e., United Bank of India in the Regional Office, Dibrugarh, was placed under suspension by order dated 14.08.1990 in contemplation of a departmental proceeding. Thereafter he was served with Annexure-II charge-sheet dated 22.02.1992 under Regulation 6 of the United Bank of India Officer/Employees (Disciplinary and Appeal) Regulations, 1976. The charge-sheet running to 9 pages comprised of the charges of excess drawal, irregular sanction and disbursement of term loan accounts causing financial loss to the bank; irregularities in many loan accounts and allowing excess drawal as indicated in the statement enclosed to the charge-sheet; allowing fraudulent transaction in connivance with other officers of the bank; sanctioning of an amount of Rs. 70,000/- to the concerned borrower in gross violation of rules and procedure and without obtaining the required documents; issuance of bank's cash certificate of Rs. 50,000/-, Rs. 45,000/- and Rs. 5,000/- under SB Accounts of the said person etc. 3. In support of the charges a detailed statement of allegations was also furnished. 4. The petitioner without specifically dealing with the charges levelled against him with supporting allegations on which the charges were based, submitted his written statement of defence generally denying the charges without any specific denial of the same. For a ready reference the reply furnished by the petitioner on 25.03.1992 is quoted below : To, The Zonal Manager & Disciplinary Authority United Bank of India Zonal Office, North Easter Zone GS Road, Opp. Bora Service Station Guwahati-781007 Dated 25th March, 1992 Dear Sir, Reg: Charge-sheet baring your letter No. ZO/PD/DIR/2284/91-92 dated the 22nd February, 1992 I am shocked and surprised to receive your aforesaid charge-sheet. The alleged charges are wild, baseless, false and frivolous and do not correspond to the real facts and circumstances. I, therefore, unequivocally deny all the alleged charges. Bora Service Station Guwahati-781007 Dated 25th March, 1992 Dear Sir, Reg: Charge-sheet baring your letter No. ZO/PD/DIR/2284/91-92 dated the 22nd February, 1992 I am shocked and surprised to receive your aforesaid charge-sheet. The alleged charges are wild, baseless, false and frivolous and do not correspond to the real facts and circumstances. I, therefore, unequivocally deny all the alleged charges. Besides, the charge-sheet is vague and inapplicable in that it has not been mentioned under which provision of the Conducts Regulations I have been charged with. Secondly the First sentence of your aforesaid charge-sheet very clearly demonstrates the closed mind in that a decision has already been taken to proceed against me to impose a major penalty and the invitation to file a reply has been made as an empty formality only. In view of the foregoing, I would request you to kindly drop the proceedings so as to enable me to get away from the severe mental strain and social ignominy to which I have been unfortunately subjected to. Yours faithfully, Sd/- (Asok Kumar Dasgupta) Officer, United Bank of India Dibrugarh Regional Office, HS Road, Dibrugarh 5. The disciplinary authority being not satisfied with the reply so furnished, decided to conduct an enquiry into the charges and accordingly appointed the Enquiry Officer and Presenting Officer. After conducting the enquiry following the due procedure, the Enquiry Officer submitted his report. Be it stated here that on conclusion of the evidence etc. both the parties, i.e. the Disciplinary Authority and the petitioner, submitted their written briefs in support of their respective cases. Thereafter the enquiry report dated 12.4.1099 was forwarded to the petitioner by which he was held guilty of the charges except some of the components of the said charges in support of which he was not found guilty In the 'Reason for Findings? and reasons in the report, the Enquiry Officer made the following observations : I have carefully gone through the evidences oral and documentary and applied my mind. A conspectus of my assessment of evidences and findings with reasons therefore evidently indicate that Sh. Ashok Kumar Dasgupta, CSO failed to take steps to protect the interest of the Bank. He also failed to discharge his duties with utmost integrity, honesty, devotion and diligence. The charge is therefore proved and hence the CSO is guilty. 6. A conspectus of my assessment of evidences and findings with reasons therefore evidently indicate that Sh. Ashok Kumar Dasgupta, CSO failed to take steps to protect the interest of the Bank. He also failed to discharge his duties with utmost integrity, honesty, devotion and diligence. The charge is therefore proved and hence the CSO is guilty. 6. Towards making the aforesaid observations, the Enquiry Officer found that out of 35 components of the basic charges, all the components except 14 stood proved. 7. On receipt of the enquiry report, the Disciplinary Authority made Annexure-XI communication dated 10.04.2004 to the petitioner giving his reasons for disagreement in respect of the components which were held to have been not proved. By the said communication the petitioner was asked to make the written submission against the reasons for disagreement and so also against the findings recorded in the enquiry report holding the charges to have been established. 8. On receipt of the said communication, the petitioner by his written statement dated 11.06.2000 (Annexure XII) projected his stand against the enquiry report and the reasons for disagreement in respect of the aforementioned components. 9. After the aforesaid developments the Disciplinary Authority in consideration of the materials on record including the representation made by the petitioner against the enquiry report and the reasons for disagreement recorded by the Disciplinary Authority, passed the impugned order dated 22.02.2008 (Annexure- XIII) imposing the penalty of dismissal from service. For a ready reference, the findings recorded in the said order are reproduced below : 3. I have considered the charge-sheet, your explanation thereto, proceedings of the enquiry and the oral and documentary evidences adduced and produced before the enquiry, the enquiry report and all other papers and documents connected with the said enquiry. I have also considered your written submission dated 14.06.2000 on the enquiry report. After applying my mind independently on all the papers and documents in connection with the aforesaid charge-sheet and having gone through the report of the Enquiry Officer, I do agree with his findings except in respect of following charges :-- (i) In respect of charge No. 1 as mentioned in the charge-sheet, save and except the charges of (a) nonexistence of borrowal units, and (b) engagement of borrowers in other gainful employment, in the Accounts of Kamakhya Das and Jnan Mukul Das, all charges are proved. Further, in the Account of Deepak Das, all charges except the charge of (a) non-submission of Discretionary Power, Statements, and (b) non-existence of the borrowal unit, have been proved. In the aforesaid accounts, the Bank has suffered total financial loss to the extent of Rs. 1,62,113.34p. as on 24.04.1990 i.e. the date of your transfer from Dholla Branch. (ii) In respect of charge No. 2 as mentioned in the charge-sheet, all charges have been proved about the irregularities occurred in Cash Credit Accounts of different parties. However, the charge of nonexistence of borrowal units have not been proved. The Bank has been exposed to financial loss of Rs. 6,12,053.74p. as on 24.04.1990 i.e., on the date of your transfer from Dholla Branch in regard to aforesaid accounts. (iii) In respect of charge No. 3 as mentioned in the charge-sheet several irregularities in the Credit Account of Dholla Saw Mill, Temporary Grievance Accounts in the name of yourself, Shri Robin Chandra Borah, the then Manager and Shri Rabin Roy, Cash-cum-General Clerk of the said Branch, and Sundry Creditors Account of different parties, were proved. However, I find that the charge of "non-calculation of drawing power due to non-submission of Stock Statement by Dholla Saw Mill in their Cash Credit Account has not been proved. Also, the charge of your passing the voucher for Rs. 10,000.00 debiting unadjusted Sundry Creditors Account and crediting the loan accounts without any basis on 19.03.1990, has not been proved. I also find that the charge of connivance with other employees of Dholla Branch in the matter of passing fictitious voucher of Rs. 1,50,000.00 on 30.04.1988 has not been proved. Finally, I have noted that the Bank has been exposed to financial loss of Rs. 1,60,298.27p. as on 30.04.1988 due to the misdeeds committed by you. (iv) In respect of charge No. 4 as mentioned in the charge-sheet, all charges have been proved in the Account of Shri Barin Dutta. The Bank has suffered a financial loss of Rs. 1,40,775.35p. 4. From the facts and circumstances of the above case and the charges so proved at the enquiry, I find that you flagrantly violated Bank's rules and procedures in the course of your duties during your tenure as Manager of Dholla Branch. The Bank has suffered a financial loss of Rs. 1,40,775.35p. 4. From the facts and circumstances of the above case and the charges so proved at the enquiry, I find that you flagrantly violated Bank's rules and procedures in the course of your duties during your tenure as Manager of Dholla Branch. You acted with mala fide intent and ignored to discharge your duties with honesty, integrity, devotion and diligence as is expected from a responsible officer of the Bank which ultimately resulted the Bank facing a huge financial loss. All considered, therefore, it warrants imposition of the punishment of "dismissal which shall ordinarily be disqualification for future employment" as per Regulation 4(j) of United Bank of India Officer Employees (Discipline and Appeal) Regulations, 1976. 5. Therefore, in exercise of powers conferred on me under Regulation 7(3) of United Bank of India Officer Employees (Discipline and Appeal) Regulations, 1976, I hereby impose upon you that following punishment which shall come into with immediate effect. DISMISSAL WHICH SHALL ORDINARILY BE A DISQUALIFICATION FOR FUTURE EMPLOYMENT" Regulation 4 (j) of United Bank of India Officer, Employees' (Discipline and Appeal) Regulations, 1976) 10. Being aggrieved by the aforesaid order of penalty, the petitioner preferred Annexure-XIV appeal dated 05.10.2001 to the Appellate Authority, but the same having not been yielded any result, he preferred the instant writ petition challenging the enquiry proceeding and the findings recorded therein and also the order of penalty. 11. In the counter affidavit filed by the respondents to which the petitioner has also filed reply the affidavit, the respondents have justified the impugned enquiry proceeding and the penalty imposed on the grounds of the petitioner being found guilty of the charges and loss of confidence on him. In the reply affidavit, the petitioner has reiterated his stand made in the writ petition which is, if the reasons for disagreement against the findings recorded in the enquiry report are left aside, the petitioner could not have been imposed with the extreme penalty of dismissal from service. 12. During the course of hearing Mr. In the reply affidavit, the petitioner has reiterated his stand made in the writ petition which is, if the reasons for disagreement against the findings recorded in the enquiry report are left aside, the petitioner could not have been imposed with the extreme penalty of dismissal from service. 12. During the course of hearing Mr. S.K. Medhi, learned counsel for the petitioner in his persuasive pursuits attacking the impugned order of penalty as well as the communication dated 10.04.2004 containing the reasons for disagreement in respect of the components of the charges which were held to have been not proved by the Enquiry Officer, submitted that the Disciplinary Authority having already disagreed with the findings of the Enquiry Officer in respect of those components, the procedure adopted was wrong causing prejudice to the case of the petitioner. He submitted that if the said components are left aside, for the other charges the petitioner could not have been imposed with the penalty of dismissal from service and instead a lesser penalty would have been sufficient. Referring to the unblemished serviced career of the petitioner in the past, he strenuously argued that the same ought to have been a factor weighing the mind of the disciplinary authority, instead of mechanically passing the impugned order of dismissal from service. 13. In support of the aforesaid arguments, Mr. Medhi, learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance on the following decisions : (i) (1975) 1 SCC 574 , L. Michael and Anr. v. M/s. Johnson Pumps Ltd.; (ii) 2001 (2) GLT 227, Probin Kumar Phukan v. Union of India; (iii) Judgment and order dated 20.08.2003 passed in W.P. (C) No. 6991/2000, Sushanta Ch. Pal v. UBI & Ors. affirmed in WA No. 524/2003, UBI v. Sushanta Ch. Pal; (iv) (1998) 7 SCC 84 , Punjab National Bank and Ors. v. Kunj Behari Mishra; (v) (1999) 7 SCC 739 , Yoginath D. Bagde v. State of Maharastra and Ors.; (vi) (1993) 4 SCC 727 , Managing Director, ECIL, Hyderabad and Ors. v. B. Karunakar & Ors; (vii) AIR 2003 SC 1377 , Kailash Nath Gupta v. Enquiry Officer (R.K. RAI), Allahabad Bank and Ors. 14. Countering the above argument, Mr. v. Kunj Behari Mishra; (v) (1999) 7 SCC 739 , Yoginath D. Bagde v. State of Maharastra and Ors.; (vi) (1993) 4 SCC 727 , Managing Director, ECIL, Hyderabad and Ors. v. B. Karunakar & Ors; (vii) AIR 2003 SC 1377 , Kailash Nath Gupta v. Enquiry Officer (R.K. RAI), Allahabad Bank and Ors. 14. Countering the above argument, Mr. S. Dutta, learned counsel appearing for the respondent Bank in his painstaking effort towards justifying the impugned action and the order submitted that the procedure adopted in the enquiry being in consonance with the basic principles of natural justice and the petitioner having been afforded with all reasonable opportunities to defend his case in the departmental enquiry and in respect of disagreement to the enquiry report, the petitioner cannot claim any leniency in the matter of punishment. 15. As regards the procedure followed in recording the reasons for disagreement, Mr. Dutta, learned counsel representing the Bank submitted that the petitioner having been afforded with all reasonable opportunities to make representation against the reasons for disagreement in respect of those components which were held not to have been established in the enquiry, there was sufficient compliance of the principles of natural justice. Finally he submitted that even leaving aside the said components, other components of the charges having been established in the enquiry, on that score alone the petitioner was liable to be dealt with appropriately which in the instant case is dismissal from service. 16. In support of the aforesaid arguments advanced by Mr. Dutta, he has also placed reliance on certain decisions which are as follows : (i) (1997) 3 SCC 371 , Balbir Chand v. FCI Ltd. and Ors.; (ii) (2005) 6 SCC 321 , Canara Bank v. V.K. Awasthy; (iii) (2003) 4 SCC 364 , Chairman and Managing Director, United Commercial Bank and Ors. v. P.C. Kakkar, (iv) (2005) 10 SCC 84 , Damoh Panna Sagar Rural Regional Bank and Anr. v. Munna Lal Jain; (v) (2005) 1 SCC 13 , Ganesh Santa Ram Sirur v. State Bank of India and Anr.; (vi) (2010) 2 SCC 59, Union of India and Ors. v. M.K. Sarkar; (vii) (1995) 1 SCC 745 , Chandigarh Administration and Anr. v. Jagjit Singh and Anr.; (viii) 2004 (1) GLT 253, Biren Borah v. United Bank of India & Ors.; (ix) (1996) 9 SCC 69 , Disciplinary Authority Cum Regional Manager and Ors. v. M.K. Sarkar; (vii) (1995) 1 SCC 745 , Chandigarh Administration and Anr. v. Jagjit Singh and Anr.; (viii) 2004 (1) GLT 253, Biren Borah v. United Bank of India & Ors.; (ix) (1996) 9 SCC 69 , Disciplinary Authority Cum Regional Manager and Ors. v. Nikunja Bihari Patnaik; (x) (1996) 3 SCC 750 , State of U.P. and Ors. v. Nand Kishore Shukla & Anr.; 17. Before dealing with the case on the basis of the submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties and the materials available on record, it will be appropriate to mention at this stage the basic case of the petitioner, which is, although he might have committed certain irregularities in conducting the Bank's transactions, but the same having not involved any financial irregularities coupled with the fact that a wrong procedure was adopted towards disagreement with the findings of the Enquiry Officer in respect of those components which were held not to have been established, the petitioner was not entitled to get harsh treatment by way of dismissal from service and instead ought to have been imposed with a lesser penalty other than dismissal and/or removal from service. It is in this context, learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance on the decisions referred to above. According to him, the procedure adopted towards recording the reasons for disagreement was in the form of a concluded opinion before the petitioner was given the chance of making representation. 18. In Kunj Behari Mishra (supra), the Apex Court dealing with a similar situation in which the Disciplinary Authority disagreed with the favourable findings recorded in the enquiry report held that the delinquent is required to afford with the opportunity of being heard against the reasons for disagreement. In the said decision it was held that when the enquiry report is in favour of the delinquent officer, but the Disciplinary Authority proposes to differ with the such conclusions, then that authority must give him an opportunity of being heard, for otherwise he would be condemned unheard. As in the case of enquiry report holding the delinquent guilty of charge(s) which is required to be furnished to the delinquent to make representation against the same, in case of disagreement against favourable findings in the enquiry report also the delinquent is required to be heard on disagreement. 19. As in the case of enquiry report holding the delinquent guilty of charge(s) which is required to be furnished to the delinquent to make representation against the same, in case of disagreement against favourable findings in the enquiry report also the delinquent is required to be heard on disagreement. 19. In Yoginath D. Badge (supra) also the Apex Court referring to the aforesaid decision in Kunj Behari Mishra (supra) reiterated the same principle with the following observation : 28. In view of the provisions contained in the statutory rule extracted above, it is open to the disciplinary authority either to agree with the findings recorded by the enquiring authority or disagree with those findings. If it is does not agree with the findings of the enquiring authority, it may record its own findings. Where the enquiring authority has found the delinquent officer guilty of the charges framed against him and the disciplinary authority agrees with those findings, there would arise no difficulty. So also, if the enquiring authority has held the charges proved, but the disciplinary authority disagrees and records a finding that the charges were not established, there would arise no difficulty. Difficulties have arisen in all those cases in which the enquiring authority has recorded a positive finding that the charges were not established and the delinquent officer was recommended to be exonerated, but the disciplinary authority disagreed with those findings and recorded its own findings that the charges were established and the delinquent officer was liable to be punished. This difficulty relates to the question of giving an opportunity of hearing to the delinquent officer at that stage. Such an opportunity may either be provided specifically by the rules made under Article 309 of the Constitution or the disciplinary authority may, of its own, provide such an opportunity. This difficulty relates to the question of giving an opportunity of hearing to the delinquent officer at that stage. Such an opportunity may either be provided specifically by the rules made under Article 309 of the Constitution or the disciplinary authority may, of its own, provide such an opportunity. Where the rules are in this regard silent and the disciplinary authority also does not give an opportunity of hearing to the delinquent officer and records findings different from those of the enquiring authority that the charges were established, "an opportunity of hearing" may have to be read into the rule by which the procedure for dealing with the enquiring authority's report is provided principally because it would be contrary to the principles of natural justice if a delinquent officer, who has already been held to be "not guilty" by the enquiring authority, is found "guilty" without being afforded an opportunity of hearing on the basis of the same evidence and material on which a finding of "not guilty" has already been recorded. 20. In the instant case, the petitioner was given the opportunity to make representation both against the enquiry report and the reasons for disagreement by the aforementioned communication dated 10.04.2000 (Annexure XI) by which the petitioner was advised to submit his written statement in respect of the disagreement as well as the findings recorded in the enquiry report. Thus, it cannot be said that the petitioner was condemned unheard in respect of those components of the charges which were held not to have been proved, but the Disciplinary Authority disagreed with the same for the reasons recorded in the said communication. The petitioner was given opportunity to persuade the Disciplinary Authority to take a different view of the matter in respect of the findings recorded in the enquiry report as well as the reasons for disagreement. Thus, there was substantial compliance of the procedural requirement of furnishing the reasons for disagreement before imposing the penalty enabling the petitioner to make written representation against the same. Thus, the proposition of law as envisaged in B. Karunakar (supra), was substantially complied with and there was no violation of the principle of natural justice. 21. The decisions in Kailash Nath Gupta; Probin Kumar Phukan and Sushanta Ch. Thus, the proposition of law as envisaged in B. Karunakar (supra), was substantially complied with and there was no violation of the principle of natural justice. 21. The decisions in Kailash Nath Gupta; Probin Kumar Phukan and Sushanta Ch. Pal (supra) have been pressed into service to substantiate the argument that since the Bank was not exposed to any financial loss and there was mere irregularity in business transactions conducted by the petitioner, the extreme penalty of dismissal from service was not warranted. Needless to say that ratio of any decision must be understood in the background of the facts of that case. It has been said long time ago that a case is only an authority for what it actually decides and not what logically follows from it. [See Lord Halsbury in Quinn v. Leathern, 1901 AC 495]. 22. In Kailash Nath Gupta (supra), the Apex Court dealing with an industrial dispute and proposition of punishment, while reiterating that the power of interference with the quantum of punishment is extremely limited, but having found that a small amount was found irrecoverable for which the petitioner was held guilty, held that the punishment of removal from service required reconsideration of the High Court considering the relevant aspects. Similarly, in Probin Kumar Phukan (supra) dealing with the quantum of punishment imposed on the petitioner, the Court interfered with the penalty of removal from service and instead substituted the same by reduction to a lower grade or post or to a lower stage in the time scale of pay. Such a course of action was adopted when it was found that the penalty imposed was discriminatory compared to the penalty imposed to another employee. While doing so, the Court also took note of the charges said to have been established in the enquiry. Similar view was taken in Sushanta Ch. Pal (supra) in which it was found that the charges brought against the delinquent were not in respect of the transactions affecting any interest of the customers of the Bank. In the said case, the charge of misappropriation of a scooter advance and unauthorisedly obtaining the loan amount as well as the advance were personal to the petitioner. Pal (supra) in which it was found that the charges brought against the delinquent were not in respect of the transactions affecting any interest of the customers of the Bank. In the said case, the charge of misappropriation of a scooter advance and unauthorisedly obtaining the loan amount as well as the advance were personal to the petitioner. Having regard to those facts and the decisions on which the learned counsel for the Bank placed reliance where the Apex Court had disapproved with the interference made by the High Court with the quantum of punishment imposed in cases where the charges proved arose out of the acts committed by the Bank officers with regard to transactions affecting third party, it was held that the punishment of compulsory retirement was excessive and accordingly the matter was remitted back to the Disciplinary Authority for reconsideration. 23. The decision in L. Michael (supra) has been pressed into service to emphasize that the writ Court is not powerless to interfere with the findings of fact if the same is not based on no evidence, or is the result of a misreading of the material evidence, or is so unreasonable or grossly unjust that no reasonable person would judicially arrive at that conclusion. 24. Unlike the aforesaid decisions, in the instant case the transactions in respect of which the petitioner had been charged, are all third party transactions exposing the Bank to financial loss. As to what are the charges, have been noted above. It is not the case of any single charge and/or two or three similar charges not involving any third party. The reading of the charges levelled against the petitioner would go to show that there was gross illegalities in sanctioning the loan even to the extent of making fraudulent transactions. As has been held by the enquiry officer, the charge of irregular sanctioning of the loan of Rs. 50,000/- was established. Similarly, exposition of the Bank towards financial loss to the tune of Rs. 69,044.57 was also established. Another component of one of the charges, i.e. irregular sanction of loan of Rs. 50,000/- was also established. Similarly the Bank was exposed to financial loss in respect of other transactions. 25. The charge of excess drawal by the petitioner of Rs. 1.50 lakh without recording the same in the Ledger Book and that there was no effective transaction, was also established. 50,000/- was also established. Similarly the Bank was exposed to financial loss in respect of other transactions. 25. The charge of excess drawal by the petitioner of Rs. 1.50 lakh without recording the same in the Ledger Book and that there was no effective transaction, was also established. As regards exposing the Bank to financial loss to the tune of Rs. 90,775.35 the finding in the report is that the said charge has also been established in respect of which the defence plea of the petitioner was that the customer had submitted a compromise proposal and that the quantum of loss would be very low. It has rightly been held by the enquiry officer that such plea was not at all tenable. It was also found that the petitioner had entered an amount of Rs. 5,000/- in the particular document in his own handwriting against the particular SB account and the same was also initialed/issued by him, although there was no corresponding credit thereof. 26. All the above actions on the part of the petitioner would go to show that he had committed gross misconduct by way of illegalities in various transactions. It is not the case of irregularity in an isolated transaction. As the charges would be go show that the petitioner was involved in a large scale illegalities in various transactions and the Bank had to suffer financial loss. Certainly such act of misconduct cannot be viewed leniently and that too in a financial institution like Bank. 27. It is in the above context the learned counsel representing the Bank has placed reliance on the decisions referred to above. He has also referred to the provisions of United Bank of India Officer Employees' (Discipline and Appeal) Regulations, 1976 so as to emphasize that as a bank employee the petitioner ought to have maintained at all times all possible steps to ensure and protect the interests of the Bank and discharged his duties with utmost integrity, honesty, devotion and diligence and ought not to have done the things which are unbecoming of a bank officer. 28. The decisions on which Mr. 28. The decisions on which Mr. Dutta, learned counsel appearing for the Bank has placed reliance are to bring home the argument that when the misconduct on the part of a bank officer is established in the enquiry irrespective of actual loss caused to the Bank, the penalty of dismissal from service cannot be said to be disproportionate. 29. In Nikunja Bihari Patnaik (supra), it was held as follows : ..Acting beyond one's authority is by itself a breach of discipline and a breach of Regulation 3. It constitutes misconduct within the meaning of Regulation 24. No further proof of loss is really necessary though as a matter of fact, in this case there are findings that several advances and overdrawals allowed by the respondent beyond his authority have become sticky and irrecoverable. 30. The decision in Balbir Chand (supra) has been pressed into service to emphasize that wrong awarding of lesser penalty to one officer does not entitle another officer guilty of proved misconduct to claim the lesser punishment instead of major one. Similarly in M.K. Sarkar (supra) the Apex Court dealing with the relief claimed on the ground of applicability of Article 14 for extension of same relief though improperly granted in some other case held that, if someone was wrongly extended to a benefit same cannot be cited as a precedent for claiming similar benefit by others. A claim on the basis of guarantee of equality, is permissible only when the person similarly placed has been lawfully granted a relief and the person claiming relief is also lawfully entitled to the same. The decision in Jagjit Singh (supra), is also pressed into service on the said proposition. 31. The decision in V.K. Awasthy (supra) has been referred to, to bring home the submission that the writ Court exercising the power of judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, would be reluctant to interfere with the quantum of punishment when the charges are proved clearly establishing that the bank employee had failed to discharge his duties with utmost integrity, honesty, devotion and diligence and the acts were prejudicial to the interest of the Bank. As in the instant case, in the said case also the penalty imposed was dismissal from service which was held to be proportionate to the gravity of the offence. Same view has been expressed in P.C. Kakkar (supra). 32. As in the instant case, in the said case also the penalty imposed was dismissal from service which was held to be proportionate to the gravity of the offence. Same view has been expressed in P.C. Kakkar (supra). 32. In Manna Lal Jain (supra) on a proven charge of unauthorized withdrawal of Rs. 25,000/- from the Bank and later on depositing the same with the interest of 24% per annum was viewed seriously by the Apex Court. It was held that when the conduct involved was clearly misconduct a subsequent deposit of the amount would not exonerate the bank officer of the charge. In the said case the order of removal from service was held to be proportionate to the misconduct. Similar view was expressed in Ganesh Santa Ram Sirur (supra) upholding the order of removal from service on the charge of sanctioning of loan to the spouse by the bank Manager in contravention of the service rules. Such conduct was held to be not prudent and honest decision. 33. In Nand Kishore Shukla (supra), the Apex Court held that even if one of the charges is held proved and sufficient for imposing the penalty by the Disciplinary Authority, the Court would be loath to interfere with that part of the order. In that case the removal from service was ordered. This case has been pressed into service to emphasize that even leaving aside the reasons for disagreement in respect of those components of the charges held not proved, the other components held to have been established in the enquiry would be sufficient to impose the penalty of dismissal from service. 34. In Biren Borah (supra) this Court in similar circumstances dealing with the question as to whether the penalty of removal from service was disproportionate as the Bank did not incur any loss, answered the same in the negative when it was found that the petitioner involved in the said case tried to defraud the Bank. 35. In the case of State of U.P. v. Harendra Arora, reported in AIR-2001 SC 2319, when a plea was made that the dismissed Govt. servant was not furnished with the copy of the enquiry report, it was held that mere non-furnishing of the same without showing any prejudice would not invalidate the dismissal order. 35. In the case of State of U.P. v. Harendra Arora, reported in AIR-2001 SC 2319, when a plea was made that the dismissed Govt. servant was not furnished with the copy of the enquiry report, it was held that mere non-furnishing of the same without showing any prejudice would not invalidate the dismissal order. In the instant case, although it was contended that before disagreement with those components of the charges held not to have been established, the petitioner was not given an opportunity of being heard. However the fact of the matter is otherwise. The points and/or reasons for disagreement were communicated to the petitioner asking him to submit reasons against the same. In Harendra Arora (supra) also it was found that the show-cause notice sent to the delinquent employee after submission of enquiry report was responded to by the delinquent as in the instant case. In the said case also it was held that non-furnishing of the enquiry report before such a course of action, was not prejudicial to the interest of the delinquent employee. 36. Similarly in V.K. Awasthy (supra) noticing the fact that the ground of prejudice or violation of principles of natural justice was not raised by the employee either in the memorandum of appeal or at the time of personal hearing, it was held that post-decisional hearing would not obliterate the procedural deficiency of pre-decisional hearing and therefore there was no violation of the principles of natural justice. 37. In the case of Govt. of Andhra Pradesh v. Md. Nasarullah Khan, reported in AIR 2006 SC 1214 , dealing with the scope of judicial review in such matter under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the Apex Court made the following observations : 10. From the finding recorded by the High Court it clearly appears that the High Court reappreciated the evidence as an Appellate Authority. Apart from reap-predating the evidence, which is not permissible in law, the High Court also fell in grave error by directing the Govt. Pleader and the learned counsel for the respondent herein to again view the cassettes. It is on record that the Inquiry Officer relied on the video cassettes displayed during the Inquiry as part of additional evidence. The finding has been clearly recorded by the Inquiry Officer on the basis of the evidence adduced by PWs 1, 2, 3 and 4 during the Inquiry. It is on record that the Inquiry Officer relied on the video cassettes displayed during the Inquiry as part of additional evidence. The finding has been clearly recorded by the Inquiry Officer on the basis of the evidence adduced by PWs 1, 2, 3 and 4 during the Inquiry. 11. By now it is a well-established principle of law that the High Court exercising the power of judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution does not act as an Appellate Authority. Its jurisdiction is circumscribed and confined to correct errors of law or procedural error, if any, resulting in manifest miscarriage of justice or violation of principles of natural justice. Judicial review is not akin to adjudication on merit by re-appreciating the evidence as an Appellate Authority. 14. As already said, in the present case there is no allegation of violation of principles of natural justice or the inquiry being held inconsistent with the mode of procedure prescribed by the rules or regulations. 38. Similar view has been expressed in State of Meghalaya v. Mechen Singh N. Marak, reported in (2008) 7 SCC 580 with the following observations : 13. Under the circumstances the question arises whether the Division Bench of the High Court was justified in setting aside the order of removal of the respondent from service and remitting the matter to the appellate authority, namely, the Inspector General of Police to consider the question of imposition of appropriate punishment, short of removal from service, commensurate with the gravity of the proven misconduct of the respondent. A Court or a tribunal while dealing with the quantum of punishment has to record reasons as to why it felt that the punishment is not commensurate with the proved charges. 14. In the matter of imposition of sentence, the scope for interference is very limited and restricted to exceptional cases. The jurisdiction of the High Court, to interfere with the quantum of punishment is limited and cannot be exercised without sufficient reasons. The High Court, although has jurisdiction in appropriate case, to consider the question in regard to the quantum of punishment, but it has a limited role to play. It is now well settled that the High Courts, in exercise of powers under Article 226, do not interfere with the quantum of punishment unless there exist sufficient reasons therefor. The High Court, although has jurisdiction in appropriate case, to consider the question in regard to the quantum of punishment, but it has a limited role to play. It is now well settled that the High Courts, in exercise of powers under Article 226, do not interfere with the quantum of punishment unless there exist sufficient reasons therefor. The punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority or the appellate authority unless shocking to the conscience of the Court, cannot be subjected to judicial review. In the impugned order of the High Court no reasons whatsoever have been indicated as to why the punishment was considered disproportionate. Failure to give reasons amounts to denial of justice. The mere statement that it is disproportionate would not suffice. 15. While considering the question of proportionality of sentence imposed on a delinquent at the conclusion of departmental enquiry, the Court should also take into consideration, the mental set-up of the delinquent, the type of duty to be performed by him and similar relevant circumstances which go into the decision-making process. If the charged employee holds the position of trust where honesty and integrity are in, built requirements of functioning, it would not be proper to deal with the matter leniently. Misconduct, in such cases has to be dealt with iron hands. 39. As noted above, throughout the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner it was submitted that even if the charges are held to have been established in the enquiry, same ought not to have been viewed in the perspective of imposing the extreme penalty of dismissal from service. It was argued that having regard to the seriousness of the irregularities, even if said to have been committed by the petitioner, coupled with the fact that some of the components of the charges had not been established in the enquiry, the Disciplinary Authority ought not have imposed the penalty of dismissal from service, and instead a lesser penalty should have been imposed. This argument will have to be appreciated in the touchstone of the findings recorded in the enquiry proceeding and the reasons for disagreement recorded by the Disciplinary Authority. 40. This argument will have to be appreciated in the touchstone of the findings recorded in the enquiry proceeding and the reasons for disagreement recorded by the Disciplinary Authority. 40. Dealing with the power of Disciplinary Authority in the matter of disagreement with the findings of the enquiry officer, the Apex Court in the case of High Court of Judicature at Bombay v. Shashikant S. Patil & Anr., reported in (2000) 1 SCC 416 has held thus : 19. Reasoning of the High Court that when the Disciplinary Committee differed from the finding of the enquiry officer it is imperative to discuss the materials in detail and contest the conclusion of the enquiry officer, is quite unsound and contrary to the established principle in administrative law. The Disciplinary Committee was neither an appellate nor a revisional body over the enquiry officer's report. It must be borne in mind that the enquiry is primarily intended to afford the delinquent officer a reasonable opportunity to meet the charges made against him and also to afford the punishing authority with the materials collected in such enquiry as well as the views are expressed by the enquiry officer thereon. The findings of the enquiry officer are only his opinion on the materials, but such findings are not binding on the disciplinary authority as the decision making authority is the punishing authority and, therefore, that authority can come to its own conclusion, of course bearing in mind the views expressed by the enquiry officer. But it is not necessary that the disciplinary authority should "discuss materials in detail and contest the conclusions of the enquiry officer". Otherwise the position of the disciplinary authority would get relegated to a subordinate level. 20. The legal position on that score has been stated by this Court in A.N. D'-Silva v. Union of India, that neither the findings of the enquiry officer nor his recommendations are binding on the punishing authority. The aforesaid position was settled by a Constitution Bench of this Court way back in 1963 (Union of India v. H.C. Goel). The Bench held that the Government may agree with the report or may differ either wholly or partially, from the conclusions recorded in the report. The aforesaid position was settled by a Constitution Bench of this Court way back in 1963 (Union of India v. H.C. Goel). The Bench held that the Government may agree with the report or may differ either wholly or partially, from the conclusions recorded in the report. Their Lordships laid down the following principle: If the report makes findings in favour of the public servant and the Government disagrees with the said findings and holds that the charges framed against the public servant are prima facie proved, the Government should decide provisionally what punishment should be imposed on the public servant and proceed to issue a second notice against him in that behalf. 41. Even if we leave aside those components which although the enquiry officer held not to have been established, but the Disciplinary Authority held otherwise, then also the charges levelled against the petitioner said to have been established in the enquiry, are enough to entail the penalty of dismissal from service. Having regard to the charges involved, it cannot be said to be a case of imposition of penalty shockingly disproportionate to the gravity of misconduct. If such a view is taken, same will be antithesis to the proven misconduct against the petitioner. As has been held by the Apex Court in a plethora of decisions that the amount is not material, what is material is the conduct of the delinquent, more particularly in a financial institution like Bank where honesty, integrity, trustworthiness etc. are the parameters and yardsticks for proper functioning involving financial transactions. In the instant case, because of wholesome illegality committed by the petitioner the Bank was exposed to financial loss. Even if no loss was incurred by the Bank, same cannot absolve the petitioner from the liability of misconduct that he had committed. It is a question of loss of faith. If the employer lost faith on the petitioner, the Writ Court cannot issue any mandamus for reconsideration of his case for imposition of another penalty other than dismissal from service. It has been held by the Apex Court in Addl. It is a question of loss of faith. If the employer lost faith on the petitioner, the Writ Court cannot issue any mandamus for reconsideration of his case for imposition of another penalty other than dismissal from service. It has been held by the Apex Court in Addl. District Magistrate (City) Agra v. Prabhakar Chaturvedi and another, reported in (1992) 2 SCC 12 and Municipal Committee Bahadurgarh v. Kaishman Behari and others, reported in (1996) 2 SCC 714 , that even in case of temporary misappropriation of a small amount by a bank employee and later on returning the same with interest, cannot absolve him from the liability of dismissal from service and that the amount misappropriated may be small or large but what is relevant is the act of misappropriation. Dismissal from service in such cases would be appropriate punishment. For all the aforesaid reasons, I do not find any merit in the writ petition and accordingly it is dismissed leaving the parties to bear their own costs.