JUDGMENT MRS. V. K. TAHILRAMANI, J.:- Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and learned APP for respondent. 2. Rule. 3. With the consent of "the parties heard forthwith. 4. The petitioner had preferred an application for parole on the ground of illness of his father. According to the petitioner, his father suffers from heart ailment. The said application for parole came to be rejected by order dated 25th May, 2011. Being aggrieved by the said fact, the petitioner has preferred this petition. 5. The learned Advocate for the petitioner submitted that when the police conducted enquiry, they found the reason given by the petitioner i.e. illness of his father, to be genuine. Despite this fact, the petitioner has not been granted parole. The learned advocate for the petitioner relied on a decision of the Gujarat High Court. in the case of Bhikhabhai Devshi vs. State of Gujarat and others, AIR 1987 Gujarat 136 to contend that the object of granting parole are that the prisoner gets an opportunity to maintain continuity with his family life, to deal with the family matters, to maintain constructive hope and active interest in the life and to save a convict from the ill effects of continuously being in prison. The aims and objects which the learned advocate for the petitioner has pointed out, are actually stated in the judgment only in relation to furlough and not in relation to parole. In the said decision, it is further observed. Furlough and parole have two different purposes. Parole is to be granted only on a sufficient cause such as cases of severe illness or death of any member of the prisoner's family or of his nearest relative or for other sufficient cause. Therefore, parole is not a matter of right and only when there is a sufficient and serious cause, the prisoner may be released on parole. Parole may be denied to a prisoner even when he makes out sufficient cause for release on parole if the competent authority is satisfied on valid grounds that release of a prisoner on parole would be against the interest of the society or the prison administration. Parole may be denied to a prisoner even when he makes out sufficient cause for release on parole if the competent authority is satisfied on valid grounds that release of a prisoner on parole would be against the interest of the society or the prison administration. For example, a prisoner who has once escaped or attempted to escape or who is likely to escape or has such means and resources, may be denied parole because under the Rules, the competent authority has discretion to grant or not to grant parole even when cause is shown. Therefore, comparison of release on parole and furlough is absolutely uncalled for. 6. It is well settled that grant of parole to the prisoner is not a right. It has been so observed by the Division Bench of this Court in para 5 of the decision in Prahlad D. Gajbhiye vs. State of Maharashtra, 1994 Mah.L.J. 1584 : 1994 Cri. L.J. 2555. Moreover, it is only in certain circumstances that a prisoner can be released on parole and even if the reason stated by the prisoner for grant of parole is found to be genuine, his case has to fall within the necessary criteria for grant of parole including favourable police report. 7. Mr. T.A. Mirza, the learned APP pointed out that on 1.8.2007 the petitioner was released on furlough for 14 days. In the said case, he ought to have surrendered on 15.8.2007, however, the petitioner did not report back to prison on 15.8.2007. The police had to eventually trace the petitioner, arrest him and bring back him to prison. There was a overstay of 1011 days on the part of the petitioner. When enquiry was conducted pursuant to the petitioner's application for parole, the fact that on earlier occasion the petitioner had over stayed for 1011 days was noticed. In addition, it was noticed that the petitioner has a brother i.e. Vishal Khandekar, who can take care of the father of the petitioner. Hence, on this ground, the application of the petitioner for parole came to be rejected. 8. The petitioner by way of amendment has relied on the Annexure III - Medical Certificate dated 17.7.2011 to support the fact that the father of the petitioner is very sick. On going through the said medical certificate, it shows that the father of the petitioner suffers from constipation, chest pain and weakness. 8. The petitioner by way of amendment has relied on the Annexure III - Medical Certificate dated 17.7.2011 to support the fact that the father of the petitioner is very sick. On going through the said medical certificate, it shows that the father of the petitioner suffers from constipation, chest pain and weakness. The medical certificate does not show that the illness of the father of the petitioner is serious or that he is in a critical condition. Thus, this certificate is of no help to the petitioner. 9. The learned advocate for the petitioner thereafter submitted that if a prisoner, who is not of bad conduct and is qualified for parole, the apprehension that his release on parole may endanger the lives of complainant or eye witnesses, is no ground for rejecting parole application of the prisoner. To support this submission, he has relied on a decision of the Punjab and Haryana High Court. The citation of the said decision according to the learned advocate is (1987) 1 All Cri.L.R. 787 (787) (P & H). First of all we would like to state that the copy of the said decision was not placed before us, nor could the learned advocate give the name of the parties in the said decision. Such a book is not available in our library. However, in any event this decision cannot be said to be applicable to the present case because the present application for parole is mainly rejected on the ground that earlier when the petitioner was released on furlough he overstayed for 1011 days and he had to be traced by police, arrested and brought to the prison by the police. The second ground for rejection is that the brother of the petitioner is available to take care of the father of the petitioner. The Division Bench of this Court in the case of Murlidhar Ishwar Suryawanshi and another vs. State of Maharashtra, 2011 ALL MR (Cri) 2159 observed that if a prisoner does not report back in time after he is released on furlough or parole and the prisoner had to be arrested and brought back to prison, the prisoner does not deserve any sympathy. 10. Thereafter, the learned Advocate for the petitioner submitted that the petitioner is being punished twice. He claimed that it is a case of double jeopardy. 10. Thereafter, the learned Advocate for the petitioner submitted that the petitioner is being punished twice. He claimed that it is a case of double jeopardy. He submitted that on account of overstay of 1011 days punishment has been imposed on the petitioner of cutting remission and in addition thereto now the petitioner is not being released on parole. Hence, according to him it is clearly a case of double punishment i.e. double jeopardy. 11. The argument advanced on behalf of the petitioner is that it is a case of double punishment in the sense that apat1 from punishment being imposed for the overstay, he is not being released on parole and thus, the petitioner has been doubly punished with is violative of Article 20(2) of the Constitution of India. 12. We are of the opinion that it is not a case of double jeopardy. The only condition precedent for application of the principle of double jeopardy is that the person concerned has been prosecuted and punished for the same offence. The Apex Court in Maqbool Hussain vs. State of Bombay, reported in 1953 Cr. L.J. 1432 : 12010 ALL SCR (O.C.C.) 294), held that the words "before a Court of law or judicial tribunal" are not to be found in Article 20(2), yet in order to invoke the protection of Article 20(2), there must have been a prosecution and punishment in respect of the same offence before a Court of Law or Tribunal, required by law to decide the matters in controversy judicially on evidence on oath which it must be authorised by law to administer. The Article contemplates proceedings of criminal nature before a Court of law in accordance with the procedure prescribed in the statute which creates the offence and regulates the procedure. It was also held that Article 20(2) incorporates within its scope the plea of "autrefois convict" as known to British Jurisprudence or the plea of "double jeopardy" as known to the American Constitution but circumscribes it by providing that there should not only be a prosecution but also a punishment in the first instance in order to operate as a bar to a second prosecution and punishment for the same offence. The petitioner in this case cannot get any benefit, because he has not been prosecuted earlier. The petitioner in this case cannot get any benefit, because he has not been prosecuted earlier. Article 20(2) would become operative in a case where the second prosecution and punishment is for the same offence for which the person concerned has already been prosecuted and punished. Moreover, the principle is that no man should be vexed with more than one trial for offences arising out of identical acts committed by him. The rule against double jeopardy is stated in the maxim Nemo debet bis vexari pro una et eadem causa. It is only when the offence has been the subject of judicial adjudication and it ended in acquittal or conviction, the criminal justice system would not allow repetition of the adjudication in a separate trial on the very same facts. In the present case, the petitioner has not been prosecuted before any Court of law or Tribunal. There were no proceedings of criminal nature "before a Court of law" in accordance with the procedure prescribed in the statute which creates offences and regulates procedure for punishment, therefore, it is clearly not a case of double jeopardy. 13. It would also be relevant to point out that proviso to Rule 26 of Chapter XXVII of the Maharashtra Prison Manual Rules clearly lays down that any measure taken for security and safe custody of a refractory or dangerous prisoner, or for preventing him from committing mischief, and exclusion from a privilege which is other wise admissible only to a well behaved prisoner shall not be deemed to be a punishment for the purposes of the Prison Rules. Thus, even if remission was cut on account of overstay, it cannot be deemed to be a punishment. 14. In the result, we find no merit in this petition. Rule discharged. Petition dismissed.