JUDGMENT This Appeal is directed against appellant's conviction for the offence punishable under Section 20(1)(c) read with Section 8(c) of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and sentence of rigorous imprisonment for ten years with a fine of Rs.1,00,000/- or in default rigorous imprisonment for one year imposed upon the appellant by the learned Special Judge, NDPS cases in Greater Mumbai. 2. Facts which are material for deciding this Appeal are as under :- On 28th February, 2003, Namboodri Prasannan Shankamarayanan, an intelligence officer working with the Narcotic Control Bureau (hereinafter referred to as NCB) gathered intelligence that the appellant was using a particular flat at Naigaon for storing heroin consignments and that the appellant had received a large consignments of heroin that day, for disposal whereof, the appellant was to visit the flat around 6:00 p.m. An intelligence note was, accordingly, prepared and submitted to the Assistant Director, who ordered Shri Namboodri to organize a team, to work out the information and report. Accordingly, a team of officers from NCB left for the location of flat of the appellant after equipping themselves for drawing up panchanamas. On reaching the place two occupants of neighbouring flats were called as panchas and at 6:10 p.m. the raiding party rang bell of the flat. The flat was opened by the appellant and the search of flat yielded 5.700 Kg of Heroin in a bag. Necessary samples were drawn and the remaining contraband in the bag was also sealed. An elaborate panchanama was drawn up and the appellant was taken along with the property to the office of the NCB. He made a confessional statement which was recorded. The appellant was then formally arrested, samples were sent to the Assistant Chemical Analyzer, and the State Forensic Science Laboratory. The remaining property was lodged appropriately. After registration of offence, further investigation was carried out. The laboratories reported that that the samples contain heroin. On completion of investigation, a complaint was lodged with the Special Court. 3. The learned Special Judge charged the appellant for the offence punishable under Section 29 and 21 read with Section 8(c) of the NDPS Act. Since the accused pleaded not guilty, he was put on trial at which the NCB examined in all ten witnesses. On completion of investigation, a complaint was lodged with the Special Court. 3. The learned Special Judge charged the appellant for the offence punishable under Section 29 and 21 read with Section 8(c) of the NDPS Act. Since the accused pleaded not guilty, he was put on trial at which the NCB examined in all ten witnesses. After considering the prosecution evidence in the light of defence of false implication, the learned Judge held the appellant guilty and convicted and sentenced him as re-counted earlier. Aggrieved thereby, the appellant has preferred this appeal. 4. I have heard the learned Counsel for the appellant and the learned APP for the NCB. With the help of both the learned Counsel I have gone through the entire record. PW-1 Namboodri is the officer, who gathered intelligence, prepared intelligence note, arranged for and participated in the raid. PW-2 Vijay Govindram Bhatia is another intelligence officer, who had been entrusted with the task of carrying out raid by his superiors. He seized the incriminating articles, performed panchanama, drew samples and sent the samples to the laboratories. PW-3 Mrs. Pamela Salino D'Souza is the land lady from whom the premises were taken on leave and license basis by the appellant. PW-4 Pradeep Kumar Bhatnagar was working as Assistant Chemical Analyzer in the New Customs House Laboratory, who received the samples and analyzed it. He has proved his report whereby he found that the sample was heroin i.e. Diacetyl Morphine. PW-5 Sanjay Gokhale was also working as Intelligence Officer and had participated in the raid. He had recorded statement of PW-6 Rachita Morje, who was estate agent through whom the appellant had allegedly taken the flat on rent. PW-6 Mrs. Rachita Ramakant Morje is the estate agent, who claimed that the land lady was her friend. She stated that she had shown the premises to the appellant, who came to her for the first time on 1st March, 2003 and that the Agreement was prepared on 1st March, 2003. She was permitted to be cross examined by the prosecution and then stated on 15th November, 2002 she had shown the premises to the appellant and that the Agreement was made in her presence. She was permitted to be cross examined by the prosecution and then stated on 15th November, 2002 she had shown the premises to the appellant and that the Agreement was made in her presence. She admitted that she wrongly stated that the accused visited the site on 1st March, 2003 and that the Agreement was signed on 1st March, 2003 which was in fact the date on which she was called out to the Narcotics Control Bureau. But again in cross examination the witness stated that the land lady told her four days prior to 1st Mach, 7003 that she wanted to give premises on rent and that for these four days, the key of the premises was with her. She admitted having signed the Agreement as Usha Morje and not Rachita Morje. In re-examination the witness re-iterated that she had received the key of the flat four days prior to 1st March, 2003. 5. PW-7 Bhushan Shriram Mulay is an inspector of Central Excise, who had applied before the Special Metropolitan Magistrate and got an inventory done in respect of the property seized. PW-8 Narayan Jogi Panigrahi, a Hawaldar at NCB, Mumbai stated having carried the sample to the Forensic Science Laboratory. PW-9 Keith John Sanehis was the Assistant Director of NCB, Mumbai at the relevant time. He had received the intelligence note from PW-1 Namboodri Prasannan Shankamarayanan and asked PW-1 to organize the raid. He stated that when the officers had gone for conducting the raid, he continued to stay in the office and raiding party returned with the accused at about 2:30 a.m.. He received the search and seizure report and put his signature thereon and eventually showed it to his superior. PW-10 Varyambat Madhavan Jayprakash is another intelligence officer, who was examined to show that the panch witnesses could not be served because their whereabouts were not known. 6. The learned Counsel for the appellant submitted that the evidence discloses that there was discrepancy as to whether the intelligence or information was received on 25th February, 2003 or 28th February, 2003. He also submitted that the procedure in recording the information and communicating the same to the superiors was not as required by the rules. He submitted that the raid itself was vitiated since the raid was continued after Sunset when the officers had sufficient time to obtain warrant before starting for raid. He also submitted that the procedure in recording the information and communicating the same to the superiors was not as required by the rules. He submitted that the raid itself was vitiated since the raid was continued after Sunset when the officers had sufficient time to obtain warrant before starting for raid. He also pointed out that the officers had not recorded any reason for not obtaining the warrant. According to the learned Counsel for the appellant, the evidence of PW-6 Mrs. Rachita Ramakant Morje would rule out possession of the premises by the appellant at the time of the raid. He also submitted that the evidence about custody of the property and samples thereon was deficient and therefore, there was no guarantee that the samples which were analyzed were from the property which was allegedly seized from the appellant. He submitted that there was absolutely no reason for the car of wife of accused to remain at the NCB office, if the accused was, in fact, nabbed in the flat hired by him. He submitted that presence of car of the wife of accused with NCB is consistent with the defence that the appellant was picked up from outside the School of his wife where he was waiting to pick her up after her School hours. The learned Counsel also submitted that reliance on confessional statement of the appellant was unjustified since the confessional statement had been retracted on the first available opportunity i.e. 13th March, 2003 and had not been corroborated in any material particulars by other evidence on record. The learned Counsel for the appellant submitted that according to the confessional statement, the appellant used to receive consignment of heroin as also adulterants to dilute the heroin. He submitted that no such adulterant was found at the spot casting a doubt about the entire story of receipt of consignment by the appellant and its seizure by the raiding party. Therefore, according to him, the evidence was grossly insufficient to warrant appellant's conviction. 7. The learned Special Public Prosecutor Mrs. Mohite-Dere for the NCB on the other hand, submitted that the information received was properly taken down and communicated to the superiors. There was no requirement of law that the original could not be sent though superior was available in the same office and that only a copy was required to be sent to the superiors. Mohite-Dere for the NCB on the other hand, submitted that the information received was properly taken down and communicated to the superiors. There was no requirement of law that the original could not be sent though superior was available in the same office and that only a copy was required to be sent to the superiors. She submitted that since the raid had commenced before Sunset, there was no question of obtaining any warrant or recording any reason for conducting the aid without a warrant. According to her, the procedure in respect of sealing and custody of the samples and property was duly followed and the standing orders issued to the department, not being mandatory in nature but being only guidelines, some deviation here or there did not vitiate the search and seizure. She pointed out that there were no allegations about tampering of seals or articles as well. She submitted that the independent witnesses were not examined because they were not available. According to her, PW-6 Mrs. Rachita Ramakant Morje was a hostile witness and therefore, her flip-flops have to be ignored. She submitted that even Mrs. Rachita Ramakant Morje had identified the appellant, as the person, who had taken the premises on leave and license basis, though there is some confusion in her mind about dates. According to her, presence of car of appellant's wife in the office of NCB has nothing to do with the factum of seizure of contraband from appellant's flat. This car may have been in the NCB office, since NCB could have been probing as to whether it was purchased from proceeds of illicit trade. Therefore, according to the learned Spl.P.P., conviction of the appellant is thoroughly justified. 8. Both the learned Counsel for the respective parties relied on a number of Judgments to support their arguments. 9. The learned Counsel for the appellant first submitted that the information was, in fact, received on 25th February, 2003 as could be seen from document at Exhibit 17 which is Search and Seizure Report dated 1st March, 2003. The information in form of intelligence note at Exhibit 8 which was proved, however, shows that the information had been received on 28th February, 2003. The information in form of intelligence note at Exhibit 8 which was proved, however, shows that the information had been received on 28th February, 2003. Therefore, according to the learned Counsel, the officials were not coming out with the whole truth and the evidence of PW-1 Namboodri relating to the receipt of information was, therefore, liable to be discarded. As rightly submitted by the learned Special Public Prosecutor the witness had specifically stated that he had collected intelligence on 28th February, 2003 and prior to that date - he had no intelligence or information about the accused. She submitted that reference to 25th February, 2003 in the Search and Seizure Report at Exhibit 17 was apparently a mistake and could not be used by the defence to assail veracity of witnesses. She pointed out that PW-9 Keith Sanchis, Assistant Commissioner, who had received the Search and Seizure Report had categorically stated in para eight of his deposition that reference to 25th February, 2003 was an inadvertent mistake and there was no intelligence note of 25th February, 2003. 10. I have considered these arguments in the light of the evidence tendered. The contention of the learned Special Public Prosecutor, that as explained by PW-9 Sanchis, reference to 25th February, 2003 in Report at Exhibit 17 could be a mistake, has to be accepted since this Report was drafted by PW2 Vijay Bhatia, who was the raiding officer, and not by PW-1 Namboodri, who had received the intelligence. Therefore, this discrepancy is irrelevant and cannot affect the veracity of the evidence tendered by the two witnesses. 11. The learned Counsel for the appellant next submitted that information in question which is at Exhibit 8 had not been recorded in the prescribed form in a register but has simply been typed on a sheet of paper and submitted in original to PW-9 Sanchis, the superior of PW-1 Namboodri. Therefore, according to the learned Counsel, the evidence about information received is assailable on two grounds: The first that it was not recorded as prescribed in a form known as DRI-1, and secondly, because it was submitted in the original and not in the form of copy to the superiors. The learned Counsel relied on Judgment of this Court in Haji Dariya & anr. The learned Counsel relied on Judgment of this Court in Haji Dariya & anr. Versus The Intelligence Officer & anr, Criminal Appeal No.484 of 1999 decided on 21st December, 2001 where this Court was considering the requirement about sending copy of information received to superior officer. In this context the Court observed as under:- It is also admitted as well as evident position that it was the gist of information, and not the copy of the original information was sent to the superior officer as contemplated by sub-section (2) of section 42 of the NDPS Act. In fact, the existence of recorded information has remained a mystery. According to witnesses Sanchis and Mr. Bichhu, the sealed packet containing the original information was handed over to Commissioner, Mr. Walke, who is not examined as a witness in this case, nor it has come on record that in compliance of sub-section (2) of Section 42, copy of the original information was sent to immediate superior i.e. Superintendent Mr. Walke, at any time whatsoever._ In this case, it is an admitted position again that the original information was in Hindi and the gist was nothing but a summary translated in English by the officer. In short, except for bare words of P.WA Sanchis and P.W.5 Bichhu, both the Customs Officers, there is nothing on record to show that the original information was reduced to writing and copy thereof was sent to the superior officer as contemplated under subsection (2) of Section 42 of the NDPS Act. The Court also noted the practice of recording the information in form DRI-1 and found that this was not done. The Court held: Therefore, the present case is a classic example of the non-compliance of the provision of Section 42(2) of the NDPS Act which renders the search and seizure a suspect, which is more so for want of independent corroboration such as DRI-1 Register, which is required to be maintained under the relevant Rules of the Department. 12. In Vinayak s/o. Dnyanoba Gaikwad & Ors. Vs. State of Maharashtra; reported at 2004 ALL MR (Cri) 1922, on which the learned Counsel for appellant relied, this Court held in respect of non-compliance to provisions of Section 42 as under:- 11. 12. In Vinayak s/o. Dnyanoba Gaikwad & Ors. Vs. State of Maharashtra; reported at 2004 ALL MR (Cri) 1922, on which the learned Counsel for appellant relied, this Court held in respect of non-compliance to provisions of Section 42 as under:- 11. It is well settled that the provisions of Section 42 of the NDPS Act, are mandatory and contravention of the same would affect the prosecution case and vitiate the trial. Subsection (2) of the Section 42 of the NDPS Act, 1985, gives a mandate to authorized officer to forthwith send a copy of information or the grounds of his belief to his immediate official superior. The provision of Subsection( 2) of Section 42 of the NDPS Act, 1985, which casts a duty upon authorized officer to send a copy of the report or the grounds of his belief to his immediate superior officer, is mandatorily in nature and non-compliance of which is fatal to the prosecution case. It has been held by the Apex Court in the case of State of Punjab Vs. Balbir Singh, (1994)3 Supreme Court Cases 299 that under Sec.42(2) such empowered officer, who takes down any information in writing or records the ground under proviso to Sec.42(1) should forthwith send a copy thereof to his immediate officer superior. If there is total non-compliance of this provision, the same affects the prosecution case. To that extent it is mandatory, Sub-section (1) of Sec.42, therefore, gives a mandate to the authorized officer, before proceeding to make search, to take down the information in writing or record his reasons and if these mandatory provisions are not complied with then the trial stands vitiated. This safeguard has been provided taking into consideration the deterrent sentence contemplated under the Act and with a view that the innocent persons are not unduly harassed and they may not be falsely implicated later on by the investigating officer and, therefore, the provision has been made that it is only the authorized officer who can proceed with the search and seizure and that too only after taking down information in writing or recording his reasons of belief. 13. The learned Counsel for the appellant submitted that the information should have been taken down in form DRI-1 as per standing instructions issued by the department and failure to do so should result in trial being vitiated. 13. The learned Counsel for the appellant submitted that the information should have been taken down in form DRI-1 as per standing instructions issued by the department and failure to do so should result in trial being vitiated. The learned Special Public Prosecutor submitted first that any forms prescribed or instructions issued cannot be elevated to the status of mandatory statutory requirements. Secondly, the form DRI-1 was basically prescribed for the purpose of deciding the question of rewards and therefore, in the absence of any specific requirement of law and that the information must be recorded in form DRI-1, failure to record the information would be immaterial. She further submitted that requirement of sending a copy does not imply that original could not be sent or shown to the immediate superior, who was sitting in the same office. Question of sending of copy would have arisen had the officer been in some other office. Therefore, merely because Section 42 refers to sending of copy, it does not imply that the original could not have been made available to the superior and when the original was so shown to the superior, there was noncompliance of requirement to send a copy. 14. The learned Special Public Prosecutor relied on Judgment of the Supreme Court in STATE OF PUNJAB Versus MAKHAN CHAND, reported at 2004 Supreme Court Cases (Cri) 830: [2004 ALL MR (Cri) 2246 (S.C.)] on the point of compliance to standing orders and Government instructions. 9. Learned counsel for the respondent-accused relied on certain standing orders and standing instructions issued by the Central Government under Section 52-A(1) which require a particular procedure to be followed for drawing of samples and contended that since this procedure had not been followed, the entire trial was vitiated. 10. This contention too has no substance for two reasons. Firstly, Section 52-A, as the marginal note indicates, deals with disposal of seized narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances. Under sub-section (1), the Central Government, by a notification in the Official Gazette, is empowered to specify certain narcotic drugs or psychotropic substances, having regard to the hazardous nature, vulnerability to theft, substitution, constraints of proper stage space and such other, relevant considerations, so that even if they are material objects seized in a criminal case, they could be disposed of after following the procedure prescribed in subsections (2) and (3). If the procedure prescribed in subsections (2) and (3) of Section 52-A is complied with and upon an application, the Magistrate issues the certificate contemplated by sub-section (2), then subsection (4) provides that, notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 or the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, such inventory, photographs of narcotic drugs or substances and any list of samples drawn under subsection (2) of Section 52-A as certified by the Magistrate, would be treated as primary evidence in respect of the offence. Therefore, Section 52-A(1) does not empower the Central Government to lay down the procedure for search of an accused, but only deals with the disposal of seized narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances. 11. Secondly, when the very same Standing Orders came up for consideration in Khet Singh v. Union of India this Court took the view that they are merely intended to guide the officers to see that a fair procedure is adopted by the officer in charge of the investigation. It was also held that they were not inexorable rules as there could be circumstances in which it may not be possible for the seizing officer to prepare the mahazar at the spot, if it is a chance recovery, where the officer may not have the facility to prepare the seizure mahazar at the spot itself. Hence, we do not find any substance in this contention. In para 7 of the Judgment, the Court also held that provision of Section 50 of the Act would not apply to a situation where the search undertaken is not of the person of the accused but of something carried in his hand. 15. In KHET SINGH Versus UNION OF INDIA, reported at (2002) 4 Supreme Court Cases 380 on which the learned Special Prosecutor relied, the Court was considering the binding effect of standing instructions. The Court held :- 5. It is true that the search and seizure of contraband article is a serious aspect in the matter of investigation related to offences under the NDPS Act. The NDPS Act and the Rules framed thereunder have laid down a detailed procedure and guidelines as to the manner in which search and seizure are to be effected. If there is any violation of these guidelines, the courts would take a serious view and the benefit would be extended to the accused. The NDPS Act and the Rules framed thereunder have laid down a detailed procedure and guidelines as to the manner in which search and seizure are to be effected. If there is any violation of these guidelines, the courts would take a serious view and the benefit would be extended to the accused. The offences under the NDPS Act are grave in nature and minimum punishment prescribed under the statute is incarceration for a long period. As the possession of any narcotic drug or psychotropic substance by itself is made punishable under the Act, the seizure of the article from the appellant is of vital importance. 10. The instructions issued by the Narcotics Control Bureau, New Delhi are to be followed by the officer-in-charge of the investigation of the crimes coming within the purview of the NDPS Act, even though these instructions do not have the force of law. They are intended to guide the officers and to see that a fair procedure is adopted by the officer-in-charge of the investigation. It is true that when a contraband article is seized during investigation or search, a seizure mahazar should, be prepared at the spot in accordance with law. There may, however, be circumstances in which it would not have been possible for the officer to prepare the mahazar at the spot, as it may be a chance recovery and the officer may not have the facility to prepare a seizure mahazar at the spot itself. If the seizure is effected at the place where there are no witnesses and there is no facility for weighing the contraband article or other requisite facilities are lacking, the officer can prepare the seizure mahazar at a later stage as and when the facilities are available, provided there are justifiable and reasonable grounds to do so. In that event, where the seizure mahazar is prepared at a later stage, the officer should indicate his reasons as to why he had not prepared the mahazar at the spot of recovery. If there is any inordinate delay in preparing the seizure mahazar, that may give an opportunity to tamper with the contraband article allegedly seized from the accused. There may also be allegations that the article seized was by itself substituted and some other items were planted to falsely implicate the accused. If there is any inordinate delay in preparing the seizure mahazar, that may give an opportunity to tamper with the contraband article allegedly seized from the accused. There may also be allegations that the article seized was by itself substituted and some other items were planted to falsely implicate the accused. To avoid these suspicious circumstances and to have a fair procedure in respect of search and seizure, it is always desirable to prepare the seizure mahazar at the spot itself from where the contraband articles were taken into custody. 16. In view of the observations in STATE OF PUNJAB Versus MAKHAN CHAND: [2004 ALL MR (Cri) 2246 (S.C.)], there could be no doubt about the legal effect of standing instructions or the forms prescribed. Since there are guidelines to be followed, deviation from those guidelines cannot affect the prosecution, at least so long as it is not shown that the departure caused any prejudice to the accused. In view of this, the contentions based on the manner of recording the information and it's being sent to the official superior have to be rejected. 17. The learned Counsel for both the parties submitted that a five Judge Bench of the Supreme Court had also considered the question of scope and applicability of Section 42 of the Act in Karnal Singh v. State of Haryana, reported at 2009 CRI.L.J. 4299. The Bench was considering a conflict in two decisions of three Judge Benches. The Court stated the background in the following words:- 1. In the case of Abdul Rashid Ibrahim Mansuri vs. State of Guiarat (2000) 2 SCC 513 , a three-Judge Bench of this Court held that compliance of Section 42 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (hereinafter referred to as NDPS Act) is mandatory and failure to take down the information in writing and forthwith send a report to his immediate official superior would cause prejudice to the accused. In the case of Saian Abraham vs. State of Kerala, (2001) 6 SCC 692 , which was also decided by a three-Judge Bench, it was held that Section 42 was not mandatory and substantial compliance was sufficient. In the case of Saian Abraham vs. State of Kerala, (2001) 6 SCC 692 , which was also decided by a three-Judge Bench, it was held that Section 42 was not mandatory and substantial compliance was sufficient. In view of the conflicting opinions regarding the scope and applicability of Section 42 of the Act in the matter of conducting search, seizure and arrest without warrant or authorization, these appeals were placed before the Constitution Bench to resolve the issue. The five Judge bench then held as under:- 15. Under Section 42(2) as it stood prior to amendment such empowered officer who takes down any information in writing or records the grounds under proviso to Section 42(1) should forthwith send a copy thereof to his immediate official superior. If there is total non-compliance of this provision the same would adversely affect the prosecution case and to that extent it is mandatory. But if there is delay whether it was undue or whether the same has been explained or not, will be a question of fact in each case. It is to be concluded that the mandatory enforcement of the provisions of Section 42 of the Act noncompliance of which may vitiate a trial has been restricted only to the provision of sending a copy of the information written down by the empowered officer to immediate official superior and not to any other condition of the Section. Abdul Rashid (supra) has been decided on 01.02.2000 but thereafter Section 42 has been amended with effect from 02.10.2001 and the time of sending such report of the required information has been specified to be within 72 hours of writing down the same. The relaxation by the legislature is evidently only to uphold the object of the Act. The question of mandatory application of the provision can be answered in the light of the said amendment. The noncompliance of the said provision may not vitiate the trial if it does not cause any prejudice to the accused. 17. In conclusion, what is to be noted is Abdul Rashid did not require literal compliance with the requirements of Sections 42(1) and 42(2) nor did Sajan Abraham hold that the requirements of Section 42(1) and 42(2) need not be fulfilled at all. 17. In conclusion, what is to be noted is Abdul Rashid did not require literal compliance with the requirements of Sections 42(1) and 42(2) nor did Sajan Abraham hold that the requirements of Section 42(1) and 42(2) need not be fulfilled at all. The effect of the two decisions was as follows: (a) The officer on receiving the information (of the nature referred to in subsection (1) of section 42) from any person had to record it in writing in the concerned Register and forthwith send a copy to his immediate official superior, before proceeding to take action in terms of clauses (a) to (d) of section 42(1). (b) But if the information was received when the officer was not in the police station, but while he was on the move either on patrol duty or otherwise, either by mobile phone, or other means, and the information calls for immediate action and any delay would have resulted in the goods or evidence being removed or destroyed, it would not be feasible or practical to take down in writing the information given to him, in such a situation, he could take action as per clauses (a) to (d) of section 42(1) and thereafter, as soon as it is practical, record the information in writing and forthwith inform the same to the official superior. (c) In other words, the compliance with the requirements of Sections 42(1) and 42(2) in regard to writing down the information received and sending a copy thereof to the superior officer, should normally precede the entry, search and seizure by the officer. But in special circumstances involving emergent situations, the recording of the information in writing and sending a copy thereof to the official superior may get postponed by a reasonable period, that is after the search, entry and seizure. The question is one of urgency and expediency. (d) While total non-compliance of requirements of sub-sections (1) and (2) of section 42 is impermissible, delayed compliance with satisfactory explanation about the ddlay will be acceptable compliance of section 42. To illustrate, if any delay may result in the accused escaping or the goods or evidence being destroyed or removed, not recording in writing the information received, before initiating action, or non-sending a copy of such information to the official superior forthwith, may not be treated as violation of section 42. To illustrate, if any delay may result in the accused escaping or the goods or evidence being destroyed or removed, not recording in writing the information received, before initiating action, or non-sending a copy of such information to the official superior forthwith, may not be treated as violation of section 42. But if the information was received when the police officer was in the police station with sufficient time to take action, and if the police officer fails to record in writing the information received, or fails to send a copy thereof: to the official superior, then it will be a suspicious circumstance being a clear violation of section 42 of the Act. Similarly, where the police officer does not record the information at all, and does not inform the official superior at all, then also it will he a clear violation of section 42 of the Act Whether there is adequate or substantial compliance with section 42 or not is a question of fact to be decided in each case. The above position got strengthened with the amendment to section 42 by Act 9 of 200]. (emphasis supplied) 18. The learned counsel for appellant submitted that the judgment would cast a duty on the officer to record the information in a register and not on a piece of paper and send a copy to the superior. As rightly submitted by the learned Special Public Prosecutor, the need to record information in a register would arise only if there is any such prescribed register, since the Court uses the expression concerned register. In the absence of such a prescription, recording information on a piece of paper too would amount to acceptable compliance of the statutory requirement. 19. In view of the Judgment in Karnal Singh's case, it is clear that mandatory enforcement of Section 42 of the Act, noncompliance whereof may vitiate a trial, is restricted only to the provision of sending copy of information recorded by the empowered officer to the immediate official superior. In this case, the original information itself had been sent to the official superior. Therefore, it cannot be said that there was any breach of mandatory provisions of Section 42 of the Act. 20. The learned Counsel for the appellants next submitted that the raid itself was conducted after Sunset. The information had been received by the officer at 12:30 hours. Therefore, it cannot be said that there was any breach of mandatory provisions of Section 42 of the Act. 20. The learned Counsel for the appellants next submitted that the raid itself was conducted after Sunset. The information had been received by the officer at 12:30 hours. Therefore, there was sufficient time for the officers to obtain a warrant for search of the premises. The learned Counsel for the appellants submitted that the information itself mentioned that the appellant was to be in the flat mound 6:00 p.m. (18 hours) for disposal of the consignment of the heroin. Thus, the official very much knew that they were to conduct the search after dusk and so had to obtain a warrant. The learned Counsel for the appellants submitted that without obtaining such a warrant, the search was conducted at the premises concerned from 6:15 p.m. He submitted that not only that no warrant was obtained but no reasons were recorded for conducting search without warrant. 21. The learned Counsel for the appellants placed reliance on Judgment of this Court in Sanjay Moreshwar Pote Versus State of Maharashtra, reported at 2005(1) Bom.C.R. (Cri.) 410: 12004 ALL MR (Cri) 3393). The question before the Court was about a raid conducted after Sunset. The Court found that the officer had received in formation which he reduced into writing at 6.25 p.m. Before proceeding for the raid he made entry in the Station Diary at 18.35 Hours. The raiding party reached the house of accused. The seizure memo showed that at about 19:00 Hours Police Head Constable Pali collected two panchas and apprised them of the information received and reached the place for conducting raid and the proceedings of the panchanama started at 19.20 hours and the same were concluded at 20.45 hours. In the context of these facts the Court held that there was a breach of mandatory provisions of Section 42 of the Act. 22. In Gangaram Rama Gundkar and another, Appellants v. Stale of Maharashtra, Respondent reported at 2002 CRI.L.J. 2578 : [2002 ALL MR (Cri) 1356) cited by the learned Counsel for appellant the question before the Court was about search before Sunrise. In that case, P.S.I. took over the charge of station diary and received an information that both the accused were possessing Ganja in their house at village Mangrul and they were going to proceed for its sale elsewhere. In that case, P.S.I. took over the charge of station diary and received an information that both the accused were possessing Ganja in their house at village Mangrul and they were going to proceed for its sale elsewhere. The P.S.I. made an entry in the Station Diary, scat a wireless message to his superiors, and the raiding party reached Mangrul at 5.15 a.m. The house of the accused was encircled by the raiding party at 5-30 a.m. Thereafter the search was conducted and the procedure was completed at 7 a.m. The Court held the raid was effected between sunset and sunrise and it was therefore incumbent upon the P.S.T. to record the grounds of his belief as required in Proviso to S.42(1) of N.D.P.S. Act, since the provision in that respect is mandatory. The Court also found that the alterations were made even in the Malkhana register creating a suspicion and observed that the possibility of tampering with the seized articles including the sample was not excluded. 23. The learned Counsel for the appellant also relied on Judgment of the Supreme Court in Mohinder Kumar v. The State, Panaji, Goa, reported at 1995 CRI.L.J.2074. The Supreme Court noted the facts as under :- 3. In the instant case, the facts show that he accidentally reached the house while on patrolling duty and had it not been for the conduct of the accused persons in trying to run into the house on seeing the police party he would perhaps not have had occasion to enter the house and effect search. But when the conduct of the accused persons raised a suspicion he went there and effected the search, seizure and arrest. It was, therefore, not on any prior information but he purely accidentally stumbled upon the offending articles and not being the empowered person, on coming to know about the accused persons being in custody of the offending articles, he sent for the panchas and on their arrival drew up the panchanama. In the circumstances, from the stage he had reason to believe that the accused persons were in custody of narcotic drugs and sent for panchas, he was under an obligation to proceed further in the matter in accordance with the provisions of the Act. In the circumstances, from the stage he had reason to believe that the accused persons were in custody of narcotic drugs and sent for panchas, he was under an obligation to proceed further in the matter in accordance with the provisions of the Act. The Court then held :- Under Section 42(1) provisio, if the search is carried out between sunset and sunrise, he must record the grounds of his belief. Admittedly, he did not record the ground of his belief at any stage of the investigation subsequent to his realizing that the accused persons were in possession of charas. He also did not forward a copy of the ground to his superior officer, as required by Section 42(2) of the Act because he had not made any record under the proviso to Section 42(1). He also did not adhere to the provisions of Section 50 of the Act in that he did not inform the person to be searched if he would like to be taken to a Gazetted Officer or a Magistrate; a requirement which has been held to be mandatory. In Balbir Singh's case, it has been further stated that the provisions of Sections 52 and 57 of the Act, which deal with the steps to be taken by the officer after making arrest or seizure are mandatory in character. In that view of the matter, the learned counsel for the State was not able to show for want of material on record, that the mandatory requirements pointed out above had been adhered to. The accused is, therefore, entitled to be acquitted. 24. The learned Counsel for the appellant relied on Judgment in U.O.I. Vs. Bal Mukund & Ors, reported at 2009 ALL MR (Cri) 1570 (S.C.), where the Supreme Court was considering an appeal against acquittal. In relation to requirements of Section 42 of the NDPS Act the Court observed: 18. Section 42 of the Act mandates compliance of the requirements contained therein, viz., if the officer has reason to believe from personal knowledge or information given by any person which should be taken down in writing that any drug or psychotropic substance or controlled substance in respect of which an offence punishable under the Act has been committed, he is empowered to exercise his power enumerated in clauses (a) and (b) of Section 42(1) of the Act between sunrise and sunset. Subject to just exceptions, thus, taking down the information in writing is, therefore, very necessary to be complied with. The proviso appended to Section 42(1) of the Act reads as under: Provided that if such officer has reason to believe that a search warrant or authorization cannot be obtained without affording opportunity for the concealment of evidence or facility for the escape of an offender, he may enter and search such building, conveyance or enclosed place at any time between sunset and sunrise after recording the grounds of his belief. Sub-section (2) of Section 42 of the Act provides that such an information reduced in writing should be communicated to his immediate superior officers within seventy two hours. 25. The learned Counsel for the appellants submitted that in view of these decisions the raid must be held to have been conducted in disregard of procedure prescribed under Section 42 of the NDPS Act and therefore, the entire prosecution must be held to have been vitiated. 26. The learned Special Public Prosecutor submitted that as per Almanac, the Sunset on that day was at 6:43 p.m. and therefore, the search had begun before the Sunset. She further submitted that the raiding party had no reason to believe that the raid would have to be conducted after the Sunset and therefore, there was no reason either to obtain a warrant or to record reasons for not doing so. Therefore, according to her, there was nothing wrong with the search conducted. 27. The learned Special Public Prosecutor rightly submitted that first the raid had not commenced after Sunset. It had commenced well before the Sunset at 6:10 p.m. though the proceedings went on till 23:30 hours. Therefore, the observations in the Judgments relied on by the learned Counsel for appellant were not at all attracted to the facts of the case at hand. Since the raid commenced well before the Sunset, there was no question of obtaining a warrant or recording reasons for not doing so. Further, unless it is shown that the alleged non-compliance caused any prejudice to the accused, such non-compliance would not vitiate the trial. Therefore, objections of the learned Counsel for the appellants on this ground have to be rejected. 28. Further, unless it is shown that the alleged non-compliance caused any prejudice to the accused, such non-compliance would not vitiate the trial. Therefore, objections of the learned Counsel for the appellants on this ground have to be rejected. 28. The learned Counsel for the appellants next submitted that independent witnesses have not been examined in this case and the learned Judge should not have relied on the testimonies of members of the raiding party alone to hold the appellant guilty. He submitted that in cases where consequences of person being found guilty are grave, it would be necessary to have the evidence of raiding officers duly corroborated by independent witnesses. For this purpose, the learned Counsel for the appellants placed reliance on the following Judgments. 29. In Shiv Kumar Ashok Mishra v. Special Judge of N.D.P.S. Court, Mapusa-Goa, reported at 1996 CRI.L.J. 1454 this Court was considering the question of the non-examination of one of the panch witnesses. The Court held:- It is not always possible to contend that the evidence of the police needs corroboration by an independent witness. But in a narcotic case where the search and seizure are the pivotal portions of the investigation, the statement of the official witness should have been corroborated at least by one independent witness. 30. In Shaikh Nazre Alam Zahoor & Anr. vs. The State of Maharashtra, reported at 2001 (11) LJ 47 this Court was considering the effect of non-examination of a panch witness. The Court held:- 23. It is important to note that the prosecution has omitted to examine two panchas who were independent witnesses, viz., Dattatraya Pramod Kashelar and Mahesh Dhirajilal Udhwadia, who were said to have been present when the pre-trap panchanama was prepared and during the entire trap and when the post-trap panchanama was prepared where the crucial fact, relates to possession of contraband goods such as heroin. I consider it a serious lapes on the part of the prosecution in failing to examine the panch witnesses who were in the first place, chosen by them. It appears that the prosecution has failed to do so and withheld independent evidence from the Court which, in my view, affect the veracity of the prosecution case. 31. I consider it a serious lapes on the part of the prosecution in failing to examine the panch witnesses who were in the first place, chosen by them. It appears that the prosecution has failed to do so and withheld independent evidence from the Court which, in my view, affect the veracity of the prosecution case. 31. The following observations of the Supreme Court in para 40 of Judgment in Noor Aga Versus State of Punjab and another, reported at 2008(3) RCR (Criminal) 643 : [2008 ALL SCR 2161] on the question of examination of independent witnesses, would also be relevant. Although examination of independent witnesses in all situations may not be imperative, if they were material, in terms of Section 114(e) of the Evidence Act, an adverse inference could be drawn. 32. The learned Special Public Prosecutor submitted that it is not that in this case, independent witnesses though available were not examined. The prosecution had examined PW-10 Varyambat Madhavan Jayprakash specifically to prove that the panch witnesses could not be served. There is no reason to disbelieve the evidence of this Varyambat Jayprakash. Therefore, according to her, if panchas were not at all available, there could be no question of their deliberate non-examination, or the prosecution failing as a consequences of non-examination of such witnesses. 33. In TAHIR Versus STATE (DELHI), reported at (1996) 3 Supreme Court Cases 338 on which the learned Special Public Prosecutor relied for this purpose the Supreme Court was considering the question of effect of non-examination of independent witness. The Court held:- 6. Mr. D.D. Thakur, the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellant, submitted that PW 4 to PW 7 or whose evidence the conviction has been recorded were all police officials and in the absence of any independent witness to corroborate them, it was not safety to rely upon their testimony to sustain the conviction of the appellant. We cannot agree. In our opinion no infirmity attaches to the testimony of police officials, merely because they belong to the police force and there is no rule of law or evidence which lays down that conviction cannot be recorded on the evidence of the police officials, if found reliable, unless corroborated by some independent evidence. We cannot agree. In our opinion no infirmity attaches to the testimony of police officials, merely because they belong to the police force and there is no rule of law or evidence which lays down that conviction cannot be recorded on the evidence of the police officials, if found reliable, unless corroborated by some independent evidence. The Rule of Prudence, however, only requires a more careful scrutiny of their evidence, since they can be said to be interested in the result of the case projected by them. Where the evidence of the police officials, after careful scrutiny, inspires confidence and is found to be trustworthy and reliable, it can form the basis of conviction and the absence of some independent witness of the locality to lend corroboration to their evidence, does not in any way affect the creditworthiness of the prosecution case. 34. In ANIL ALIAS ANDYA SADASHIV NANDOSKAR Versus STATE OF MAHARASHTRA, reported at (1996) 2 Supreme Court Cases 589, which was cited by the learned Special Public Prosecutor, the Court was considering effect of absence of independent witnesses and held as under:- 5. Indeed all the 5 prosecution witnesses who have been examined in support of search and seizure were members of raiding party. They are all police officials. There is, however, no rule of law that the evidence of police officials has to be discarded or that it suffers from some inherent infirmity. Prudence, however, requires that the evidence of the police officials, who are interested in the outcome of the result of the case, needs to be carefully scrutinized and independently appreciated. The police officials do not suffer from any disability to give evidence and the mere fact that they are police officials does not by itself give rise to any doubt about their creditworthiness..... The explanation given by the prosecution, for the non-examination of the two panch witnesses, which is supported by the report Ext.24 filed by PW 4 PI Gaikwad is satisfactory. The evidence on the record shows that the raiding party made sincere efforts to join with them two independent panchas at the time of search and seizure and they were so joined. They were also cited as prosecution witnesses and summoned to give evidence. The evidence on the record shows that the raiding party made sincere efforts to join with them two independent panchas at the time of search and seizure and they were so joined. They were also cited as prosecution witnesses and summoned to give evidence. However, despite diligent efforts made by the prosecuting agency to serve them, they could not be located or traced and therefore they could not be examined at the trial. In the face of the• facts stated in report Ext. 24, the correctness of which has remained virtually unchallenged during the cross-examination of PW 4, the non-examination of the two panchas cannot be said to be on account of any oblique reason. Their non-production at the trial thus has not created any dent in the prosecution case. The prosecution cannot be accused of withholding these witnesses since it made every effort to trace and produce them at the trial but failed on account of the fact that they had left the addresses furnished by them at the time of search and their whereabouts could not be traced despite diligent efforts made in that behalf. We, therefore, do not find any reason to doubt the correctness of the prosecution version relating to the apprehension of the appellant, the search and seizure by the raiding party and the recovery from the appellant of the country-made revolver and cartridges for which he could produce no licence or authority because of the non-examination of the panch witnesses. We find that, the evidence of PW 1 to PW 5 is reliable, cogent and trustworthy. 35. In the case at hand, since the prosecution had made a serious endeavour to serve the panchas but could not locate them, their non-examination in itself cannot be said to be fatal to the prosecution. Only evidence of raiding officers would have to carefully scrutinized. Therefore, the argument of the learned Counsel for the appellant based on such non-examination of prosecution witnesses would have to be rejected. 36. This takes me to the question of reliability of evidence of raiding officers, since their evidence is not supported by that of panchas. The learned Counsel for the appellant submitted that the evidence of officers, who participated in the raid is not worthy of belief. 36. This takes me to the question of reliability of evidence of raiding officers, since their evidence is not supported by that of panchas. The learned Counsel for the appellant submitted that the evidence of officers, who participated in the raid is not worthy of belief. The learned Counsel submitted that PW-2 raiding ot1icer, Vijay Bhatia had submitted that the bag containing contraband was taken out by PW-1 Namboodri whereas in the panchanama at Exhibit 10 which has been recorded on page 3 that the officers found that a Blue Red Nylon Zipper bag. Now, since, Namboodli was also an officer, it cannot be said that the recitals in panchanama, contradict the claim of Namboodri to have found the bag. First it has to be pointed out that the evidence of PW-1 Namboodri, the raiding officer, PW-2 Bhatia and PW-5 Intelligence officer, Sanjay Gokhale, who participated in the raid is cohesive and they substantially corroborate each other on the manner in which the raid was conducted. PW-9 Keith Sanchis, Assistant Commissioner of Customs and Central Excise was waiting at his office till the raiding party reported in the early hours of next morning. There is no reason to disbelieve the evidence of these witnesses only because all of them happen to belong to the NCB. Evidence of other members of raiding party is coherent in respect of the seizure. 37. The learned Counsel for the appellant next submitted that the prosecution evidence was extremely deficient to show that the flat in question was in possession of the appellants at the relevant time He submitted first that the appellant had nothing to do with the flat and secondly, the appellant had, in fact, being picked up when he was waiting outside his wife's School to pick her up. The claim that appellant was picked up when he was waiting in a car outside his wife's School stems from the fact that his wife's car was with NCB for some days after the raid. Though the explanation of the learned Special Public Prosecutor that NCB officers might have detained the car because they wanted to verify if it was purchased out of proceeds of illicit trade is plausible, the prosecution ought to have documented the detention of car to dispel such a defence. 38. The learned Counsel submitted that PW-3 Mrs. Though the explanation of the learned Special Public Prosecutor that NCB officers might have detained the car because they wanted to verify if it was purchased out of proceeds of illicit trade is plausible, the prosecution ought to have documented the detention of car to dispel such a defence. 38. The learned Counsel submitted that PW-3 Mrs. Pamela D'Souza, the land lady personally had no occasion to get in touch with the appellant. He submitted that the appellant was allegedly introduced to her by PW-6 Usha Morje, the Estate Agent. PW-3 Pamela had admitted in her cross-examination that she had not obtained any possession receipt from the appellant though, she stated that there was an Agreement, which had been executed by the appellant and which had been produced and proved at Exhibit 11A before the Trial Court. In cross examination she denied that the Agreement was executed on 20th November, 2002. According to her, the Agreement was signed on 15th November, 2002, but it seems that in para 9 of her deposition, she claimed to have signed the Agreement on 20th November, 2002. The learned Counsel for the appellant pointed out that in figures, monthly compensation is shown 1,300/- whereas in words, it is written One Thousand Three Only. The omission of word Hundred after Three is not significant and cannot reduce the value of this document. The evidence of PW-3 Pamela thus, clearly shows that the premises in question had been given on Leave and License basis to the appellant in November, 2002. 39. The evidence of PW-1 Rachita Morje, who was the Estate Agent is discrepant and she was not clear on the date on which the appellant was inducted in the flat. But confusion about date could also be on account of the fact that she did not remember the dates perfectly. There could be absolutely no question of the witnesses claiming to be in possession of the flat for four days prior to 1st March, 2003 as her statement itself was recorded on that day. Therefore, the defence cannot take advantage failure of PW-6 Rachita Morje to exactly state the date on which the appellant was inducted in the premises. She had identified the appellant as the person, who had been inducted in the premises. Therefore, the defence cannot take advantage failure of PW-6 Rachita Morje to exactly state the date on which the appellant was inducted in the premises. She had identified the appellant as the person, who had been inducted in the premises. Therefore, cumulative effect of evidence of PW-3 and PW-6 Estate Agent would be to show that the appellant was in possession of the premises at the relevant time. 40. The learned Counsel for the appellant submitted that even so, it cannot be said that the appellant was in conscious possession of the contraband. He placed reliance on Judgment of this Court in Antony Sauri Pilley v. State of Maharashtra, reported at 1993 CRI.L.J. 1502 on which the learned Counsel for the appellant relied. This Court was considering the question of conscious possession in the context of the following facts. 2. ....According to the Prosecution, P.S.I. Jagannath Salunkhe (P.W.3) received some information that the accused was dealing in Ganja and pursuant to this information, he and members of the raiding party went to the hut of the accused, which is in a Zopadpatti opposite an S.T. bus stand at Vithalwadi. They called out the accused, who is alleged to have emerged from the hut, and they offered search of themselves which he declined. Thereafter the hut was searched and it is alleged that a gunny bag was found under a cot, on examination of which four kilograms of Ganja were detected. A Panchanama was drawn after the contraband was weighed in an adjoining grocery shop. 3. ....There is a suggestion put forth by the defence that that gunny bag was in the possession of two other persons who ran away on seeing the Police Party and it was this bag that was subsequently recovered..... In this context, the Court observed as under:- 5. Shri Patil, the learned A.P.P., has made a very determined attempt to defend the conviction. Shri Patil relies on the fact that the accused was the sole occupant of the hut, that nothing has come on record to indicate that any other person was residing with him when he was found on the premises at the time of the raid. In these circumstances, it is Shri Patil's contention that the Court must accept the position that he is deemed to have been in exclusive possession of these premises and that the liability automatically fastens on him. In these circumstances, it is Shri Patil's contention that the Court must accept the position that he is deemed to have been in exclusive possession of these premises and that the liability automatically fastens on him. Unfortunately, the law cannot accept such short-circuiting. It is essential to establish, particularly in serious cases of the present type that the accused and he alone was the person from whose possession the contraband was recovered. His mere presence on the premises is not good enough. 41. The learned Special Public Prosecutor submitted that the appellant's presence in the flat where contraband was found would be sufficient to indicate that he was possessed of the contraband material. Unlike the facts in Antony Sauri Pilley none else is stated to have run away from the flat on seeing the raiding party. The learned Special Public Prosecutor placed reliance on two Judgments of the Supreme Court on the question of conscious possession. The Supreme Court held in Balbir Kaur Versus State of Punjab, 2009 AIR (SCW) 4875 as under:- Since the appellant was sitting on the two bags and her conduct on turning her face towards the village on seeing the police party and thereafter telling the police party on asking by the police that the said bags contained poppy husk clearly establishes that she was in conscious possession of the contraband goods. 42. In MADAN LAL AND ANOTHER Versus STATE OF H.P., reported at (2003) 7 Supreme Court Cases 465 : [2003 ALL MR (Cri) 2412 (S.C.)], on which the learned Special Public Prosecutor placed reliance, the Supreme Court was considering the meaning of expression possession and held as under:- 22. The expression possession is a polymorphous term which assumes different colours in different contexts. It may carry different meanings in contextually different backgrounds. It is impossible, as was observed in Supdt. & Remembrancer of Legal Affairs, W.B. v. Anil Kumar Bhunja to work out a completely logical and precise definition of possession uniformally applicable to all situations in the context of all statutes. 25. The word possession means the legal right to possession (see Helath v. Drown). It is impossible, as was observed in Supdt. & Remembrancer of Legal Affairs, W.B. v. Anil Kumar Bhunja to work out a completely logical and precise definition of possession uniformally applicable to all situations in the context of all statutes. 25. The word possession means the legal right to possession (see Helath v. Drown). In an interesting case it was observed that where a person keeps his firearm in his mother's flat which is safer than his own home, he must be considered to be in possession of the same (See Sullivan v. Eur' of Caithness.) Similar observations were made in Megh Singh Vs. State of Punjab, reported at 2003 Cri.L.J. 4329. 43. It may be seen that in MADAN LAL's [2003 ALL MR (Cri) 2412 (S.C.)] case the Court observed that when a person keeps fireanl1 in his mother's flat, he must be considered to be in possession of the same. Here, first, the information was specific that the appellant had received a consignment of narcotic drugs and he was to come to the flat in question at specific point of time for its disposal. This information had been duly recorded. Further, there is evidence to show that the flat in question had been given on leave and license basis by the landlady to the appellant. The deficiencies in evidence of Estate Agent Rachita Morje PW-6 about the date are not unnatural and could be ignored. She too identified the appellant as a person, who was inducted on leave and license basis in the flat. There is no evidence of any sort to show that anyone else was possessed of the flat. When the raiding party reached the place, it is the appellant who had opened the door of the flat and he was the only person in the flat and therefore, it cannot be said that the learned Trial Judge erred in concluding that the contraband was found to be in appellant's possession. 44. The learned Counsel for the appellant next submitted that the evidence in respect of taking samples and securely sending the samples to the laboratory was deficient and left a room of doubt as to whether the samples analyzed by the laboratory were, in fact, taken from material allegedly seized from the flat of the appellant. 44. The learned Counsel for the appellant next submitted that the evidence in respect of taking samples and securely sending the samples to the laboratory was deficient and left a room of doubt as to whether the samples analyzed by the laboratory were, in fact, taken from material allegedly seized from the flat of the appellant. PW-2 Vijay Bhatia had stated in para 2 of his deposition that he took out three samples of five grams each of brown coloured powder from large polythene bag. Then samples were kept in three envelopes separately and were closed shut with the NCB seal No.3. Before putting the sachet in the envelopes, the sachet was heat sealed. The learned Counsel pointed out that in the panchanama, there is a reference to three samples being taken, but there is no mention of heat sealing those samples. 45. The learned Counsel next submitted that in the panchanama page 4, it was mentioned that nylon zip was kept ill the cartoon which was closed and the label was affixed on the cartoon about its contents, and cartoon was further tied with jute string and sealed with NCB seal No.3. PW-2 Vijay Bhatia admitted in his cross examination in para 58 that there was no label on the cartoon when seen in the Court. Therefore, according to the learned Counsel, evidence of PW-2 was discrepant as regards taking of samples or dealing with the property. 46. As rightly pointed out by the learned Special Public Prosecutor, the question as to whether the cartoon containing Nylon zip bag had label or not may not be so significant, because absence of label at the time when cartoon was seen by the witnesses in the Court may be on account of variety of reasons. She submitted that so long as it is shown that the samples were properly drawn and sent to the Forensic Science Laboratory in a sealed condition, the defence can not be allowed to make a grievance. The samples were despatched to the Forensic Science Laboratory on 3rd March, 2003. PW-2 Vijay Bhatia had stated that the 1st and 2nd March were holidays being Saturday and Sunday and therefore, the sample was sent on the 3rd March to the Customs House Laboratory and on the 4th March to the Forensic Science Laboratory. The samples were despatched to the Forensic Science Laboratory on 3rd March, 2003. PW-2 Vijay Bhatia had stated that the 1st and 2nd March were holidays being Saturday and Sunday and therefore, the sample was sent on the 3rd March to the Customs House Laboratory and on the 4th March to the Forensic Science Laboratory. PW2 Vijay Bhatia had categorically stated that he had prepared forwarding letter on 3rd March, 2003 and sent it with PW-8 Narayan Jogi Panigrahi to the Forensic Science Laboratory. PW-4 Assistant Chemical Examiner Pradeep Kumar Bhatnagar had stated that he had received the samples on 3rd March, 2003 and had started analysis on 5th March, 2003. 47. The evidence of PW-4 Assistant Chemical Examiner Pradeep Kumar Bhatnagar shows that the sample examined was of Diacetyl Morphine (Heroin). The report of PW-4 Bhatnagar is at Exhibit 24. The report from the Forensic Science Laboratory at Exhibit 27 also shows that the analysis showed the sample to be of Heroin along with other Opium Alkaloids. The Forensic Science Laboratory report at Exhibit 28 shows that the percentage of Heroin in the sample was 35%. This explains absence of adulterants in the premises at the time of reach. 48. The learned Counsel for the appellant submitted that the sample analyzed by PW-4 Bhatnagar was not 5 grams but 4.91 grams. This really does not matter, since the quantity was adequate for carrying out the analysis. 49. The learned Counsel for the appellant submitted that PW-2 Vijay Bhatia had carried out the raid. He had drawn samples. Therefore, from that point onwards the investigation should have been conducted by some other officer and property should have been lodged with some other officer so that there was separation between officer conducting raid and officer conducting investigation. 49. The learned Counsel for the appellant submitted that PW-2 Vijay Bhatia had carried out the raid. He had drawn samples. Therefore, from that point onwards the investigation should have been conducted by some other officer and property should have been lodged with some other officer so that there was separation between officer conducting raid and officer conducting investigation. For this purpose, the learned Counsel for the appellant relied on Judgment of this Court in Dinesh Palyekar v. State of Goa, reported at 2007 CRI.L.J. 106 where this Court observed:- In the first case of K.A. Kova v. A.S. Menon (2002 Cri LJ 4502), this Court referred to Section 50 of the Act and observed that the intention behind making a provision that the sample to be sent for examination and the remaining packets should be handed over to the custody of the Officer-in-charge of the nearest Police Station by the members of the raiding party is that there should be a separation between the members of the raiding party and such an officer and the purpose of ensuring such separateness is for the purpose of avoiding the possibility of tampering with the samples and other packets by partisan person who happen to be members of the raiding party. The Court further observed that: The good purpose, the safeguards created, assurance rendered gets frustrated by allowing such an officer to have the seals in his possession or custody, which were used by the members of the raiding party by effecting the raid, search and panchanama. The learned Judge then referred to his Judgment in the case of Gopal Bahadur v. State of Goa (2005 Drugs Cases (Narcotics) 449), where the learned Judge had observed as under:- 12. The Cout1s have always frowned upon with the practice of Police Officers keeping the custody of the seals as well as of the seized articles for long in the hands of the same Officer. In other words, a person who has the custody of the seized articles and the seal used to seal the same, should not continue to have both for long because such practices can lead to tampering with the seized article. The Act has taken special care that in normal course after the seizure, the seized drug should be handed over in the custody of the Officer in charge of the nearest Police Station. The Act has taken special care that in normal course after the seizure, the seized drug should be handed over in the custody of the Officer in charge of the nearest Police Station. No such provision is made in case of seal. In this case PW.5/P.I. Paes has acted exactly opposite. He claims he kept the seized article with himself and the seal, he gave to PW.6/D'souza. When the sentence provided is severe, the procedures followed should be beyond suspicion and above board. The Officer having the custody of the seized article and the custody of the seals, should not be the same. 50. In Noor Aga Versus State of Punjab and another, reported at 2008 (3) RCR (Criminal) 643: [2008 ALL SCR 2161] the Supreme Court considered the lapses in sealing and sending the property and held: 39. The seal was not even deposited in the malkhana. As no explanation whatsoever has been offered in this behalf, it is difficult to hold that sanctity of the recovery was ensured. Even the malkhana register was not produced. There exist discrepancies also in regard to the time of recovery. The recovery memo Exhibit PB shows that the time of seizure was 11.20 pm. PW1, Kulwan Singh and PW2, K.K. Gupta, however, stated that the time of seizure was 8.30 pm. Appellant's defence was that some carton left by some passenger was passed upon him being a crew member in this regard assumes importance (See Jitendra (supra) Para 6). The Court then quoted from Baldev Singh (2004) 10 SCC 562 : (1999) 3 SCC 977 as under:- 28. This Court cannot overlook the context in which the NDPS Act operates and particularly the factor of widespread illiteracy among persons subject to investigation for drug offences. It must be borne in mind that severe the punishment, greater has to be the care taken to see that all the safeguards provided in a statute are scrupulously followed. 51. On the question of samples remaining with raiding officer and delay in sending them to Forensic Science Laboratory, the learned Counsel relied on the Judgment of this Court in Mohd. Hussain Babamiyan Ramzan v. State of Maharashtra, reported at 1994 CRI.L.J. 1020, observed as under:- 9. .... 51. On the question of samples remaining with raiding officer and delay in sending them to Forensic Science Laboratory, the learned Counsel relied on the Judgment of this Court in Mohd. Hussain Babamiyan Ramzan v. State of Maharashtra, reported at 1994 CRI.L.J. 1020, observed as under:- 9. .... Therefore, it is at least clear that from 31-7-1990 till 3-8-1990, i.e. till they reached Chemical Analyzer's office, they remained with P.I. Ghuge, without being noted down anywhere in the office of M.I.D.C. Unit.... At any rate, it is clear that the samples remained with P.I.Ghuge, even according to his own evidence, between the period of 31-7-1990 to 3-8-1990 without being noted down anywhere in the records that they were with him.... We, by no chance, want to say that P.I.Ghuge had tampered with the said samples, but possibility of the said samples being tampered with in this period is not excluded by the prosecution by leading satisfactory evidence and that by itself is sufficient to discard the certificate of the Chemical Analyzer certifying that the said samples which were examined by him contained heroin. The prosecution, therefore, has failed to establish, by good and reliable evidence, that the samples which were taken out from the material which was seized from the two accused contained heroin. 52. The learned Counsel for appellant also relied on Judgment in State of Rajasthan, v. Gurmail Singh, reported at 2005 CRI.L.J. 1746, where the Supreme Court held as under:- In the first instance, though the seized articles are said to have been kept in the malkhana on 20th May, 1995, the Malkhana register was not produced to prove that it was so kept in the malkhana till it was taken over by PW-6 on June 5, 1995. We further find that no sample of the seal was sent along with the sample to Excise Laboratory, Jodhpur for the purpose of comparing with the seal appearing on the sample bottles. Therefore, there is no evidence to prove satisfactorily that the seals found were in fact the same seals as were put on the sample bottles immediately after seizure of the contraband. These loopholes in the prosecution case have led the High Court to acquit the respondent. Such are not the facts of present case and hence this Judgment is of no help to appellant. 53. These loopholes in the prosecution case have led the High Court to acquit the respondent. Such are not the facts of present case and hence this Judgment is of no help to appellant. 53. The learned Special Public Prosecutor submitted first that though it would have been ideal to have investigation handled by an officer other than one in the raiding party, in this case, PW-2 Vijay Bhatia had merely sent the sample to the Forensic Science Laboratory on 3rd March, since the 1st and 2nd March, 2003 were holidays. She submitted that there is nothing to show that PW-2 Vijay Bhatia had tampered with samples. She pointed out that there was no suggestion to this effect to PW-2 Bhatia. She placed reliance on the observations in the Judgment in Balbir Kaur Versus State of Punjab, reported at 2009 DGLS (Soft.) 878 : 2009 AIR (SCW) 4875 : 2009(9) JT 628 , in support of her contention that delay in sending samples was not fatal. The Court held:- 13. As far as delay in sending the samples are concerned, we find the said contention untenable in law. Reference in this regard may be made to the decision of this Court in Hardip Singh case (supra), wherein there was a gap of 40 days between seizure and sending the sample to chemical examiner. Despite the said fact the Court held that in view of cogent evidence that opium was seized from the appellant and the seals put on the sample were intact till it was handed over to the chemical examiner, delay itself is not fatal to prosecution case. In the present appeal, the contraband goods were recovered from the possession of the appellant on 19.02.1998 and the same were sent to the chemical examiner for chemical examination on 23.02.1998, the aforesaid delay has no consequence for the fact that the recovery of the said sample from the possession of the appellant stands proved and established by cogent and reliable evidence led in the trial. Therefore, it cannot be said that there was any delay in sending the said sample for examination. 54. In BABUBHAI ODHAVJI PATEL AND OTHERS v. STATE OF GUJARAT, reported at (2005) 8 Supreme Court Cases 725 : [2006 ALL MR (Cri) 598 (S.C.)], on which the learned Special Public Prosecutor relied, while considering the objections to custody of articles seized the Court held:- 8. 54. In BABUBHAI ODHAVJI PATEL AND OTHERS v. STATE OF GUJARAT, reported at (2005) 8 Supreme Court Cases 725 : [2006 ALL MR (Cri) 598 (S.C.)], on which the learned Special Public Prosecutor relied, while considering the objections to custody of articles seized the Court held:- 8. The learned counsel further contended that the seized articles were not kept in proper custody and that there was violation of Sections 52, 55 and 57 of the NDPS Act. He placed reliance on Valsala v. State of Kerala. We do not think that there is much force in this contention. This Court in Gurbax Singh v. State of Haryana held that these provisions are not mandatory and they are only directory. In the present case, we do not find any serious violation of these provisions. The prosecution adduced evidence to prove that these provisions have been substantially complied with and the Sessions Judge discussed these matters in detail and accepted the prosecution case. 55. In State of Orissa v. Sitansu Sekhar Kanungo, reported at JT 2002(8) SC 292, the Supreme Court was considering an appeal against acquittal by the High Court which had placed strong reliance on the defence submission of non-production of the malkhana register. In para 4 the Court held as under:- 4. The learned advocate appearing in support of the appeal, however rather confidently stated that since the provisions of section 57 of the Act are now settled to be only directory and not mandatory in nature, the question of non-production of the malkhana register though vital, but the success of a case does not and cannot depend upon it. It may be a mere irregularity but cannot go to the root of the prosecution which makes the prosecution vulnerable. At the first blush, the arguments seems to be rather convincing but on a closure (sic closer) scrutiny, however, it lost its efficacy by reason of the fact of there being no factual support therefor. The High Court has dealt with the matter purely on the factual score and concluded adversely by reason of non-production of malkhana register coupled with other set of facts, as argued before the High Court. The doubt which sprang up as regards the seizure lists, admittedly cannot be brushed aside. (emphasis supplied) It is not that non-production of malkhana register in itself which led to acquittal of accused. The doubt which sprang up as regards the seizure lists, admittedly cannot be brushed aside. (emphasis supplied) It is not that non-production of malkhana register in itself which led to acquittal of accused. It was coupled with other set of facts. And the observations came in the context of examination of a Judgment of acquittal where standard of scrutiny is different. 56. After considering these Judgments, and particularly, in view of the fact that the evidence of PW-2 Bhatia about sending the samples to the laboratory has not been shaken, the learned Special Public Prosecutor rightly submitted that the samples must be held to have been received by the laboratory without being tampered and therefore, reports by the laboratories in respect of contents of samples must be held to prove that contra band article seized was heroin or diacetyl morphine. 57. PW-7 Bhushan Mulay, who was working with the NCB had produced the articles before the Special Metropolitan Magistrate for having an inventory conducted. The Special Metropolitan Magistrate had duly certified inventory and the cross examination of this witness does not show anything to warrant about doubts about the inventory conducted. 58. The learned Counsel for the appellant next submitted that the learned Trial Judge should not have relied on the confessional statement of the appellant recorded under Section 67 of the NDPS Act. This statement recorded by PW-2 Vijay Bhatia is at Exhibit 18. ft bears an endorsement in the handwriting of Uday Kumar to the effect that he read the statement and it was correctly recorded as per his say, that it was true and correct and given by him voluntarily, that it was without any threat or fear. The statement itself has been type written on a Computer. PW-2 Vijay Bhatia stated that the appellant was asked questions in Hindi. He replied those questions in Hindi and answers were typed in narrative in English on Computer by a Data Entry Operator. He stated that the appellant Uday Kumar was given a copy, which was read by Uday Kumar himself in English. 59. The learned Counsel for the appellant submitted that PW-2 Vijay Bhatia had admitted that there was sufficient material with Bhatia to formally arrest the appellant before recording statement of appellant and that the appellant was actually in custody of Bhatia right from 6:30 p.m. on 28th February, 2003 till his statement was recorded. 59. The learned Counsel for the appellant submitted that PW-2 Vijay Bhatia had admitted that there was sufficient material with Bhatia to formally arrest the appellant before recording statement of appellant and that the appellant was actually in custody of Bhatia right from 6:30 p.m. on 28th February, 2003 till his statement was recorded. The witness had also stated that before recording the statement he had collected personal particulars of the accused. The witness had stated that he had written down these particulars for preparing statement on Computer. In the statement itself it is recorded that the accused could write in English correctly but not conveniently. Possibly what the officer meant was to convey was with ease. The witness admitted that the appellant consumed 25 minutes for writing five lines endorsement at the end of statement. According to the learned Counsel for the appellant, the evidence of PW-2 Vijay Bhatia would show that in fact, the statement was not made voluntarily by the appel1ant and PW-2 Vijay Bhatia had attributed to the appellant what the appellant did not wish to say. 60. In any case, the learned Counsel stated that the confession was retracted on 13th March, 2003 which was the first available opportunity for the appellant to retract it when produced before the Court, and therefore, confession could not have been used by the Trial Judge to reach the conclusions about guilt of the appellant. He submitted that confession could not form foundation of appellant's guilt. 61. For this purpose, the learned Counsel drew my attention to observations of the Supreme Court about relevance of confession of a person accused, in Union of India Vs. Balmukund, reported at 2009 ALL MR (Cri) 1570 (S.C.) where the Court quoted from State (NCT of Delhi) v. Navjot Sidhu, (2005) 11 SCC 600 : [2005 ALL MR (Cri) 2805 (S.C.)] in the following words: The legal position was then stated thus : (SCR p.530) Translating these observations into concrete terms they come to this. The proper way to approach a case of this kind is first, to marshal the evidence against the accused excluding the confession altogether from consideration and see whether, if it is believed, a conviction could safely be based on it. If it is capable of belief independently of the confession, then of course it is not necessary to call the confession in aid. If it is capable of belief independently of the confession, then of course it is not necessary to call the confession in aid. But cases may arise where the judge is not prepared to act on the other evidence as it stands even though, if believed, it would be sufficient to sustain a conviction. In such an event the judge may call in aid the confession and use it to lend assurance to the other evidence and thus fortify himself in believing what without the aid of the confession he would not be prepared to accept. 62. In Raju Premji & Another Versus Customs NER Shillong Unit & Another, reported at CDT 2009 SC 1018 on which reliance was placed by the learned Counsel for the appellant, the Court noted the facts as under:- 6. Appellants herein were in the custody of the police officers since evening of 19th August, 2003. Their custody was handed over to the customs officers. It is now borne out from the record that whereas all the accused made two statements each on 20th August, 2003 purported to be under Section 67 of the Act. So far as accused No.4 is concerned the statements made by him were marked as Exts. 17 and 18 whereas those of the accused No.3 are concerned, they were marked as Exts. 13 and 14. A formal first information report was lodged only in the afternoon of 20th August, 2003. All the accused persons were formally arrested at 4.30 p.m. They were subjected to further interrogation and both the appellants made a third statement on 21st August, 2003 which were marked as Exts. 19 and 15 respectively. They were produced before the Magistrate on the same day. Whereas accused No.4 retracted from his confession on 4th November, 2003, other accused including accused No.3 retracted therefrom while making their statements under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The Court then held:- 26. The confession was retracted by accused No.4 only after a few days. The learned Special Judge has taken into consideration the fact of such retraction. Taking into consideration the facts and circumstances of the case, we are of the firm opinion that confession cannot be said to have been made by the appellants voluntarily. 63. The Court then held:- 26. The confession was retracted by accused No.4 only after a few days. The learned Special Judge has taken into consideration the fact of such retraction. Taking into consideration the facts and circumstances of the case, we are of the firm opinion that confession cannot be said to have been made by the appellants voluntarily. 63. In M. PRABHULAL Versus ASSISTANT DIRECTOR, DIRECTORATE OF REVENUE INTELLIGENCE, reported at (2003) 8 Supreme Court Cases 449, the Supreme Court was considering the value of a statement of accused recorded under Section 67 of the Act. The Court held:- 3. The conviction of the appellants is based primarily on their statements recorded under Section 67 of the NDPS Act as also on the recovery except from Accused 1/Appellant 1. 4. ....There was, under the circumstances no delay in recording the statements of the appellants. Further, it is also to be borne in mind that the appellants did not make any complaint before the Magistrate before whom they were produced complaining of any torture or harassment. It is only when their statements were recorded by the trial Judge under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure that a vague stand about the torture was taken. Under these circumstances, the confessional statements cannot be held to be involuntary. The statements were voluntarily made and can, thus, be made the basis of the appellants' conviction. Such is not the present case. Retraction was made on the first opportunity. 64. The learned Counsel for the appellant relied on a Judgment in Noor Aga Versus State of Punjab and another, reported at 2008(3) RCR (Criminal) 643 : [2008 ALL SCR 2161]. On the question about a retracted confession in para 23 and 24 the Court held as under:- 23. It is also to be noticed that the Sea Customs Act itself refers to police officer in contradistinction to the Customs Officer. Section 180 empowers a police officer to seize articles liable to confiscation under the Act, on suspicion that they had been stolen. Section 184 provides that the officer adjudging confiscation will take and hold possession of the thing confiscated and every officer of police, on request of such officer, shall assist him in taking, and holding such possession. This leaves no room for doubt that a Customs Officer is not an officer of the Police._ 24. Section 184 provides that the officer adjudging confiscation will take and hold possession of the thing confiscated and every officer of police, on request of such officer, shall assist him in taking, and holding such possession. This leaves no room for doubt that a Customs Officer is not an officer of the Police._ 24. It was pointed out that the power of a Police Officer as crime detection and custom officer as authorities invested with a power to check the smuggling of goods and to impose penalty for loss of revenue being different, they were not Police Officers but then the court took notice of the general image of police in absence of legislative power to enforce other law enforcing agencies for the said purpose in the following terms: It may also be of some interest to note the decision of this Court in State of Puniab v. Barkat Ram ( AIR 1962 SC 276 ), holding: 17. There has, however, arisen a divergence of opinion about officers on whom some powers analogous to those of police officers have been conferred being police officers for the purpose of S. 25 of the Evidence Act. The view which favours their being held police officers, is based on their possession powers which are usually possessed by the police and on the supposed intention of the legislature at the time of the enactment of S. 25 of the Evidence Act to be that the expression 'police officer, should include everyone who is engaged in the work of detecting and preventing crime. The other view is based on the plain meaning of the expression and on the consideration that the mere fact that an officer who, by no stretch of imagination is a police officer, does not become one merely because certain officers similar to the powers of a police officer are conferred on him.' 65. The learned Counsel for the appellant submitted that even applying these decisions to the evidence of PW-2 Vijay Bhatia, it is clear that he had not taken the trouble to have statement corroborated in material particulars and therefore, the statement could not have been relied on. 66. The learned Counsel for the appellant submitted that even applying these decisions to the evidence of PW-2 Vijay Bhatia, it is clear that he had not taken the trouble to have statement corroborated in material particulars and therefore, the statement could not have been relied on. 66. On the other hand, the learned Special Public Prosecutor relied on the Judgments in Kanhaiyalal v. Union of India, reported at AIR 2008 SUPREME COURT 1044 : [2008 ALL SCR 359] where as regards the value of statement recorded under Section 67 of the Act the Court noted arguments advanced as under:- 22. Mr. Gambhir submitted that the High Court had erred in relying upon the appellants statement made under Section 67 of the NDPS Act, although, not only had the same been retracted immediately thereafter before the learned Magistrate, but the same was not admissible under the above-mentioned provisions of the Evidence Act. It was submitted that since apart from the above statement there was no other evidence, which linked the appellant with the alleged offence, the High Court should have maintained the judgment of the acquittal passed by the learned trial Court. The Supreme Court then noted the context in which the question arose in the following words:- 35. From the facts of the case and the submissions made on behalf of the respective parties the point which emerges for determination is up to what extent can a statement under Section 67 of the NDPS Act be relied upon for convicting a person accused of having committed an offence under the provisions of the said Act. In order to arrive at a decision in regard to the above, it will also have to be considered whether such a statement would attract the bar both of Sections 24 to 27 of the Indian Evidence Act as also Article 20(3) of the Constitution of India. The Court then held:- 37. The law involved in deciding this appeal has been considered by this Court from as far back as in 1963 in Pyare Lal Bhargava's case (supra). The Court then held:- 37. The law involved in deciding this appeal has been considered by this Court from as far back as in 1963 in Pyare Lal Bhargava's case (supra). The consistent view which has been taken with regard to confessions made under provisions of Section 67 of the NDPS Act and other criminal enactments, such as the Customs Act, 1962, has been that such statements may be treated as confessions for the purpose of Section 27 the Evidence Act, but with the caution that the Court should satisfy itself that such statements had been made voluntarily and at a time when the person making such statement had not been made an accused in connection with the alleged offence. In addition to the above, in the case of Rai Kumar Karwal v. Union of India and others (1990) 2 SCC 409 , this Court held that officers of the Department of Revenue Intelligence who have been vested with powers of an Officer-in-Charge of a police station under Section 53 of the NDPS Act, 1985, are not police officers within the meaning of Section 25 of the Evidence Act. Therefore, a confessional statement recorded by such officer in the course of investigation of a person accused of an offence under the Act is admissible in evidence against him. It was also held that power conferred on officers under the NDPS Act in relation to arrest, search and seizure were similar to powers vested on officers under the Customs Act. Nothing new has been submitted which can persuade us to take a different view. AIR 1963 SC 1094 38. Considering the provisions of Section 67 of the N.D.P.S. Act and the views expressed by this Court in Rai Kumar Karwals case (supra), AIR 1991 SC 45 @ page-SC 1052 with which we agree that an officer vested with the powers of an Officer-in-Charge of a Police Station under Section 53 of the above Act is not a Police Officer within the meaning of Section 25 of the Evidence Act, it is clear that a statement made under Section 67 of the N.D.P.S. Act is not the same as a statement made under Section 161 of the Code, unless made under threat or coercion. It is this vital difference, which allows a statement made under Section 67 of the N.D.P.S. Act to be used as a confession against the person making it and excludes it from the operation of Sections 24 to 27 of the Evidence Act. 39. There is nothing on record to suggest that the appellant was compelled under threat to make the statement after he had been placed under arrest which renders such statement inadmissible and not capable of being relied upon in order to convict him. On the other hand, there is the evidence of PW9 upon which the High Court has relied in convicting the appellant. It may once again be mentioned that no question in cross-examination had been put to PW9 in this regard and the version of the said witness must be accepted as corroborative of the statement made by the accused. 40. It may also be recalled that though an application was made for retracting the confession made by the appellant, neither was any order passed on the said application nor was the same proved during the trial so as to water down the evidentiary value of the said statement. On the other hand, in the absence of such evidence on record, the High Court had no option but to proceed on the basis of the confession as made by the appellant under Section 67 of the NDPS Act. Since it has been held by this Court that an officer for the purposes of Section 67 of the NDPS Act read with Section 42 thereof, is not a police officer, the bar under Sections 24 and 27 of the Evidence Act cannot be attracted and the statement made by a person directed to appear before the officer concerned may be relied upon as a confessional statement against such person. Since a conviction can be maintained solely on the basis of a confession made under Section 67 of the NDPS Act, we see no reason to interfere with the conclusion of the High Court convicting the appellant. 67. The learned Special Public Prosecutor submitted that the evidence of PW2 Vijay Bhatia would show that he had tried to trace up the contacts mentioned by the appellant in his confessional statement but some of them proved to be incorrect. 67. The learned Special Public Prosecutor submitted that the evidence of PW2 Vijay Bhatia would show that he had tried to trace up the contacts mentioned by the appellant in his confessional statement but some of them proved to be incorrect. She submitted that merely because the information given could not be verified as correct, it could not be said that the statement was liable to be discarded. Moreover, according to the learned Special Public Prosecutor, the conviction in this case is not based on the confession of the appellant. She submitted that there is sufficient evidence apart from the confession of the appellant to show that the appellant was found to be in possession of the contraband articles. According to her, the legal position as stated in Navjot Sidhu's case as quoted in Balmukund was that the trial Judge had to marshal the evidence against accused, excluding the confession altogether, and to see as to whether if it is believed a conviction could be safely based on it. If it was capable of belief independently of the confession, then it is not necessary to call the confession in aid. She submitted that confession only lends an assurance to the learned Judge and fortifies himself into believing what without the aid of the confession he would have not been prepared to accept. In this case, as rightly submitted by the learned Special Public Prosecutor even without the aid of confession, the complicity of the appellant stood established by the other evidence tendered. In view of this, it cannot be said that the Judgment impugned suffers from any infirmity on account of reference to the confessional statement. 68. To sum up, the learned trial Judge cannot be said to have erred in concluding that there was no case of non-compliance of Section 42 of the NDPS Act in conducting the raid. He cannot also be faulted for concluding that the appellant was in any conscious possession of contraband seized. There is nothing to show that the articles were tampered or the samples taken did not reach the laboratory in a liea1ed condition. The learned trial Judge also rightly appreciated the evidence of officers of NCB that panchas were not available and concluded about complicity of the appellant. There is nothing to show that the articles were tampered or the samples taken did not reach the laboratory in a liea1ed condition. The learned trial Judge also rightly appreciated the evidence of officers of NCB that panchas were not available and concluded about complicity of the appellant. Since the conviction is not based on the statement of appellant recorded under Section 67 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, its retraction did not really matter. 69. In view of this, conviction of the appellant cannot at all be faulted. As far as sentence is concerned, it is minimum prescribed under the law for the offence committed and hence, does not call for an interference. 70. Appeal is consequently dismissed. Appeal dismissed.