JUDGMENT Hon’ble A.P. Sahi, J.—Heard Sri U.S.M. Tripathi, learned counsel for the petitioners and Sri Pankaj, learned counsel holding brief of Sri H.S.N. Tripathi, Advocate for the contesting respondents No. 2 to 4 and the learned Standing Counsel. 2. The petitioners and the contesting respondents entered into a compromise in proceedings under Section 9A (2) of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953 before the Consolidation Officer on 30th July, 1974. The said compromise was presented, according to the petitioners, after the parties put their thumb impressions and were duly verified by their respective counsel. A certified copy of the compromise has been filed as Annexure 2 to the writ petition. 3. The application of compromise was moved and it has been indicated in the order of the Consolidation Officer that the compromise has been presented before him and which was accepted and accordingly an order was passed in terms of the said compromise. 4. The respondents appear to have moved an application on 7th August, 1974 before the Consolidation Officer that the said compromise was allegedly entered into on account of undue influence being exercised by some persons and that the Consolidation Officer/Presiding Officer was not present on the date when the said compromise is said to have been entered into. Since the petitioners wanted to usurp the property, therefore, the said application was moved alleging that fraud had been practiced and a prayer was made to recall the order of compromise. 5. The said application was contested by the parties and the Consolidation Officer recorded a finding that the compromise had been duly entered into by the parties after putting their thumb impressions and had been also verified by their respective counsel namely Sadhu Saran, Advocate and Suresh Chandra Verma, Advocate. The Consolidation Officer, vide order dated 21st August, 1974 rejected the restoration application moved by the respondents. 6. An appeal was preferred and in the memo of appeal a fresh ground was taken that the compromise was transcribed on a plain piece of paper on which signatures have been fraudulently obtained telling the respondents that the same was necessary for getting a spot inspection carried out. The denial of the compromise, therefore, took a different turn in the memo of appeal. The denial of the compromise, therefore, took a different turn in the memo of appeal. The appellate Court after having recorded findings came to the conclusion that no allegations have been made against both the learned counsel, who have verified the said compromise and, therefore, it cannot be believed that the compromise had not been entered into. The recall application was therefore moved as an after thought by the respondents, and the appeal was rejected. 7. A revision was preferred by the respondents where it was alleged that a forged compromise had been prepared and that both the learned counsel had not been authorized to enter into any such compromise. It was also alleged that Awadh Bihari Mishra and the learned counsel Sadhu Saran were real brothers and, therefore, all correct facts were not represented. This was a new third dimension that was set up in the memo of revision. The Deputy Director of Consolidation proceeded to hear the revision and came to the conclusion that since the revisionists are illiterate persons, it was probable that they were given to understand something else whereas the contents of the compromise application were something else. He further went on to hold that since Awadh Bihari Mishra, Advocate and Sadhu Sharan Mishra, Advocate were real brothers, therefore, it was quite possible that the counsel had not acted fairly. It was therefore not appropriate for the authority below to have cast way the allegations made by the revisionists. The Deputy Direction of Consolidation further recorded that it is just possible that fraud was played. It was further commented that the compromise appears to have been presented by the counsel and not the parties in person. Accordingly the orders of Consolidation Officers and Settlement Officer, Consolidation were set aside. 8. In the opinion of the Court, the entire order of the Deputy Director of Consolidation is based on surmises and conjectures. 9. One of the contentions that was raised by the respondents was that undue influence was exercised to make them sign the compromise application. There is no material nor any evidence was led by the respondents to prove as to how and in what manner the undue influence was exercised. This being the position on facts, there was no occasion for the Deputy Director of Consolidation to have carved out a new theory for upsetting the orders passed by the authorities below. 10. There is no material nor any evidence was led by the respondents to prove as to how and in what manner the undue influence was exercised. This being the position on facts, there was no occasion for the Deputy Director of Consolidation to have carved out a new theory for upsetting the orders passed by the authorities below. 10. The respondents further alleged that fraud had been practised on them. In the opinion of the Court, fraud cannot be inferred on mere allegations. It has to be established on facts or on the basis of proven facts. The connotation of fraud has been explained in the case of State of Andhra Pradesh and another v. T. Suryachandra Rao, (2005) 6 SCC 149 , paragraphs 4 to 14. Fraud therefore has to be proved. A mere allegation would not sufficient to establish fraud. This aspect has also been dealt with by the Apex Court in the case of Indian Bank v. Satyam Fibres (India) Pvt. Ltd., (1996) 5 SCC 550 , paragraphs 21 to 32. The said decision relies on a Privy Council decision in the case of Satish Chandra Chatterji v. Kumar Satish Kantha Roy, AIR 1923 PC 73 and the relevant paragraph for the said proposition as extracted in the Apex Court judgment is quoted below: “Charges of fraud and collusion like those contained in the plaint in this case must, no doubt, be proved by those who make them - proved by established facts or inferences legitimately drawn from those facts taken together as a whole. Suspicions and surmises and conjecture are not permissible substitutes for those facts or those inferences, but that by no means requires that every puzzling artifice or contrivance restored to by one accused of fraud must necessarily be completely unravelled and cleared up and made plain before a verdict can be properly found against him. If this were not so, many a clever and dextrous knave would escape.” 11. The Deputy Director of Consolidation has not recorded findings in conformity with the proposition of law indicated above. No ingredient of fraud has been established. 12. Apart from this, the Settlement Officer, Consolidation has clearly recorded that no allegation was made against the counsel at the stage of appeal. The Deputy Director of Consolidation has not recorded findings in conformity with the proposition of law indicated above. No ingredient of fraud has been established. 12. Apart from this, the Settlement Officer, Consolidation has clearly recorded that no allegation was made against the counsel at the stage of appeal. The Apex Court in the case of Byram Pestonji Gariwala v. Union Bank of India and others, (1992) 1 SCC 31 and this Court in the case of Khachchan Singh v. State of U.P., 2011 (3) ADJ 402 have held that the counsel represent their parties in a Court of law and they are authorized on behalf of their clients to enter into a compromise. A caveat was however put in that the counsel should take care to seek instructions in writing for entering into a compromise. In the instant case, there is a compromise in writing signed by the parties and the same has been verified by their counsel. The counsel were also present at the time of the compromise which factum could not be successfully assailed by the respondents. No attempt appears to have been made to produce an expert to counter the allegations. The Deputy Director of Consolidation therefore fell into an error in assuming facts otherwise that does not establish fraud. 13. The impugned order of the Deputy Director of Consolidation, therefore, having proceeded on mere surmises and conjectures cannot be sustained. A faint plea in paragraph 5 of the counter affidavit has been raised to the effect that the counsel were won over. This is not based any cogent material or any evidence nor was it the case before the Consolidation Officer when the restoration application was moved or even before the appellate forum. 14. The respondents, therefore, took different stands at different stages and, their case was clearly developed as an after thought. The Deputy Director of Consolidation, therefore, committed a manifest error by proceeding to reverse the order of the Consolidation Officer and the Settlement Officer, Consolidation. Accordingly the impugned order dated 15.5.1975 is quashed. 15. The writ petition is allowed. —————