JUDGMENT N.K. Balakrishnan, J. 1. Both appeals are filed by Smt.Shamila P. Iqbal, the 4th defendant in O.S.49/2000 who is the plaintiff in O.S.128/2000. O.S.49/2000 was filed by the first respondent Anas P. Iqbal who is the eldest son of Mohammed Iqbal for a declaration that Ext.B25 Will executed by his father P.A. Mohammed Iqbal is vitiated by fraud, undue influence and coercion and also for partition of the properties left behind by his father who died on 7.9.99. 2nd respondent, Hajira Beevi who is the first defendant in O.S.49/00, is the wife of Mohammed Iqbal. Respondents 3 and 4(D2 and D3 in O.S.49/00) are the other two sons of late Mohammed Iqbal. 2. O.S.49/00 was dismissed by the learned Subordinate Judge holding that Ext.B25 Will is true and genuine and that all the legal heirs have accepted and acted upon that Will. The plea raised by the appellant that she was the naturally born daughter of Mohammed Iqbal and Hajira Beevi was turned down. Based on the judgment in O.S.49/00 the suit O.S.128/'00, subsequently filed by the appellant, was also dismissed. 3. The plaintiff in O.S.49/00 did not file any appeal. 4. Since the issues involved in both these appeals are similar, we have heard both the appeals together. 5. The parties are referred to as they are arrayed in RFA 174/'07. Respondents 5 to 21 are not contesting respondents. Hence, hereinafter, for the sake of convenience, contesting respondents are referred to as 'respondents'. 6. Shorn of the details the case of the appellant is stated thus. The appellant, R1, R3 and R4 are the children of Mohammed Iqbal and Hajira Beevi. The appellant married one Mohammed Sali. Respondents 2 to 4 were not happy with that marriage. In order to deprive the appellant of her due share in the property left behind by Mohammed Iqbal a Will was created by the respondents. That Will was got executed under coercion and undue influence. It is against the provisions of the Mohammedan Law. The appellant is not an adopted daughter as contended by the respondents. She is the naturally born daughter of late Mohammed Iqbal and Smt.Hajira Beevi and so on the death of Mohammed Iqbal his property devolved upon the appellant and respondents 1 to 4. The marriage of the appellant with Mohammed Sali was solemnized with the blessings of Mohammed Iqbal. The appellant is not an adopted daughter as contended by the respondents. She is the naturally born daughter of late Mohammed Iqbal and Smt.Hajira Beevi and so on the death of Mohammed Iqbal his property devolved upon the appellant and respondents 1 to 4. The marriage of the appellant with Mohammed Sali was solemnized with the blessings of Mohammed Iqbal. Since the Will was not executed with the consent and knowledge of all the legal heirs it is invalid and inoperative. 7. The appellant was known all through and brought up as daughter of Mohammed Iqbal and it was so recorded in all the records. It was so mentioned in the school records and in other records. Even assuming that the appellant is not the naturally born daughter of Mohammed Iqbal through Hajira Beevi since she was acknowledged by Mohammed Iqbal as his daughter, under Mohammedan Law, she is entitled to the share in the suit properties. 8. Respondents contended that the appellant was not the naturally born daughter of Mohammed Iqbal and Hajira Beevi. She was born on 19.5.1978 at Lissie Hospital, Ernakulam to one Safia and she was abandoned by her mother. Kochamina Umma, the mother of Mohammed Iqbal, obtained the abandoned child and brought her to the family house of Mohammed Iqbal. The contention that the Will is vitiated by fraud, undue influence etc. is denied. The Will was accepted and acted upon by all the legal heirs of deceased Mohammed Iqbal. 9. O.S.49/2000 was first taken up for trial. Evidence was adduced by the parties in that suit. The plaintiff, Anas Iqbal, was examined as PW1 and Exts.A1 to A12 and B1 to B29 were marked. DWs. 1 to 8 were examined and Ext.X1 series to Ext.X2 and Ext.X3 series were marked. 10. The Court below held that the appellant is not the naturally born daughter or acknowledged daughter of Mohammed Iqbal and Hajira Beevi. It was further found that the Will in question is genuine and valid and was acted upon by all the legal heirs. Thus the plea raised by the appellant in both suits was turned down by the trial Court. The appellant assails those findings. 11. Sri.K.C.Charles, learned counsel for the appellant and Sri.Dinesh R. Shenoy, learned counsel for the contesting respondents have been heard. 12. The following points arise for consideration. Thus the plea raised by the appellant in both suits was turned down by the trial Court. The appellant assails those findings. 11. Sri.K.C.Charles, learned counsel for the appellant and Sri.Dinesh R. Shenoy, learned counsel for the contesting respondents have been heard. 12. The following points arise for consideration. (i) Whether the appellant is the naturally born daughter of Mohammed Iqbal and Hajira Beevi; (ii) Whether the appellant was acknowledged by late Mohammed Iqbal as his daughter? (iii) Whether Ext.B25 Will is true and valid? Points 1 and 2: 13. Learned counsel for the appellant would submit that Exts.B2 to B4, B14, B15 and B24 would prove, that the appellant was shown by Mohammed Iqbal as his daughter. Ext.B2 is the application submitted by Mohammed Iqbal to admit the appellant to school. The appellant was shown therein as his daughter and not as his foster daughter as respondents now claim. According to the respondents as the appellant was brought up in the family of Mohammed Iqbal and since admittedly she was given love and affection just like other children of Mohammed Iqbal, in order to give her education she was admitted to School and it was only to see that the appellant was admitted to school, she was shown as the daughter of Mohammed Iqbal and Hajira Beevi. According to the respondents it does not mean that the appellant was the naturally born daughter of Mohammed Iqbal. Based on Ext.B2 application submitted by Mohammed Iqbal entries were made in the school register showing Mohammed Iqbal as the father of the appellant. Accordingly in the certificates issued, his name appeared as the father of the appellant. All the aforesaid documents were prepared based on the applications submitted by Mohammed Iqbal in which the appellant was shown as his daughter. The learned counsel for the appellant Sri.K.C.Charles would assert that as the appellant was shown by Mohammed Iqbal as his daughter and since the entries were made in the school register, the extracts received from the school had to be given due credence and that the binding effect of those documents cannot be taken away by the subsequent retraction or oral vibration of the family members. But on the other hand Sri.Dinesh R. Shenoy, learned counsel for the respondents, would submit that the circumstances under which Ext.B2 application had to be submitted to the school, were well explained by the respondents and so the acceptability of that version given by the respondents has to be appreciated and analysed in the particular factual back drop of the case. 14. It is submitted by the learned counsel for the appellant that though a specific case was put forwarded by the respondents that the appellant was born on 19.5.1978, the date of birth shown in Exts.B2 to B4 is 14-1-1979 and as such, according to the appellant, except stating that the appellant was born to Safiya and Kunju Mohammed on 19.5.1978 there is no acceptable evidence to substantiate that plea, 15. The appellant was examined as DW1. It is pointed out by Sri. Dinesh R. Shenoy, the learned counsel for the respondents, that even in the affidavit filed in lieu of chief examination it was not specifically stated by DW1 that she was born to Hajira Beevi through Mohammed Iqbal. Though at two places in the 'chief affidavit' Hajira Beevi was referred to as her mother, it was not stated by her that she was the naturally born daughter of Mohammed Iqbal and Hajira Beevi. On going through the evidence given by DW1 it is evident that she was harping on Exts.B2 to B4 and B14 to support her claim that she was acknowledged by Mohammed Iqbal as his daughter. 16. Ext.B2 is the S.S.L.C. Book which is relied upon by her to prove that Mr. Mohammed Iqbal was shown as her father and Hajira Beevi was shown as her mother. Her date of birth was shown therein as 14.1.1979. Ext.B2 is the birth certificate issued by Corporation of Cochi where also her date of birth was shown as 14.1.1979 and her father was shown as P.A. Mohammed Iqbal and her mother as Hajira. 17. Ext.B4 is the extract of the admission register where also similar entries were made. Learned counsel for the appellant would rely upon these documents and would submit that it would falsify the case advanced by the respondents that the appellant was born on 19.5.1978 at Lissie Hospital as the daughter of Smt.Safia and Kunju Mohammed. 17. Ext.B4 is the extract of the admission register where also similar entries were made. Learned counsel for the appellant would rely upon these documents and would submit that it would falsify the case advanced by the respondents that the appellant was born on 19.5.1978 at Lissie Hospital as the daughter of Smt.Safia and Kunju Mohammed. Learned counsel further submits that since Ext.B2 to B4 would clearly show that her date of birth was 14.1.1979 and since Mohammed Iqbal and Hajira Beevi were shown as the father and mother of the appellant, it has to be accepted that the appellant Shamila P. Iqbal was the naturally born daughter of Mohammed Iqbal and Hajira Beevi. 18. The first defendant, Hajira Beevi, was examined as DW2. It was sworn by her that the appellant is not the child given birth to by her. She says that in the marital tie between herself and Mohammed Iqbal three sons, the plaintiff and defendants 2 and 3 alone were born to her. Though a vague suggestion was put to her by the appellant to the effect that DW2 happened to deny the maternity as the appellant did not agree to marry Rias Mohammed (son of DW2's brother) it was denied by her. The assertion made by DW2 that the appellant was not given birth to by her could not be effectively challenged. It is also pointed out by the learned counsel for the respondents that the defence put forward by DW2 was a denial not only of paternity but also of maternity and it was the definite incontrovertible assertion made by DW2 that the appellant was not given birth to by her. Therefore, the mere suggestion that DW2 has chosen to deny maternity only because of the ill-will referred to above cannot be accepted for a moment. 19. It was stated by DW2 that her husband's mother Kochamina Umma had close acquaintance and association with and was a frequent visitor of Lissie Hospital situated just near to their house and when Kochamina Umma came to know that a female child was abandoned by a lady by name Safia who delivered the child on the night of 19.5.1978, Kochamina Umma went to the hospital on the next day morning and expressed her willingness to bring that child to their house. Accordingly the new born baby as mentioned above was given to Kochamina Umma. Accordingly the new born baby as mentioned above was given to Kochamina Umma. The evidence given by DW1 that Kochamina Umma was called as 'Lissie Umma' because of her close association and acquaintance with the Hospital and doctors working there was not seriously challenged by the appellant. The learned counsel for the respondents would submit that it was because of that close intimacy, acquaintance and relationship, the abandoned female child was given to Lissie Umma (Kochamina Umma) without complying with the legal formalities regarding the handing over of a child. 20. It was asserted by DW2 that Sr.Hyasintha of that hospital had told her that a female child was abandoned in the hospital in the manner stated above and that she was told by Sr.Hyasintha as to the necessity of bringing up that abandoned female child and it was as per the consent and permission of the hospital authorities and Sr.Hyasintha, the female child (who was later named as Shamila) was brought to her house. It was also stated by DW2 that her three sons were also told about the same. The fact that Mohammed Iqbal and Hajira Beevi were not having a female child was also a circumstance which persuaded Kochamina Umma to take that abandoned female child to their house. The Court below was rightly inclined to believe the case of the respondents that it was under those circumstances the abandoned female child was taken to their house from Lissie hospital. If that version is accepted, it has to be held that the appellant was born to Saffiya Kunju-Mohammed on 19.5.1978. The evidence would also show that the appellant being the female child was given maximum love and affection even more than that was given to their own children. 21. In order to prove that appellant was not born to her, DW2 was permitted to undergo DNA test. It is the admitted case that the blood group of the appellant is -negative, whereas the blood group of three sons of Hajira Beevi and Mohammed Iqbal is 'O'-positive. Ext.B23 is the blood group report dated 17.6.2003 issued from Doctor's Diagnostic Centre, M.G.Road, Ernakulam which shows that their blood group is 'O'-positive. It was stated by DW2 that the blood group of her husband Mohammed Iqbal was also 'O'-positive. Ext.B23 is the blood group report dated 17.6.2003 issued from Doctor's Diagnostic Centre, M.G.Road, Ernakulam which shows that their blood group is 'O'-positive. It was stated by DW2 that the blood group of her husband Mohammed Iqbal was also 'O'-positive. It was also pointed that in O.S. 128/2000, the suit filed by the appellant for partition, an application was filed by DW2 for getting the DNA test conducted so as to prove positively by scientific method that the appellant was not born to herself and Mohammed Iqbal. That petition was opposed by the appellant and hence the petition was dismissed by the trial court. That order was challenged before the High Court in C.R.P.2036/02. It was observed by this Court that if the trial court feels that DNA test is necessary after the entire trial is over then the petitioners could make any such request and then the Court below should consider that application and pass appropriate orders. It was contended that since the application for DNA test and the order on the C.R.P. referred to above were in the other suit, O.S.128/2000, that cannot be pressed into service in this suit. We cannot accede to that contention. The controversy in O.S.128/00 was also exactly the same; namely whether the appellant was the naturally born daughter of Mohammed Iqbal and Hajira Beevi. It is now contended by the appellant that even if she is not the naturally born daughter of Mohammed Iqbal she can bank upon the doctrine of acknowledgment. Even then it has to be proved that she was born to Mohammed Iqbal and Hajira Beevi. If that be so the appellant cannot turn round and contend that there was no necessity of having the DNA test conducted. The very fact that the appellant resisted the application for DNA test and even now declines to have that test conducted would unravel the fallacy of the plea raised by her, for, otherwise there is no reason why the appellant should feel shy of getting the DNA test conducted as it is the most accepted and recognized scientific test for proving the paternity. Since DW2 was getting old she thought of preserving her blood at the Centre for DNA Finger Printing and Diagnostic, Hyderabad for which she relied upon Ext.B22, the acknowledgment given to her from that Centre for having collected her blood sample for the purpose as aforesaid. Since DW2 was getting old she thought of preserving her blood at the Centre for DNA Finger Printing and Diagnostic, Hyderabad for which she relied upon Ext.B22, the acknowledgment given to her from that Centre for having collected her blood sample for the purpose as aforesaid. That shows the willingness of DW2 to have that test conducted. It was submitted by the learned counsel for the respondents that since the respondents were ready to meet the entire expenses for the same there was no reason for the appellant to oppose the same. Therefore, the reasonable inference to be drawn is that she has turned down that request evidently because she was not the daughter born to Mohammed Iqbal and Hajira Beevi. The learned counsel for the respondents points out that admittedly the appellant's blood group is 'O'-negative whereas that of Mohammed Iqbal and Hajira Beevi(DW2) and their three sons is 'O'-positive and as such that also will go a long way against the appellant. 22. A strange contention was advanced by the appellant that even if DNA test is conducted it will not disprove the fact that Mohammed Iqbal is not her father as the blood sample of the first defendant(Hajira Beevi) collected and stored at Hyderabad is not sufficient to disprove the paternity. In this case the learned counsel for the respondents would submit that the three sons of Mohammed Iqbal are alive and their blood samples are also available to be tested. The respondents were ready to bear the entire expense also. In order to wriggle out of the situation the appellant now advances a plea that even if Hajira Beevi is not her mother still she can sustain her plea that Mohammed Iqbal is her father. But her case was that she was the daughter of Mohammed Iqbal born to Hajira Beevi and not that she was the daughter of Mohammed Iqbal born through some other woman. Therefore, the learned counsel for the respondents would submit that the appellant cannot now turn round and contend that even if DNA test is conducted it will not be of any help to decide the question of paternity. At the risk of repetition it has to be stated that DW2 Hajira Beevi has asserted in emphatic terms that the appellant was not the child delivered by her. At the risk of repetition it has to be stated that DW2 Hajira Beevi has asserted in emphatic terms that the appellant was not the child delivered by her. When the first defendant, the alleged mother, herself asserts that she did not deliver this female child, and when there is no iota of evidence to show that the appellant was born to the first defendant, it can be held with certainty that the plea whereby the maternity was attempted to be fastened on the first defendant is nothing but a tissue of falsehood. 23. Learned counsel for the respondents would submit that it was to overcome that insurmountable difficulty the appellant later took a totally inconsistent plea by getting her written statement amended incorporating a plea to the effect that even if she is not the naturally born daughter of Sri. Mohammed Iqbal through DW2 she can still claim to be a legal heir of Mohammed Iqbal as there is sufficient evidence to show that Mohammed Iqbal had acknowledged her as his daughter. It was to support that plea she has relied upon Exts.B2 to B4, B14, B15 and B24. It was contended by respondents that since the birth of the child was not immediately registered, later when a birth certificate was felt necessary to be obtained to admit the child to school, a former Councilor Mr.T.A. Beerankunhu some how or other managed to get some particulars entered in the Register maintained by the Corporation and thus a birth certificate from the Corporation was obtained showing a convenient date and that was how the date of birth of the appellant was shown in the Corporation records as 14.1.1979 and thus based on the certificate issued by the Corporation, the date of birth of the child was shown in the school register also as 14.1.1979. Learned counsel for the respondents would submit that it is not unusual that parents used to give date of birth when child is to be admitted in the first standard, according to their convenience especially when certificate showing the date of birth was not available. Learned counsel for the respondents would submit that it is not unusual that parents used to give date of birth when child is to be admitted in the first standard, according to their convenience especially when certificate showing the date of birth was not available. Therefore, simply because the date of birth was shown in the school register and in the Corporation records as 14.1.1979 the Court cannot jump to the conclusion that the case of the respondents that Shamila P Iqbal was the child abandoned by her parents in the Lissie Hospital immediately after her delivery on 19.5.1978 is untrue. 24. The appellant has now produced before this Court the certified extract from the birth register maintained by the Corporation of Cochin to show that the entry in the said register also shows that her date of birth is 14.1.79. Nothing turns out by production of that extract since the facts and circumstances would show that the date of birth of that girl was given to the office of the Corporation as 14.1.79, for the purpose of getting the date of birth shown in the concerned Register and similarly the names of Mohammed Iqbal and Hajira Beevi, as her father and mother, were also entered in the register and thereafter its extract was taken to produce it before the School authorities for admitting Shamila P. Iqbal to school. It was the date of birth so entered therein which was shown in the certificate and it was based on that certificate Mohammed Iqbal and Hajira Beevi were shown as the father and mother of Shamila P. Iqbal in all the school records including Exts.B2 to B4 records. 25. Relying on the decision in State of Kerala v. Jose 1989 (1) KLT 296 it was argued by the learned counsel for the appellant that in the absence of proof to the contrary there can be a presumption that the entries in the school admission register are correct especially when the relevant entries in the Corporation records also would show that appellant Shamila P. Iqbal was described as the daughter of Mohammed Iqbal and Hajira Beevi. But when Hajira Beevi herself says that the appellant is not her daughter and when the definite case is that a certificate was obtained from the Corporation showing the names of Mohammed Iqbal and Hajira Beevi only for getting school admission for the appellant, the relevancy or probative force of Exts.B2 to B14 would pale into insignificance. Hajira Beevi is undoubtedly the most competent witness to say whether the appellant was given birth to by her. When she has stoutly denied it and when there is no other evidence the entries in the aforesaid documents are not sufficient to confer legitimacy on the appellant. 26. It has been argued at length by Mr.K.C. Charles, learned counsel appearing for the appellant, that I.A.6949/06 and 7370/06 were filed by the appellant before the Court below to call for certain documents and I.A.6950/06 was also filed by her to reopen the evidence. As per the applications mentioned earlier the request made by the appellant was to direct the Headmistress of St.Theresus L.P. School to produce the application for admission dated 21.5.1984 submitted by Sri. Mohammed Iqbal and also the declaration given by him regarding the date of birth of the appellant and also to produce the admission register maintained in that school for the year 1984. The purpose was to prove that in the application so submitted by Mohammed Iqbal he had described himself as the father and Hajira Beevi as the mother of the appellant and declared the date of birth of the appellant as 14.1.1979. The application was opposed by the respondents pointing out that those documents will not prove that the appellant was the naturally born daughter of Mohammed Iqbal and Hajira Beevi, for, according to the respondents the best evidence would be the register of births or other records available in the hospital which would show the actual date of delivery of the child, the name of the mother of the appellant as well as the actual time of birth. According to the respondents the best evidence that could be obtained is by conducting the DNA test which is the most acceptable scientific method. According to the respondents the best evidence that could be obtained is by conducting the DNA test which is the most acceptable scientific method. The respondents would submit that as Exts.B2 to B4 and B14 were already produced and the entries therein had been made based on the particulars furnished in the application for school admission and the birth certificate was produced along with that application there was no necessity to produce the records mentioned in that application. It was on that ground also the application was resisted by the respondents. The learned counsel for the appellant would submit that a, request was also made to summon the concerned City Rationing Officer to call for the particulars of ration card No.009366 of ARD No.26 of Ernakulam North. Learned counsel submits that though now it is not seriously disputed by the respondents that in the ration card of Mohammed Iqbal the appellant was shown as the daughter of Mohammed Iqbal and Hajira Beevi that was not so admitted by DW2 and that was why request to summon those documents was also made. Now it is not seriously disputed by the respondents that in the ration card mentioned above also the appellant's name was shown as the daughter of Mohammed P. Iqbal. The stand taken by the respondents before the Court below was that these documents will only show that the appellant was described as the daughter of Mohammed P. Iqbal and it will not prove that she was the naturally born daughter of Mohammed P. Iqbal and Hajira Beevi. 27. In C.R.P.2036/08 it was held that it is open to the trial court to direct the parties to go for DNA test if there is any doubt as to the parentage of the appellant or that she is the naturally born daughter of Mohammed Iqbal and Hajira Beevi. But she was disinclined to undergo DNA test but instead wanted to protract the suit by adopting different tactics. Pointing out these factors the Court below dismissed the application. It was also found by the Court below that the suit was filed in the year 2000 and sufficient time was given to all parties to produce documents and to examine their witnesses and that the applications mentioned above were filed when the suit was posted for final hearing after closing evidence. It was also found by the Court below that the suit was filed in the year 2000 and sufficient time was given to all parties to produce documents and to examine their witnesses and that the applications mentioned above were filed when the suit was posted for final hearing after closing evidence. Learned counsel for the appellant would submit that whatever may be the reasons stated by the Court below the fact remains that the ration card and the application submitted by Mohammed Iqbal for getting the appellant admitted to school etc. were prevented from being produced in Court. Now, request is made by the appellant to direct the 2nd respondent to produce ration card issued to Hajira Beevi for the period upto 1999. The ration card was not produced. As per I.A.518/11, the appellant has produced the certified copy of the application for renewing ration card issued to late Mohammed Iqbal. It was produced to prove that in the declaration given by Mohammed Iqbal, Shamila P. Iqbal was shown as one of the inmates of that house who was described as the daughter of Mohammed Iqbal. It is not disputed by the respondents that the appellant's name was shown as the daughter of Mohammed Iqbal in the ration card issued to the residential house of Mohammed Iqbal. Since there was a request to produce that document before the trial court and as that was not produced by the respondents the certified copy produced by the appellant before this Court is marked as Ext.B30. But nothing turns out of that document also since the point to be proved by the appellant is about her legal status. 28. As per I.A.1101/11 the appellant requests the court to receive another document also. It is stated to be a certified copy of the relevant page of the birth register. It shows that Mohammed Iqbal who was described as father of the appellant was the informant at whose instance entry was made in the register of birth and deaths maintained by the Corporation. There the date of birth of the girl was shown as 14.1.1979 and it was shown to have been registered on 15.1.1979. It shows that Mohammed Iqbal who was described as father of the appellant was the informant at whose instance entry was made in the register of birth and deaths maintained by the Corporation. There the date of birth of the girl was shown as 14.1.1979 and it was shown to have been registered on 15.1.1979. It is pointed out by the learned counsel for the respondents that while the entries pertaining to other children shown in column No.20 (which relates to type of admission of the child) it was shown as institutional, so far as the entry relating to the appellant the column was kept blank by putting a line across. Mohammed Iqbal and Hajira Beevi were residing in the house 'Thattanveedu' situated very near to Lissie Hospital. If as a matter of fact the appellant was the child delivered by Hajira Beevi then certainly the name of the hospital would have been mentioned' in column No.20 or at least it would have been shown in the column as "institutional". Conspicuous absence of such an entry in that column would speak volumes, learned counsel for the respondents submits. It is pointed out that in column No.21 names of the hospitals, where other children were born, were specifically mentioned but as regards the entry relating to the appellant it was only shown as 'Thattanveedu in Cochi-18". It was not the case of the appellant that Hajira Beevi delivered that child in the house-Thattanveedu. This according to the respondents would strengthen their case that the aforesaid female child was brought to 'Thattanveedu' from Lissie hospital. It was already said that the necessary application for registration was submitted to the Corporation by Mohammed Iqbal after years, for getting a birth certificate so as to admit that girl to school. However, the certified copy of the relevant page produced as per I.A.1101/01 has been marked as Ext.B31. The contention that since Mohammed Iqbal was shown as the name of the informant it should be held that Mohammed Iqbal was the natural/biological father of the appellant cannot be accepted in the particular facts and circumstances obtained in this case. 29. Respondents very much rely upon Ext.B21, the letter which was sent to DW7 (P.K.Saidhu Mohammed) who was then working as a Manager of the Federal Bank, Edava P.O., Varkala, Thiruvananthapuram. DW7 has testified before Court that Ext.B21 inland letter was given by him to DW2. 29. Respondents very much rely upon Ext.B21, the letter which was sent to DW7 (P.K.Saidhu Mohammed) who was then working as a Manager of the Federal Bank, Edava P.O., Varkala, Thiruvananthapuram. DW7 has testified before Court that Ext.B21 inland letter was given by him to DW2. That letter was dated 31.5.1978 and it was received at Edava P.O. on 1.6.1978 at 9.30 a.m. as could be seen from the postal seal affixed on it. It was sent by the father of DW7 narrating their family matters including the 'important event' which had taken place in Thattanveedu, which is admittedly the house name of Mohammed Iqbal. Among so many other matters it was written by the father of DW7 that the 'grand mother of Thattanveedu gave birth to a child', that the grand mother and the grand father got a female child from Lissie hospital and that the child was adopted. Relevant portion of the letter is extracted below. xxxxxxx 30. DW7 has stated that the aforesaid reference about the female child which was adopted from Lissie hospital was with reference to the appellant, Shamila P. Iqbal. The definite case of the respondents is that the appellant was born to Safia and Kunju Mohammed on 19.5.1978. Since this letter was so proximate in time and since the information conveyed to his son working at Edava is so clear, cogent and convincing the court can place absolute reliance on this document. Since a mistake was committed by DW7 while stating about the date of death of his father subsequently Ext.B27 was produced to prove that his father, B.Koyakutty, the sender of letter died only on 7.9.1978. Therefore, the contention advanced on behalf of the appellant that Ext.B21 was subsequently created is found to be denuded of any merit. Since this letter was sent on 31.5.1978 at an undisputed point of time and received at Edava Post Office on 1.6.1978, the genuineness, authenticity and relevancy of this letter cannot be questioned at all. This incontrovertible piece of evidence would strengthen the case of the respondents that the appellant was born at Lissie Hospital, she was abandoned by her mother, and from there she was taken to Thattanveedu, the house of Mohammed P. Iqbal and was brought up there as their foster daughter. The word used in the letter is that the child was 'adopted'. The word used in the letter is that the child was 'adopted'. The word 'adopted' used therein can be treated only as a layman's expression. That letter assumes relevance because the information as aforesaid conveyed under that letter was proximate in time. The fact established as per that letter is that a child was brought to 'Thattanveedu' from Lissie Hospital. 31. Now comes the admission made by the appellant herself in Ext.B19. Admittedly. Mohammed Iqbal and DW2 had decided to give the appellant in marriage to Mohammed Rias son of DW2's brother. It is also not in dispute that after the 'engagement ceremony' was over and when Mohammed Iqbal and others came back to their house to their utter dismay the appellant was missing from the house and later they realised that she had eloped with her lover Mohammed Saly. As Mohammed Iqbal and his family members decided to give the appellant in marriage to Mohammed Rias mentioned above, according to DW1, she was told by her college mates to write a letter to Mohammed Rias to dissuade him from the proposed marriage and it was only as instructed or advised by her friends she happened to write Ext.B19 letter dated 6.7.1995 to Mohammed Rias who was then working abroad. Admittedly it was written by her. In that letter it was written by her that Mohammed Iqbal and Hajira Beevi had suppressed the fact that she (the appellant) was not their daughter but she came to know when she was studying in 8th std. that she was a child abandoned at the hospital and from there, as Mohammed Iqbal and Hajira Beevi were not having a female child, they brought that child to their house and brought up as their daughter. It was specifically stated that she was given maximum love and affection by Mohammed Iqbal and Hajira Beevi who were described in her letter as Daddy and Mammy. The appellant wanted to convey that information to Mohammed Rias who was an engineer working abroad, drawing a fabulous amount as salary, so that he should withdraw and express his unwillingness to marry her. A reading of Ext.B19 letter would show that though Mohammed Iqbal and Hajira Beevi had treated her as their daughter and though she was given love and affection as a daughter she could later come to know that she was not their naturally born daughter. A reading of Ext.B19 letter would show that though Mohammed Iqbal and Hajira Beevi had treated her as their daughter and though she was given love and affection as a daughter she could later come to know that she was not their naturally born daughter. DW1 wanted to tell Riyas through this letter that DW2 wanted Mohammed Rias to marry the appellant since even if subsequently he comes to know of the fact that the appellant was not the daughter of Mohammed Iqbal and Hajira Beevi, Mohammed Rias being the son of Hajira Beevi's brother, can be prevailed upon and there would be no future complication or controversy in the matrimonial home. The appellant wanted to appraise Mohammed Riyas of the fact that she is not the daughter of Mohammed Iqbal and Hajira Beevi and that she was only an abandoned child and only the foster daughter of Mohammed Iqbal and Hajira Beevi. 32. When Ext.B19 was confronted to the appellant she tried to wriggle out stating that she happened to write so since she was so advised by her college-mates. Ext.B19 contains informations about so many matters relating to herself and the family members and relatives which could not have in the normal circumstances been written had it not been a usual letter written by her on her own accord. The explanation that it was written only as instructed or advised by her friends is too hard to be digested. On the other hand Ext.B19 would lend assurance to the case pleaded by the respondents that she(DW1) had written . so narrating the true facts as she wanted to have her marriage contracted with her lover Mohammed Saly. In the teeth of Ext.B19 and Ext.B21 it would be a futile exercise to contend that she was the naturally born daughter of Mohammed Iqbal and Hajira Beevi. That must precisely be the reason why she now tries to squirm out of the situation by banking upon the doctrine of acknowledgment. 33. The learned counsel for the respondents Sri.Dinesh R. Shenoy, at the very inception pointed out that the appellant cannot contend that she was the naturally born daughter of Mohammed Iqbal and Hajira Beevi and at the next breath argue that she was the acknowledged daughter of Mohammed Iqbal. 33. The learned counsel for the respondents Sri.Dinesh R. Shenoy, at the very inception pointed out that the appellant cannot contend that she was the naturally born daughter of Mohammed Iqbal and Hajira Beevi and at the next breath argue that she was the acknowledged daughter of Mohammed Iqbal. According to the learned counsel for the respondents, appellant should have given up the plea that she is the naturally born daughter of Mohammed Iqbal and Hajira Beevi. Be that as it may, the crucial question that now falls for consideration is whether banking upon the doctrine of acknowledgment the appellant can sustain her plea that she is the legal heir of deceased Mohammed Iqbal. Ext.B19 and Ext.B21 would unmistakably prove or probabilise the case that the appellant was the child abandoned by her mother at Lissie Hospital and was brought to the house of DW2 and was brought up as their foster daughter. That would demolish the case of acknowledgment of paternity. In order to appreciate the plea of acknowledgment of paternity the relevancy of Ext.B25 can also be adverted to. 34. Ext.B25 is the original Will dated 29.7.1999 executed by deceased Mohammed Iqbal. It was registered in the office of the sub registrar, Ernakulam. Mohammed Iqbal died on 7.9.1999. The appellant and the first respondent, who is the plaintiff in O.S:49/2000 and who was examined as PW1 in that suit, contended that the said Will is vitiated by undue influence and coercion and is thus not valid and binding on them. It was contended that the testator, Mohammed Iqbal, was forced to execute such a Will bequeathing his entire properties to the plaintiff and defendants 1 to 3 in the suit in such a way giving only a nominal share to the plaintiff. It was contended that it was also vitiated for the reason that the appellant who was the 4th defendant in the suit was totally disinherited. His plea was that the said Will was executed at the behest of defendants 1 to 3 in the suit and that in the normal course Mohammed Iqbal would not have executed such a Will. That contention was stoutly resisted by the respondents pointing out that admittedly Mohammed Iqbal was a well educated respectable person who was able to take a decision of his own. That contention was stoutly resisted by the respondents pointing out that admittedly Mohammed Iqbal was a well educated respectable person who was able to take a decision of his own. Admittedly he was a social and political worker and was also the President of Ernakulam District Congress Committee. Though Mohammed Iqbal was in the hospital for a few days, there is no evidence to show that he was mentally or physically incapacitated to take a decision of his own and to execute the documents. There is no evidence to show that the testator was non compos mentis so as to render the document unacceptable nor are there suspicious circumstances surrounding the execution of Ext.B25. At one stage the appellant who was examined as DW4 even went to the extent of saying that Ext.B25 does not bear the signature of Mohammed Iqbal. Though the proof of execution of the Will as required u/s 63 of the Indian Succession Act and S.68 of the Indian Evidence Act is not required in respect of a Mohammedan Will, so far as the execution and attestation of Ext.B25 is concerned, even the proof as required under the aforesaid provisions stood satisfied, learned counsel for the respondents submits. No evidence was adduced by the appellant and the first respondent to prove that Mohammed Iqbal was bedridden or was unable to take a decision of his own at the time of execution of B25. It is true that it was executed only about 40 days before his death. But that will not in any way affect the genuineness or validity of the Will. 35. To prove the execution of Ext.B25 the respondents mainly relied upon the evidence given by DW6 who was then an advocate practising in this Court. He was admittedly related to Mohammed Iqbal through his wife. It was sworn by him that he had acquaintance with Mohammed Iqbal and his family members since 1980 and that they were closely associated since 1986. It was further stated by DW6 that he was entrusted by Mohammed Iqbal to prepare a Will about 4 months prior to the date of execution. The fact that Mohammed Iqbal was a respectable person in the locality and was a member of the Wakf Board and an office bearer of the District Congress Committee and a social worker is discernible from the evidence given by DW6 as well. 36. The fact that Mohammed Iqbal was a respectable person in the locality and was a member of the Wakf Board and an office bearer of the District Congress Committee and a social worker is discernible from the evidence given by DW6 as well. 36. Learned counsel Sri.Dinesh R. Shenoy would submit that since the plaintiff in O.S.49/00 who is the first respondent in this appeal does not now dispute the genuineness and validity of Ext.B25, it is actually not necessary to probe deep into the plea as to the acceptability or otherwise of the contention regarding the validity of Ext.B25. It is pointed out that if only the appellant succeeds in proving that she is a legal heir of deceased Mohammed Iqbal she can question the genuineness of the Will and not otherwise. Whatever that be, it is better to have a re-appreciation of the evidence regarding the validity of Ext.B25 Will also, for, the declaration contained in Ext.B25 as to the relationship or status of the appellant(DW4) would also help the respondents to scuttle the plea raised by the appellant regarding her legal status projected in this suit. 37. DW6 has stated that it was as per the instructions given by deceased Mohammed Iqbal Ext.B25 was written by him. DW7, Sri.Sayed Mohammed is an attester to Ext.B25. He is the cousin(mother's sister's son) of Mohammed Iqbal. He had no axe to grind in the matter. He had no prejudice towards DW4 nor any predilection towards the respondents. The evidence would show that DW7 was having close association with Mohammed Iqbal. Therefore, it is contended that there was nothing unusual in his witnessing the execution of the Will. The evidence given by DW6 and DW7 that deceased Mohammed Iqbal, the testator, was healthy having sound and disposing. state of mind to take a decision of his own bequeathing his properties in favour of his wife and children in the manner set out in Ext.B25 could not be effectively controverted by the appellant or the first respondent. 38. Under the Mohammedan Law even a verbal declaration may be sufficient and no writing as such is required to make a valid Will. Here, in fact, there is sufficient evidence to hold that Ext.B25 stood the test of requirements contained in S.63 of the Indian Succession Act. 38. Under the Mohammedan Law even a verbal declaration may be sufficient and no writing as such is required to make a valid Will. Here, in fact, there is sufficient evidence to hold that Ext.B25 stood the test of requirements contained in S.63 of the Indian Succession Act. Though Mohammedan Law does not require attestation so far as Ext.B25 is concerned it was properly attested and evidence to that effect was given by DW6 and 7. In fact no serious argument was addressed before this Court questioning the execution or attestation of Ext.B25. 39. It was testified by DW7 that the testator Mohammed Iqbal signed the Will Ext.B25 in his presence and in the presence of the other attesting witness Thomas D. Silva and that the testator had seen Thomas D. Silva and DW7 attesting that document. The evidence given by DWs.6 and 7 is clear, cogent and convincing that the attester Mohammed Iqbal was in a sound and disposing state of mind and that the Will was prepared by DW6 as per the instructions and according to the will and volition of the testator Sri. Mohammed Iqbal. The credibility of DW6 was not challenged before us. Similarly, the evidence given by DW7 regarding the attestation of the Will was also not seriously assailed. So much so, Ext,B25 will is proved to be a true and genuine Will executed by deceased Mohammed Iqbal. 40. The validity of the Will was assailed by the plaintiff before the Court below contending that the Will is valid only to the extent of legal l/3rd of the assets of the testator. The bequest in excess of the legal l/3rd can be validated by the consent of the other heirs. If the appellant, Shamila P Iqbal is held to be not a legal heir then the objection regarding the validity of the Will could be only of the first respondent (the plaintiff before the Court below). The Court below has analysed the evidence given by DW.6 and other documentary evidence to hold that the plaintiff had admitted and accepted the rents from the tenants of the building situated in the properties set apart to the plaintiff as per the Will. That is not challenged by the plaintiff/first respondent and as such it is not necessary to probe further into that question. Suffice to say, Ext.B25 is proved to be a valid will. That is not challenged by the plaintiff/first respondent and as such it is not necessary to probe further into that question. Suffice to say, Ext.B25 is proved to be a valid will. The finding to that effect entered by the trial court is confirmed. 41. In Ext.B25 the appellant was described as the foster daughter of the testator. Learned counsel for the appellant would submit that if the appellant was acknowledged by Mohammed Iqbal as his legitimate daughter, and once acknowledgment stood established it can never be revoked so that the recital in Ext.B25 that the appellant is only a foster daughter of Mohammed Iqbal has no effect or consequence so as to disentitle the appellant from claiming, to be the legal heir of Mohammed Iqbal. The recital in Ext.B25 is admissible in evidence in the light of 5.32(5) and 32(6) of the Evidence Act. When the declaration is as to the status of the appellant which is in question, the declaration contained in and made by the testator in Ext.B25 to the effect that she is not his daughter but only a foster daughter would certainly gain momentum in the particular factual matrix. S.32 (6) of the Evidence Act reads, "32. Cases in which statement of relevant fact by person who is dead or cannot be found etc., is relevant- Statements, written or verbal, of relevant facts made by a person who is dead, or who cannot be found, or who has become incapable of giving evidence, or whose attendance cannot be procured without an amount of delay of expense which, under the circumstances of the case, appears to the Court unreasonable, are themselves relevant facts in the following cases:-(Sub-Sec. 1 to 5 omitted) (6) When the statement relates to the existence of any relationship (by blood, marriage or adoption) between persons deceased, and is made in any will or deed relating to the affairs of the family to which any such deceased person belonged, or in any family pedigree, or upon any tombstone, family portrait or other thing on which such statements are usually made, and when such, statement was made before the question in dispute was raised." 42. The recitals in Ext.B25 would support the case advanced by the respondents that DW4 was only a foster daughter of Mohammed Iqbal and Hajira Beevi. That stood further fortified by Ext.B21 mentioned earlier:.. The recitals in Ext.B25 would support the case advanced by the respondents that DW4 was only a foster daughter of Mohammed Iqbal and Hajira Beevi. That stood further fortified by Ext.B21 mentioned earlier:.. These aspects have been highlighted by the learned counsel for the respondents to buttress his submission that, except the fact that in order to admit DW4 to school a birth certificate was obtained from the Corporation of Cochin for which the names of Mohammed Iqbal and Hajira Beevi were furnished as the father and mother of that girl and that birth certificate was produced before the school authorities for getting the girl admitted to school consequent to which entries were made in the certificates and other registers to the effect that Mohammed Iqbal and Hajira Beevi are the father and mother of Shamila P. Iqbal(the appellant), there is no other evidence or circumstance to hold that the appellant was the naturally born daughter of Hajira Beevi or to show that she was the acknowledged daughter of Mohammed Iqbal. 43. Ext.B28 is the affidavit of a witness Sister-Hyasintha dated 9.3.2000. It was attested by notary-advocate who was examined as DW4. When the affidavit was sworn to by Sr.Hyasintha she was aged 83 years. This affidavit was produced by the respondents to prove their plea that the appellant was born to one Safia of Ponnurunni. It was stated by Sr.Hyasintha that a female child was delivered by Safiya at 1.30 a.m. on 19.5.1978 at Lissie Hospital. It was stated by her that name and address of Safia and her husband were recorded in the register as stated by Safia. It was further stated that immediately after delivery Safia wanted her to be discharged from the hospital and accordingly she was discharged from the hospital. The further statement made by Sr.Hyasintha was that the female child delivered by Smt.Safia was abandoned by Her in the hospital. She further deposed that Kochaminaumma, mother of Mohammed Iqbal, who was a frequent visitor of that hospital, on coming to know of this, requested to give her the child as her son Mohammed Iqbal and Hajira Beevi were not having a female child and thus that female child was given to Kochaminaumma. So many other aspects were also stated by her. 44. So many other aspects were also stated by her. 44. The learned counsel for the respondents would submit that affidavit of Sr.Hyasintha was filed in court with the hope that she could be examined in Court without delay but the trial was stayed when the application seeking direction for DNA test was pending consideration before this court in the C.R.P. The fact that Sr.Hyasintha was afflicted with cancer and was in a precarious condition was not known to the respondents and that was why she could not be examined immediately after the filing of Ext.B28, it is argued. It is a fact that the trial could not be continued due to the pendency of CRP before this court. Therefore, the contention raised by the appellant that the respondent obtained and thrust in an affidavit in court without making the deponent available for cross-examination with oblique motive is factually incorrect. 45. It is contended by the appellant that Ext.B28 cannot be acted upon since the deponent could not be cross examined so as to test the veracity of the statement contained therein. The evidence would show that an advocate Commissioner was appointed for the examination of Sr.Hyasintha. She was examined by the Advocate Commissioner for a short while but because of serious ailment she could not be examined in full and thus Ext.B28 was not relied upon by the Court below. The learned counsel for the respondents would submit that though Sr.Hyasintha could not be examined in full the fact that the affidavit Ext.B28 was signed by Sr.Hyasintha, when she was in a normal mental condition as spoken to by DW4 advocate/notary is acceptable in evidence. It is further contended that the evidence would show that after understanding the contents and admitting the same to be true it was signed by Sr.Hyasintha. It was testified by DW4 that Ext.B28 was signed by Sr.Hyasintha and accordingly it was notarised by him from the office of the hospital. The evidence given by DW4 would show that he had no doubt regarding the identity of the deponent nor had he any doubt regarding the cognitive or mental capacity of Sr.Hyasintha to give the statement as contained in Ext.B28. The evidence given by DW4 would show that he had no doubt regarding the identity of the deponent nor had he any doubt regarding the cognitive or mental capacity of Sr.Hyasintha to give the statement as contained in Ext.B28. It was pointed out that the advocate Commissioner also admitted that when Ext.B28 was shown to Sr.Hyasintha she admitted her signature and it was also admitted by her that a girl child was obtained by Lissie Umma from Lissie Hospital and that child was adopted, by her. (There is evidence to show that Kochamina Umma was popularly known as Lissie Umma) But it could be seen that when the examination continued DW8 became fatigue and went asleep because of the serious ailment she was suffering from. That apart, the deposition recorded by the advocate Commissioner could not be signed by Sr.Hyasintha as she was not in a fit condition to sign the papers. DW8 was not in a position to give evidence thereafter. Because of those reasons the Court below did not rely upon Ext.B28. The learned counsel appearing for the respondents would submit that since the affidavit, Ext.B28 has been otherwise proved to the extent that it was sworn to by DW8 after knowing and admitting the contents of Ext.828 to be true that part of the evidence given by DW4 can be relied upon. 46. Though the evidence given by DW4 that Ext.B28 affidavit was sworn to by Sr.Hyasintha before him and that it was attested and notarised by him as evidenced by Ext.B28 may be acceptable still that affidavit cannot be admitted in evidence since Sr.Hyasintha could not be cross-examined by the opposite party to find whether the statement contained in Ext.B28 is true or not. Learned counsel for the respondents submits that even if Ext.B28 is ignored there is sufficient evidence and strong circumstance to discountenance the plea raised by the appellant that she was the naturally born daughter of Mohammed Iqbal and Hajira Beevi. 47. The fact that in Exts.B2 to B4 the date of birth of Shamila P Iqbal was shown as 14.1.1979 has been projected by the appellant to contend that there is no document to show that Shamila P Iqbal was not born on that date. It is further contended that there is no acceptable evidence to show that the appellant was born on 19.5.1978 at Lissie Hospital. It is further contended that there is no acceptable evidence to show that the appellant was born on 19.5.1978 at Lissie Hospital. It was also argued that though as per Ext.B28 it was stated that the mother and father of the appellant was Safia and Kunju Mohammed of; Ponnurunni, the respondents did not attempt to get those persons examined in Court. It is pointed out by the learned counsel for the respondents that except that the place of residence of those persons was Ponnurunni no other particulars were furnished. That apart, it may not be possible to get that lady to depose before Court as to the factum of her delivery and abandonment of that child as it may invite so many controversies which may breed so many social issues also. 48. The next other document relied upon by the appellant is Ext.B24, a wedding card printed with regard to the marriage of the appellant originally proposed to be had with Mohammed Rias. That marriage was proposed to be had on 5.9.1996. In that card the appellant was described as the daughter of Mrs. and Mr. P.A. Mohammed Iqbal. The file containing the applications submitted to Thottathumpadi Muslim Jumaath by various persons for the conduct of the marriage was produced before the Court below by the Secretary of that Jumaath. Ext.X2 is the application pertaining to the marriage of the appellant with Mohammed Sali. Though in that application name of the applicant was shown as Mohammed Iqbal of Thattanveedu, Ernakulam and that the bride to be given in marriage was shown as Shamila-Thattanveedu and name of the bridegroom as Mohammed Sali, this application was not signed by Mohammed Iqbal but was signed by the first respondent herein(plaintiff in O.S.49/2000) who signed it 'for' Mohammed Iqbal. The application does not bear the date. The date of the proposed marriage was shown as 25.4.1996. The file contains applications submitted to that Jumaath for other purposes as well. 49. Ext.B1 is the certificate dated 30.7.2002 issued by the Secretary of that Jumaath where it was stated that the marriage between the appellant Shamila and Mohammed Sali was conducted on 25.4.1996 as 'Thahkim', as per the entry in 3331 of the marriage register. Ext.X1 is the marriage register maintained by that Jumath. It was proved through DW5. 49. Ext.B1 is the certificate dated 30.7.2002 issued by the Secretary of that Jumaath where it was stated that the marriage between the appellant Shamila and Mohammed Sali was conducted on 25.4.1996 as 'Thahkim', as per the entry in 3331 of the marriage register. Ext.X1 is the marriage register maintained by that Jumath. It was proved through DW5. In Column No.6 it was specifically noted that marriage of the appellant with Mohammed Sali was conducted as 'Thahkim'. It was stated by DW5 that if parents were not available or do not co­operate then such marriages are described as Thahkim marriage. According to the respondents Mohammed Iqbal and Hajira Beevi are not the father and mother of the bride and that was why the type of marriage was described as Thahkim. The contention raised by the appellant that the said entry was subsequently made does not appear to be correct. It is true that certain corrections are seen but such corrections are seen almost in all the entries in this register. The fact that the register was maintained in the usual course of duty performed in that Jumaath cannot be assailed at all. There are so many other entries regarding the marriages conducted under that Jumaath. It is pointed out by the learned counsel for the respondents that in similar other entries father's name was written in Column 6 as the person giving the girl in marriage whereas in the entry relating to 3331 corresponding to Ext.X1 the name written was K.Abdul Sammed Phaisy and it was shown in bracket as 'Thankim'. The evidence would show that the usual practice is that when father is not there to give the girl in marriage then the name of the person who gives the girl in marriage was used to be written in that column. 50. The learned counsel for the appellant has pointed out two corrections in Ext.X2 application submitted to the Jumaath. It seems, originally name of the appellant was shown as Shamila P. Iqbal but subsequently that portion denoting 'Mohammed P. Iqbal' was scored of. 51. In column No.7 though the appellant was originally described as the daughter it was subsequently corrected to make it appear that she was a foster daughter. In Ext.X1 Register except that Shamila P. Iqbal was corrected as Shamila(scoring the word P.Iqbal) no other correction is seen made. 51. In column No.7 though the appellant was originally described as the daughter it was subsequently corrected to make it appear that she was a foster daughter. In Ext.X1 Register except that Shamila P. Iqbal was corrected as Shamila(scoring the word P.Iqbal) no other correction is seen made. In this register applicant is not described as the daughter of Mohammed P. Iqbal. The Court below after analysing the evidence found that Ext.X1 application was submitted for the purpose of getting the marriage registered at that Jumaath. The Court below also did not agree with the case put forwarded by the appellant that Ext.X1 entry is not a true and genuine one. 52. Ext.B15 is the certificate dated 25.9.1999 issued by the Secretary of the very same Jamaath. It was produced by the appellant. Learned counsel has pointed out that in Ext.B15 name of the appellant was shown as Shamila P. Iqbal daughter of Mohammed Iqbal and that in Ext.B15 the marriage was not shown to have been performed as Thahkim and so learned counsel submits that Ext.B1 was subsequently obtained by the respondents to bolster up a false case. But the learned counsel for the respondents would submit that the word 'Tahkim' is seen to have been noted then and there. The ink, writing and old age would strengthen that view. It seems it was omitted to have been noted in Ext.B15. The fact that in Ext.B15, obtained by the appellant, it was not so written cannot affect the acceptability or credibility of Ext.B1 or the entries in Ext.X1. The word 'Thahkim' was there even originally. Of course, corrections/scorings are there with regard to other writings as pointed out by the appellant. 53. It seems, Mr.Abdul Samad Phaisy shown in column No.6 is the musaliar or other religious person competent as per the custom prevailing in the community to give such girls in marriage. Anyway, the fact that in the relevant column name of Mohammed Iqbal was not shown and it was not signed by Mohammed Iqbal would demolish the case pleaded by the appellant that when she was given in marriage Mohammed Iqbal acknowledged and recognized her as his daughter. The contention that Ext.B1 certificate was issued due to the influence exerted by the respondents who are rich, powerful and influential persons cannot be sustained in view of the unimpeachable entry in the marriage register evidenced by Ext.X1. The contention that Ext.B1 certificate was issued due to the influence exerted by the respondents who are rich, powerful and influential persons cannot be sustained in view of the unimpeachable entry in the marriage register evidenced by Ext.X1. The contention raised by the appellant that the entries in the marriage register were fraudulently made cannot be countenanced at all since the entry was made on 25.4.1996. The register contains entries made from 15.10.1989 to 6.2.2005. It was asserted by DW5 that if the father and mother of the bride are alive and available for giving the girl in marriage, then such marriage will not be described as 'Tahkim'. 54. It was observed by the court below that though the learned counsel for D1 to D3 submitted that midwifery, register of Lissie Hospital, Ernakulam was produced before the court to show that a girl child was born to Smt.Safia on 19.5.1978, and the mother abandoned that child, no such register was marked or proved before court and so it cannot be looked into. But on going through the records it is seen that maternity register produced from the Lissie Hospital was marked as 'Ext.X2'. It is seen that loose file containing applications given to the Thottathumpadi Jumaath was also marked as Ext.X2. However since the Maternity Register mentioned above was marked the court below should have considered the relevant entry on the date 19.5.1978 mentioned above. After hearing both sides, this Court on 30-6-2011 marked the aforesaid Maternity Register(which was marked by the learned Sub Judge as Ext.X2).as Ext.X4. 55. Ext.X4 register contains entries from 1.1.1977 to 29.12.1979. It is seen to be a register, maintained in the usual course of business. That register, according to the respondents, was maintained by the hospital authorities regularly and in the usual course of the business or affairs of that hospital and so it was marked without any objection. In page 117 it is seen noted, that, on 19.5.1978 as case No.512, Safia-Kunhumohammed aged 41 years had given, birth to a female child weighing 2.70 kg. The time of delivery was shown as 1.30 a.m. It was specifically noted that the lady was discharged on the same day at her request and that the baby was left in Lissie hospital itself. The time of delivery was shown as 1.30 a.m. It was specifically noted that the lady was discharged on the same day at her request and that the baby was left in Lissie hospital itself. Learned counsel for the appellant would submit that the person who had made this entry was not examined nor was any other person examined to say in whose handwriting the aforesaid entry was made. Even though the person who had made that entry was not examined according, to the learned counsel for the respondents, that entry can also be taken into account to probabilise the case of the respondents that the appellant was born to Safia Kunju Mohammed on 19.5.1978 and on that day itself she left the baby in the hospital. The respondents would further contend that the very same register shows the entries pertaining to deliveries that occurred in that hospital in January 1979 as well. There is no entry to the effect that Hajira Beevi, wife of Mohammed Iqbal had delivered a child in that hospital on 14.1.1979 or on any other day during January 1979. True, there is no case for the appellant that she was delivered at Lissie Hospital, but this aspect also has been pointed out by the learned counsel for the respondents to improbabilise the case of the appellant. Mohammed Iqbal and Hajira Beevi were admittedly residing in a house situated in a compound almost adjacent to Lissie hospital and so in all probability Hajira Beevi would have been taken to that hospital for delivery if as a matter of fact the appellant was the child delivered by Hajira Beevi. 56. DW7 is the cousin of Hajira Beevi. It is pointed out by the respondents that DW.7 is also definite and emphatic in his statement that the appellant was not born to Mohammed Iqbal and Hajira Beevi. The opinion expressed by DW7 is that the appellant was only a foster daughter of Mohammed Iqbal and Hajira Beevi and was hot their own daughter. The opinion so expressed by him as to the relationship of appellant with Mohammed Iqbal and Hajira Beevi; namely that the appellant was only a foster daughter of Mohammed Iqbal and Hajira Beevi cannot be ignored. The opinion so expressed by him as to the relationship of appellant with Mohammed Iqbal and Hajira Beevi; namely that the appellant was only a foster daughter of Mohammed Iqbal and Hajira Beevi cannot be ignored. The fact that being a near relative, having close association with that family, DW7 had special means of knowledge with regard to the relationship of the appellant with Mohammed P Iqbal and Hajira Beevi could not be seriously assailed. If so, the opinion expressed by DW7 is also relevant. The appellant did not examine any person who had close association with that family to speak in support of the case pleaded by her. It is not necessary to dwell much on that aspect since so far as the denial of maternity is concerned the evidence given by DW2 (Hajira Beevi) itself is sufficient, for, there is no reason to disbelieve her evidence on that aspect. No evidence what so ever was adduced by the appellant to show that she was born to Hajira Beevi, to mean that Hajira Beevi is her natural/biological mother. 57. It was contended by the appellant that the presumption u/s 112 of the Evidence Act is also applicable. Learned counsel for the respondents would submit that the said argument is too preposterous to be countenanced. S.112 would apply if only the child was born during the continuance of a valid marriage between his mother and a man. The alleged mother Hajira Beevi herself says that the appellant was not given birth to by her. If only the appellant was born to Hajira Beevi the presumption u/s 112 if at all could have been pressed into service, that too if only Hajira Beevi asserts that the appellant was born to Mohammed Iqbal. Therefore, the argument based on S.112 of the Evidence Act is totally misplaced and misconceived. 58. Section 112 of the Evidence Act has no application since maternity cannot be presumed under that provision. The burden is on the appellant to prove the legal status as claimed by her. No neighbour or any other person could be examined by her to prove that she was the naturally born daughter of Hajira Beevi. On the other hand the evidence and circumstances would scuttle the plea raised by the appellant that she was the naturally born daughter of Hajira Beevi. 59. No neighbour or any other person could be examined by her to prove that she was the naturally born daughter of Hajira Beevi. On the other hand the evidence and circumstances would scuttle the plea raised by the appellant that she was the naturally born daughter of Hajira Beevi. 59. The next question is whether the appellant could prove that she was the acknowledged daughter of Mohammed Iqbal. There is the insurmountable difficulty for the appellant, since in all the decisions cited on behalf of the appellant and available on the point, the dispute was only as to the paternity. In other words, in all such cases there was a definite and known mother for the son or daughter as the case may be whose paternity was disputed unlike in this case where unassailable evidence is that the appellant was not the daughter of Hajira Beevi. If only she was the daughter of Hajira Beevi the appellant can contend for the position that she was the daughter born through Mohammed Iqbal in Hajira Beevi. The question of acknowledgment in this case again does not arise in view of the fact that Hajira Beevi is the legally wedded wife of Mohammed Iqbal and three sons were born to them in that wedlock. There was no necessity of an acknowledgment if as a matter of fact she was born to Hajira Beevi in the lawful wedlock. If only there was no valid marriage or there was dispute as to the time of marriage between the alleged father and the mother of the so called acknowledgee, the necessity of acknowledgment would come into play. 60. The Mohammedan Law of acknowledgment of paternity can be invoked only where the factum of marriage or the exact time of marriage could not be proved. The doctrine of acknowledgment is based on the assumption of a lawful union between the parents of the acknowledged child. It is not applicable when the lawful union between the parents of the child is not possible. Marital tie between Mohammed Iqbal and Hajira Beevi was subsisting and it continued to be so. That apart, when the stand taken by the appellant is that she is the naturally born daughter of Mohammed Iqbal and Hajira Beevi she cannot turn round and contend that she was the daughter of Mohammed Iqbal born to some other woman. Marital tie between Mohammed Iqbal and Hajira Beevi was subsisting and it continued to be so. That apart, when the stand taken by the appellant is that she is the naturally born daughter of Mohammed Iqbal and Hajira Beevi she cannot turn round and contend that she was the daughter of Mohammed Iqbal born to some other woman. There is no case for the appellant that she is the daughter of Safia or any other woman born through Mohammed Iqbal. If the appellant wanted to sustain her claim and the paternity is to be approved, applying the doctrine of acknowledgment, it must be a case where she was born to some other woman through Mohammed Iqbal. The question of applicability of the doctrine of acknowledgment is totally out of question since as stated above marital tie between Mohammed Iqbal and Hajira Beevi was well in force, for several years prior to, at the relevant time and even thereafter. In view of the towering circumstances delineated earlier the inconsistent plea belatedly advanced by the appellant that her paternity was acknowledged and so applying the doctrine of acknowledgment she must be held to be the legal heir of deceased Mohammed Iqbal gets imbogged in the quagmire of Irreconcilable contradictions. The oral and documentary evidence would show that she was abandoned at the Lissie hospital by her mother immediately after she was delivered and from that hospital she(the child) was taken to the house of Mohammed Iqbal by Kochaminaumma and thereafter the appellant was brought up in that house as the foster daughter of Mohammed Iqbal and Hajira Beevi. Since it was not the case of the appellant that she was born to Safiya or to any other woman through Mohammed Iqbal, the doctrine of acknowledgment of paternity is in­apposite to the factual matrix of this case. 61. The appellant has relied upon the decision in Surendra Mohan v. State of West Bengal (AIR 1979 Calcutta page 3) where it was held: "If a child is in possession of filiation acknowledged by the parents and has repute in the society, legitimacy should be presumed and if anybody challenges such legitimacy of the child, the onus is upon him to prove that the child is illegitimate." 62. Learned counsel for the appellant has argued that if the status of the appellant as the daughter of Mohammed Iqbal and Hajira Beevi was acknowledged and if the child was known by others as the daughter of those two parents then legitimacy should be presumed "and if anybody challenges the same the onus is upon him to prove that the child is illegitimate. The decision in Mohabbat Ali Khan v. Mahomed Ibraim Khan ( AIR 1929 PC 135 ) has also been referred to here. There the question whether Khushdil Khan and Musammat Babo were married was held to be one of fact. But an important part of the case attempted to be made by the respondents therein was that such a marriage was legally impossible, because at the time of the marriage and the birth of the appellant the lady was already married to another person. In fact that case was one of acknowledgment by the father that he had married Musant Beevi, the mother of the appellant therein. It was held that the general proposition laid down is that if a claimant's son has in his favour a good acknowledgment of legitimacy, the marriage of parents would be held proved and his legitimacy would remain established unless the marriage is disproved. The ratio decided in that case would make it clear that either there should be a marriage between the father and mother of the child or it must be a case where it was not impossible for the father to marry the mother of the child. It was further made clear that there should be a definite case as to who the mother of the child is. In the instant case the position is entirely different. 63. The decision in Sadik husain Khan ( AIR 1916 PC 27 = 1916 ILR 38 ALL. 627 has been relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellant to fortify his submission that a statement or acknowledgment made by the father is substantive evidence that the person so acknowledged is the legitimate daughter of the person who makes the statement, provided her legitimacy was possible. The question therein was whether Sulthan Mirza Sadik Husain Khan was the legitimate son of Zaigham-Ud-Daula, grantor of the trust. The question therein was whether Sulthan Mirza Sadik Husain Khan was the legitimate son of Zaigham-Ud-Daula, grantor of the trust. It was held: "Under Mohammedan Law and indeed under the English Law the legitimate son of the most low-born, debased and degraded woman to whom a man could be lawfully united has just the same proprietary right in his father's property as if his mother had been the most well born and the purest. But it is rather against human nature to suppose that this equality before the law should secure equality of treatment in the domestic circle. It was also urged that the treatment which Sultan Mirza and his mother received in the Nawab's family was quite inconsistent with his position as the legitimate son of the Nawab, and of her position as the legitimate wife, through a muta marriage, of the Nawab." 64. This decision has been relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellant since in that case, according to him, the Nawab had acknowledged Sultan Mirza as his son and so on that ground it was held that Sultan Mirza was the legitimate son. Sri.Dinesh R. Shenoy, learned counsel for the respondents, would submit that in the decision cited supra there was no dispute regarding the fact as to who was the mother of Sultan Mirza. In other words there was a known mother for Sultan Mirza. In paragraph 48 of the very same judgment it was held; "No statement made by one man that another (proved to be illegitimate) is his son can make that other legitimate, but where no proof of that kind has been given such a statement or acknowledgment is substantive evidence that the person so acknowledged is the legitimate son of the person who makes the statement, provided his legitimacy be possible." 65. The decision in Rahmat Ali Shah v. Sardar Harbhajan Singh (AIR 1946 Lahore 450) was also relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellant in support of his argument that acknowledgment is good evidence of a legal marriage. In the aforesaid case it was held: "Some reliance was placed by learned counsel for the appellants on the evidence of acknowledgment by Ghulam Jilani. In the aforesaid case it was held: "Some reliance was placed by learned counsel for the appellants on the evidence of acknowledgment by Ghulam Jilani. But while acknowledgment may be good evidence of a legal marriage in cases where marriage can be safely presumed it cannot be held so to, be in the absence of any satisfactory and legal evidence of marriage in cases where the woman is found to be a prostitute and where the connection is found to have been adulterous in its inception. Acknowledgment may be evidence of a legal marriage in certain circumstances but it does not legitimatize any person where a marriage between his parents cannot be in the circumstances presumed." 66. The aforesaid decision according to the learned counsel for the respondents would indeed run counter to the case advanced by the appellant since in that case it was held that acknowledgment; is not intended to legitimatise any person where a- marriage between his parents could not in the circumstances be presumed. According to Mr.Dinesh R. Shenoy since there is no evidence to show that Hajira Beevi, 2nd respondent in this case, is the mother of the appellant, the appellant cannot canvass for the position that the marriage of her mother Safia or any other woman with Mohammed Iqbal could be legitimatised. 67. Learned counsel for the appellant has also relied upon the decision in S.A. Kaiser v. Noor Sahan (1980 Crl.L.J. 611) where, following the decision in Mohabatt Ali Khan's case (AIR 1929 P.C.135), it was held: "An acknowledgment, express or implied, by a person who is of sound mind that another person is his child or that the mother of the, child is his wife by a valid marriage confers upon such child the status of legitimacy provided that the following conditions are satisfied; (a) that the marriage is not disproved, (b) that the acknowledgment is one of the legitimacy of the child;(c)that the relationship is not impossible by reason of disparity between the ages or otherwise; (d)that the person acknowledged, if he has attained discretion, does not repudiate the acknowledgment. It is well settled law that the presumption is always in favour of marriage and against concubinage when the person has been living with the woman as husband and wife for a large number of years." 68. The facts of that case are also entirely different. It is well settled law that the presumption is always in favour of marriage and against concubinage when the person has been living with the woman as husband and wife for a large number of years." 68. The facts of that case are also entirely different. Here, It is not the case of the appellant that because of the long cohabitation between Mohammed Iqbal and, Hajira Beevi, legitimacy should be conferred on the appellant. So much so, the contention raised by the appellant that legitimacy can be inferred if there was long cohabitation between husband and wife and would tantamount to acknowledgment of the factum of marriage and the legitimacy of the child is totally misplaced and misconceived. It was held in Mohammed Allahdad Khan 1888 ILR 10 All.289 thus: "Paternity does not admit of positive proof, because the connection of a child with its father is secret, but it may be established by the word of the father himself or by a subsisting firash(bed) that is, a legally constituted relation between him and the mother of the child." 69. Srir Dinesh R,. Shenoy, learned counsel for the respondents poses a pertinent question as to who according to the appellant is her mother. Maternity has been, denied by her alleged mother Hajira Beevi herself. The appellant has resisted the application for conducting DNA test. She is even now unwilling to undergo DNA test. No document whatsoever was produced to show that the appellant was given birth to by Hajira Beevi. The circumstances would undoubtedly show that the appellant was not given birth to by Hajira Beevi. It was held in Mohammed Allabadab Khan's case cited supra that Mohammedan rule as to acknowledgment of parentage is only a substitute for adoption as understood in the Hindu and the Roman system of jurisprudence, or that the rule of the Muhammadan law is the same as the Roman or the Scotch rule relating to the legitimation of children per subsequens matrimonium, that is, legitimation of ante-nuptial children whose illegitimacy is proved and admitted by subsequent marriage between the parents. 70. 70. After a comparative analysis of the Roman and of the Scotch law on the one hand and the Mohammedan Law on the other it was held in the decision supra: "Putting the matter shortly, the former two systems proceed upon the principle of legitimating children whose illegitimacy is proved and admitted, whilst the Mohammedan Law relates only to cases of uncertainty and proceeds upon the assumption that the acknowledged child is not the offspring of the acknowledger and the mother of the child." 71. Therefore, it is crystal clear that though the doctrine aforesaid is applicable to a case where a child was born to a man and woman and there was uncertainty as to the time of marriage between them, if there is evidence of acknowledgment in such cases of the alleged child as his daughter born to that woman who delivered the child then that acknowledgment will be sufficient to confer legitimacy to the child but that doctrine cannot be imported to the case on hand since the child was not given birth to by Hajira Beevi. 72. In the instant case Hajira Beevi is not proved to be the biological mother nor was Mohammed Iqbal the biological father of Shamila. Hence it cannot be contended that the appellant was the issue of a lawful union between the so called acknowledger Mohammed Iqbal and Hajira Beevi. In all the decisions cited by the learned counsel for the appellant the dispute was only as to the paternity or as to the time of birth of the child. There was no dispute as to the maternity at all. There can be no conferment or acknowledgment of maternity. 73. The decision in Roshanbai v. Suleman Haji Ahmed Umar (AIR 1944 Bombay 213) has also been relied upon by the appellant's counsel. In fact in that case it was held: "The presumption of marriage does not arise merely from the fact of some years of cohabitation. It must be proved that the man treated the woman as his wife and had recognized her as such not merely casually but with the intention and knowledge of giving her the status of a wife. The acknowledgment of a son must be as of a legitimate son. It must be proved that the man treated the woman as his wife and had recognized her as such not merely casually but with the intention and knowledge of giving her the status of a wife. The acknowledgment of a son must be as of a legitimate son. Mere acknowledgment of paternity is not sufficient to raise a presumption of legitimacy of marriage." Where, by reason of time or circumstances the question of marriage between the father of the child and her mother stands not proved or disproved, but if there is evidence of acknowledgment of the woman as the wife or the acknowledgment of a child as the legitimate child then it may be presumed that there was a marriage between that man and woman. Learned counsel for the respondents would submit that to bank upon the doctrine, the son or daughter should be acknowledged as the legitimate son or daughter so as to hold further that there was a legitimate marriage between the acknowledger and the mother of the child, thereby conferring legitimacy on the mother of the child also. Hajira Beevi, (DW2) is proved to be not the woman who delivered the appellant. Hence maternity vis-a-vis the appellant cannot be fastened or conferred upon Hajira Beevi. Mohammed P. Iqbal is not proved to be the biological father of the appellant nor was Hajira Beevi the biological mother of the appellant. If so the applicability of the doctrine of acknowledgment of paternity is out of question, the respondent's counsel submits. In other words, if there is no specific case as to who is the mother of the appellant the question of applicability of the doctrine of acknowledgment would not arise at all. 74. A mere casual acknowledgment of paternity, not intended to confer status of legitimacy, will not have any effect. Learned counsel would further submit that in the decision cited supra, it was held that where the legitimacy could be established by direct proof of such marriage, acknowledgment was recognized by Mohammedan Law as the means whereby marriage of parents or legitimate descent might be established and as such acknowledgment always proceeds upon the hypothesis of a lawful union between the parents and the legitimate descent of the acknowledged persons from the acknowledger. It was held in Roshan Bai's case cited supra that there is nothing in the Mohammedan Law similar to adoption recognized by the Roman and Hindu systems of admitting of an affiliation which has no reference to consanguinity or legitimate descent. The child whose legitimacy is by reason of the marriage of his parents being either disproved on found to be unlawful cannot be legitimatised by acknowledgment. In the case on hand the appellant has no case of any marriage between Mohammed Iqbal and Safia or with any other woman. The appellant cannot therefore be legitimatised by the acknowledgment as pleaded by her. Acknowledgment has only the effect of legitimation where either the fact of the marriage or its exact time, with reference to the legitimacy of the child's birth, is a matter of uncertainty. Under the Mohammedan Law acknowledgment has only the effect of a declaration of legitimacy and not of legitimation of a child who is otherwise proved to be illegitimate. In Roshan Bai's case(AIR 1944 Bombay 213) it was also held: "In respect of acknowledgment of a son it is further clear that the acknowledgment must be as of a legitimate son and mere acknowledgment of paternity is not sufficient to raise a presumption of legitimacy or marriage. It is further clear that in the event of disproof of marriage no amount of acknowledgment can make; the presumption override the fact and persuade the Court to decide the matter on the presumption." 75. It is clear that only when by reason of time or circumstances the question of marriage is in a state of being "not proved", the question of acknowledgment arises. 76. It was held by the Privy Council in Habeebul Rahman's case (1921 ILR 48) cited supra that the doctrine of acknowledgment must not be pressed into service to disturb the ruling principle that under Mohammedan Law an acknowledgment is a declaration of legitimacy and not a legitimation. 77. In Habibur Rahman v. Altaf Ali (1921 ILR 48 Calcutta 856 it was observed: "By the Mohammedan Law a son to be legitimate must be the offspring of a man and his wife or of a man and his slave; any other offspring is the offspring of zina, that is, illicit connection, and cannot be legitimate. 77. In Habibur Rahman v. Altaf Ali (1921 ILR 48 Calcutta 856 it was observed: "By the Mohammedan Law a son to be legitimate must be the offspring of a man and his wife or of a man and his slave; any other offspring is the offspring of zina, that is, illicit connection, and cannot be legitimate. The term 'wife'necessarily connotes marriage, but, as marriage may be constituted ' without any ceremonial, the existence of a marriage in any particular case may be an open question. Direct proof may be available, but if there be no such, indirect proof may suffice. Now one of the ways of indirect proof is by an acknowledgment of legitimacy in favour of a son". 78. Relying on the decision, in Fatma Binti Hafidt v. Administrator General; Zanzibar (1949) 2 MLJ 484 it was held by the Madras High Court in FathimaBi Ammal v. A.A. Mohammed Mohideen and others - (1971) 2 MLJ 451 that in cases where the question to be determined is whether there has been a marriage between the parents some thing more than a mere acknowledgment of paternity is required. Mere admission of paternity will no way establish anything but a casual union and more is required to show the existence of marriage bond, if the existence of that bond is to be derived from association alone without any preceding ceremony. It was held that the father may accept his parenthood without intending to make the child legitimate but once the marriage is established acknowledgment of paternity is enough to hold the marriage to be valid. It was further held that though acknowledgment of paternity is substantive evidence it does not arouse an irrebuttable presumption. The acknowledgment merely proceeds upon the hypothesis of a lawful union between the parents. Here the presumption of legitimacy projected by the appellant gets demolished on account of the fact that the appellant was not proved to be the daughter born to Hajira Beevi. It is not proved or probabilised as to who her mother was. Simply because, for getting admission to school, birth certificate was obtained from the Corporation showing Mohammed Iqbal and Hajira Beevi as the father and mother of the child and based on that certificate school admission was obtained, it cannot said that Mohammed Iqbal had actually intended to confer legitimacy to the appellant. Simply because, for getting admission to school, birth certificate was obtained from the Corporation showing Mohammed Iqbal and Hajira Beevi as the father and mother of the child and based on that certificate school admission was obtained, it cannot said that Mohammed Iqbal had actually intended to confer legitimacy to the appellant. That the appellant was brought to the family house as the daughter of Mohammed Iqbal is not sufficient to hold that she was acknowledged by Mohammed Iqbal as his legitimate daughter. The doctrine of acknowledgment can have no application in this case since she was not proved to be the daughter born to Hajira Beevi. 79. In the light of the judicial precedents which we have already adverted to we are of the considered view that "acknowledgment" recognized under Muhammaden Law is a declaration of legitimacy and not legitimatisation. The appellant is not proved to be the child born to her alleged mother Hajira Beevi. She was also not proved to be the child born through her alleged father Mohammed Iqbal. The evidence in this case would perforce probabilise the case of the respondents that the appellant was born to another woman through somebody else and abandoned at Lissie Hospital. She was taken to the house of and brought up by Muhammed Iqbal and Hajira Beevi as their 'foster' daughter. The appellant cannot be legitimatised by the so called acknowledgment. Acknowledgment recognized under the Muhammedan Law has only the effect of declaring or acknowledging the legitimacy of the child by the father and not legitimatisation of the child. What is attempted to be done is legitimatisation. Muhammedan Law does not recognize legitimatisation of an illegitimate child or of a child not born to the alleged father and mother. 80. To sum up our conclusions are: The appellant has failed to prove that she was the child born to deceased Muhammed Iqbal and Hajira Beevi. The plea raised by the appellant that Muhammed Iqbal had acknowledged her as his legitimate daughter is also not proved. The findings so entered by the learned Sub Judge are well merited. We confirm the same. Point No.3: 81. While discussing points 1 and 2 we have already found that Ext.B25 Will is true and valid and was accepted and acted upon by all the legal heirs of deceased Muhammed Iqbal. Hence, this point is also answered against the appellant. Point No.4: 82. We confirm the same. Point No.3: 81. While discussing points 1 and 2 we have already found that Ext.B25 Will is true and valid and was accepted and acted upon by all the legal heirs of deceased Muhammed Iqbal. Hence, this point is also answered against the appellant. Point No.4: 82. In the light of the findings entered above, the appellant is not entitled to get any share in the plaint schedule properties. In the result, both appeals are dismissed. The parties are directed to suffer their respective costs.