JUDGMENT H. K. RATHOD, J. Heard learned Advocate Mr. A. V. Thakkar on behalf of applicant, learned Advocate Mr. D. B. Mehta has filed leave note today, but on his behalf, learned Advocate Ms. Ami Patel is appearing on behalf of respondent. 2. In this application, according to prayer made in Para 5(B) in all total delay is of 905 days. Against present application, affidavit in reply is filed by respondent opposing it. Thereafter, today rejoinder is filed by applicant. Copy thereof is served to other side Advocate. 3. In main Civil Revision Application, petitioner has challenged common order dated 19-11-2007 passed in Revision Application No.1 of 2007 and also in Revision Application No.2 of 2007 by Dy. Collector, Vyara, District Sural. The petitioner has also challenged order passed by Mamlatdar Court, Mahuva, District Surat in Case No.1 of 2006 dated 28-12-2006. The Civil Revision Application has filed on 7-8-2010 before Registry of this Court, which has been registered on 12-8-2010. 4. The applicant has preferred Regular Civil Suit No. 26 of 2008 before Principal Sr. Civil Judge, Bardoli on 10-3-2008. The said suit is still pending before Civil Court. The aforesaid Civil Suit No. 26 of 2008 filed by applicant regarding subject-matter, which are under challenged. Thereafter, considering facts that opponents are trying to take undue advantage of order passed in proceeding of Mamlatdar Court and just to avoid such technicalities, petition was preferred by applicant challenging order dated 19-11-2007 passed by Dy. Collector, which was registered as Stamp No. 14876 of 2008. Thereafter, it was registered after removing office objection being Spl. C.A. No. 4934 of 2009. The said has been disposed of by this Court 30-6-2010 on the ground that Civil Revision Application is maintainable not Special Civil Application. This Court has passed an order on 30-6-2010 in Spl.C.A.No. 4934 of 2009, which is quoted as under: "Against the impugned order passed by the authorities below under the Mamlatdar's Courts Act, Revision Application is maintainable. Hence, the present petition is not entertained. It will be open for the petitioner to prefer Revision Application. As and when such Revision Application is made and application for condonation of delay is filed, the same shall be considered considering Sec. 14 of the Limitation Act. With this, present petition is dismissed. Notice is discharged. No costs." 5. Hence, the present petition is not entertained. It will be open for the petitioner to prefer Revision Application. As and when such Revision Application is made and application for condonation of delay is filed, the same shall be considered considering Sec. 14 of the Limitation Act. With this, present petition is dismissed. Notice is discharged. No costs." 5. The total period comes to 905 days which is required to be condoned as per prayer made by applicant. The other side has opposed it only, on the ground that such period is remained unexplained no satisfactory explanation is given by applicant for delay of thirteen months. The affidavit is made by other side that some material fact has been suppressed by applicant. The said affidavit is dated 12-1-2011, against which, today, rejoinder is filed by present applicant dated 10-2-2011. 6. I have considered submission made by both learned Advocates appearing on behalf of respective parties. It is necessary to note that while disposing Special Civil Application this Court has made it clear that as and when Civil Revision Application is made for condonation of delay, Sec. 14 of Limitation Act is required to be considered. The Sec. 14 of Limitation Act excluded time of proceeding bona fide filed in Court without jurisdiction. The Sec. 14(1)(2) and (3) are quoted as under : "14(1) In computing the period of limitation for any suit, the time during which the plaintiff has been prosecuting with due diligence another civil proceeding, wherein in a Court of first instance or of appeal or revision, against the defendant shall be excluded, where the proceeding relates to the same matter in issue and is prosecuted in good faith in a Court which, from defect of jurisdiction or other cause of a like nature, is unable to entertain it. (2) In computing the period of limitation for any application, the time during which the applicant has been prosecuting with due diligence another civil proceeding, whether in a Court of first instance or of appeal or revision, against the same party for the same relief shall be excluded, where such proceeding is prosecuted in good faith in a Court which, from defect of jurisdiction or other cause of a like nature, is unable to entertain it. (3) Notwithstanding anything contained in Rule 2 of Order XXIII of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), the provisions of sub-sec. (3) Notwithstanding anything contained in Rule 2 of Order XXIII of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), the provisions of sub-sec. (1) shall apply in relation to a fresh suit instituted on permission granted by the Court under Rule 1 of the Order where such permission is granted on the ground that the first suit must fail by reason of a defect in the jurisdiction of the Court or other cause of a like nature." 7. The aforesaid Section suggests that if any bona fide proceeding is filed by any party before Court which is not having jurisdiction then that period must have to be excluded while counting delay under Sec. 5 of Limitation Act. It is also necessary to consider good faith and diligence of party to file proper proceeding challenging order in question. The scope of Secs. 5 and 14 of Limitation Act, both are different and independent and are not mutually excluded to each other even in case where Sec. 14 applies, Sec. 5 excluded. Therefore, this Court has to consider both Sections i.e. Sec. 5 and Sec. 14 of Limitation Act. While considering Sec. 14, Spl.C.A. has been preferred by applicant on 11-12-2008 which remained in objection but matter was preferred it shows bona fide and diligence of applicant, and office objection not removed immediately or within some reasonable time. Therefore, matter remained pending before this Court for some time to remove office objection. Thereafter, Sp1.C.A. has been disposed of by this Court on 30-6-2010. Therefore, period from 11-12-2008 to 30-6-2010 is must be covered by Sec. 14 of Limitation Act and that period is required to be excluded by this Court due to bona fide approach of applicant to this Court which is having no jurisdiction in Special Civil Application. So, most of period i.e. from 11-12-2008 to 30-6-2010 is covered under Sec. 14 of Limitation Act. Thereafter, Civil Revision Application was preferred on 16-8-2010 before this Court which period covered about more than 40 days. [See: Vaditho Anantharao Naik v. Bhoomisetty Rajaiah, 1994 (2) CCC 45 (AP) & Samuel Joseph v. Ramachandran Chellayyan, 1991 (1) CCC 583 (Ker.)] 8. In present application, applicant has challenged order dated 19-112007 and Civil Suit No. 26 of 2008 filed on or about 10-3-2008. Therefore, aforesaid period covered by wrong advice given by Advocate. In suit, subject-matter is same and also challenged order dated 19-11-2007. In present application, applicant has challenged order dated 19-112007 and Civil Suit No. 26 of 2008 filed on or about 10-3-2008. Therefore, aforesaid period covered by wrong advice given by Advocate. In suit, subject-matter is same and also challenged order dated 19-11-2007. There is no inaction but due to not having proper advice from Advocate present delay is occurred for the period 19-11-2007 to 10-3-2008 for which there is sufficient causes established by applicant. The subsequent period from 10-3-2008 to 11-12-2008 also satisfactorily explained. The applicant remained through out active in process of challenge order dated 19-11-2007. There is no deliberate delay on his part and in such circumstances view taken by Apex Court in case of State of Karnataka v. Y. Moideen Kunhi by L.Rs., reported in AIR 2009 SC 2577 . The relevant observation made in Paras 15 to 19 are quoted as under : "15. It is submitted that even with the introduction of safeguards against delay in the process, in an occasional case delay occurs which is inexplicable in normal circumstances. The question is whether such delay, should result in the negation of the state's claim and at the cost of the interest of the members of the public whose cause has not been carefully espoused. It is submitted by the appellant-State that in such cases, delay must be visited with consequences but the interest of the inhabitants of the State must be protected. In State (N. Co T. of Delhi) v. Ahmed Jaan, 2008 (11) SCALE 455 , it was held as follows : ......It is axiomatic that decisions are taken by officers/agencies proverbially at slow pace and encumbered process of pushing the files from table to table and keeping it on table for considerable time causing delay - intentional or otherwise - is a routine. Considerable delay of procedural red-tape in the process of their making decision is a common feature. Therefore, certain amount of latitude is not impermissible. If the appeals brought by the State are lost for such default no person is individually affected but what in the ultimate analysis suffers, is public interest. .....In the event of decision to file appeal needed prompt action should be pursued by the officer responsible to file the appeal and he should be made personally responsible for lapses, if any. Equally, the State cannot be put on the same footing as an individual. .....In the event of decision to file appeal needed prompt action should be pursued by the officer responsible to file the appeal and he should be made personally responsible for lapses, if any. Equally, the State cannot be put on the same footing as an individual. The individual would always be quick in taking the decision whether he would pursue the remedy by way of an appeal or application since he is a person legally injured while State is an impersonal machinery working through its officers or servants." Further at Para 15, this Court held that : ".... The above position was highlighted in State of Haryana v. Chandra Mani, 1996 (3) SCC 132 ; Special Tehsildar, Land Acquisition, Kerala v. K. V. Ayisumma, 1996 (10) SCC 634 and State of Nagaland v. Lipok A.O., 2005 (3) SCC 752 . It was noted that adoption of strict standard of proof sometimes fail to protract public justice, and it would result in public mischief by skilful management of delay in the process of filing an appeal." 16. This Court has in appropriate cases even condoned delays of over 30 years in filing of S. L. Ps. In Nand Kishore v. State of Punjab, 1995 (6) SCC 614 , this Court held : "……13. The step of the three-member Bench so taken reveal its mind as reflected in the above proceedings. Their Lordships wanted to do substantial justice. It was thought better to advise the petitioner to file special leave petition. As we view this order, having invited the petitioner to file the special leave petition, it is no longer advisable or appropriate for us to retrace back the step put forward by the three-member Bench. It is significant to recall that the writ application was dismissed on 5-2-1962 and the moment Moti Ram Deka case appeared on the scene, the appellant or 24-2-1964, within limitation, brought forward his suit which got strengthened by Gurdev Singh case appearing within a couple of months of its filing. The appellant-special leave petitioner was thus bona fide pursuing an appropriate remedy for all these years. In these circumstances, we think that an appropriate case for condonation of delay of the intervening period has been made out. We, therefore, allow CC 11644 of 1991 and condone the long durated delay in these exceptional circumstances. On doing so, we grant leave to appeal. In these circumstances, we think that an appropriate case for condonation of delay of the intervening period has been made out. We, therefore, allow CC 11644 of 1991 and condone the long durated delay in these exceptional circumstances. On doing so, we grant leave to appeal. The appeal thus arising and the Civil Appeal No. 632 of 1975 may now be disposed of together……." 17. On perusal of the explanation offered, it is clear that the officials who were dealing with the matter have either deliberately or without Understanding the implications dealt with the matter in a very casual and lethargic manner. It is a matter of concern that in very serious matters action is not taken as required under law and the appeals/petitions are filed after long lapse of time. It is a common grievance that it is so done to protect unscrupulous litigants at the cost of public interest or public exchequer. This stand is more noticeable where vast tracts of lands or large sums of revenue are involved. Even though, the Courts are liberal in dealing with the belated presentation of appeals/applications, yet there is a limit upto which such liberal attitude can be extended. Many matters concerning the State Government and the Central Government are delayed either by the nature of bureaucratic process or by deliberate manipulation of the same by taking advantage of loopholes in the conduct of litigation. Several instances have come to the notice of this Court where as noted above appeals have been filed where the revenue involved runs to several crores of rupees. It is true that occasionally delay occurs which is inexplicable in normal circumstances. 18. The case at hand is a classic example where the circumstances are the same. More than 4000 acres of land are involved out of which, according to the State, nearly 3500 acres constitute forest land. Ultimately, the Court has to protect the public justice. The same cannot be rendered ineffective by skillful management of delay in the process of making challenge to the order which prima facie does not appear to be legally sustainable. 19. Ultimately, the Court has to protect the public justice. The same cannot be rendered ineffective by skillful management of delay in the process of making challenge to the order which prima facie does not appear to be legally sustainable. 19. The expression 'sufficient cause' as appearing in Sec. 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 (in short the 'Limitation Act') must receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice as was noted by this Court in G. Ramegowda, Major v. Special Land Acquisition Officer, Bangalore, AIR 1988 SC 897 . Para 8 of the judgment reads as follows : 8. ....... The law of limitation is, no doubt, the same for a private citizen as for governmental authorities. Government, like any other litigant must take responsibility for the acts or omissions of its officers. But a somewhat different complexion is imparted to the matter where Government makes out a case where public interest was shown to have suffered owing to acts of fraud or bad faith on the part of its officers or agents and where the officers were clearly at cross-purposes with it. Therefore, in assessing what, in a particular case, constitutes "sufficient cause" for purposes of Sec. 5, it might, perhaps, be somewhat unrealistic to exclude from the considerations that go into the judicial verdict, these factors which are peculiar to and characteristic of the functioning of the Government. Governmental decisions are proverbially slow encumbered, as they are, by a considerable degree of procedural red-tape in the process of their making. A certain amount of latitude, is therefore, not impermissible. It is rightly said that those who bear responsibility of Government must have "a little play at the joints". Due recognition of these limitations on governmental functioning of course, within reasonable limits is necessary if the judicial approach is not to be rendered unrealistic. It would, perhaps, be unfair and unrealistic to put Government and private parties on the same footing in all respects in such matters. Implicit in the very nature of Governmental functioning is procedural delay incidental to the decision-making process. In the opinion of the High Court, the conduct of the law officers of the Government placed the Government in a predicament and that it was one of those cases where the mala fides of the officers should not be imputed to Government. It relied upon and trusted its law officers. In the opinion of the High Court, the conduct of the law officers of the Government placed the Government in a predicament and that it was one of those cases where the mala fides of the officers should not be imputed to Government. It relied upon and trusted its law officers. Lindley, M. R., in the In Re. National Bank of Wales Ltd., 1899 (2) Ch. 629 at p. 673 observed, though in a different context : 'Business cannot be carried on upon principles of distrust. Men in responsible positions must be trusted by those above them, as well as by those below them, until there is reason to distrust them'." 9. Normally, deliberate attempt or intentional delay cannot be encourage by Court. However, it is better to decide matter on merits by party. If delay is not condoned then it will adversely effect the legal right of applicant and if it is condoned it will not cause any prejudice to opponent. Normally, liberal approach in such cases necessarily not the strict rules is to apply but practical approach is necessary. In such cases, discretionary power can be exercised by Court for doing substantial justice between parties. 10. In light of this fact, which are on record not much in dispute between parties, this Court has considered recent decision of Apex Court in case of Coal India Limited v. Ujjal Transport Agency, reported in 2011 (1) SCC 117 , where Sec. 14 of Limitation Act has been considered along with Sec. 34 sub-sec. (3) of Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. The relevant discussion made in Paras 6 to 8 are quoted as under : "6. Section 34(3) of the Act provides that an application for setting aside an award may not be made after three months from the date of receipt of the arbitral award. The proviso thereto enables the Court, if satisfied that the applicant was prevented by sufficient cause, to entertain the application within a further period of thirty days but not thereafter. This Court in M/s. Consolidated Engineering Enterprises v. Tile Principal Secretary (Irrigation Department), 2008 (7) SCC 169 held that neither Sec. 34(3) nor any other provision of the Act excludes the application of Sec. 14 of Limitation Act, 1963 and the provisions of Sec. 14 of Limitation Act would apply to applications under Sec. 34 of the Act. This Court in M/s. Consolidated Engineering Enterprises v. Tile Principal Secretary (Irrigation Department), 2008 (7) SCC 169 held that neither Sec. 34(3) nor any other provision of the Act excludes the application of Sec. 14 of Limitation Act, 1963 and the provisions of Sec. 14 of Limitation Act would apply to applications under Sec. 34 of the Act. This Court held that even where there is jurisdiction for applying Sec. 14 of Limitation Act, the period of limitation will continue to be three months (subject to extension under the proviso to sub-sec. (3) of Sec. 34 of the Act) but in computing the limitation period of three months for the application under Sec. 34(1) of the Act, the time during which the applicant was prosecuting the matter bona fide and with due diligence before the wrong Court will have to be excluded. 7. In this case, the Award was passed on 6-2-2009. The petition under Sec. 34 before the District Court was filed on 19-10-2009. The appeal before the wrong forum was filed on 6-5-2009 and withdrawn on 30-10-2009. If the appellants are able to demonstrate that they were bona fide and with due diligence pursuing the remedy before a Court without jurisdiction, they will be entitled for exclusion of time from 6-5-2009 to 30-10-2009 (or till 19-10-2009 when they filed the application before the proper forum). If the said period is excluded, it will be seen that the application was filed within three months which is the period of limitation, even without the benefit of extension under the proviso to Sec. 34(3) of the Act. 8. The question that therefore, would arise for consideration is whether the appellants were bona fide and diligently pursuing the remedy before a wrong forum. The first respondent contended that different causes were shown and different explanations were given by the appellants in the application for condonation of delay filed by the appellant before the District Court on 3-11-2009, the subsequent application under Sec. 34(3) of the Act read with Sec. 14 of Limitation Act filed on 8-1-2010 and the application dated 29-10-2009 for withdrawal of the appeal filed before the High Court. But a careful examination of these applications shows that there is, in fact, no inconsistency. The first appellant is a Corporation and it has to act through its Board of Directors and not at the level of individual officers. But a careful examination of these applications shows that there is, in fact, no inconsistency. The first appellant is a Corporation and it has to act through its Board of Directors and not at the level of individual officers. It is true that the appellants have stated that they became aware that the appeal was not maintainable before the High Court when they came to know about the execution proceedings. But thereafter, there was some uncertainty as to whether the application under Sec. 34 of the Act had to be filed in the District Court only after the withdrawal of 'appeal' under Sec. 34 of the Act before the High Court, or whether the withdrawal and filing of fresh application under Sec. 34 of the Act should be simultaneous, or whether to avoid delay, the application under Sec. 34 of the Act should be filed in the District Court immediately even before the application for withdrawal could be moved before the High Court. In fact the appellants demonstrated their diligence and bona fides by filing the application under Sec. 34 of the Act on 19-10-2009 itself immediately on reopening of Court, without waiting for a formal order of withdrawal of the 'appeal' under Sec. 34 before the wrong forum. Therefore, it cannot be said that filing of the application under Sec. 34 of the Act on 19-10-2009 was belated. Further, if the period spent before wrong "orum is excluded, the application is filed within three months and there is no question of explaining any delay." 11. In respect to delay occurred in filing proceeding under Sec. 5 of Limitation Act recently Apex Court has examined same issue in case of Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. v. Subrata Boraj Chowlek, reported in 2011 AIR SCW 269. The length of delay is not relevant, material and important, but question is whether delay has been specifically explained by applicant before this Court or not? Therefore, conduct of party is required to be considered that whether inaction or negligence or mala fide can be attributed to applicant or not? These are also relevant consideration at the time when delay condone application is required to be considered by this Court, under Sec. 5 of Limitation Act. This question has been discussed in Paras 7 to 11 which are quoted as under : "7. These are also relevant consideration at the time when delay condone application is required to be considered by this Court, under Sec. 5 of Limitation Act. This question has been discussed in Paras 7 to 11 which are quoted as under : "7. Having heard the learned Counsel, we are of the opinion that in the instant case a sufficient cause had been made out for condonation of delay in filing the appeal, and therefore, the High Court erred in declining to condone the same. It is true that even upon showing a sufficient cause, a party is not entitled to the condonation of delay as a matter of right, yet it is trite that in construing sufficient cause, the Courts generally follow a liberal approach particularly when no negligence, inaction or mala fides can be imputed to the party. (See : Shakuntala Devi Jain v. Kuntal Kumari, AIR 1969 SC 575 ; State of West Bengal v. The Administrator, Howrah Municipality, AIR 1972 SC 749 ; N. Balakrishnan v. M. Krishnamurthy, 1998 (7) SCC 123 ; Sital Prasad Saxena v. Union of India, AIR 1985 SC 1 ). 8. In Ramlal, Motilal & Chhotelal v. Rewa Coalfields Ltd., AIR 1962 SC 361 , this Court held that: "In construing Sec. 5, it is relevant to bear in mind two important considerations. The first consideration is that the expiration of the period of limitation prescribed for making an appeal gives rise to a right in favour of the decree-holder to treat the decree as binding between the parties. In other words, when the period of limitation prescribed has expired the decree-holder has obtained a benefit under the law of limitation to treat the decree as beyond challenge, and this legal right which has accrued to the decree-holder by lapse of time should not be light-heartedly disturbed. The other consideration which cannot be ignored is that if sufficient cause for excusing delay is shown discretion is given to the Court to condone delay and admit the appeal. This discretion has been deliberately conferred on the Court in order that judicial power and discretion in that behalf should be exercised to advance substantial justice. As has been observed by the Madras High Court in Krishna v. Chathappan, (1890) ILR 13 Mad. 269. This discretion has been deliberately conferred on the Court in order that judicial power and discretion in that behalf should be exercised to advance substantial justice. As has been observed by the Madras High Court in Krishna v. Chathappan, (1890) ILR 13 Mad. 269. "Sec. 5 gives the Court a discretion which in respect of jurisdiction is to be exercised in the way in which judicial power and discretion ought to be exercised upon principles which are well understood; the words 'sufficient cause' receiving a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice when no negligence nor inaction nor want of bona fide is imputable to the appellant." 9. Similarly, in Ram Nath Sao Alias Ram Nath Sahu v. Gobardhan Sao, 2002 (3) SCC 195 this Court observed that : "But one thing is clear that the Courts should not proceed with the tendency of finding fault with the cause shown, and reject the petition by a slipshod order in over-jubilation of disposal drive. Acceptance of explanation furnished should be the rule and refusal, an exception, more so when no negligence or inaction or want of bona fides can be imputed to the defaulting party. On the other hand, while considering the matter the Courts should not lose sight of the fact that by not taking steps within the time prescribed a valuable right has accrued to the other party which should not be lightly defeated by condoning delay in a routine-like manner. However, by taking a pedantic and hyper-technical view of the matter the explanation furnished should not be rejected when stakes are high and/or arguable points of facts and law are involved in the case, causing enormous loss and irreparable injury to the party against whom the lis terminates, either by default or inaction and defeating valuable right of such a party to have the decision on merit. While considering the matter, Courts have to strike a balance between resultant effect of the order it is going to pass upon the parties either way." 10. While considering the matter, Courts have to strike a balance between resultant effect of the order it is going to pass upon the parties either way." 10. In State (N.C.T. of Delhi) v. Ahmed Jaan, 2008 (14) SCC 582 while observing that although no special indulgence can be shown to the Government which, in similar circumstances is not shown to an individual suitor, one cannot but take a practical view of the working of the Government without being unduly indulgent to the slow motion of its wheels, highlighted the following observations of this Court in State of Nagaland v. Lipok A.O., 2005 (3) SCC 752 : "It is axiomatic that decisions are taken by officers/agencies proverbially at slow pace and encumbered process of pushing the files from table to table and keeping it on table for considerable time causing delay-intentional or otherwise-is a routine. Considerable delay of procedural red tape in the process of their making decision is a common feature. Therefore, certain amount of latitude is not impermissible. If the appeals brought by the State are lost for such default no person is individually affected, but what in the ultimate analysis suffers, is public interest. The expression 'sufficient cause', should therefore, be considered with pragmatism in a justice-oriented approach rather than the technical detection of sufficient cause for explaining every day's delay. The factors which are peculiar to and characteristic of the functioning of the Governmental conditions would be cognizant to and requires adoption of pragmatic approach in justice-oriented process." (See also : Special Tehsildar, Land Acquisition, Kerala v. K. V. Ayisumma, 1996 (10) SCC 634 ; State of Haryana v. Chandra Mani, 1996 (3) SCC 132 ). 11. It is manifest that though Sec. 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 envisages the explanation of delay to the satisfaction of the Court, and make. no distinction between the State and the citizen, nonetheless adoption of a strict standard of proof in case of the Government, which is dependant on the actions of its officials, who often do not have any personal interest in its transactions, may lead to grave miscarriage of justice, and therefore, certain amount of latitude is permissible in such cases." 12. Considering observation made by Apex Court in both cases, one is related to Sec. 14 of Limitation Act and another is related to Sec. 5 of Limitation Act. Considering observation made by Apex Court in both cases, one is related to Sec. 14 of Limitation Act and another is related to Sec. 5 of Limitation Act. In this case, delay is occurred due to both reasons, one is to approach before wrong forum and another is to approach before this Court. I have considered conduct of present applicant and also bona fide litigation which has been filed before this Court challenging order in Special Civil Application. It suggests and proves that applicant was not remained inaction and there was no question of negligence arise. The mala fide has not been alleged by other side in their reply. Therefore, after considering entire matter according to my opinion, applicant has shown sufficient cause and also satisfactorily explained delay, which covered by both Sec. 5 and 14 of Limitation Act and sufficient cause has been shown to the satisfaction of this Court. Therefore, delay of 905 days is condoned in interest of justice for filing Civil Revision Application before this Court. 13. Accordingly, present application is allowed and delay occurred in filing Civil Revision Application is condoned in interest of justice. Application allowed.