JUDGMENT Hon'ble Prakash Krishna, J. A portion consisting of two rooms one store, bathroom, latrine and kitchen etc. on the first floor of a building bearing Municipal No.16/14 known as Muslim Yateem Khana situate in prime locality of Kanpur city is the subject matter of the present petition. The petitioner as tenant came in occupation of the aforesaid two rooms accommodation in pursuance of an allotment order dated 28.12.1985 in her favour. It was allotted on her application on a presumptive rent of Rs.17.50. The petitioner having failed to pay the rent, thus, committed default in its payment in spite of notice of demand and termination of tenancy, is facing eviction order passed by the two Courts below concurrently in a duly constituted suit being SCC suit No.185 of 2002. The said suit after contest has been decreed for recovery of arrears of rent, damages and eviction by the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court on 17th of November, 2004 confirmed in SCC revision no.86 of 2004 by the Additional District Judge on 4.2.2009. The decree for eviction has been passed principally on the two grounds that (i) the property in dispute is Waqf property to which the provisions of U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 are not applicable in view of Section 2 (1) (bb) of the said Act and that (ii) the defendant tenant/petitioner is in arrears of rent for a period more than four months and has failed to pay the rent and damages in spite of service of notice of demand and determination of tenancy. Therefore, she is liable for eviction under the provisions of the said Act even if the said Act is applicable. 2. The suit was contested by denying the fact that the building in question is Waqf property. So far as default in payment of rent is concerned, it was set out in the written statement that the plaintiff has not accepted the rent from her and as such there is no default. She has deposited the rent under Section 20 (4) of the Act and thus, she may be relieved from the decree of eviction thereunder. 3. Points for determination were framed in the light of the pleadings of the parties by the trial Court. She has deposited the rent under Section 20 (4) of the Act and thus, she may be relieved from the decree of eviction thereunder. 3. Points for determination were framed in the light of the pleadings of the parties by the trial Court. Under the point no.1 it was held that the property in question is Waqf property and therefore it is exempt from the operation of the U.P. Act No.13 of 1972. The tenancy has been validly terminated under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act and the notice has been validly served, was held under the point no.2. Under point no.3, it was found that as against the requisite amount of deposit amounting to Rs.5,104/-, the petitioner has deposited only a sum of Rs.5,000/- and therefore, she is not entitled to invoke the benefit as provided for under Section 20(4) of the said Act. These findings having been accepted by the revisional Court, the present writ petition challenging them has been preferred. 4. Sri M.A. Qadeer, learned senior counsel for the petitioner mainly contended that there is no specific pleading that the property in dispute is a Waqf property. The pleading is to the effect that Muslim Yateem Khana is a society registered under the Societies Registration Act. For creation of a valid Waqf the dedication of property to Almighty is essential. There being the proceedings under the Waqf Act in the form of reference before the Tribunal constituted thereunder, the Courts below were not justified in treating the property in dispute as a Waqf property. The other point canvassed by him is that at any rate, the petitioner tenant has substantially complied with the provisions of Section 20(4) of the Act and the shortfall in the deposit is liable to be ignored. Besides the aforesaid two points, no other point was urged. 5. In contra, Sri M.K. Gupta, Advocate, along with Sri Manish Tandon, Advocate, submitted that the petitioner tenant has accepted in her application for allotment of disputed accommodation that the property in dispute is a Waqf property. She is now estopped to say anything otherwise. She entered into the premises in question armed with the allotment order which was obtained by her on the premises that the property sought to be allotted is Waqf property and the said Waqf property is being managed by the present plaintiff. She is now estopped to say anything otherwise. She entered into the premises in question armed with the allotment order which was obtained by her on the premises that the property sought to be allotted is Waqf property and the said Waqf property is being managed by the present plaintiff. Even otherwise also there are clinching evidence to show that the property in dispute is a Waqf property. It is registered as Waqf property under the U.P. Muslim Waqf Act, 1936 as is clear from the certificate of registration dated 26th of September, 1959 and also it is registered under the Waqf Act, 1995. The property in dispute is recorded as a Waqf property by the statutory authority under the relevant Statute dealing with the registration of Waqfs as Waqf property and that continued to be so the date on which the allotment order in favour of the petitioner was passed and the said position still continues till date. The principle of estoppel as mentioned in Section 116 of the Evidence Act is applicable. 6. On the second point relating to compliance or non compliance of Section 20(4) it was urged that looking to the rate of rent per month, the shortfall of Rs.104/- cannot be said as trifling amount which can be ignored. 7. Considered the respective submissions of the learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. 8. A bare perusal of the plaint would show that in para 1 it is stated that the plaintiff is a registered society duly incorporated under the Societies Registration Act in the name of Anjuman Islamia Muslim Yateem Khana. In para 2 it has been stated that since the disputed property is Waqf property duly registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860, therefore, it is exempt from the operation of the U.P. Act No.13 of 1972. In the face of plaint allegations as contained in para 2, the argument that there is no pleading that the property in question is a Waqf property is liable to be rejected. In para 21 of the written statement the defendant petitioner has set out that the accommodation under tenancy is not Waqf property or the plaintiff is registered body. In the face of plaint allegations as contained in para 2, the argument that there is no pleading that the property in question is a Waqf property is liable to be rejected. In para 21 of the written statement the defendant petitioner has set out that the accommodation under tenancy is not Waqf property or the plaintiff is registered body. On the basis of the pleadings of the parties, as noted herein above points for determination and for that matter as to whether the provisions of the U.P. Act No.13 of 1972 are applicable or not being point no.1 was framed. The parties led evidence in support of their respective stand. The plaintiff filed the certified copy of the registration both under the Societies Registration Act as well as under the Waqf Act, 1995 to show that the property in dispute is a Waqf property and the registration of the society was renewed from time to time and was valid. In other words, the parties knew the point in issue and they led the evidence in support of their respective cases with regard to the question relating to the Waqf. This being so, it cannot be said that the plaintiff has sought a relief which was not pleaded by it before the Courts below. The issue relating to Waqf was put to trial. In this fact situation, it is relevant to reproduce a passage from the judgment of the Apex Court : Bhagwati Vs. Chandra Mauli, AIR 1966 SC 735 , as follows: "If a plea is not specifically made and yet it is covered by an issue by implication and the parties knew that the said plea was involved in the trial, then the mere fact when the plea was not specifically taken in the pleadings would not necessarily disentitle a party from relying upon it if it is specifically proved by evidence. The general rule no doubt is that the relief should be founded on pleadings made by the parties. But where the substantial matters relating to the title of both parties of the suit are touched, though indirectly or even obscurely, in the issues, and evidence has been led about them, then the argument that the particular matter was not specifically taken in the pleadings would be purely formal and technical and cannot succeed in every case. But where the substantial matters relating to the title of both parties of the suit are touched, though indirectly or even obscurely, in the issues, and evidence has been led about them, then the argument that the particular matter was not specifically taken in the pleadings would be purely formal and technical and cannot succeed in every case. What the Court has to consider in dealing with such an objection is did the parties know that the matter in question was involved in the trial, and did they lead evidence about it........................" 9. Then, it was contended that the property in dispute belongs to the plaintiff society registered under the Societies Registration Act as is evident from the paragraph 1 of the plaint and the statement of PW/1 namely Ahsanul Haq Khan. The crux of argument is that the property belongs to a registered society and therefore, it could not be Waqf property. 10. Pointedly, a query was put to the learned senior counsel to support the above argument, with reference to any principle of law or statutory provision which may prohibit or bar a property registered under the Societies Registration Act could not be a Waqf property, but he failed to do so. If the said argument is accepted utterly it would be repugnant to the genius of Section 43 (3) of Waqf Act. Section 43 (3) provides that Waqf Board may suo motu register any property of any trust or society registered in pursuance of the Indian Trust Act, 1982 or under the Societies Registration Act, 1860 or under any other Act, as Waqf property, if it has reason to believe that it is Waqf property, after holding an inquiry in this regard. 11. The other limb of the argument is that the property in dispute though was registered as a Waqf property under the Waqf Act, cancellation of registration was sought for, by filing some application dated 7th of April, 1982 before the Administrator, U.P. Sunni Central Waqf Board, Lucknow and when nothing was done, a reference as provided for under section 29(2) of the U.P. Muslim Waqf Act which was registered as Case No.182 of 1992 was filed before the Waqf Tribunal/Civil Judge, Kanpur Nagar. These proceedings were taken out by one Kwaja Abdul Qadeer claiming himself as General Secretary of Anjuman Yateem Khana Islamia. These proceedings were taken out by one Kwaja Abdul Qadeer claiming himself as General Secretary of Anjuman Yateem Khana Islamia. The case of the plaintiff is that these proceedings were got initiated unauthorisedly by some interested persons with ill motive to grab the property of the Waqf. However, the said proceedings for cancellation of registration as Waqf property were never pursued seriously and were initiated, obviously as they were without any justifiable cause. The fact which was not disputed by Sri M.A. Qadeer, learned senior counsel for the petitioner is that the property in dispute was recorded as Waqf property under the relevant statutory provisions with the statutory authorities and it continued to be so even today. In other words, till date, there is no order by any statutory authority or otherwise holding that the property in question is not a Waqf property. This is the end of the matter. 12. At any rate the petitioner who is tenant is estopped to challenge that the property in question is not a Waqf property. Along with the counter affidavit a true copy of the application for allotment of the disputed accommodation filed by the petitioner before the authority concerned has been annexed as CA-1. Column 15 (e) of the said application reads as follows: (e) "Name and address of the landlord --Waqf Muslim Yateem Khana through Manager" 13. It is an admitted fact that the aforesaid application for allotment was filed by her wherein she has admitted the name and address of the landlord as Waqf Muslim Yateem Khana. The said admission is binding on her being clear cut and specific admission of a fact. Section 116 of the Evidence Act also estops a tenant to challenge the title of landlord. 14. The defendant's husband was examined as DW/1 who has admitted in his cross examination that major portion of the building is used for living purposes of orphans. The office of the orphans is housed in a room. In the cross examination in chief nothing material has been stated as to how the property in dispute is not a Waqf property except that an application for reference against its registration as Waqf was filed by a third person and the said reference has been got dismissed by the present plaintiff respondent. In other words it is admitted fact that orphans are residing therein and there is no evidence to contrary. In other words it is admitted fact that orphans are residing therein and there is no evidence to contrary. 15. It is not out of place to mention here that the land beneath the building was Nazul land which has been got converted into a free-hold land by the plaintiff respondent vide free hold deed dated 5th of August, 2006 on the record executed by the District Magistrate, Kanpur in pursuance of the lease deed dated 1st of March, 1915 for a sum of Rs.75,01,522/-. 16. There is another aspect of the matter yet. Waqfs and matters relating thereto were for a long time governed by Waqf Act, 1954. The need for fresh legislation on the subject was felt. The Waqf Act,1995 was enacted for better administration of Waqfs and matters connected there with or incidental thereto. Its section 6 provides that if any question arises whether a particular property specified as Waqf property in the list of Waqfs is Waqf property or not, the Board or Mutwalli of Waqf or any person interested therein may institute a suit in a Tribunal for decision of the question and the decision of the Tribunal in respect of such matters shall be final. Its proviso provides period of limitation of one year for raising any such dispute from the date of publication of list of Waqfs. Section 85 of the Act bars the jurisdiction of Civil Court. It provides that no such or other proceedings shall lie in any Civil Court in respect of any dispute, question or other matter relating to any Waqf, Waqf property etc. which is required to be determined by a Tribunal under the Act. Constitution of Tribunal etc. had been provided for under section 83 thereof. Having regard to the various provisions of the Waqf Act, 1995 and Sections referred to above in particular, in my considered view, a tenant cannot indirectly raise such an issue with regard to Waqf property in a suit instituted against him for his eviction before a Court of Small Causes which has a limited jurisdiction, particularly, when the jurisdiction of Civil Court relating to such questions is barred. 17. 17. In the light of the above discussions, the petitioner tenant cannot derive any advantage from mere filing of an application or reference before the Tribunal by a person whose motive and identity is doubtful specially when the property in dispute continues to be registered as Waqf property even today. 18. In view of the above, it is not necessary to examine the second point urged by the learned counsel for the petitioner. The buildings belonging to Waqf are exempt from the operation of the U.P. Act No.13 of 1972 under section 2(1) (bb) of the Act. This being so, a tenant cannot take the aid of any provision of the U.P. Act No.13 of 1972 including Section 20(4). Even otherwise also, I find no merit in the second point. 19. With regard to the above, it is not in dispute that as against Rs.5,104/-, the petitioner has deposited a sum of Rs.5,000/- only and has invoked the doctrine of substantial compliance. This point is no more res integra and has been examined in Khubi Ram alias Azad Mantoo Vs. VIIth Additional District Judge, Azamgarh, ARC 2009 (2) 79. The relevant portion is reproduced below: "Legal maxim de minimis non curat lex means the law does not concern itself about the triffles. Explaining the said mistake, in Brooms Legal Maxims it has been said that court of justice generally do not take triffling and immaterial matters into account. Where triffling irregularities or even infractions of the strict letter of the law are brought under the notice of the Court, the maxim de minimis non curat lex is of frequent practical application. The said maxim was invoked by the Apex Court in the case of Umesh Chand Gandhi, referred to above. More or less, same thing has been said by the Apex Court in the case of Mam Chandra Pal (supra). Invoking the said maxim, on the facts of the present case, it may be noticed that monthly rent is Rs. 150/-. The short fall towards monthly rent is more than a month's rent. Percentagewise it comes to more than 2% of the total amount deposited which cannot be covered by invoking maxim de minimis non curat lex. Except making a bald statement that it was due to calculation mistake, there is nothing on the record in support thereof. 150/-. The short fall towards monthly rent is more than a month's rent. Percentagewise it comes to more than 2% of the total amount deposited which cannot be covered by invoking maxim de minimis non curat lex. Except making a bald statement that it was due to calculation mistake, there is nothing on the record in support thereof. It may be remembered that by enacting Section 20(4), which is a beneficial piece of legislation, so far as the tenant is concerned, the Legislature has provided second opportunity to a tenant to get himself relieved by making the deposit of amount mentioned therein. In response to a notice demanding the arrears of rent, a tenant has opportunity to clear the arrears within 30 days from the date of receipt of notice to save himself from the eviction decree. It has been held that while protecting the interest of the tenant, certain limited right has been given to the landlord. A tenant is under obligation to comply with the provisions of the Act strictly if he wishes to take advantage of beneficial provision of the Act. In E. Palanisamy Vs. Palanisamy (dead) by LRs. and others, (2003) 1 Supreme Court Cases 123, the Apex Court has held that consideration of equity is not applicable in the case of clear statutory provision while interpreting Section 8 of Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent) Control Act, 1960. A tenant has to observe the procedure as prescribed in the statute and strict compliance with the procedure is necessary. In this connection, the following observation made by the Apex Court is apposite:- "5. Mr. Sampath, the learned counsel for the appellant argued that since the appellant tenant had deposited the arrears of rent in court, it should be taken as compliance with Section 8 of the Act. This would mean there is no default on the part of tenant in payment of rent and therefore, no eviction order could have been passed against the appellant on that ground. According to the learned counsel, the court should not take a technical view of the matter and should appreciate that it was on account of refusal of the landlords to accept the rent sent by way of money orders that the tenant was driven to move the court for permission to deposit the arrears of rent. According to the learned counsel, the court should not take a technical view of the matter and should appreciate that it was on account of refusal of the landlords to accept the rent sent by way of money orders that the tenant was driven to move the court for permission to deposit the arrears of rent. Since there is a substantial compliance with Section 8 inasmuch as the arrears of rent stand deposited in court, a strict or technical view ought not to have been taken by the High Court. We are unable to accept this contention advanced on behalf of the appellant by the learned counsel. The rent legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the tenants. At the same time, it is well settled that the benefits conferred on the tenants through the relevant statutes can be enjoyed only on the basis of strict compliance with the statutory provisions. Equitable consideration has no place in such matters. The statute contains express provisions. It prescribes various steps which a tenant is required to take. In Section 8 of the Act, the procedure to be followed by the tenant is given step by step. An earlier step is a precondition for the next step. The tenant has to observe the procedure as prescribed in the statute. The tenant cannot straightway jump to the last step i.e. to deposit rent in court. The last step can come only after the earlier steps have been taken by the tenant. We are fortified in this view by the decisions of this Court in Kuldeep Singh V. Ganpal Lal (1996) SCC 243 and M. Bhaskar V. J. Venkatarama Naidu (1996) 6 SCC 228 ." (Emphasis supplied) 20. In the light of above and taking into consideration that there is shortfall of Rs.104/- i.e. non deposit of around seven months' rent at the rate of Rs.17.50, it cannot by any stretch of imagination be held as substantial compliance. The shortfall in deposit of six/seven months' rent is neither trifling nor immaterial. The finding recorded by the Courts below on this score is perfectly justified and legally sound. 21. Thus, the findings recorded by the two Courts below holding that the property in dispute is a Waqf property and the other findings are based on relevant material on record and do not call for any interference in the present petition. 22. The finding recorded by the Courts below on this score is perfectly justified and legally sound. 21. Thus, the findings recorded by the two Courts below holding that the property in dispute is a Waqf property and the other findings are based on relevant material on record and do not call for any interference in the present petition. 22. In view of the above discussion, I do not find any merit in the writ petition. The writ petition is dismissed. By way of interim order, the petitioner was directed to pay the damages at the rate of Rs.500/- per month, from the date of order i.e. 29th of April, 2009. The petitioner must have deposited the damages @ as was directed above. 23. In the result, the writ petition is, therefore, dismissed with cost of Rs.2,000/- (Rupees Two Thousand only). 24. Time to vacate the disputed premises is granted up to 30th September, 2011 provided the petitioner files an undertaking on affidavit before the trial court within a period of one month that she will vacate the disputed premises and will handover its vacant peaceful possession to the landlord without inducting any person therein. The petitioner shall also deposit the entire arrears of rent up to 30th of September, 2011 with the trial court within aforesaid period of one month after adjusting the amount, if any, already paid by her as per order dated 29.4.2009. If the petitioner fails to vacate the disputed accommodation on or before 30th of September, 2011 she will be liable to pay the damages at the rate of Rs.2,000/- per month, thereafter, till the date of actual handing over of possession to the plaintiff landlord. 25. In case of default in compliance of either of the conditions, stipulated above, the time granted under this judgment shall stand discharged and the landlord will be at liberty to put the decree for execution.