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2011 DIGILAW 936 (PNJ)

Gurpreet Singh v. State of Punjab

2011-03-28

GURDEV SINGH

body2011
JUDGMENT GURDEV SINGH, J. 1. The petitioner, Gurpreet Singh son of Lal Singh, was convicted for the offences under Sections 302/34, 376(2)(g) and 201/34 IPC and was sentenced as under:- Sr. Offence under Sentence imposed Fine No. section 1. 302 /34 IPC Life term imprisonment Rs.1000/- In default of payment fine to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of one month 2. 376(2) (g) IPC Rigorous imprisonment Rs.1000/- In default of payment fine to for 10 years undergo rigorous 3. 201/34 IPC Rigorous imprisonment Rs.1000/- In default of payment fine to for a period of three undergo rigorous months by the Additional Sessions Judge, Karnal,vide judgment dated 16.8.2001, in the case registered vide FIR No. 67 dated 3.8.1997 in Police Station, Mehal Kalan. Against that conviction and sentence, an appeal was preferred but the same was dismissed by this Court, upholding the conviction and sentence so recorded by the trial court. The present Criminal Writ Petition has been filed by the petitioner under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India for quashing the impugned order dated 12.11.2010(Annexure P-4), vide which it was held that he is not entitled to be released prematurely. That order has been challenged by him on the ground that he has already undergone actual sentence for a period of 13 years, 03 months and 03 days and the total sentence on 19 years, 08 months and 10 days and as per the Policy dated 8.7.1991, which was in force on the day, he was convicted, he is entitled to premature release after having undergone 12 years of actual sentence and 18 years of total sentence. According to him, Jugraj Singh and Partap Singh, who were convicted, vide the same judgment, have already been released prematurely, though they were also convicted for the offence under Section 366 IPC. Through out his detention in the jail, he maintained good conduct. 2. The facts as stated in the petition, were not denied by the respondents in their replies. However, it has been submitted by respondent No. 1 in the reply, that the impugned order was passed after consideration and due application of mind. The order is legal and valid and has been passed in accordance with the law. 3. I have heard learned counsel for both the sides. 4. However, it has been submitted by respondent No. 1 in the reply, that the impugned order was passed after consideration and due application of mind. The order is legal and valid and has been passed in accordance with the law. 3. I have heard learned counsel for both the sides. 4. It has not been disputed by the respondents that the petitioner has already undergone actual sentence for a period of more than 13 years and a total sentence of more than 19 years. As per the Policy, annexed with the petition as Annexure P-2, which was in force at the time the petitioner was convicted, the convicts who have committed heinous crimes, for the purposes of premature release, were required to undergo actual imprisonment for 12 years and total imprisonment for a period of 18 years. The heinous crimes are defined in that Policy itself and it is admitted case of both the sides that the petitioner was convicted for the offence which has been described as heinous crime in the Policy. Thus, he could have been released prematurely, in case, it was found that he maintained good conduct in jail and has not committed any jail offence for a period of five years prior to the date of his eligibility for consideration. That relief could have been refused to him, if the Government was satisfied that in the event of his release, there was likelihood of his committing a crime or breach of peace in any way connected with the circumstances of the crime for which he was originally convicted. Neither it is the case of the respondents that the petitioner was not having good conduct while confined in the jail nor his case was rejected on the ground that in the event of his release, there was likelihood of his committing crime or breach of peace. A perusal of the impugned order shows that he was not released prematurely on the ground that offences committed by him were horrible and heinous. His case could not have been rejected on that ground. Once the State Government made the Policy, it was bound to give the benefit thereof to the petitioner unless that benefit could have been refused to him on any of the grounds mentioned in the Policy itself. 5. His case could not have been rejected on that ground. Once the State Government made the Policy, it was bound to give the benefit thereof to the petitioner unless that benefit could have been refused to him on any of the grounds mentioned in the Policy itself. 5. It was specifically pleaded by the petitioner in para No. 9(a) of his petition that his co-accused; namely Jugraj Singh and Partap Singh have already been released, vide orders, Annexures P-5 and P-6, though Jugraj Singh had committed more heinous offence as compared to him and that accused was the main accused in the case, who had been convicted for the offence under Section 366 IPC also. The respondents having been cornered by the petitioner, tried to give evasive reply to that para of the petition. They did not admit or deny the facts mentioned in that para. Vide order dated 28.2.2011, they were directed to file a detailed reply to that para, admitting/denying each and every fact stated therein. After that direction, the respondents submitted their replies. Even in the reply, so submitted by respondent No. 1, each and every fact so stated in para No. 9(a) of the petition, was neither admitted nor denied specifically or by necessary implication. However, respondent No. 2 in his reply has admitted each and every fact so stated in that para. If it is so, then what was the ground to make any such discrimination between the present petitioner and those accused, who were convicted under Section 366 IPC also, in addition to the offences for which the petitioner had been convicted. The petitioner was better placed as compared to those accused. The respondents having given the benefit of premature release to those accused could not have denied the same benefit to the present petitioner, unless his case was not covered by the Policy or he was to be refused that relief on the grounds mentioned in the Policy itself. As already observed, it is not the case of the respondents that the conduct of this petitioner in the jail was not good or that his case was rejected on the ground that there is likelihood of his committing crime or breach of peace. The State Government was not expected to make such like discrimination and to violate the very basic principle enshrined in the Constitution of India regarding equality. The State Government was not expected to make such like discrimination and to violate the very basic principle enshrined in the Constitution of India regarding equality. This Court feels that in future the State Government will not be failing in its duty to abide by the principles and the provisions of the Constitution of India and to keep in mind the very basic principles as enshrined in the Preamble thereof. 6. In view of the above discussion, this petition is hereby accepted. The order dated 12.11.2010 is hereby quashed and the State Government is directed to release the petitioner prematurely in accordance with the Policy, Annexure P-2. It is directed to pass necessary orders within one month of the passing of this order.