Judgment K.M. Thaker, J.—The appellant, a Co-operative Housing Society (original petitioner) has preferred present appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent against the order dated 9.3.2009 passed by the learned Single Judge rejecting the petition preferred by it against the orders dated 20.9.1992 and 19.11.1998 passed by the Collector of Stamp Duty and the Chief Controlling Authority respectively. 1.1 The Collector of Stamp Duty Valuation, by his order dated 20.9.1992 determined that the document in question was not adequately stamped. The said authority quantified the deficit at Rs. 2,62,450/-and also imposed fine of Rs. 25,000/-. The appellant herein carried the said order in Appeal before the Chief Controlling Revenue Authority who, after considering the appeal, rejected the appeal and confirmed the order passed by the first authority as regards the decision regarding the deficit in the duty paid by the appellant, however modified the order imposing fine and reduced it to Rs. 250/- from Rs. 25,000/- as originally imposed. Aggrieved by the said order of the appellate authority the appellant herein preferred writ petition which came to be dismissed by the impugned judgment. Thus, except to the extent of quantification of fine imposed by the first authority, two concurrent decisions by the statutory authorities and the judgment passed by the learned Single Judge rejecting the petition, and thereby approving the order of the appellate authority are before us. 2. The facts in backdrop of which present appeal is preferred can be summarized thus. 2.1 A parcel of land bearing Survey No. 291-292 admeasuring about 7319 sq. mtrs (hereinafter referred to as the “land in question”) was in the hands and under the ownership of deceased Motibhai Kalyanbhai. The heirs of the said Motibhai Kalyanbhai were impleaded as respondent Nos. 5 to 7 in the petition before the learned Single Judge. 2.2 The land in question was excess vacant land in the hands of the said respondents and that therefore it was liable to be declared as such and the consequences of such declaration would then follow. 2.3 However, the original landowners made application under Section 21 of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 (“ULC” for short) to the competent authority seeking permission to continue to hold the land in question for the purpose of developing dwelling units for weaker section. 2.3 However, the original landowners made application under Section 21 of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 (“ULC” for short) to the competent authority seeking permission to continue to hold the land in question for the purpose of developing dwelling units for weaker section. 2.4 The competent authority, vide order dated 30.8.1998 sanctioned the scheme-application under Section 21 of the ULC Act. It is pertinent that the said order, in terms, recorded that the lands were liable to be declared as surplus under Section 4(1) of the ULC Act. 2.5 It is also pertinent to note that the scheme was sanctioned subject to certain conditions which the landowners had to comply. 2.6 The order recorded that the landowners had undertaken to abide by and comply the conditions prescribed in the sanction order. It was on the prescribed condition and undertaking given to comply the said condition that the competent authority granted permission under Section 21 of the ULC Act. 2.7 It appears that it was after this stage that the appellant society entered into the picture. It seems that the original landowner had given authority to the appellant-petitioner society to undertake the construction work and develop the units. In view of the said agreement the petitioner society has entered into the ring of dispute. 2.8 After the construction work was completed the original landowners entered into a sale deed with appellant-petitioner society transferring the land at price of Rs. 1,41,807.01. 2.9 The parties to the said agreement (i.e. original landowners and the society) incorporated a clause in the agreement that only the land was transferred. 2.10 As per the claim of the petitioners, supported by the original landowners, adequate stamp was affixed on the document in question and accordingly requisite stamp duty was paid. 2.11 Upon scrutiny of the document and the transaction in question, the authority formed the opinion that there was a deficit in the stamp affixed on the document. Therefore notice was issued and the petitioner-appellant was heard. 2.12 After the hearing, the Collector of stamp duty passed the above referred order dated 20.9.1999 and quantified the deficit stamp duty at Rs. 2,62,450/- and demanded the said amount under the aforesaid order. The authority also imposed fine of Rs. 25,000/-. Therefore notice was issued and the petitioner-appellant was heard. 2.12 After the hearing, the Collector of stamp duty passed the above referred order dated 20.9.1999 and quantified the deficit stamp duty at Rs. 2,62,450/- and demanded the said amount under the aforesaid order. The authority also imposed fine of Rs. 25,000/-. 2.13 It deserves to be noted herein that the said conclusion was arrived at on the premise that the transfer-conveyance was inclusive of the superstructure (the dwelling units built after the conditional permission) and that therefore the cost of superstructure was required to be taken into account. 2.14 Aggrieved by the said order the petitioner-appellant preferred appeal which came to be disposed of by order dated 19.11.1998. The appellate authority interfered only in respect of the order imposing the penalty and reduced the amount from Rs. 25,000/- to Rs. 250/- however confirmed rest of the order. 2.15 The appellant-petitioner thereafter, assailed the said order mainly on the ground that it was only the land in question which was transferred by the landowners to the petitioner society and the superstructure was constructed by the petitioner society and that therefore the authority could not have demanded additional stamp duty in respect of the cost of superstructure. 2.16 The learned Single Judge did not find any merits in the contention and came to the conclusion that though the superstructure was put up by the petitioner society it was the task of the original owners and that therefore it cannot be construed that the sale deed in question transferred only the land in question. Hence present Appeal. 3. Heard Mr. P.M. Bhatt, learned Advocate for the petitioner and Mr. J.K. Shah, learned AGP for the Respondent No. 1 to 4 while Mr. A. R. Lakhia, learned Advocate has appeared for Respondent No. 5 to 7. We have perused the record. With the consent of the parties the Appeal is heard for final decision. 4. Mr. Bhatt, learned Advocate for the appellant society submitted, inter alia, that the terms between the parties to the agreement, as incorporated in the sale deed in dispute, are amply clear. We have perused the record. With the consent of the parties the Appeal is heard for final decision. 4. Mr. Bhatt, learned Advocate for the appellant society submitted, inter alia, that the terms between the parties to the agreement, as incorporated in the sale deed in dispute, are amply clear. It is clearly spelt out in the disputed agreement that the landowners, by virtue of the said conveyance deed, conveyed only the land and the superstructure was put up by the petitioner society and that therefore the appellant-petitioner society cannot be saddled with the liability of additional stamp duty in respect of the cost of construction inasmuch as the superstructure was never transferred by the landowners. He submitted that the demand by the respondent authority is unjustified and contrary to the provision of the Stamp Act. He submitted that the disputed sale deed has been misconstrued by the authority and also by the learned Single Judge. He further submitted that what was not sold could not have been presumed to have been sold and what was not of the original landowners could not have been sold. He also submitted that the relevant guidelines have also been misconstrued. He submitted that impugned orders are unjustified, contrary to the provision of the Act and passed on misinterpretation of the disputed documents. 4.1 Per contra Mr. Shah, learned AGP submitted that the obligation to construct the units was primarily on the landowners and that was the main condition of the order granting permission under Section 21 of the ULC Act. Mr. Shah, learned AGP referred to and relied upon the guidelines for granting permission under Section 21 of the ULC Act. He also referred to the provision under Section 21 of the ULC Act and Rule 11-A of ULC Act as well as Schedule I-A and submitted that the ownership of the land does not get transfered until the construction is carried out. He also submitted that scheme and the permission under Section 21 of ULC Act envisaged that construction shall have to be carried out by the landowners. 5. He also submitted that scheme and the permission under Section 21 of ULC Act envisaged that construction shall have to be carried out by the landowners. 5. There is no dispute about (i) the ownership of the land in question, or about the fact that the lands in question were liable to declared as excess vacant land in the hands of the landowners and (ii) on the point that having regard to the fact that lands were liable to the declared as excess vacant land the landowners had made application under Section 21 of the ULC Act seeking permission to continue to hold the land in question for the purpose of developing dwelling units for weaker section and (iii) also so far as the price of the lands and the cost of construction is concerned. Any dispute with regard to the quantification and determination of the construction cost and/or about the quantification of the stamp duty on the basis of the construction cost also was not and is not raised. The dispute is, fundamentally, against (i) the decision of the authority holding that the superstructure was also transferred and (ii) demanding duty in respect of the cost of such superstructure. 5.1 The crux of the diverse contentions raised by the appellant is that the construction was put up by the society at its own cost and that the landowners had allowed the petitioner society to undertake and complete the construction work whereas the landowners had merely transferred the land in question to the society and in turn the appellant society had purchased merely the land in question. The conveyance deed also clearly showed that the landowners transferred only the land in question and that therefore any stamp duty with regard to the superstructure cannot be demanded. Thus the stamp duty would be payable only on the property conveyed. 5.2 The contention is misconceived and overlooks the condition subject to which the permission under Section 21 of the ULC Act was granted. Thus the stamp duty would be payable only on the property conveyed. 5.2 The contention is misconceived and overlooks the condition subject to which the permission under Section 21 of the ULC Act was granted. It is pertinent that the said Section 21 provides, that the competent authority may decide that the excess vacant land in the hands of the owner may not be treated as such for the purpose of Chapter-III and may permit the landowners to construct the dwelling units for the weaker section and for that purpose the authority may permit the landowners to continue to hold the land subject to the conditions which may be prescribed. 5.3 In present case it is not in dispute that the lands in question were otherwise excess vacant land in the hands of the landowners and were liable to be declared as such and the landowners had made an application under Section 21 of the ULC Act and sought permission as noted earlier. 5.4 It is also not in dispute that the competent authority granted permission subject to various conditions and one of the conditions which were prescribed was that until the construction work was completed the landowners will not be entitled and will not be allowed to sell, gift or transfer, in any manner, the land in question and after the completion of construction, the landowners shall have to give advertisement and allot the units at the fixed price and it would be open to the Government to purchase the units at fixed price. 5.5 At this stage it is pertinent to note that in view of the provision under the ULC Act, sale of the land in question is, otherwise prohibited under Section 6 of the ULC Act and it was only in view of the application under Section 21 of the ULC Act that the landowners were permitted to continue to hold the land in question for constructing the dwelling units for weaker section and the declaration under the Act and the post-declaration consequences did not follow. However the said permission was saddled with the obligation to not to sell or transfer in any manner the land in question before construction work was over. 5.6 The conditions, including the aforesaid condition, prescribed by the competent authority in the order in respect of Section 21 applications are to be found in Schedule 1A under the Act. However the said permission was saddled with the obligation to not to sell or transfer in any manner the land in question before construction work was over. 5.6 The conditions, including the aforesaid condition, prescribed by the competent authority in the order in respect of Section 21 applications are to be found in Schedule 1A under the Act. The relevant terms, prescribed under Schedule 1A (in view of Rule 11A), read thus:— 3. The construction of the dwelling-units shall be completed within five years from the date on which the declaration is made by the Competent Authority under Sub-section (1) of Section 21, permitting the person concerned to continue to hold the vacant land for the purpose specified in that Sub-section. 5. Between the date on which a declaration in relation to the vacant land is made by the Competent Authority under Sub-section (1) of Section 21 and the date of completion of the construction of the dwelling units, the person concerned shall not transfer the land by way of sale, gift, lease or otherwise; Provided that such person may mortgage it without possession to the State Government of Central Government or a Bank as defined in Section 19 for getting a loan for the purpose of constructing such a dwelling-units. (emphasis supplied) 5.7 Obviously it is in view of the said provision that the authority prescribed the said condition while granting the permission. 5.8 The condition prescribed by the authority vide order passed on application under Section 21 makes it clear that construction work was to be carried by the landowners and until then (i.e. until the completion of construction) the transfer, by any mode, of the land was impermissible. Such condition being part of schedule 1-A under the Act, any other interpretation as regards the restriction and obligation on the part of original landowners, would be contrary to the provision and scheme of the Act. 5.9 Thus, it is clear that but for the permission granted under Section 21 of the Act the landowners could not have continued to hold and/or sell the land to the appellant-petitioner society. 5.10 It is also clear that the original landowners could not have escaped, and cannot be permitted – even indirectly – to wriggle out of, their obligation to construct the dwelling units and complete such construction before selling or transferring, in any manner, the land in question to any one. 5.10 It is also clear that the original landowners could not have escaped, and cannot be permitted – even indirectly – to wriggle out of, their obligation to construct the dwelling units and complete such construction before selling or transferring, in any manner, the land in question to any one. As per the prescribed condition before selling/transferring the land in question the construction work of the dwelling units for weaker section had to be completed, and that therefore on the date on which the conveyance was executed, the constructed dwelling units had to be (and actually they were) existing and consequently what would be the sold/conveyed would be the land in question alongwith the superstructure. 5.11 The obligation to complete the construction work of the dwelling units before selling/transferring the land in question was on the original landowners and that therefore it is incomprehensible and unpalatable as to how the appellant-society could contend, in face of such condition, that the landowners had merely transferred the land in question, whereas without completing the construction the land could not have been sold. Our attention was drawn to the guidelines by the Government, particularly the circular dated 19.3.1979. However, before we advert to the terms mentioned in the said circular, it is necessary to refer to the circular dated 29.12.1976, particularly Clause 64(A) (1) and (5) which read thus:— 64(A) Construction of dwelling units for the weaker sections of society 1. Please refer to this Ministry’s letter No. 1/56/76-UCU dated 19.12.1977. Schedule 1A of Rule 11A of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Rules, 1976 prescribes the conditions for permitting a person to utilise his excess land for constructing houses for weaker sections of society. One of the conditions is that the dwelling units may be sold outright or by hire purchase or let out to people in the weaker sections of society, and that the sale price of the dwelling units should be calculated as in Para 4(2) of Schedule 1A. The sale price include an element of land cost which is equal to the amount payable for the land if it were acquired by the Government under the Act. 5. Very often landowners may not be able to undertake the construction themselves, and may like to associate a builder or collaborator to construct the dwelling units and dispose of them. The sale price include an element of land cost which is equal to the amount payable for the land if it were acquired by the Government under the Act. 5. Very often landowners may not be able to undertake the construction themselves, and may like to associate a builder or collaborator to construct the dwelling units and dispose of them. There is no objection to a landowner who is permitted under Section 21(1) to retain the land entering into such an agreement with a contractor or builder as does not offend Section 21(1) But no actual transfer of land or transfer of rights in the land to the contractor or builder should take place. 5.12 It can be seen from the conjoint reading of the aforesaid provisions that between the date on which permission is granted and the date on which the construction of the dwelling units is completed, the landowners must not transfer/sale the land in any manner (though mortgage is not prohibited). The guidelines, make it clear that “But no actual transfer of land or transfer of rights in the land to the contractor or builder should take place”. 5.13 We may now refer to the circular which was cited before us i.e. the circular dated 19.3.1979. The clause No. 2 of the said circular reads thus:— “2. Assuming that the landowner will retain the land till the dwelling units are constructed on it and transfer to the individual buyers who are members of the housing co-operative society and assuming that the housing co-operative society is going to construct the dwelling units by borrowing from the apex co-operative society finance society or other financial institutions or raising money from its members, all that is necessary is that the land in question should be placed by the landowner at the disposal of the society so that it is enabled to mortgage it to the financial institution and obtain a loan and also to enable the society to undertake construction of the dwelling units, the landowner all along retaining the ownership of the land till the dwelling units are constructed and completed and transferred to the individual buyers of the dwelling units, who are members of the housing co-operative society. To achieve this, it is enough if the landowner executes a Power of attorney which will: (1) authorise the co-operative society to mortgage the land raise moneys; (2) authorise the co-operative society to construct dwelling units in accordance with the approved scheme with the money so raised and with the moneys advanced by the members of the co-operative society or raised from other sources in accordance with the conditions prescribed under Section 21 and the scheme approved by the authority notified by the Government under Section 21 and in accordance with the local municipal building regulations; and (3) require the co-operative society to render proper accounts to the owner of the land in regard to the resources so raised and the expenditure incurred in the construction of the houses.” The said clause is, however required to be read along with the below mentioned provisions:— “In addition, it is also necessary that the landowner and the buyer which is the housing co-operative society execute an agreement which will provide (1) that the excess land owner shall on the completion of the construction of the dwelling units transfer the land and the dwelling units to the members of the society. (2) that in respect of the land and the dwelling units so transferred, the excess landowners shall be paid and amount calculated in accordance with Para 4(2) of Schedule IA of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Rules, 1976; and (3) that the amount spent by the co-operative society in pursuance of the agreement shall be repaid to it with interest by the owner.” 5.14 It emerges from the conjoint reading of above referred two circulars and the guidelines that while permitting the landowner to engage contractor or builder or society to complete the construction work the guidelines clearly require/mandate that the landowners shall have to retain the land until the dwelling units are constructed and until then actual transfer of land or the rights in the land shall not take place. 5.15 It also becomes clear from the conjoint reading of the conditional permission, the guidelines, the circular and the agreement, that merely for the sake of convenience in discharging their obligation (imposed by the condition prescribed by the authority) the landowner had, by deriving support from the circular/guidelines asked the appellant society to construct the units and in turn, the appellant society had undertaken the execution of the landowners’ obligation to complete the construction of dwelling units, so that the scheme can be implemented. 5.16 The obligation of completing the construction work was cast on the original landowners. The guidelines and Scheduled-1A r/w Rule-11-A, for the sake of convenience, permit the landowner to engage a contractor or builder or a housing society to execute the said work but that does not mean that the landowner(s) can completely shift the entire obligation of completing the construction of the dwelling units to a third party i.e. to a developer or housing society and thereby escape his obligation and nullify or render otiose, the important condition of the permission granted under Section 21 of the ULC Act. The internal arrangement (asking or permitting the appellant to construct the dwelling units) between the parties to the disputed sale deed would not, and cannot be allowed to completely wipe-out the main condition which formed the basis of the permission under Section 27 of the ULC Act. Such reading of the provision and/or the guidelines would make the primary and fundamental condition, subject to which the permission was granted, absolutely redundant. 5.17 Having regard to such position emerging from the relevant provision of the order passed under Section 21 the learned Single Judge has observed, in paragraph 10 that:— “10....By no legal fiction, can it be construed that under the sale deed in question, it was only the land which was transferred from the land owners to the society and not the superstructure thereon. Considered from any angle, such interpretation would be impermissible. It would amount to permitting the land owners to sale the land which was other-wise liable to be declared excess and sale thereof was prohibited under the ULC Act.” After the foregoing discussion about the provisions and our conclusions, we do not see any reason to take a different view. Considered from any angle, such interpretation would be impermissible. It would amount to permitting the land owners to sale the land which was other-wise liable to be declared excess and sale thereof was prohibited under the ULC Act.” After the foregoing discussion about the provisions and our conclusions, we do not see any reason to take a different view. 5.18 With regard to the appellants’ submission that the first authority did not consider various contentions raised by it, and/or that certain material which was requested for was not made available to it, the learned Single Judge has observed in Paragraphs 11 and 12 of the impugned order that:— 11. It is true that order passed by the Collector is not elaborate and may not have taken into account certain contentions raised by the petitioner. However, only on that count when I find that otherwise the order is legal, the proceedings need not fail. 12. The contention that certain material was not made available to the petitioner also would not be fatal to the order under challenge since all factual aspects are admitted and legal contentions have been examined. 5.19 We do not find any justification to take different view and/or to set aside the orders including the order passed by the first authority on such ground. We are of the view that the decision by the learned Single Judge is, in the facts of the case, wholly justified. So far as the contention that the Collector cannot insist for a composite sale or composite conveyance-deed is concerned, the said contention, in our view is misconceived. The learned Single is right and justified in holding that it was the appellant society who entered into the sale deed with the landowners as a result of which and pursuant to which the superstructure (in respect of which the stamp duty was not paid) came to be passed on to the appellant. Once the disputed document is adequately stamped it would be open to the society, in turn, to govern the right, title and interest of the third person on such terms as it considers appropriate. It would, however, be a matter of internal arrangement between the society and its member which has nothing to do with the question about adequate stamping of the disputed document. It would, however, be a matter of internal arrangement between the society and its member which has nothing to do with the question about adequate stamping of the disputed document. In view of the foregoing discussion we are of the view that the appellant has failed to make out any case against the impugned orders and the contentions raised by the appellants are without merits. In our considered view the orders impugned before the learned Single Judge do not suffer from any infirmity and the learned Single Judge has not erred in rejecting the petition. Besides this, even otherwise the Letters Patent Appeal against two concurrent orders by the statutory authorities, which have been approved by the learned Single Judge, does not deserve to be entertained. Thus, on overall consideration the appeal, fails and it is hereby rejected. There shall, however, be no order as to cost. P P P P P