K Tyre & Industries Ltd. Rep by its General Manager v. Assistant Commissioner of Central Excise
2011-01-22
K.GOVINDARAJULU, SUBHASH B.ADI, V.G.SABHAHIT
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DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT : 1. This matter is place before this Bench for answering the question of law, as to whether the Division Bench decision of this Court in Commissioner of Central Excise, Bangalore III V/S Denso Kirloskar Industry Private Limited reported in 2008 (224) ELT 207 (Kar) requires reconsideration. 2. In the order of reference dated 31.7.2008 it is observed that, the decision of the Division Bench of this Court in the said case in Commissioner of Central Excise, Bangalore III Vs. Denso Kirloskar Industry Private Limited requires reconsideration, as the Division Bench of this Court while interpreting the provisions of Section 35C(2) held that, no order on the application for rectification can be passed beyond the period of six months and accordingly the learned judges have referred the matter to the Full Bench. 3. It is further observed that, in view of the argument submitted by the learned counsel that, the said period of six months is only a period for filing the application and not for disposal of the application for rectification. Hence, decision of the Division Bench requires reconsideration. 4. We have heard the learned counsel appearing for the appellant and the learned senior standing counsel for the Central Government. 5. Learned counsel appearing for the appellant submitted that, the appeal is filed being aggrieved of the order passed by the Customs, Excise & Service Tax Appellate Tribunal (hereinafter referred to as ‘CESTAT’) dated 6.5.2008, wherein the tribunal has rejected the application for rectification of its order filed in time as having become infructuous, following the decision of this Court in Commissioner of Central Excise, Bangalore III Vs. Denso Kirloskar Industry Private Limited referred to above .
Denso Kirloskar Industry Private Limited referred to above . It is the contention of the learned counsel appearing for the appellant that, the interpretation of Section 35C(2) of the Central Excise Act as per the decision of the Division Bench in the said case of Denso Kirloskar requires reconsideration in view of the decision of the Honorable Supreme Court, wherein, the principle has been laid down while interpreting the identical provision of Section 254 of the Income Tax Act, 1961 and it has been clearly held that, the Section comprises of two parts and the limitation of four years prescribed for exercising the power of rectification of the order applicable only where the authority of the tribunal proceeds to exercise suo-moto power and it is not applicable to the second part where the power of rectification can be exercise on the application filed by the party of the proceedings. 6. In support of his contention he has relied upon the decision of the Honorable Supreme Court in the case of SREE AYYANAR SPG & WVG. MILLS LID. Vs. COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX reported in 2008(229) E.L.T. 164 (S.C.). He has taken us through the provisions of Section 254(2) and contents of para 9 and 10 of the said decision wherein the principles laid down by the Honorable Supreme Court. 7. On the other hand, in response to the argument of the learned counsel appearing for the appellant, the learned senior standing counsel for the Central Government submitted that, the provisions of Section 35C(2) provides that, there should be expeditious disposal of the application of rectification and therefore, the proceedings has to be disposed of within six months. 8. We have given careful consideration of the contention of the learned counsel appearing for the parties and scrutinized the material on record.
8. We have given careful consideration of the contention of the learned counsel appearing for the parties and scrutinized the material on record. Section 35C(2) of the Central Excise Act, 1944 reads as follows: 35C(2): The Appellate Tribunal may, at any time within six months from the date of the order, with a view to rectifying any mistake apparent from the record, amend any order passed by it under sub-section (1) and shall make such amendments if the mistake is brought to its notice by the Commissioner of Central Excise or the or her party tot he appeal: PROVIDED that an amendment which has the effect of enhancing a assessment or reducing a refund or otherwise increasing the liability of the other party, shall not be made under this sub-section, unless the Appellate Tribunal has given notice to him of its intention to do so and has allowed him a reasonable opportunity of being heard”. The provisions of Section 254(2) of the Income Tax Act reads as follows: “The Appellate Tribunal, may at any time within four years from the date of the order, with a view to rectifying any mistake apparent from the record, amend any order passed by it under sub-section (1), and shall make such amendment if the mistake is brought to its notice by the assessee or the Assessing Officer.” 9. It is clear from the perusal of the above said provisions that; the provisions of Section 35C(2) of the Central Excise Act, 1944 and the provisions of Section 254(2) of the Income Tax Act are identical. 10. The interpretation of the provisions of Section 254(2) of the Income Tax Act, had come up for consideration by the Honorable Supreme Court in SREE AYYANAR SPG & WVG. MILLS LIMITED Vs. COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX 2008(220)ELT 164(SC) and following law has been laid down by Honorable Supreme Court in Para 9 and 10 which reads as under: “Para 9: Analysing the above provisions, we are of the view the Section 254(2) is in two parts. Under the first part, the Appellate Tribunal may, at any time, within four years from the date of the order, rectify any mistake apparent from the record and amend any order passed by it under sub-section (1).
Under the first part, the Appellate Tribunal may, at any time, within four years from the date of the order, rectify any mistake apparent from the record and amend any order passed by it under sub-section (1). Under the second part of Section 254(2) reference is t the amendment of the order passed by the Tribunal under sub-section (1) when the mistake is brought to its notice by the assessee or the Assessing Officer. Therefore, in short the first part of Section 254(2) refers to suo motu exercise of the power of rectification by the Tribunal whereas the second part refers to rectification and amendment on an application being made by the Assessing Officer or the assessee pointing out the mistake apparent from the record. In this case, we are concerned with the second part of Section 254(2). As stated above, application for rectification was made within your years. Application was well within four years. It is the Tribunal which took its own time to dispose of the application. Therefore, in the circumstances, the High Court had erred in holding that the application could not have been entertained by the Tribunal beyond four years. Para 10. In this connection, our attention is also invited to the judgment of the Rajasthan High Court in the case of Harshvardhan Chemicals and Minerals Limited Vs. Union of India and another (2002 (256) ITR 767) wherein an identical controversy arose for determination and the view taken by that Court was as follows:- “Once the assessee has moved the application within four years from the date of appeal, the Tribunal cannot reject that application on the ground that four years have lapsed, which includes the period of pendency of the application before the Tribunal. If the assessee has moved the application within four years from the date of the order, the Tribunal is bound to decide the application on the merits and not on the ground of limitation. Section 254(2) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, lays down that, the Appellate Tribunal may at any time within four years from the date of the order rectify the mistake apparent from the record but that does not mean that if the application is moved within the period allowed, i.e., four years, and remains pending before the Tribunal, after the expiry of four years the Tribunal can reject the application on the ground of limitation.” 11.
In view of the principles laid down by the Honorable Supreme Court while interpreting identical provisions under the Income Tax Act, which is identical to provisions of Section 35C(2) of the Central Excise Act has to be applied by holding that Section 35C(2) contains two parts, limitation prescribed i.e. six months under the Central Excise Act having regard to the principles laid down above, is application for disposal of the application for rectification to the first part, wherein the Tribunal or Authority, exercises suo-moto power and the said period of limitation for disposal of the proceeding for rectification would not be applicable in respect to the application filed by the aggrieved party. Therefore, the decision of the Division Bench of this Court in Commissioner of Central Excise, Bangalore III Vs. Denso Kirloskar Industry Private Limited reported in 2008(224)ELT 207, wherein the Division Bench has held that, the application for rectification though filed in time, has not been disposed of within six months, same would become infructuous and no order can be passed after six months from the date of the order which is sought to be rectified, does not lay down the correct law and is required to be over ruled. Accordingly, following the principles laid down in the Honorable Supreme Court in Sree Ayyanar SPG & WVG. Mills Ltd. Vs. Commissioner of Income Tax reported in 2008(229) ELT 164 (SC), we hold that, the decision of the Division Bench of this Court in Commissioner of Central Excise Bangalore III Vs. Denso Kirloskar Industry Private Limited 2008(224) ELT 207 does not lay down the correct law and the same is over ruled. 12. The main appeal is taken up for final hearing with the consent of the learned counsel appearing for the parties. 13. It is clear from the order which is impugned in this appeal that the order passed by the CESTAT is passed only on the principles laid down in the Division Bench of this Court in Commissioner of Central Excise Vs.
13. It is clear from the order which is impugned in this appeal that the order passed by the CESTAT is passed only on the principles laid down in the Division Bench of this Court in Commissioner of Central Excise Vs. Denso Kirloskar Industry Private Limited 2008(224)ELT 207 and tribunal has not gone into the merits of the case and following the judgment of the tribunal in the impugned order has held that, since the period of six months has expired from the date of filing of the order, the application for rectification and in view of answer to the question of law, the decision of the Division Bench of this Court in Commissioner of Central Excise, Bangalore III Vs. Denso Kirloskar Industry Private Limited 2008(224) ELT 207 does not lay down the correct law and the period of six months for disposal of the application for rectification would not be applicable, when the power is exercised on the application filed by the aggrieved party, the order passed by the tribunal cannot be sustained. In view of answer to the substantial question of law that is referred to this Bench, the impugned order of the Tribunal cannot be sustained and the same is set aside and remitted and we pass the following order: The appeal is allowed. The order passed by Customs, Excise and Service Tax Appellate Tribunal, South Zonal Bench, FKCCI, WTC Building, K.R.Road, Bangalore-09 in E/ROM/58/2006 is set aside and the matter is remitted to the CESTAT for fresh consideration of the application for rectification in accordance with law.