Judgment : The Court: An objection on the ground of territorial jurisdiction pertaining to a request under Section 11 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 is more of an avoidable irritant, since in such proceedings, unlike in a full-fledged action, the only thing that a Chief Justice or his designate is required to do is to make a decision on whether there are live claims to go to arbitration and, if so, set up the arbitral tribunal. Yet, judicial propriety demands that the Chief Justice or his designate receiving a request under Section 11 of the Act keep within the bounds of authority. The two points canvassed by the respondent here, though of similar ultimate effect, question the authority of the Chief Justice of this Court or his designate, in varying degrees, to take up this matter. The respondent says that since the disputes between the parties relate to a land which is situated in Delhi, no Court in this State could have received an application pertaining to the proposed reference and, as a consequence, the Chief Justice of this Court or his designate would not have the authority to receive a request under Section 11 of the Act in respect of such proposed reference. The other challenge is on the ground of Section 42 of the 1996 Act. The respondent says that since there was, admittedly, a petition filed under Section 9 of the 1996 Act pertaining to this arbitration agreement before the Delhi High Court, all subsequent applications in respect of the agreement have per force to be carried to the Delhi High Court. Though, in the ultimate analysis, the petitioner failing on either count of challenge will have the identical effect, the two objections are qualitatively different. In the second case, there is a fundamental challenge thrown to the authority of the Chief Justice of this Court or his designate to receive the request. In the other case, the challenge has more to do with whether the authority under Section 11 of the 1996 Act can, on facts, be exercised by the Chief Justice of this Court or his designate. In the other case, the challenge has more to do with whether the authority under Section 11 of the 1996 Act can, on facts, be exercised by the Chief Justice of this Court or his designate. It is, thus, that the second challenge urged by the respondent has to be taken up first since, if it is found that the Chief Justice of this Court or his designate did not have the authority to receive the request, the matter would end there without any assessment being required as to whether the nature of the disputes would make the reference a suit for land. In support of the respondent’s contention on such ground, a Division Bench judgment reported at 2008 (3) Cal LT 1 (Visva Bharati vs Sarkar & Sarkar) is placed. A recent Single Bench judgment reported at AIR 2011 Cal 82 (Ranjita Apartment Owners’ Association vs Prabir Kumar Chakraborty) is also cited. The respondent suggests that in view of the Division Bench judgment and the more recent opinion of a single Judge of this Court, the position as recognised in a previous Single Bench judgment reported at 2007 (3) Cal LT 43 (Apeejay Oxford Bookstores Private Limited vs Hotel Leela Venture Limited) is no longer good law. Before any discussion can be attempted on the legal proposition as to whether Section 42 of the 1996 Act would have any bearing on a request under Section 11 of that Act to a Chief Justice or his designate, some fundamental rules as to judicial propriety need to be established. The discussion must be prefaced with a note that certainty and consistency are at the root of a mature judicial system. A legal pronouncement of a superior forum, in our hierarchical structure, when cited before an inferior forum is binding on the inferior forum, subject to the condition that the authority of the superior forum is not per inquirium. The expression “per inquirium,” in the context of a judicial opinion, literally implies that a judgment has been rendered in ignorance of law. A judgment can be said to have been rendered in ignorance of the law and, therefore, having no binding value, if such judgment is contrary to any statute or it is contrary to the judgment of a superior forum. A judgment can be said to have been rendered in ignorance of the law and, therefore, having no binding value, if such judgment is contrary to any statute or it is contrary to the judgment of a superior forum. If a judgment of a Division Bench is placed before a single Judge of the same High Court, then the law recognised in such judgment is binding for all practical purposes unless the judgment is patently contrary to the applicable statute or it is contrary to a Supreme Court judgment. If, however, the Division Bench judgment notices a Supreme Court judgment and reads a legal issue discussed in the Supreme Court judgment to imply something that the Supreme Court decision clearly does not say, it is such interpretation which is binding on the single Judge of the same High Court and the single Judge has no room to interpret the Supreme Court judgment in any natural or ordinary way other than as read by the Division Bench. If a Single Bench judgment of a High Court on a point of law is cited before a subsequent Single Bench of the same Court, it is binding on the later Single Bench. The only recourse that the subsequent Judge may have, if he does not agree with the previous opinion, is to refer the matter to a larger Bench. The case is similar if a Division bench judgment is cited before a subsequent Division Bench of the same Court and the subsequent Division Bench does not agree with the view expressed in the previous one. The matter is slightly different if a Supreme Court judgment is cited before a High Court. As to the binding nature of Supreme Court judgments, inter se, it is elementary that a Constitution Bench judgment will prevail over judgments of the Supreme Court rendered by lesser Benches. If, however, there are two Supreme Court judgments of varying import on the same point of law delivered by Benches of coordinate strength without the later judgment noticing the previous view, the High Court – be it a Division Bench or a Single Bench – has the option to choose the one more suited to the case at hand. If, however, there are two Supreme Court judgments of varying import on the same point of law delivered by Benches of coordinate strength without the later judgment noticing the previous view, the High Court – be it a Division Bench or a Single Bench – has the option to choose the one more suited to the case at hand. However, the choice arises only in a situation where the subsequent Supreme Court judgment has not noticed or considered the previous view of the Supreme Court rendered by a Bench of the same strength. If the subsequent Supreme Court Bench of the same strength has noticed the previous view and has read it down, it is the subsequent view which becomes binding. In the instant case, Visva Bharati says that Section 42 of the 1996 Act will have a telling effect as to the destination of subsequent applications under Part I of the 1996 Act if a previous request under the Section 11 of the Act has been carried to a particular Chief Justice. The judgment was rendered in an appeal arising out of an order by which proceedings under Section 34 of the 1996 Act instituted in this Court were found to be incompetent on the ground of pecuniary jurisdiction. One of the arguments made in support of the continuation of the Section 34 proceedings in this Court was that the arbitral tribunal in that case had been constituted under Section 11 of the Act by the Chief Justice of this Court or his designate. The Division Bench held in such circumstances that the expression “any other application” appearing in Section 42 of the 1996 Act would even include an application under Section 11(6) of such Act. Paragraph 8 of the report is in the clearest terms: “8. Considering the observations of the Apex Court referred and quoted above we are of the view that ‘any other application’ as contemplated under Section 42 should also include an application under Section 11(6) and thus the said application under Section 34 should lie to this Court and not any other Court.” The ratio decidendi in Visva Bharati is founded on “the observations of the Apex Court referred and quoted above” as is evident from paragraph 8 of the report. The only Supreme Court judgment that is considered in Visva Bharati is the Constitution Bench decision reported at (2005) 8 SCC 618 (SBP & Co. vs Patel Engg. Ltd). Paragraph 23 of the report in SBP & Co. has been quoted in Visva Bharati. Paragraph 20 of the same Supreme Court judgment has been referred to at paragraph 7 of the Visva Bharati report. In SBP & Co. the majority view overturned a previous Constitution Bench verdict to hold that the nature of the function discharged by a Chief Justice or his designate under Section 11 of the 1996 Act is judicial and not merely administrative. SBP & Co. did not consider as to whether a request for the constitution of an arbitral tribunal made in respect of an arbitration agreement before a Chief Justice or his designate would entail subsequent applications under Part I of the 1996 Act pertaining to the same arbitration agreement to be carried to the court over which the Chief Justice presided. Paragraph 20 of the report, referred to at paragraph 7 of Visva Bharati, laid down that where jurisdictional issues are decided under Section 8 or Section 11 of the Act before a reference is made, “Section 16 cannot be held to empower the Arbitral Tribunal to ignore the decision given by the judicial authority or the Chief Justice before the reference to it was made” since the arbitral tribunal’s competence under Section 16 of the Act “does not enable the Arbitral Tribunal to get over the finality conferred on an order prior to its entering upon the reference by the very statute that creates it.” Paragraph 23 of the report in SBP & Co. noticed the history behind the previous view on such aspect rendered in Konkan Railway Corporation Ltd vs Mehul Construction Co. [reported at (2000) 7 SCC 201 ] and quoted the essence of the previous Constitution Bench view on such aspect. With respect, nothing in SBP & Co., and particularly in paragraph 20 and 23 of the report, throws any light on the applicability of Section 42 of the 1996 Act in course of subsequent applications under Part I of the Act pertaining to the same arbitration agreement if the arbitral tribunal for a reference under the arbitration agreement had been constituted by a Chief Justice on a request under Section 11 of the Act. The judgment in Ranjita Apartment Owners’ Association followed the Division Bench judgment in Visva Bharati. The judgment also noticed another Single Bench judgment reported at 2008 (2) WBLR (Cal) 34 (Banerjee Construction vs Union of India) where a view similar to the one expressed in Apeejay Oxford Bookstores had been taken. But Ranjita Apartment Owners’ Association opined that since there was a Division Bench judgment of this Court rendered on such aspect of the matter, it was the Division Bench judgment which was binding. In Ranjita Apartment Owners’ Association, the following additional observation was made at paragraph 8 of the report: “8. No doubt, the application under Section 11(6) of the said Act of 1996 was dealt with by the Hon’ble Chief Justice of the High Court, Calcutta and he passed the appropriate orders appointing an arbitrator. Therefore, the first application under Section 11(6) of the said Act under Part I was dealt with by this Hon’ble Court. Section 42 is also included within the Part I of the said Act. Therefore, whenever any subsequent application relating to the arbitration matter is to be moved, it must be done before the same Court where the previous one was lodged, that is, before the Hon’ble High Court, Calcutta. Section 42 of the said Act is very much explicit in this regard.” Section 42 of the 1996 Act begins with a non-obstante clause and mandates that where in respect of an arbitration agreement any application under Part I of the Act has been made in a particular Court, it would be that Court alone which would have the jurisdiction over the arbitral proceedings and the sole authority to receive subsequent applications arising out of such arbitration agreement. Section 11 of the 1996 Act contemplates a situation where there is no agreed procedure for the constitution of an arbitral tribunal in the arbitration agreement between the parties or the parties fail to concur in the manner in which the tribunal would be constituted or the constitution of the tribunal is otherwise not achieved; and a party to the arbitration agreement applies to the Chief Justice or his designate for constituting an arbitral tribunal. Section 11 covers both domestic arbitrations and international arbitrations. That is the first pointer to Section 11 having a different status in Part I of the 1996 Act than some of the other provisions therein. Section 11 covers both domestic arbitrations and international arbitrations. That is the first pointer to Section 11 having a different status in Part I of the 1996 Act than some of the other provisions therein. Section 11(11) of the Act contemplates that requests in respect of the same domestic arbitration may be made to several Chief Justices but it would be the Chief Justice to whom the request has first been validly made who would alone be competent to decide on the request. Sub-section (11) of that Section is the further pointer to Section 11 of the Act being self-contained and standing on a separate footing than the other provisions in Part I of the Act that envisage applications there under to be carried to a Court. Section 11(12) of the Act needs to be noticed in the present context: “11. Appointment of arbitrators.- …. (12)(a) Where the matters referred to in sub-sections (4), (5), (6), (7), (8) and (10) arise in an international commercial arbitration the reference to “Chief Justice” in those subsections shall be construed as a reference to the “Chief Justice of India. (b) Where the matters referred to in sub-sections (4), (5), (6), (7), (8) and (10) arise in any other arbitration, the reference to “Chief Justice” in those sub-sections shall be construed as a reference to, the Chief Justice of the High Court within whose local limits the principal Civil Court referred to in clause (e) of sub-section (1) of Section 2 is situate and, where the High Court itself is the Court referred to in that clause, to the Chief Justice of that High Court.” Section 11(11) of the Act commands that if requests under Section 11 have been carried to more than one Chief Justice, the Chief Justice to whom the request is first made would alone be competent to decide thereon. That does not mean that a request under Section 11 can be made to any Chief Justice. Section 11(12)(b) of the Act specifies the Chief Justice or the Chief Justices who would be competent to receive a request for constitution of an arbitral tribunal under Section 11 of the 1996 Act. That does not mean that a request under Section 11 can be made to any Chief Justice. Section 11(12)(b) of the Act specifies the Chief Justice or the Chief Justices who would be competent to receive a request for constitution of an arbitral tribunal under Section 11 of the 1996 Act. It necessarily follows that if more than one request under Section 11 of the 1996 Act in respect of the same arbitration agreement is made, the earliest request would only be eligible to be taken up, provided the earliest request has been made to a Chief Justice competent to receive it under Section 11(12)(b) of the Act. If the earliest request is made to a Chief Justice not competent, within the meaning of Section 11 (12)(b) of the Act, to receive it, it would be no request at all; never mind that it was made before any other similar request pertaining to the same arbitration agreement. It is the same underlying thought that is evident in Section 42 of the Act. A subsequent application under Part I of the 1996 Act has necessarily to be made to a court which has received the previous application under Part I of the Act, provided the previous application under Part I of the Act pertaining to the same arbitration agreement was carried to a competent court; or, no objection as to jurisdiction had been taken even though it had been instituted before a court lacking territorial or pecuniary jurisdiction to receive it. Section 42 of the Act does not imply that even if a previous application is carried to a court and such court is found to have been incompetent to receive it, all subsequent applications under Part I of the Act relating to the arbitration agreement have to be carried to such incompetent court. There is, however, a rider. Section 42 of the Act does not imply that even if a previous application is carried to a court and such court is found to have been incompetent to receive it, all subsequent applications under Part I of the Act relating to the arbitration agreement have to be carried to such incompetent court. There is, however, a rider. Since a question of territorial jurisdiction may not go to the root of the matter as in inherent lack of jurisdiction, if the parties allow the proceedings to continue before an apparently incompetent court without raising any objection thereto, subsequent applications under Part I of the Act pertaining to the same arbitration agreement have to be made to the apparently incompetent court which received the earlier application as the parties would be estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the court subsequently upon not having urged it in course of the earliest application under Part I of the Act in the apparently incompetent court. However, proceedings under Section 8 and Section 11 of the Act would be unaffected by Section 42 since, in the first case, the request is made to a Chief Justice or his designate and not to a court; and, in the other case, the application is made to a judicial authority which has received an action in breach of an arbitration agreement and, again, the expression used in Section 8 is “judicial authority” and not “court.” By reason of Section 11(12)(b), Section 2(1)(e) of the Act has to be borne in mind to assess the competence of the Chief Justice to consider a request under Section 11 of the Act, though the allusion to such provision would be quite different from the manner of its relevance in other provisions in Part I of the 1996 Act. Section 2(1)(e) of the Act defines the court referred to in the Act to be the principal civil court of original jurisdiction in a district, and includes the High Court in exercise of its ordinary original civil jurisdiction, having jurisdiction to decide the questions forming the subject-matter of the agreement if the same had been the subject-matter of a suit. The additional feature of the definition, which is not relevant in the present context, is that the civil court has to be a principal civil court and not a civil court of an inferior grade. The additional feature of the definition, which is not relevant in the present context, is that the civil court has to be a principal civil court and not a civil court of an inferior grade. Section 2(1)(e) of the Act, therefore, brings in the same principles as recognised in Sections 16 to 20 of the Civil Procedure Code which apply to ordinary civil courts; and to Clause 12 of the Letters Patent which applies to this Court. In their essential terms, the provisions of Section 16 to 20 of the Code are akin to the principles recognised in Clause 12 of the Letters Patent, save in respect of the proviso to Section 20 of the Code. Fundamentally, there can be two classes of suits – suits for land and others which are not for land. In a suit which is a suit for land, a civil court would have authority to entertain an action in respect thereof if the entirety or a part of the land or the immovable property which is the subject-matter of the action is situate within its jurisdiction. There may be several civil courts within whose jurisdiction parts of one or more of the subject properties may be situate and any of these courts can receive the suit, but no other civil court would have authority to receive a suit for land; and, there is no exception to the rule. If a suit is not a suit for land, then the plaintiff has the choice of forum based on the two other considerations which are recognised both in Sections 16 to 20 of the Code and in Clause 12 of the Letters Patent: the situs of the defendant or the situs of the cause of action. If, at the time of the institution of the suit, the defendant resides or voluntarily works for gain or carries on business within the jurisdiction of a civil court, that court would have the authority to receive an action if it is not a suit for land. If, at the time of the institution of the suit, the defendant resides or voluntarily works for gain or carries on business within the jurisdiction of a civil court, that court would have the authority to receive an action if it is not a suit for land. If the defendant or all the defendants do not reside or voluntarily work for gain or carry on business within the jurisdiction of the civil court in respect of a suit not being a suit for land, then the plaintiff may cite the accrual of a part of the plaintiff’s cause of action in the suit within the territorial limits of the court to found the suit in such civil court. The fundamental principle as to territorial jurisdiction is the same in Sections 16 to 20 of the Code as in Clause 12 of the Letters Patent. The reference to Section 2(1)(e) of the Act in clause (b) of subsection (12) of Section 11 of the Act only implies that if the subject-matter of an arbitration agreement were capable of being made the subject-matter of a suit and if such suit could have been instituted in any principal civil court over which the High Court exercises superintendence within the meaning of Article 227 of the Constitution of India, the Chief Justice of such High Court would be competent to receive a request in such regard. It necessarily implies that if the subject-matter of the arbitration agreement is a suit for land and if, instead of the arbitral reference, the subject-matter were carried by way of a civil suit, it would only be the Chief Justices of the High Courts exercising superintendence of the civil courts that could have received the suit for land who will be empowered to receive a request under Section 11 of the Act. There is the additional difficulty of assessing a point of jurisdiction canvassed in course of a request under Section 11 of the 1996 Act. There is the additional difficulty of assessing a point of jurisdiction canvassed in course of a request under Section 11 of the 1996 Act. As has recently been noticed in a judgment delivered on July 7, 2011 in A.P. No. 224 of 2010 (New Age Realty Pvt. Ltd vs M/s. Karthikeya Ancillaries Pvt. Ltd), the nature of a suit is assessed on the basis of the statements contained in a plaint; but in case of a request under Section 11 of the 1996 Act, there is obviously no statement on the nature of the disputes and the Chief Justice or his designate has to gauge the matter based on whatever may appear from the pleadings and the correspondence exchanged between the parties immediately prior to the request being carried to the Chief Justice or his designate. The petitioner here insists that notwithstanding the petitioner not having made a request for the constitution of an arbitral tribunal in accordance with the arbitration agreement, Section 11(5) of the 1996 Act allows the petitioner to carry a request to an appropriate Chief Justice in such regard if it is evident that the arbitration agreement laid down no procedure for the constitution of the arbitral tribunal and the parties failed to agree as to the composition of the arbitral tribunal. The petitioner refers to a letter dated July 13, 2010 issued by the respondent. The petitioner made the present request on or about August 16, 2010 and the petitioner states that implicit in its conduct is the petitioner’s disagreement with the respondent in the choice of the arbitrator. The petitioner is right. Section 11(5) of the Act permits either party to the arbitration agreement to carry a request under Section 11 of the Act to the appropriate Chief Justice, provided it is evident that the agreed machinery for constituting the arbitral tribunal has failed, or the arbitration agreement does not provide a procedure for the setting up of the arbitral tribunal and the parties have been unable to agree on the constitution of the tribunal. Sub-section (5) does not confer the right to make a request under Section 11 of the Act to only the party which has made a request to the other party to the arbitration agreement to set up an arbitral tribunal; it gives both parties the same right. Sub-section (5) does not confer the right to make a request under Section 11 of the Act to only the party which has made a request to the other party to the arbitration agreement to set up an arbitral tribunal; it gives both parties the same right. An agreement was entered into between the parties herein for the development of a land in Delhi. A supplemental agreement subsequently executed envisaged that in view of a pronouncement of the Supreme Court, it would not be possible to develop the relevant land. The supplemental agreement recorded as to how the parties would deal with each other in the matter of funds deposited and other things done under the original agreement. It is not necessary, at this stage, for the substance of the matter to be gone into in any greater detail. The respondent herein claims some interest over the land and in proceedings under Section 9 instituted by it before the Delhi High Court, the principal prayer made was for an injunction restraining the petitioner herein from creating any third party rights or entering into any development or other agreement in respect of the property. Clearly, whether or not the respondent herein was so entitled, it was a right in respect of land that the respondent asserted and it was such land which was central to the respondent’s petition under Section 9 of the 1996 Act. Following an order being made in the Section 9 proceedings and an observation contained in the order that the parties should attempt to have their disputes resolved in accordance with the arbitration agreement, the respondent issued the notice of July 13, 2010 nominating the respondent’s arbitrator to adjudicate upon the disputes. The petitioner did not respond to the request but immediately carried the present petition to the Chief Justice of this Court. To return to the authority of the Chief Justice of this Court or his designate to receive the present request, one needs next to refer to a judgment of the Supreme Court reported at 2006 (11) SCC 651 (Rodemadan India Ltd vs International Trade Expo Centre Ltd). To return to the authority of the Chief Justice of this Court or his designate to receive the present request, one needs next to refer to a judgment of the Supreme Court reported at 2006 (11) SCC 651 (Rodemadan India Ltd vs International Trade Expo Centre Ltd). Though the matter pertained to an international arbitration – hence the request was carried to the designate of the Chief Justice of India – paragraph 25 of the report is apposite in the present context since it was held by the Supreme Court that Section 42 of the 1996 Act would not be applicable to Section 11 of the Act since there was no court involved under Section 11 and it was only a Chief Justice or his designate who had the authority to receive a request there under. Paragraph 25 of the report said, “25. Finally, it is contended that as recourse had been taken by the petitioner under Section 9 of the Act to obtain interim relief by moving the Delhi High Court by their original petition OMP No. 98 of 2005 dated 24-3-2005, by reason of Section 42 of the Act that Court alone could have jurisdiction upon the arbitral tribunal. In my view, this contention has no merit as I have held earlier, neither the Chief Justice or his designate under Section 11(6) is a “court” as contemplated under the Act. Section 2 (1)(e) of the Act defines the expression “court”. The bar of jurisdiction under Section 42 is only intended to apply to a “court” as defined in Section 2(1)(e). The objection, therefore, has no merit and is rejected.” It is, thus, evident that the general rule in Section 42 would not apply to Section 11 of the 1996 Act, as held by the Supreme Court, since the nature of function under Section 11 demands otherwise. It was such position which was highlighted in Apeejay Oxford Bookstores where paragraph 25 of the Rodemadan was quoted. In neither judgment that the respondent has placed in support of its contention on such aspect (Visva Bharati and Ranjita Apartment Owners’ Association), was the Supreme Court decision in Rodemadan noticed. The Supreme Court judgment in Rodemadan was rendered in the year 2006, long prior to the Division Bench judgment of Visva Bharati in 2008 and the recent Single Bench judgment. The Supreme Court judgment in Rodemadan was rendered in the year 2006, long prior to the Division Bench judgment of Visva Bharati in 2008 and the recent Single Bench judgment. In view of binding value of the Supreme Court judgment and the legal position enunciated in Rodemadan, it appears, in all humility, that the Division Bench judgment in Visva Bharati and the Single Bench judgment in Ranjita Apartment Owners’ Association may no longer be applicable in the field. Rodemadan clearly instructs that a previous application under any of the other provisions of Part I of the 1996 Act would not decide as to which Chief Justice is to be approached for a subsequent request under Section 11 of the Act pertaining to the same arbitration agreement. The other aspect of the same matter is evident in the Supreme Court dictum. A previous valid request under Section 11 of the Act to a Chief Justice would not decide the situs of subsequent applications under Part I of the Act. An example may help clear the air. Say, an agreement is executed in Darjeeling between two parties carrying on business only in Darjeeling and the performance of the agreement is also confined to Darjeeling. If such agreement contains an arbitration clause, then an application under Section 9 of the 1996 Act in respect of the arbitration clause can only be made before the principal civil court in Darjeeling. That would not imply that a subsequent request under Section 11 of the Act pertaining to the same arbitration agreement has to be filed before the Darjeeling court. To begin with, there is the minor matter of there being no Chief Justice available in the Darjeeling court. If a previous application under any of the other provisions of Part I of the Act pertaining to an arbitration agreement made in a particular competent court would not necessitate a subsequent request under Section 11 of the Act to be carried to the same forum, the converse must also hold good. In other words, a previous request under Section 11 of the 1996 Act to a Chief Justice would not require a subsequent application under any of the provisions of Part I of the Act pertaining to the same arbitration agreement to be carried only to the High Court over which such Chief Justice presides. In other words, a previous request under Section 11 of the 1996 Act to a Chief Justice would not require a subsequent application under any of the provisions of Part I of the Act pertaining to the same arbitration agreement to be carried only to the High Court over which such Chief Justice presides. Again, there is the minor matter that most High Courts in the country have only appellate jurisdiction in civil matters; and, the 1996 Act – unlike, for instance, the Companies Act, 1956 – does not confer any original jurisdiction to High Courts otherwise not exercising such jurisdiction in civil matters. The initial ground of objection urged at the threshold by the respondent fails. Notwithstanding the previous proceedings under Section 9 of the Act having been launched by the respondent before the Delhi High Court, the Chief Justice of this Court or his designate would still have authority to receive a request under Section 11 of the 1996 Act pertaining to the same arbitration agreement if the other conditions as recognised in Section 2(1)(e) of the Act are met. The petitioner says that despite the claim made in the Delhi petition, it is evident from the supplemental agreement executed by the parties that they had accepted that if the land could not be developed, the claim would only be in the money that had been deposited. The petitioner contends that since it is the admitted position that the review petition referred to in the supplemental agreement had failed before the Supreme Court, it is obvious that the land can no longer be touched and the claims of the parties can no longer be attached to the land so as to make any disputes between them in relation to the agreement or the supplemental agreement amount to a suit for land. Rational as the argument appears as first flush, it cannot succeed. The nature of a claim is assessed not by adjudicating upon the merits thereof, or even taking a prima facie view, but on the basis of the claim as made. Rational as the argument appears as first flush, it cannot succeed. The nature of a claim is assessed not by adjudicating upon the merits thereof, or even taking a prima facie view, but on the basis of the claim as made. If a plaint were filed where a right or interest in respect of an immovable property was sought to be asserted, the Court will not disregard the assertion and treat it otherwise than as a suit for land, merely because the plaintiff may be seen to be not entitled to the right or interest that is canvassed in the plaint. As in receiving a challenge by way of a demurer, on a challenge to the jurisdiction of the Chief Justice or his designate in receiving a request under Section 11 of 1996 Act it is the nature of claim that is asserted that has to be seen and the assessment cannot be by making an adjudication thereon by encroaching on the arbitrator’s exclusive domain. In any event, the petitioner here is at a greater disadvantage. There was no request by this petitioner for the constitution of an arbitral tribunal to adjudicate upon any claim made by this petitioner. The petitioner has made the present request following the receipt of the letter of July 13, 2010 from the respondent. The respondent’s letter refers to the Delhi High Court order and it is evident from the Delhi High Court order that the primary dispute that the respondent had raised in that Court was in respect of a claim on the Delhi land. Since it is found that the disputes between the parties, or the claims as asserted by the respondent, are inextricably connected to a land which is situate outside this State, it is evident that no civil court in this State could have entertained a suit if the subject-matter of the proposed arbitral reference were to be incorporated in a civil suit. As a consequence, the Chief Justice of this Court or his designate would not have any authority to deal with the present request. A.P.No. 464 of 2010 fails on the other count of challenge urged by the respondent. There will be no order as to costs. Urgent certified photocopies of this order, if applied for, be supplied to the parties subject to compliance with all requisite formalities.