JUDGMENT : This order shall govern the disposal of both the aforesaid criminal revisions, as the facts are common and the same identical questions are involved in the same. Therefore both are decided by this common order. 2. Both these petitions have been filed by the petitioners under Sec. 397 read with Sec. 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Here­inafter referred to as the 'Code') being ag­grieved by the order dated 28.4.11 passed by the learned Magistrate in having dismissed the complaint filed by the respondents under Sec. 200 of the Code after recording the evidence of complainant, as she did not found merits and dismissed the complaint. The respondents approached the Revisional Court by filing re­vision under Sec. 397 of the Cr.P.C. The Revisional Court reversed the order of Magis­trate and directed issuance of process against the petitioner. 3. It is the aforesaid order which is impugned by the petitioners, alleging that the order of Revisional Court in having reversed the order of learned Magistrate without issuance of notice to the petitioners, is not sustainable, as the order of dismissal of complaint, which is an order of acquittal could not have been taken away without hearing the petitioner. Learned petitioners' counsel has relied upon the judg­ment of Apex Court delivered in the case of P. Sunder Rajan and Others vs. R. Vidhya Sekar, reported in (2004) 13 SCC 472 . It is a short judgment and it would appropriate to take note of the entire judgment which lays down the law:- "1. Heard learned counsel for the appellants. 2. Leave granted. 3. A complaint filed by the respondent herein for an offence punishable under Section 420 IPC before the Judicial Magistrate, Udumalpet, came to be dismissed by the said Court. Being aggrieved by the said order of dismissal of his complaint, the respondent herein filed a revi­sion petition before the High Court. The High Court without issuing any notice to the appel­lant herein, came to the conclusion that on the material available before it, it is not necessary to issue notice to the appellant even when it decided to dispose of the appeal in favour of the respondent herein. The High Court without issuing any notice to the appel­lant herein, came to the conclusion that on the material available before it, it is not necessary to issue notice to the appellant even when it decided to dispose of the appeal in favour of the respondent herein. In this regard, this is what the Court observed : "The Court is of the considered view that no notice is necessary to the respondent as the available materials would suffice to give a dis­posal to this revision and in order to avoid the avoidable delay". 4. On the above basis, it proceeded to con­sider the material produced by the petitioner before it and without taking into consideration the defence that was available to the respondent proceeded to set aside the order of the Magistrate, and directed the said Court to take the complaint on file and proceed with the same in accordance with law. 5. In our opinion, this order of the High Court is ex facie unsustainable in law by not giving an opportunity to the appellant herein to de­fend his case that the learned Judge violated all principles of natural justice as also the re­quirement of law of hearing a party before passing an adverse order. 6. We have, therefore, no hesitation in al­lowing this appeal, setting aside the impugned judgment and remanding the matter to the High Court to issue proper notice to the appellant herein who is the respondent in the criminal revision petitioner before it and afford him a reasonable opportunity of hearing and to pass appropriate orders. The appeal is allowed". 4. Learned counsel appearing for respon­dents has relied upon another judgment deliv­ered in the case of Chandra Deo Singh vs. Prakash Chandra Base alias Chabt Rose and Am. ( AIR 1963 SC 1430 ) and submits that pe­titioners have no locus-standi to come to this Court at this stage to participate in the pro­ceedings before issuance of process. Learned counsel has referred para 7 of the aforesaid cited judgment which reads as under :- 7. Taking the first ground, it seems to us clear from the entire scheme of Ch. XVI of the Code of Criminal Procedure that an accused person does not come into the picture at all till pro­cess is issued. This does not mean that he is precluded from being present when an enquiry is held by a Magistrate. Taking the first ground, it seems to us clear from the entire scheme of Ch. XVI of the Code of Criminal Procedure that an accused person does not come into the picture at all till pro­cess is issued. This does not mean that he is precluded from being present when an enquiry is held by a Magistrate. He may remain present either in person or through a counsel or agent with a view to be informed of what is going on. But since the very question for consider­ation being whether he should be called upon to face an accusation nor he has no right to take part in the proceedings no has the Magis­trate any jurisdiction to permit him to do so. It would follow from this, therefore, that it would not be open to Magistrate to put any question to witnesses at the instance of the person named as accused but against whom process has not been issued; nor can he examine any witnesses at the instance of such a person. Of course, the Magistrate himself is free to put such ques­tions to the witnesses produced before him by the complainant as he may think proper in the interests of justice. But beyond that, he cannot go. It was, however, contended by Mr. Sethi for respondent No, 1 that the very object of the provisions of Ch. XVI of the Code of Criminal Procedure is to prevent an accused person from being harassed by a frivolous com­plaint and, therefore, power is given to a Mag­istrate before whom complaint is made to post­pone the issue of summons to the accused per­son pending the result of an enquiry made ei­ther by himself or by a Magistrate subordinate to him. A privilege conferred by these provi­sions can according to Mr. Sethi, be waived by the accused person and he can take part in the proceedings. No doubt, one of the objects behind the provisions of S. 202,Cr.P.C is to enable the Magistrate to scrutinise carefully the allegations made in the complaint with a view to prevent a person named therein A3. Learned counsel appearing for respondents has relied upon another judgment delivered in the case of Chandra Deo Singh vs. Prakash Chandra Rose alias Chabt Bose and Am. Learned counsel appearing for respondents has relied upon another judgment delivered in the case of Chandra Deo Singh vs. Prakash Chandra Rose alias Chabt Bose and Am. ( AIR 1963 SC 1430 ) and submits that petitioners have no locus-standi to come to this Court at this stage to participate in the proceedings Cri. Revision No. 744 of 2011. before issuance of process. Learned counsel has referred para 7 of the aforesaid cited judgment which reads as under :- "accused from being called upon to face an obviously frivolous complaint. But there is also another object behind this provision and it is to find out what material there is to support the allegations made in the complaint. It is the bounden duty of the Magistrate while making an enquiry to elicit all facts not merely with a view to protect the interest of an absent accused persons, but also with a view to bring to boor: a person or persons against whom grave allegations are made. Whether the complaint is frivolous or not has, at that stage, necessar­ily to be determined on the basis of the mate­rial placed before him by the complainant. Whatever defence the accessed may have can only be enquired into at the trial. An enquiry under S. 202 can in no sense be characterised as a trial for the simple reason that in law there can be but one trial for an offence. Permitting an accused person to intervene during the en­quiry would frustrate its very object and that is why the legislature has made no specific provision permitting an accused person to take part in an enquiry. It is true that there is no direct evidence in the case before us that the two persons who were examined as Court wit­nesses were so examined at the instance of re­spondent No. 1 but from the fact that they were persons who were alleged to have been the associates of respondent No. 1 in the First In­formation Report lodged by Panchanan Roy and who were alleged to have been arrested on the spot by some of the local people, they would not have been summoned by the Mag­istrate unless suggestion to that effect had been made by counsel appearing for respondent No. 1. This inference is irresistible and we hold that on this ground, the enquiry made by the enquiring Magistrate is vitiated. This inference is irresistible and we hold that on this ground, the enquiry made by the enquiring Magistrate is vitiated. In this connection, the observations of this Court in Vadilal Panchalvs. Dattatraya Dulaji, (1961) 1 SCR at p.9: (AIR SC 1113 at p. 1116 may usefully be quoted : "The enquiry is for the purpose of ascertain­ing the truth or falsehood of the complaint; that is, for ascertaining whether there is evidence in support of the complaint so as to justify the issue of process and commencement of pro­ceedings against the person concerned. The section does not say that a regular trial for ad­judging the guilt or otherwise of the person complained against 6 Cri.Revision No. 744 of 2011. should take place at that stage, for the person complained against can be legally called upon to answer the accusation made against him only when a process has issued and he is put on trial". 5. Having gone through the aforesaid two judgments, i.e. one cited by the petitioners and other cited by the respondents, it is clear that the accused cannot participate in the proceed­ings before the Magistrate till the process is ordered. However, once the Magistrate form his mind and has dismissed the complaint, then, the Revisional Court cannot pass any adverse order against the respondent/accused without hearing the petitioner that is what has stated by the Supreme Court. 6. In view of aforesaid, the objection taken by the learned counsel appearing for the respondents does stand to the ground. In view of that, the revision filed by the petitioners are allowed and the Revisional Court is directed to decide the petitions after hearing the peti­tioners. As such the impugned order is hereby set aside. Parties are directed to appear before the Revisional Court on 5th September,11.