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2011 DIGILAW 943 (CAL)

K. Khalid v. Sajeeda Khalid

2011-07-18

RAGHUNATH RAY

body2011
JUDGMENT Raghunath Ray, J. 1. BY preferring this application under section 482 Cr PC, the petitioner husband has sought to challenge the judgment and order dated 28.3.2011, passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Andaman and Nicobar Islands, Port Blair in Criminal Revision No. 003 of 2011, whereby the learned revisional court affirmed the judgment and order dated 2.12.2010, passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate, First Class-II, Port Blair in Misc. Case No. 131 of 2009. In the present application, the petitioner husband has, however, prayed for setting aside the judgment impugned and remanding the case back to the learned trial Court for adjudication of the matter after taking evidence of vital witnesses including the petitioner husband afresh. 2. THE relevant facts giving rise to this criminal revision may be capsulised as under: Smti. Sajeeda Khalid (OP No. 1 herein) and her minor son Kumar K. Naushad (OP No.2 herein) instituted a Misc. Case No. 131 of 2009 under section 125 Cr PC, claiming maintenance at the rate of Rs. 10,000/- per month in total for them from the petitioner. It is contended inter alia therein, that the marriage between the petitioner and the OP No. 1 was solemnized in accordance with the Muslim religious rites and customs on 18.01.1990 and out of the said wedlock, the OP petitioner No.2 was born on 14th June, 1991. Since the petitioner No. 1 OP is a housewife and not employed anywhere, she is "facing extreme financial hardship to maintain herself and her minor son" who is studying in Govt. Polytechnic, Dollygunj in Diploma (Mechanical Engineering), First Year. Further, the OP wife is a heart patient and underwent open heart surgery on 02.01.1999. She has no source of income to maintain herself and her minor son. On the contrary, the petitioner OP is a govt, servant working as driver in the State Transport Department under the Directorate of Transport, Port Blair. He is also drawing salary of Rs. 23,105/- in total per month. In such circumstances, she prayed for maintenance at the rate of Rs. 10,000/- per month in total, for herself and her minor son. 3. He is also drawing salary of Rs. 23,105/- in total per month. In such circumstances, she prayed for maintenance at the rate of Rs. 10,000/- per month in total, for herself and her minor son. 3. THE petitioner husband has, however, sought to resist the claim of his son's maintenance on the ground that the petitioner No.2, who was born on 14.2.1991 is above 18 years and is not entitled to any maintenance from him in view of attainment of majority prior to the institution of the Misc. case in question. It is, further contended inter alia in his written objection that the OP wife is getting monthly rent of Rs. 12,500/- from the tenants. It is also stated that she is residing in her house constructed by him on investment of- lakhs of rupees. But when the respondent was transferred from Port Blair to Mayabunder, she failed to accompany him and she is residing separately with their minor son as per her own choice. He is, however, ready to take the petitioner with him to Mayabunder. According to him, she has sufficient source of income since she is getting monthly rent form the tenants. She is, therefore, not entitled to any maintenance from him. Further, the petitioner OP wife had married him by changing her religion as also by changing her name from 'Sudharma' to 'Sajeeda'. She has again changed her religion and her name without his consent. So, her claim of maintenance is not maintainable and the petition under section 125 Cr PC is liable to be dismissed accordingly. 4. UPON consideration of evidence adduced by two PWs i.e. the petitioner OP wife herself as PW-1 and one Ramlall, an employee of the State Transport Service as PW-2 as also the studentship certificate of the Petitioner respondent No.2 (Exb -1) and the pay certificate of the OP petitioner husband dated 10.8.2010 (Exb -2), the learned trial Court formulated as many as six points in the backdrop of evidence on record for adjudication. On analysis of evidence on record the learned Magistrate came to a finding that the petitioner had no sufficient means to maintain herself while the petitioner OP husband had sufficient means to provide adequate maintenance to the petitioner wife in view of his gross salary of Rs.23,105/- per month as was evident from the salary certificate itself dated 10.8.2010 (Exb-2). 5. 5. IT is, however, found by the learned trial Court that the petitioner OP No.2 completed 18 years of age on 13.2.2009. But the case was filed on 24.9.2010 i.e. after the attainment of majority by the petitioner respondent No.2. Therefore, it is held by him that the petitioner respondent No.2 being major is not entitled to maintenance under section 125 Cr PC. 6. THE learned trial Court also came to a clear finding that the OP husband deserted the petitioner No. 1 without any cause and also neglected her to pay adequate maintenance since desertion till date, despite sufficient means to provide it. She is, therefore, entitled to maintenance from the date of filing of the case. After assessing the petitioner husband's net income as Rs.16,075/-per month and further opining that no specific income of the petitioner No. 1 has been proved, the learned trial Court was of the view that if the amount of monthly maintenance is fixed at Rs. 5000/- it would be just and proper for survival of the petitioner wife in the society to which she belongs and it would not be prejudicial one to the petitioner OP husband in anyway. The learned trial Court disposed of the maintenance proceeding on contest with a direction upon the OP petitioner husband to pay Rs.5000/- per month to his wife towards her maintenance regularly by 7th day of succeeding month and further to pay the arrears of maintenance by six equal monthly installments. 7. FEELING aggrieved, the revisionist petitioner preferred a criminal revision before the learned Sessions Judge, Port Blair on the ground that the marriage between him and the respondent No. 1 was a void one since she was earlier married to Shri Chandran as per Hindu religious and customs and out of the said wedlock, she gave birth to two children and both being now major are earning their livelihood of their own. The factum of her first marriage as also procreation of two children by Chandran was, however, suppressed and the petitioner was thus cheated. Therefore, the marriage between the petitioner and the respondent was a void marriage in the eye of law in view of the subsistence of her first marriage. In such circumstances, she not being a legally wedded wife is not entitled to any maintenance whatsoever. Therefore, the marriage between the petitioner and the respondent was a void marriage in the eye of law in view of the subsistence of her first marriage. In such circumstances, she not being a legally wedded wife is not entitled to any maintenance whatsoever. That apart, the learned trial Court also did not consider that the first marriage of the respondent solemnized as per Hindu rites and custom was not dissolved by any decree of divorce. Further, the petitioner husband was not afforded sufficient opportunity to adduce his evidence before the learned trial Court. 8. AFTER going through the relevant case record of Misc. Case No. 131 of 2009 and also considering the argument advanced by both sides, the learned revisional Court was of the view that a Court dealing with the application under section 125 Cr PC is not called upon to decide the question whether the marriage of the couple is liable to be declared as null and void. Since in the present case it is the fact that the marriage of the couple was solemnized on 18.1.1990 and they lived as husband and wife more than 19 years, this itself confers right on the wife to claim maintenance from her husband, if, she has no source of income or unable to maintain herself. It was opined by the learned Court of revision that the learned trial Court rightly rejected the prayer for maintenance of the revisionist's son as he has since attained the age of majority. So far the quantum of maintenance fixed by the learned trial Court was also not interfered with since the revisionist is in receipt of gross monthly salary of Rs.23,105/- in total. The criminal revision No. 003 of 2011 was, thus, dismissed on contest and the judgment and order dated 2.12.2010 passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Port Blair in Misc. Case No. 131 of 2009 was upheld and the interim order of stay also stood vacated. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the afore-mentioned order of the learned Court of revision, the petitioner husband has come up to this Court with a prayer for setting aside the judgment impugned passed by the learned revisional Court and to send the case back on remand with a direction upon the learned trial Court to afford an opportunity to the petitioner husband to adduce evidence and to adjudicate the matter afresh. 9. 9. IN support of the present petition under section 482 Cr PC, Mr. Ananda Haider, learned counsel for the petitioner argues that the marriage solemnized by the parties in the present case is void one since the wife, respondent No. 1 married the petitioner OP for the second time during the substance of her previous nuptial tie. By referring to her cross-examination, it is submitted by him that, even though she suppressed such fact in her petition, she has to admit the same at the very outset of her cross examination. It reveals therefrom that she was married to Chandran and the said marriage was solemnized in accordance with the Hindu religious rites. Further, she has two sons from her first marriage. 10. IN this context he refers to two rulings of the Hon'ble Apex Court, reported in (i) AIR 1988 SC 644 (Smtt YamunaBai Anantrao Adhav v. Anantrao Adhav and another) and (ii) AIR 2005 SC 1809 (Savitaben Somabhai Bhatiya v. State of Gujarat and Others). Fortified with these two decisions he proceeded to argue that since the petitioner Respondent No. 1 married him having living spouse, such marriage is null and void and cannot even be treated as voidable marriage under section 12 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. The expression "wife" used in section 125 Cr PC means only a legally wedded wife. But the respondent No.1 is not his legally wedded wife since she married the petitioner when her first husband was alive and the matrimonial tie between them subsisted. Therefore, his marriage with the respondent No. 1 is a complete nullity as per the relevant provisions of the Hindu Marriage Act. Such submission of Mr. Haider is strongly disputed by Mr. Arul Prasanth, learned counsel for the respondent Nos. 1 and 2. At the very outset of his argument, he has invited this Court's attention to paragraphs 3 and 4 of the present petition which are reproduced as under: "3. That after desertion by her husband, the respondent No. 1 started to live in adultery with many persons and accordingly the relation between the petitioner and respondent No. 1 was strained. 4. At the very outset of his argument, he has invited this Court's attention to paragraphs 3 and 4 of the present petition which are reproduced as under: "3. That after desertion by her husband, the respondent No. 1 started to live in adultery with many persons and accordingly the relation between the petitioner and respondent No. 1 was strained. 4. That due to the illicit relation with the petitioner and other many people the respondent No.2 was born who is presently more than 21 years of age and it is very much difficult to say whether the petitioner is father of the respondent No.2 or not without DNA test." 11. IT is argued by Mr. Prasanth, that by no stretch of imagination the wife can possibly conceive that her husband would stoop so low as to assail her chastity and also to deny the paternity of his own son by averring in such a fashion in the present petition itself merely to defeat her claim for maintenance. Such unfounded allegations levelled against her as also their son have caused tremendous mental agony to both the mother and their college going major son. IT is, therefore, vehemently argued by him that on this solitary ground, the instant petition is liable to be dismissed in limini. 12. HE has further challenged the maintainability of the present petition seeking to set aside the judgment impugned and to send the case back on remand to the learned Court below by invoking the inherent jurisdiction of this Court on the ground of not affording to him an opportunity to adduce evidence during trial. In this context, he refers to section 397(3) of Cr PC and argues that since earlier revisional application was rejected by the learned Sessions Judge, Port Blair, the petitioner husband's second revision challenging the judgment impugned is not entertainable before this Court. It is submitted by him since both sessions Judge and High Court have concurrent power, the second revision by the same person is barred under section 397(3) of Cr PC before the High Court since such revision was rejected earlier by the learned Sessions Judge. In support of his contention he refers to a ruling of the Hon'ble Apex Court reported in 1993 AIR SC 1361: 1993 Cr LJ 1049 SC (Dharampal and others v. Ramshree and others). In support of his contention he refers to a ruling of the Hon'ble Apex Court reported in 1993 AIR SC 1361: 1993 Cr LJ 1049 SC (Dharampal and others v. Ramshree and others). It is, therefore, submitted by him that the inherent power under section 482 of Code cannot be utilized for exercising powers which are expressly barred by the Code. By referring to several paragraphs of the written objection filed by the husband petitioner in the learned trial Court, it is argued by him that the petitioner husband has admitted that respondent No. 1 is his wife while the respondent No.2 is the son. He has, however, sought to set up a plea of void marriage as also denial of paternity of his only son at the stage of filing of revisional application before the learned Session Judge, even though he kept mum on that aspect of the matter before the learned trial Court, with an ulterior motive to defeat his wife's claim of maintenance. Therefore, this belated defence which was not put forward before the learned trial court, should not be accepted by this court. He was of further view that the ruling of the Apex Court cited on behalf of the petitioner husband are neither relevant nor applicable to the facts and circumstances of the present case since the petitioner husband being a Muslim cannot be governed by the provisions of the Hindu Marriage Act. 13. IT is pointed out by him that, even then though the husband petitioner was asked to adduce evidence, he did not avail of that opportunity during trial. He even did not either care to examine himself as a witness not to speak of any other OPWs or to file any document in order to controvert the claim of maintenance. In this connection he refers to Order No.21 dated 15.09.2010 and argues that as the learned advocate of the OP petitioner husband submits that he has no OPW, evidence on behalf of the OP was closed by the learned Court below. Therefore, it follows that on the prayer of the OP petitioner husband the defence case was closed. In such view of the matter he is unable to concede to the prayer of the OP petitioner husband's prayer to send the case back on remand for affording him an opportunity to adduce his evidence. Therefore, it follows that on the prayer of the OP petitioner husband the defence case was closed. In such view of the matter he is unable to concede to the prayer of the OP petitioner husband's prayer to send the case back on remand for affording him an opportunity to adduce his evidence. He concludes his argument by making a fervent appeal for dismissal of this petition under section 482 of Cr PC with exemplary costs since the petitioner husband has cast serious aspersion on the chastity of his wife and denied the paternity of his son subject to DNA test. 14. ADMITTEDLY, the petitioner husband, a Muslim by faith married Sajeeda after her conversion to Islam in accordance with the Muslim religious rites in the year 1990. It is also, not disputed before the learned trial Court that Shri K. Naushad, respondent No.2 was born on 14.2.1991 out of the said wedlock. In his revisional application before the learned Sessions Judge the petitioner husband raised for the first time the issue of void marriage on the plea of substance of marriage tie between his wife and her first Hindu husband. It was also alleged in the revisional application that the learned trial Court closed the evidence of the petitioner on the basis of his Advocate's oral submission. His grievance was that he was not asked by the learned Court as to whether he would adduce evidence in support of his case or not. He even did not hesitate to allege that he was un-defended before the learned Court below. All these pleas were taken into consideration by the learned revisional Court and on proper appreciation of circumstances including factual aspects of the matter, the learned revisional Court rejected all such pleas of the husband revisionist and affirmed the findings of the learned trial Court. Against such backdrop, the petitioner husband's prayer for sending the case back on remand on the ground of purported denial of opportunity to adduce evidence before the learned trial Court is to be taken into consideration. On perusal of xerox copies order sheets maintained by the learned trial Court annexed to the present petition, it is manifestly discernable therefrom especially from order No. 19 dated 27.08.2010 that after the closure of the petitioner wife's evidence on 27.8.2010 the case was posted to 9.9.2010 for OPWs. On perusal of xerox copies order sheets maintained by the learned trial Court annexed to the present petition, it is manifestly discernable therefrom especially from order No. 19 dated 27.08.2010 that after the closure of the petitioner wife's evidence on 27.8.2010 the case was posted to 9.9.2010 for OPWs. A close look to Order No.20 dated 9.9.2010 further reveals that the OP prayed for time to adduce his evidence and accordingly, the case was adjourned and the next date was fixed on 15.9.2010 for OPWs. Thereafter, on 15.9.2010, learned lawyer for the OP submitted that he was not in a position to adduce any evidence and his case, therefore, may be closed. As per his counsel's prayer the evidence of the OP was closed and the next date was posted for argument on 29.09.2010. It is, therefore, factually incorrect to suggest that the petitioner husband was not afforded reasonable opportunity to adduce evidence. Rather it is abundantly clear from the orders referred to hereinbefore that he did not care to adduce evidence for the reasons best known to him. It would be far-fetched and preposterous to presume that despite their presence in Court the OP and his witnesses were not examined because of the learned lawyer's incorrect submission. In fact, there is no earthly reason for the learned trial Court to ask the OP petitioner personally as to whether he intends to adduce evidence for the simple reason he had engaged a lawyer to contest the case on his behalf. If the learned counsel was wrong in making such submission, the petitioner husband could have drawn the attention to the learned trial Magistrate on subsequent dates when the case was fixed for OPWs, argument and further argument. But such plea was not raised at any stage of trial. In such view of the matter, I am not prepared to accept such unfounded plea of the husband petitioner that no reasonable opportunity was afforded to him to adduce evidence during trial. 15. ON the question of maintainability of the second revision, it is argued by Mr. Haider that even after dismissal of the first one by the Court of learned Sessions Judge, there is no bar in exercising inherent power of this High Court to prevent the abuse of the process of Court in order to secure the ends of justice. 15. ON the question of maintainability of the second revision, it is argued by Mr. Haider that even after dismissal of the first one by the Court of learned Sessions Judge, there is no bar in exercising inherent power of this High Court to prevent the abuse of the process of Court in order to secure the ends of justice. In this context he refers to a ruling of the Hon'ble Apex Court reported in AIR 2009 SC 1032 [Dharimal Tobacco Product Ltd and Others v. State of Maharashtra and Another). But the afore-cited judgment is easily distinguishable on facts. The short question arose before the Apex Court in the said decision as to whether the application under section 482 of Cr PC is maintainable against issuance of process even when he is entitled to move revisional petition against such issuance of process. It is held by the Apex Court that only because revisional petition is maintainable, the same by itself would not constitute a bar for entertaining application under section 482 Cr PC. It was further held therein that even in the case when the second revision before the High Court after dismissal of first one by Court of session is barred under section 397(2), inherent power of the Court is available. It is to be noted that section 397(2) speaks about any interlocutory order passed in any appeal, inquiry, trial or other proceeding. It may be pointed out here that in the present case the second revision is barred under section 397(3) Cr PC. Therefore, I am afraid, Mr. Haider's submission on that score cannot be accepted. In my considered view, the afore-cited ruling is of no help to the learned counsel for the petitioner. More so, the facts and circumstances of the case in hand are both factually and contextually distinguishable on facts. 16. TURNING to the petitioner's next contention that the marriage solemnized between the petitioner, and Sajeeda, on her conversion to Islam is a void one since her first Hindu Husband was alive at the time of solemnization of their marriage is not legally tenable for the simple reason that after her conversion into Islam, her second marriage was solemnized with a Muslim male is accordance with Muslim religious rites. In such circumstances, the parties can no longer reasonably be governed by the relevant provisions of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. In such circumstances, the parties can no longer reasonably be governed by the relevant provisions of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. In fact, both the spouses would naturally be governed by the Muslim law. As a matter of fact under Muslim law a male is allowed to have four wives at a time and even if a Muslim husband takes a fifth wife, such a marriage is not void but merely irregular (Fasid). The offspring of such a marriage is, however, illegitimate and cannot be legitimized by any subsequent acknowledgment. On the other hand, the wife can have only one husband at a time. It is, however, yet to be settled whether a Muslim lady contracting a second marriage during the subsistence of first marriage with a Hindu is liable to be punished under section 494 IPC for the offence of bigamy. Mr. Haider's argument that in view of restriction imposed upon a Muslim wife that she can have only one husband at a time, her marriage with the petitioner is void because of subsistence of marriage tie with her first Hindu husband, is devoid of any merit since Sajeeda ceases to be a Hindu wife because of her conversion to Islam. Therefore, by no stretch of imagination it can be said that she is governed by Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. The restriction of a Muslim woman in taking second husband would come into operation in her case as a Muslim wife of a Muslim husband subsequent to her conversion to Islam. In view of such factual position analyzed hereinabove, both the rulings of the Apex Court cited on behalf of the petitioner husband, I am afraid, are neither relevant nor applicable to the facts and circumstances of the present case. Rather both the rulings are distinguishable on facts. In the case of (Smti YamunaBai Anantrao Adhav v. Anantrao Adhav and another) (supra), the point involved was whether a Hindu woman who is married after coming to force of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 to a Hindu male having a lawfully wedded wife can maintain an application for maintenance under section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973. In the case of (Smti YamunaBai Anantrao Adhav v. Anantrao Adhav and another) (supra), the point involved was whether a Hindu woman who is married after coming to force of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 to a Hindu male having a lawfully wedded wife can maintain an application for maintenance under section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973. It is held by the Apex Court therein that the marriage of a woman in accordance with the Hindu rites with a man having a living spouse is a complete nullity in the eye of law and she is not entitled to the benefit of section 125 of the Code. 17. TURNING to another ruling of the Apex Court reported in AIR 2005 SC 1809 [Sabitaben Somabhai Bhatiya, Appellant v. State of Gujarat and Others, Respondents) (supra) relied upon by Mr. Haider, I find that similar principles of law have also be reiterated therein. The Hon'ble Apex Court has been pleased to observe inter alia in Para 15 of the said judgment as under: "15. The marriage of a woman in accordance with the Hindu rites with a man having a living spouse is a complete nullity in the eye of law and she is therefore not entitled to the benefit of Section 125 of the code or the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (in short the Marriage Act). Marriage with person having living spouse is null and void and not voidable. However, the attempt to exclude altogether the personal law applicable to the parties from consideration is improper. Section 125 of the Code has been enacted in the interest of a wife and one who intends to take benefit under sub section 1(a) has to establish the necessary condition, namely, that she is the wife of the person concerned. The issue can be decided only by a reference to the law applicable to the parties. It is only where an applicant establishes such status or relationship with reference to the personal law that an application for maintenance can be maintained. Once the right under provision in section 125 of the code is established by proof of necessary conditions mentioned therein, it cannot be defeated by further reference to the personal law. The issue whether the section is attracted or not cannot be answered except by reference to the appropriate law governing the parties". (Emphasis supplied) 18. Once the right under provision in section 125 of the code is established by proof of necessary conditions mentioned therein, it cannot be defeated by further reference to the personal law. The issue whether the section is attracted or not cannot be answered except by reference to the appropriate law governing the parties". (Emphasis supplied) 18. APPLYING the ratio of the afore-quoted principles of law in the case in hand it can safely be concluded that the marriage solemnized between Sajeeda subsequent to her conversion to Islam with another Muslim male i.e. the petitioner husband, indisputably, is to be governed by their personal law applicable to the parties. Since the applicant wife respondent No.1 has established her "status or relationship with reference to their personal law" i.e. "Muslim Law" 'an application for maintenance can be maintained'. I am, therefore, emboldened to observe that the Provisions of section 11 read with section 5(i) of the Hindu Marriage Act, have no application whatsoever in any manner to the Muslim couple governed by the Muslim personal laws. In such a situation, the plea of void marriage set up by the petitioner husband at the belated stage is neither factually nor legally tenable. In my opinion, both the afore-cited judgments do not help the husband petitioner. In this context it is, however, to be borne in mind that the conversion of one spouse to another religion must be bonafide and not colourable. There is nothing on record to indicate that Sajeeda's conversion to Islam about 20 years ago was not bonafide and it was a mere pretension with any ulterior motive on her part. The petitioner husband has also not alleged so at any stage of the proceedings. Therefore, in the absence of anything contrary on record in this regard, I am to hold that her conversion to Islam was genuine. In that context of the matter, I must hold that because of her conversion to Islam Sajeeda's first marriage with Chandran stood dissolved. More so, whenever the rule of justice, equity, fair play and good conscience demands that the husband petitioner should not be allowed to defeat his wife's claim of maintenance on the unfounded plea of void marriage because of alleged subsistence of her first marriage which was admittedly solemnized between the two Hindus in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. 19. 19. ON the wholesome appreciation of the entire materials on record in the light of the principles of law enunciated by the Apex Court in various rulings discussed hereinabove, I feel inclined to hold as under: (a) Conversion of one spouse to another religion must be bonafide and not colourable and in the event of such genuine conversion the first marriage of the spouse is liable to be dissolved. (b) The expression 'wife' used in section 125 Cr PC means a legally wedded wife. (c) The marriage solemnized in contravention to section 5(i) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 between a Hindu male and female having a living spouse at the time of such solemnization of marriage is a void marriage as per section 11 of the said Act. (d) Conditions as specified in section 5 of the Hindu Marriage Act are applicable only to a marriage which would be solemnized between any two Hindus (Emphasis supplied). (e) Contravention of a condition specified in section 5(i) of the Hindu Marriage Act that neither party has a spouse living at the time of the marriage would invariably lead to a void marriage provided both the spouses are the Hindu. It, therefore, necessarily follows that the marriage solemnized between two Muslims cannot definitely be brought within the ambit and scope of section 11 read with section 5(i) of the Hindu Marriage Act especially in view of the finding recorded in (a) above. (f) A woman either Hindu or Muslim is not entitled to obtain a Magistrate's order until she succeeds in proving that she was validly married to her husband. (g) A Hindu husband marrying a Hindu woman for the second time having a living spouse, is not liable to pay any maintenance to his second wife. (h) Similar is the position if a Hindu wife marries a Hindu male for the second time when her first Hindu husband is alive and she is not entitled to any maintenance from her second husband. (i) When such validity of marriage is questioned it is undoubtedly for the applicant to prove that she was legally wedded wife according to the personal law by which the parties are governed. (j) However, the standard of proof in order to prove a marriage in a proceeding under section 125 Cr PC is not so high as required in criminal prosecution for bigamy. (j) However, the standard of proof in order to prove a marriage in a proceeding under section 125 Cr PC is not so high as required in criminal prosecution for bigamy. It is summary in nature meant to prevent vagrancy. (k) The marriage between the husband OP petitioner namely Khalid and the wife petitioner respondent No. 1 OP namely Sajeeda is to be proved as valid marriage under the Muslim personal law. 20. IT is well settled that under Muslim law a valid marriage may be proved either by direct or indirect evidence. The indirect evidence may be presumed from the following circumstances: (i) from continuous cohabitation as husband and wife. (ii) from an acknowledgement by the man (a) that the woman is his married wife provided that marriage between them is not unlawful or; (b) that the children of the woman are his children. such acknowledgment satisfies the conditions of a valid marriage. In the present case, there was a continued cohabitation between the petitioner husband and the respondent wife and the petitioner husband has also admitted that Sajeeda is his wife and a son was born out of the said wedlock. Their continued conjugal life for a period of about 20 years raises the legal presumption in favour of their marriage and such presumptions are not only admissible under Muslim law but also under section 114 of the Evidence Act. 21. IN view of foregoing discussions, it is quite safe and prudent to hold that Khalid, the petitioner husband and Sajeeda, the respondent No. 1 wife No. 1 after her conversion to Islam are legally wedded wife as per their personal law since all legal requirements for a valid Muslim marriage as indicated hereinabove have been satisfied. Their marriage solemnized in accordance with the Muslim religious rites cannot be invalidated because of a living spouse of Sajeeda in view of the finding that her first marriage stood dissolved because of her genuine conversion to Islam based on solemn rituals coupled with her ardent religious belief which converted her to a devout Muslim married woman about 20 years ago. Since the petitioner husband being a Muslim male married Sajeeda on her conversion to Islam, their marriage cannot legally be treated as a void marriage under the provisions of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 which have no application whatsoever in any manner to the Muslim couple married under the Muslim religious rites. IN my considered view, their marriage under Muslim law is only liable to be terminated either by the husband or by wife or under mutual agreement between the spouses. 22. IT is, therefore, held that since Sajeeda's conversion to Islam was a genuine one based on bonafide religious beliefs, her first marriage with Chandran stood dissolved. Her second marriage with Khalid being governed by their Muslim personal law is a valid marriage. I have, therefore, no hesitation in holding that she is a legally wedded wife of Khalid the petitioner herein and is also entitled to maintenance under section 125 Cr PC from her husband. In such a situation, the petitioner's contention of void marriage with an ulterior motive of denying maintenance to his wife stands demolished. It is further held that the petitioner husband has also failed to show that there was any abuse of the process of court necessitating invocation of inherent jurisdiction of the High Court to prevent such abuse of the process of Court to secure the ends to justice. Further, the present petition seeking to invoke the High Court's inherent jurisdiction is for all practical purposes, a second revision, which is barred under section 397(3) of Cr PC, even though such application has been filed in the garb of a prayer for invocation of inherent jurisdiction of this court. In such view of the matter, I am to hold that the instant petition under section 482 Cr PC is not legally maintainable. 23. VIEWED in the light of the reasons aforementioned, I do not feel inclined to interfere with the concurrent findings of both the learned trial Court and revisional Court. Accordingly, the judgment and order impugned stands affirmed. 24. BEFORE parting with, I cannot put it on record that my judicial conscience is rudely shocked to see the most uncharitable conduct of the husband in assailing the chastity of his own wife and also denying the paternity of his son before this Court even after the lapse of 20 years. Accordingly, the judgment and order impugned stands affirmed. 24. BEFORE parting with, I cannot put it on record that my judicial conscience is rudely shocked to see the most uncharitable conduct of the husband in assailing the chastity of his own wife and also denying the paternity of his son before this Court even after the lapse of 20 years. There is no doubt that he has not Gome up with a clean hand before this Court. Despite all these, I am unable to accept Mr. Prasanth's submission that exemplary cost should be imposed upon the petitioner husband for such reprehensible conduct of the husband petitioner on the ground that the Court of law must strive for betterment of matrimonial relationship between the spouses and imposition of exemplary costs in this regard may not be beneficial to the parties since continuance of cordial matrimonial relationship between the spouses is of paramount importance. Crr No. 018 of 2011, therefore, stands dismissed on contest but in the facts and circumstances of the case without costs. Interim order, if any, stands vacated. The learned trial Magistrate is, however, directed to proceed with the misc. execution case No.6 of 2011 with utmost expedition in accordance with law, and to dispose of the same within two months from the date of communication of this order positively. 25. LET a copy of this order be sent to the learned trial Court forthwith for necessary compliance. Urgent Xerox certified copy of this order be supplied to the parties, if applied for, on priority basis on compliance of usual formalities. Revisional application dismissed.