JUDGEMENT Anjana Prakash, J. 1. The Appellant No. 1 has been convicted under Section 307 IPC and sentenced to RI for ten years as also under Section 27 Arms Act and sentenced to RI for five years. The rest of the Appellants have been convicted under Section 307/34 IPC and sentenced to RI for seven years by the Additional Sessions Judge-VII, Patna in S.Tr. No. 127 of 1991 by a judgment dated 10/13.03.1995. 2. It has been submitted that the Appellant No. 1 has died and, therefore, his appeal has abated. 3. In view of such, the appeal of Kedar Singh is dismissed as having abated. 4. The case of the prosecution is that on the night of 28.03.1990 informant Lal Singh was sleeping along with the son the accused persons came there and asked as to why he was filing cases and committing mischief and then the Appellant No. 1 Kedar Singh is said to have fired at informant on account of which he and his two sons sustained fire arm injuries. On the sound of firing the neighbors gathered and the accused persons fled away. 5. During trial the prosecution examined nine witnesses out of whom P.W. 1 and P.W. 2 are the sons of the informant and P.W. 3 is a co-villager, P.W. 4 is the informant himself and P.W. 5 is the wife of P.W. 2. P.W. 6 and P.W. 9 are formal witnesses and P.W. 7 is the Investigating Officer. P.W. 8 is the Doctor who examined the three injured. 6. On going through the evidence of P.W. 1, P.W. 2, P.W. 3, P.W. 4 and P.W. 5 one finds that all of them stated categorically that it was only Appellant No. 1 who had fired on account of which the three persons were injured. He had made single firing and there was no intervening circumstance despite which he did not repeat fire. In the facts of the case, therefore, no offence under Section 307 IPC would be made out. Further the fact the Appellants No. 2, 3 and 4 were merely accompanying the Appellant No. 1 would not make out a case of common intention and, therefore, I am inclined to acquit the Appellant No. 2, 3 and 4 of the charges of 307/34 IPC. 7. In the result, the appeal with regard to Appellant Nos. Further the fact the Appellants No. 2, 3 and 4 were merely accompanying the Appellant No. 1 would not make out a case of common intention and, therefore, I am inclined to acquit the Appellant No. 2, 3 and 4 of the charges of 307/34 IPC. 7. In the result, the appeal with regard to Appellant Nos. 2, 3 and 4 is allowed and the judgment dated 10/13.1995 passed by the Additional Sessions Judge-VII, Aurangabad in S.Tr. No. 127 of 1991 is set aside. The Appellants are discharged of the liability of their bail bonds.