Judgment M.M.Kumar, J. 1. This appeal under Clause X of the Letters Patent by the unsuccessful appellant, is directed against the judgment dated 25.11.2010 rendered by the learned Single Judge holding that once the charges against the appellant were proved in a regular departmental inquiry then there was no escape for the conclusion that the appellant was liable to be punished. The learned Single Judge has repelled the contention that the nature of misconduct is disproportionate to the penalty of premature retirement. 2. In order to appreciate the controversy it would first be appropriate to notice few facts. The appellant was working as Cashier/Clerk and was posted at Malout Branch in the year 2006. He was charge sheeted for various acts of omission and commission. In a detailed departmental inquiry held against him in accordance with the provisions of the Memorandum of Settlement on Disciplinary Action Procedure for Workmen, dated 10.4.2002 of the respondent Bank, in which the appellant was given full opportunity, he was found guilty of 15 charges. The conclusion reached by the Enquiry Officer in his report dated 19.10.2007 (P-6) is as under:- It is established from the above that the EPA was looking after clearing the BC seat in the capacity of computer operator and the supervision as well. Though the designation of EPA is special assistant no cap in his posting ensumed which indicates that managerial control at the branch is not up to the desired level. Technically all the entries/transactions referred to in the chargesheet were completed with the IDs of them being the EPA first arrange to afford wrongful credits and then subsequently arrange to credit the amount to rightful beneficiaries who were deprived of the credits at the first instance, though the local cheque drawn in other banks. In view of what has been stated above and documents/witnesses brought on inquiry record all the charges against EPA are held proved." 3. A perusal of the inquiry report would show that the appellant has credited the account of one account holder to the disadvantage of another account holder whom the credit should have been given. In many cases M/s Parwati Trading Company and M/s Parwati Lubricants are the beneficiaries of the wrong credit given by the apjpellant. In pursuance of the findings recorded by the Enquiry Officer, a show cause notice was issued to the appellant on 29.11.2007 (P-2).
In many cases M/s Parwati Trading Company and M/s Parwati Lubricants are the beneficiaries of the wrong credit given by the apjpellant. In pursuance of the findings recorded by the Enquiry Officer, a show cause notice was issued to the appellant on 29.11.2007 (P-2). The appellant filed reply to the show cause notice and was also granted opportunity of personal hearing on.27.12.2007. The findings recorded by the Enquiry Officer were accepted and the punishment of compulsory retirement from service was imposed, vide order dated 2.2.2008 (P- 7). 4. The learned Single Judge has held that the punishment is not disproportionate to the misconduct and in that regard reliance has been placed on a judgment of Honble the Supreme Court rendered in the case of Union of India v. S.S. Ahluwalia, 2001(4) S.CT. 459: (2007) 7 SCC 257. 5. We have heard learned counsel for the appellant. It has come on record that the inquiry against the appellant has been held in accordance with the procedure laid down by the provisions of the Memorandum of Settlement on Disciplinary Action Procedure for Workmen, dated 10.4.2002 (for brevity, Settlement) entered into between the employees and the respondent Bank. Learned counsel for the appellant has not been able to point out any lapse on the part of the disciplinary authorities in conducting the disciplinary proceedings or violation of principles of natural justice causing prejudice to the case of the appellant either before the leaned Single Judge or before this Court. In other words, in the inquiry the procedure prescribed by the Settlement of the respondent Bank has been followed. 6. It is settled principle of law that unless there is violation of mandatory provisions of the Rules, the quantum of punishment cannot be interfered with. For the aforesaid proposition reliance may be placed on the judgments of Honble the Supreme Court in the cases of Mithilesh Singh v. Union of India, 2003(2) S.C.T. 287: (2003) 3 SCC 309; B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India, 1996(1) S. C. T. 617: (1995) 6 SCC 749, and Om Kumar v. Union of India, 2001(1) S.CT. 214: (2001) 2 SCC 386. The aforesaid legal principle has also been given another name viz. Wednesbury concept.
214: (2001) 2 SCC 386. The aforesaid legal principle has also been given another name viz. Wednesbury concept. The principle emerging from Wednesbury concept has been crystallised by a Seven-Judges Bench judgment in the case of Rameshwar Prasad (VI) v. Union of India, (2006) 2 SCC 1, by observing as under :- "242. The Wednesbury Associated ProvincialPicture Houses Ltd. V. Wednesbury Corpn., (1948) 1 KB 223 principle is often misunderstood to mean that any administrative decision which is regarded by the Court to be unreasonable must be struck down. The correct understanding of the Wednesbury principle is that a decision will be said to be unreasonable in the Wednesbury sense if (i) it is based on wholly irrelevant material or wholly irrelevant consideration, (ii) it has ignored a very relevant material which it should have taken into consideration, or (iii) it is so absurd that no sensible person could ever have reached it." 7. Once the aforesaid position in law is accepted then interference on the quantum of punishment could only be in one of the three situations. However, in the present case we see no violation of the Wednesbury principle. The allegations levelled against the appellant stood proved beyond any doubt. In such a case there would be no scope left with regard to quantum of punishment unless the Court comes to the conclusion that the punishment is so shockingly disproportionate to the misconduct that no reasonable person would award such a punishment in the context of the misconduct. Moreover, the respondent Bank would have lost the confidence in the appellant, as is evident from the perusal of para 3 of the impugned order of punishment dated 2.2.2008 (P-7). The punishing authority has categorically rhentioned that the misconduct proved against the appellant is grave in nature, and as such, he has lost the confidence of the Bank Management. 8. As a sequel to the above discussion, the instant appeal is devoid of merit and does not warrant admission. There is no legal infirmity in the view taken by the learned Single Judge. Accordingly, the appeal fails and the same is dismissed. Appeal dismissed.