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2011 DIGILAW 948 (ALL)

USHA KIRAN TYAGI v. STATE OF U. P.

2011-04-13

ARUN TANDON

body2011
JUDGMENT Hon’ble Arun Tandon, J.—Heard Sri R.P. Dubey, Advocate for the petitioner, Shri S.G. Hasnain, Additional Advocate General, who is present on behalf of the Secretary, Secondary Education, U.P. Government, Lucknow and the Standing Counsel for the State. 2. Petitioner before this Court challenges the selections which have been made on the post of Principal (on regular basis) in Shree Diagember Jain Kanya Higher Secondary School, Deoband, District Saharanpur (hereinafter referred to as a ‘school’). According to the petitioner, (who is also one of the candidates) there are serious infirmities in the selection. By means of an amendment application which was served on the Standing Counsel on 25.3.2011, and which has been allowed, the petitioner further contends that the institution is not a minority institution and it is only because of the Government Order dated 9.6.2004 that the said institution is being treated as a minority institution and is claiming privileges in the matter of appointment as Principal on substantive basis. He clarifies that under the Government Order dated 9.6.2004 minority status has been conferred upon the school, which in turn is based on the recommendation of the Committee dated 2.6.2004 constituted under the Chairmanship of the Principal Secretary. 3. He submits that the same recommendations of the Committee dated 2.6.2004 and consequential Government Order dated 9.6.2004 conferring minority status on one of the institutions was subject-matter of consideration in the case of Committee of Management, Inter College Dharaon District Chandauli v. State of U.P. and others, 2006(8) ADJ 109 . The Single Judge in paragraph 22 held that the order dated 9.6.2004 had wrongly been passed on the basis of the recommendation of the Committee constituted under the Chairmanship of Principal Secretary, State Government dated 2.6.2004. The order of the Single Judge was subjected to challenge by way of Special Appeal No. 903 of 2006. The appeal was dismissed on 24.8.2006 and the Division Bench after expressing its agreement with the reasoning given in the order of the Hon’ble Single Judge dated 13.6.2006, further proceeded to hold that it was not within the competence of the State Government to confer any minority status on the schools. The State Government had hopelessly misconstrued the Constitution. The Division Bench went on to hold that the order of the State Government shows a complete misunderstanding of Article 30 of the Constitution of India. The State Government had hopelessly misconstrued the Constitution. The Division Bench went on to hold that the order of the State Government shows a complete misunderstanding of Article 30 of the Constitution of India. (the detail order of the Court shall be re- produced hereinafter). He submits that despite the said Division Bench judgment of the Court, the State authorities have not acted inconfirmity thereto and have permitted the schools covered by the same resolution dated 2.6.2004 to draw the benefits of minority status conferred thereon. The petitioner has questioned/challenged the action of the Government to treat the school as minority institution. 4. This Court while entertaining the present writ petition took note of the law declared by the Division Bench in Special Appeal No. 903 of 2006 and found that the continuance of the benefit of the minority status on the recommendation of the Committee dated 2.6.2004 on the school was clearly in teeth of the judgment of this Court and, therefore, passed following order on 25.3.2011. “Connect with Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 15276 of 2011. Let the Secretary, Secondary Education, U.P. Government at Lucknow file his personal affidavit categorically stating as to under which legal authority, the State Government has issued the order declaring the institution in question as a minority institution. He may also explain as to why, despite the Division Bench judgment of this Court passed in Special Appeal No. 903 of 2006, wherein the order of the State Government conferring minority status on another institution dated 9th June, 2004 was held to be wholly illegal, to the extent that the Division Bench recorded that “the matter is so hopelessly illegal that it is very difficult to explain how hopeless it is”, no action has been been taken by the State Government to get the mistake which had been committed earlier rectified. He may also explain as to why appropriate proceedings be not initiated against the officers concerned. All the records as may be available with the State Government at the time of issuance of the Government Order dated 9th June, 2004 shall be produced before this Court on the next date. Put up this matter on Wednesday i.e. 30th March, 2011.” The Secretary, Secondary Education filed an affidavit on 1.4.2011 and stated in paragraphs 4, 5, 6, 8 and 9 as follows: 4. Put up this matter on Wednesday i.e. 30th March, 2011.” The Secretary, Secondary Education filed an affidavit on 1.4.2011 and stated in paragraphs 4, 5, 6, 8 and 9 as follows: 4. “That it is respectfully stated that the Institution in question namely Acharya Nemi Sagar jain Inter College Sardhana, Meerut was conferred minority status on 9.6.2004. A true copy of the order dated 9.6.2004 conferring minority status on the Institution in question is being annexed herewith as Annexure No. A-1 to this affidavit. 5. That it may be stated that though the aforesaid status has been conferred by the department of Minority Welfare, yet the same was based on the recommendations of a Committee constituted under the Government Order dated 13.6.1997 under the chairmanship of Principal Secretary, Secondary Education, meeting of which was held on 2.6.2004. In the said meeting the Government Orders dated 6.10.1994 and 22.2.1995 prescribing the method and standard for conferment of minority status on private recognised Intermediate Colleges were taken into consideration. 6. That it is however stated that subsequently the work of conferment of minority status on basic and Intermediate Institution has been allocated to the department of Minority Welfare and Muslim Waqf vide an office memorandum dated 22.2.2005, a copy of which is being annexed herewith as Annexure No. A-2 to this affidavit. It is further stated here that the work of declaration of an institution to be a minority institution had been allotted to the department of Minority Welfare in the year 1996 but with effect from year 2003 till February, 2005 the work was again allotted to the department of Secondary Education. The said fact are evident from the aforementioned office memorandum dated 22.2.2005. 8. That in compliance of the order dated 24.8.2006 further action was to be taken by the Department of Minority Welfare because the work related with that subject was being governed by the same Department. 9. That with respect to the aforesaid order of this Hon’ble Court dated 24.8.2006, it has been brought to the record by the Department of Minority Welfare stated that the Special Leave Petition file by the State Government before the Hon’ble Apex Court against the aforesaid judgment and order has been dismissed on the ground of limitation. 9. That with respect to the aforesaid order of this Hon’ble Court dated 24.8.2006, it has been brought to the record by the Department of Minority Welfare stated that the Special Leave Petition file by the State Government before the Hon’ble Apex Court against the aforesaid judgment and order has been dismissed on the ground of limitation. However, the Special Leave Petition preferred by the private individual is still pending before the Hon’ble Apex Court.” The affidavit of the Secretary was not to the satisfaction of the Court. Therefore, another order dated 1.4.2011 was passed giving an opportunity to the Secretary to remedy the situation. The order dated 1.4.2011 reads as follows: “Affidavit filed by the Secretary, Secondary Education, U.P. Government, Lucknow today is highly unsatisfactory. An order declaring an institution as minority had been set aside of this Court specifically after recording that it is not within the competence of the State Government to confirm minority status on an institution. Such powers vest in a Court of law only. It may be recorded that under the impugned order with reference to the resolution taken in the meeting dated 2.6.2004 that such declaration has been issued. Neither the resolution dated 2.6.2004 nor the records which were asked for by the Court under order dated 25.3.2011, on the basis whereof, such declaration was made, has been produced before this Court nor reply has been given as to under which statutory power such declaration has been issued. One last opportunity afforded to the Secretary, Secondary Education, U.P. Government, Lucknow, to ensure that all relevant records including the minute of the meeting dated 2.6.2004 are produced before this Court on 8.4.2011 failing which he shall remain present before this Court alongwith record. He must indicate the source of power of the State to issue such declaration about minority character of Intermediate Institutions. List on 8.4.2011. “ Today a supplementary affidavit has been filed by the Secretary and in paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 8, 9 and 11, it has been stated as follows: 3. He must indicate the source of power of the State to issue such declaration about minority character of Intermediate Institutions. List on 8.4.2011. “ Today a supplementary affidavit has been filed by the Secretary and in paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 8, 9 and 11, it has been stated as follows: 3. “That, it is submitted that the State Government by order dated 7.1.2003 constituted a 4 member committee including Director, Minority Welfare and 3 other members for considering the proposal of the institution for recognizing them as a minority institution and thereafter the aforesaid committee will submit the report to the State Government after considering the guidelines as given by the State Government in its government order. A true copy of the order dated 7.1.2003 issued by the State Government, is being annexed herewith and marked as Annexure No. SA-01 to this affidavit. 4. That, the deponent is annexing the copy of the order dated 2.6.2004 passed by a 4 Member Committee constituted by the State Government for declaration/recognition of the minority institution situated in the State of Uttar Pradesh Photocopy of the recommendation of the Committee, is being annexed herewith and marked as Annexure No. SA-02 to this affidavit. 5. That, it is further submitted that in pursuance to above recommendation the State Government by its order dated 9.6.2004 declared/recognised the various institutions and the copy of one Institution named as Acharya Nami Sagar Jain Inter College, Sardhana, Meerut. A true copy of the order of the State Government dated 9.6.2004, is being annexed herewith and marked Annexure No. SA-03 to this affidavit. 8. It is also relevant to submit that the judgment and order of Special Appeal No. 903 of 2006 which has been taken note in the present writ petition, will not be applicable since the said judgment of learned Single Judge as well as the Division Bench judgment related with a dispute regarding the establishment of dispute of rival committee of management that there was a dispute of minority or not, as such the judgment of division Bench of this Hon’ble Court, which has been referred in the order passed by this Hon’ble Court will not be applicable for adjudication of present case. 9. 9. That, it is also relevant to submit that the entire controversy regarding the approval of appointment by the Institution managed by an Institution of having constitution of minority character as provided under Article (30) of the Constitution. 11. That, at the time of taking decision on 9.6.2004 conferring minority status to the Institution involved in the special appeal, there was no dispute before the State Government of rival committee, as such at that time the Government had determined the status of minority character and conferring to the management of Institution in pursuant to the Government Order issued by the State Government.” 5. Shri S.G. Hasnain, Additional Advocate General in support of the stand so taken by the State contends that the judgment of the Division Bench in Special Appeal No. 903 of 2006 (supra) will not apply to other institutions covered by recommendation of Committee dated 2.6.2004 and consequential Government Order dated 9.6.2004. The conferment of minority status on the school in question is still valid. In this case, there is no rival committee before the Court and that the present institution is a minority institution as is stated in paragraph 3 of the writ petition. He explains that originally no prayer for questioning the minority status of the institution, who made in the petition and it is only by way of amendment that such issue has been raised. The pleadings in that regard by way of amendment application are supported by an affidavit filed by the clerk of the Advocate which is even otherwise contrary to the contents of writ petition. The petitioner has no locus to challenge the validity of grant of minority status to the school as she herself applied in pursuance to the advertisement published by the school which specifically mentioned that the institution was a minority school. Having failed to compete before the Selection Committee, she cannot now question the minority status of the school. 6. He further submits that it was not brought to the notice of the Division Bench that an Act has been passed by the Parliament namely National Commission for Minority Education Act, 2004 (hereinafter referred to as Act 2004) whereby a National Commission has been constituted to determine the minority status of the institutions. 7. 6. He further submits that it was not brought to the notice of the Division Bench that an Act has been passed by the Parliament namely National Commission for Minority Education Act, 2004 (hereinafter referred to as Act 2004) whereby a National Commission has been constituted to determine the minority status of the institutions. 7. A Single Judge in the case of Rafi Memorial Girls Higher Secondary School and another v. State of U.P. and others, 2010(3) ADJ 834 (LB), has considered the various aspects of the matter including the judgment of the special appeal as well as various other judgment applicable and has upheld the minority status of other institution. He submits that the real intent of the judgment of the Division Bench in Special Appeal No. 903 of 2006 is that if there is a dispute as to whether an Institution is a minority Institution or not, it should be decided by the Court alone. 8. He lastly submits that irrespective of the interpretation placed by the Division Bench on the conferment of status of minority institution, the same would apply to particular case only and the State Government is free to Act qua other institution on the status conferred under resolution dated 2.6.2004. As a last argument, he submits that since the Act 2004 was not brought to the knowledge of the Division Bench, the judgment dated 24.8.2006 is per incuriam. 9. In order to understand the contention so raised on behalf of the Secretary by the Additional Advocate General, this Court by way of example made a pointed query to the Additional Advocate General i.e. while interpreting regulation 21 of Chapter III of the Regulations framed under the Intermediate Education Act initially in view of Division Bench judgments of this Court a circular was issued by the State Government directing that no teacher will continue as ad hoc Principal after he attains the age of superannuation for any subsequent period i.e. till the end of academic session. The Division Bench Judgment was overruled by the Full Bench of this Court and it has been held that ad hoc Principal will continue till the end of the academic session. The Division Bench Judgment was overruled by the Full Bench of this Court and it has been held that ad hoc Principal will continue till the end of the academic session. Can the State Government still insist that all other ad hoc Principal, who were not party to the case before the Full Bench of this Court will not continue as ad hoc Principal after attaining the age of superannuation. 10. The Additional Advocate General in reply states that this question is not to be answered. He submits that such facts are foreign to the dispute and cannot be examined by the Court. He states that this petition cannot be treated as P.I.L. qua which this Court has no jurisdiction. 11. This Court now proceeds to consider the stand of the State as per the contentions made by/on benefit of the Secretary. 12. The recommendation of the Committee under the Chairmanship of Principal Secretary dated 2.6.2004 and the consequential order issued by the State Government dated 9.6.2004, (which is of same date and identical in terms to one conferring the minority status on the school in question) were directly and substantively, in issue before the Single Judge in the case of Pratap Narayan Singh and others v. State of U.P. and others, 2006 (6) ADJ 109 , which gave rise to the Special Appeal No. 903 of 2006. The Division Bench vide its judgment dated 24.8.2006 held as follows: “This appeal is taken up and summarily disposed of. We are in respectful agreement with the reasoning given and the order passed by Hon’ble Mr. Justice V.C. Misra on the 13th of July, 2006. While hearing the appeal we could not cross our first mental hurdle, which was the question whether the appeal should be given any serious thought at all or not. The State Government has, by the impugned order dated the 9th of June, 2004 sought to confer a minority status on the school in question. The society controlling the school was registered in 1947. It was always run as an open institution. Hindus became even a majority during the middle of the last century. Some interested parties hopelessly misconstrued the Constitution and prayed to the State Government for grant of minority status. It is not for any State Government to grant any minority status to any institution; not even the Parliament or State Legislature can do it. Hindus became even a majority during the middle of the last century. Some interested parties hopelessly misconstrued the Constitution and prayed to the State Government for grant of minority status. It is not for any State Government to grant any minority status to any institution; not even the Parliament or State Legislature can do it. A minority institution has to grow by itself. Only a competent Court of law can declare such status. The order of the State Government shows a complete misunderstanding of Article 30 of the Constitution. It appears to have constituted a Committee and on the basis of the report of the Committee, it took upon itself the power and authority to grant minority status with ‘’immediate effect’ The matter is so hopelessly illegal that it is very difficult to explain how hopeless it is. The appeal is dismissed.” 13. It is therefore apparent from the aforesaid order that the Division Bench of this Court was directly specifically considered the competence of the State Government to constitute the Committee which decided to confer minority status upon various institutions including the school in question as per recommendation dated 2.6.2004 and the consequential issuance of the G.O. dated 9.6.2004. The Division Bench opined without doubt that the State Government had no legal authority to confer any such minority status on school. The power in that regard vests in a Court of law only. It is a judgment in rem which declared that the State Government cannot confer minority status on institutions on the recommendation dated 2.6.2004 and by issuance of consequential order dated 9.6.2004. The Division Bench went on to record that even an Act of Parliament or the State Legislature cannot confer such minority status. 14. At this stage, it would be worthwhile relevant portion of para 75 to reproduce the Division Bench judgment of this Court in the case of Aligarh Muslim University, Aligarh v. Malay Shukla and others, 2006(1) AWC 992 which reads as follows: “Parliament is similarly incompetent from another point of view. A minority institution cannot be created by Parliament; only a minority can create it. Whether a minority has succeeded in creating an Article 30 institution of the Constitution or not, is in the peculiar province and jurisdiction of the Courts of law to declare. Parliament is incompetent to declare by, at least a simple legislation, an institution to be a minority institution. Whether a minority has succeeded in creating an Article 30 institution of the Constitution or not, is in the peculiar province and jurisdiction of the Courts of law to declare. Parliament is incompetent to declare by, at least a simple legislation, an institution to be a minority institution. If it could do that then it could add to Article 30 by saying A,B,C,D, etc. will be Article 30 institutions. Parliament cannot do it, not at least by a simple Act of Parliament, if by anything else.” 15. It is not in dispute that against the judgment dated 24.8.2006, the State Government filed an special leave petition before the Hon’ble Supreme Court which was dismissed on the ground of delay. The contesting parties also filed special leave petition separately against the same judgment but no interim order has been granted by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in their favour till date. The law declared by the Division Bench of the High Court dated 24.8.2006 therefore holds filed even today. 16. The original record pertaining to the resolution dated 2.6.2004 has been produced before the Court. This Court finds that under the same resolution dated 2.6.2004, the Committee recommended grant of minority status to as many as 76 minority institutions. The complete records in respect of the school in question alongwith the record of another institutions have also been placed before the Court. Except for the memorandum of association of the institution, the name of the teachers and other staffs, the application made in the prescribed proforma for grant of minority status, there exists no material document which could demonstrate that the school had been established by a minority community and is being run and managed by the same. 17. The issue with regard to grant of minority rights under Article 30 of the Constitution of India has been adjudicated by the Constitution Benches of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, it has repeatedly been held that for claiming a right under Article 30 of the Constitution of India, two factors have to be established: (a) That the institution has been established by a minority community and (b) that the said institution is being run and managed by the same minority community. Both the aforesaid conditions must co-exist. Both the aforesaid conditions must co-exist. If even one of them is found wanting, the institution will not be entitled to claim minority status under Article 30 of the Constitution of India (Reference: State of Kerala v. R. Mother Provincial, AIR 1970 SC 2079 ). 18. To prove that the institution has been established by a minority community, it has further to be examined as to from where the major corpus for establishing the institution has come and as to whether the founders of the same were members of minority community or not. 19. It is recorded that there has been complete non-consideration of the law so explained by the Supreme Court in the matter of declaration of 76 institutions as minority institution by the Committee as per recommendation dated 2.6.2004, as is apparent from the documents produced before this Court. This Court may therefore record that the declaration despite being wholly in competent in the eyes of law, was even otherwise an attempt to confer uncalled for benefits upon 76 institutions covered by resolution dated 2.6.2004 without examining the relevant material for arriving at a conclusion qua the institution to be a minority institution as per the law declared by the Supreme Court. It may be stated that mere filing of affidavit and the memorandum of association can never lead to a conclusion that the institution has been established by a minority community and is run and managed by a minority community without examination in detail the mandatory requirement. 20. From the documents enclosed as SA-1 and SA-2 to the supplementary affidavit filed by the Secretary, it is apparent that the Committee constituted under the Government Order dated 7.1.2003, had not considered the issue of grant of minority status to the institution. The resolution dated 2.6.2004 has been passed in the meeting of a different Committee. Therefore, the allegation made in paras 3 and 4 of the counter-affidavit are false. The resolution dated 2.6.2004 refers to Government Orders dated 6.10.1994, dated 22.2.1995 and G.O. dated 13.6.1997 which for reasons best known to Secretary, have not been brought on record. 21. Because of such declaration by the State Government, the school alongwith other 75 institutions have gone out of the purview of U.P. Secondary Services Selection Board Act, 1982 in the matter of appointment and termination/dismissal of teachers including Principals, besides conferring other illegal advantages. 21. Because of such declaration by the State Government, the school alongwith other 75 institutions have gone out of the purview of U.P. Secondary Services Selection Board Act, 1982 in the matter of appointment and termination/dismissal of teachers including Principals, besides conferring other illegal advantages. Repeatedly two orders were passed by this Court giving an opportunity to the Secretary to Act in compliance with the law declared by the Division Bench. He has chosen not to do so. To make the situation worse a stand has been taken on his behalf by the Additional Advocate General that the Division Bench will have no application meaning thereby that the State does not propose to comply with the law declared by the Division Bench of this Court as per judgment dated 24.8.2006. 22. The judicial system has many components all working for the same goal i.e. to uphold the Rule of law. The duty of the High Court is to lay down the law and then to apply the legal principles so declared to the facts of the case and to decide the same accordingly. It is the legal principle, which so declared, is binding. The role of the State and its Officers is to implement the law, as declared by the High Court. The Officers of the State cannot be permitted to violate the law so declared, only because someone has a feeling that the law so declared should have been otherwise. The wisdom of the Officers of the State to question the law so declared before appropriate forum or in subsequent proceedings, both on the ground that the law had not been correctly laid down as well as on the ground that the law is per incuriam, cannot be doubted, but so long as such pleas are not accepted by the Higher Court or a larger Bench, the State and its Officers must Act accordingly to the law so declared, failing which the Rule of law would cease to exist. 23. Mere opinion of the particular Officer that the law has not been correctly laid down cannot be the basis for violating the law so declared by the High Court, more so when the judgments are in rem, like the one in hand wherein the competence of the State to do a particular Act has been found by the High Court to be non-existent. Such Acts of the Officers of the State would amount to interference in administration of justice and therefore, contempt. 24. Under the order of this Court dated 25.3.2011, the Court initially afforded an opportunity to the Secretary bring the Acts of the State in confirmity with the Division Bench judgment of this Court dated 24.8.2006 so as to ensure that no further benefit as applicable to minority institutions is provided to the school in question only because of declaration issued under the G.O. Dated 9.6.2004. The Secretary, instead of responding and instead of acting in accordance with the law as declared by the Division Bench of this Court, side stepped the issue as is clear from his counter-affidavit referred to above. 25. A second opportunity was afforded vide order of the Court dated 1.4.2011 to the Secretary to revisit the entire issue. The Secretary has come out with a stronger response as per paragraph of the supplementary affidavit quoted above. Despite two opportunity afforded by the Court, there is no attempt on the part of the Secretary to ensure that no further benefit of minority status flow in favour of the school in question because of declaration issued under G.O. Dated 9.6.2004 based on the resolution dated 2.6.2001 which has been found by the Division Bench of this Court to be without authority of law. 26. The apology tendered in the paragraphs of the affidavit and assurance given that the Secretary that he has every respect to the order of the High Court are merely an eye wash, inasmuch as before the Court, it has been contended with all vehemence at his command by the Additional Advocate General on behalf of the Secretary that the order of the Division Bench dated 24.8.2006 is not to be acted upon. 27. The plea that the present writ petition is in the nature of P.I.L. is wholly a vague statement made by the Additional Advocate General without referring any material fact for substantiating the aforesaid contention. 28. On reading of facts on record and the reliefs as prayed for in the present writ petition, this Court has no hesitation to hold that the present writ petition is not in the nature of a P.I.L. 29. 28. On reading of facts on record and the reliefs as prayed for in the present writ petition, this Court has no hesitation to hold that the present writ petition is not in the nature of a P.I.L. 29. The other contention that the judgment of the Division Bench dated 24.8.2006 is per incuriam also has no leg to stand inasmuch as the mere issuance of the National Commission for Minority Education Act, 2004 will not in any way dilute the legal principle of law initiated by the Division Bench as quoted above. It may also be stated that the Single Judge in the case of Rafi Memorial Girls Higher Secondary School and another (supra) has relied upon the certificate issued by the Minority Commission declaring the institution (which was subject-matter before the Single Judge) to be a minority institution. No such certificate has been issued in favour of the 76 institutions covered by resolution dated 2.6.2004 at least none has been brought on record. 30. The Court may now consider the plea that since the petitioner has participated in the selections in response to the advertisement, he cannot question the status of the institution. The plea so raised is totally misconceived as there can be no estoppal or acquiescence against law. If the institution is found not to be a minority institution, the appointment on the post of Principal by the Management would be rendered void by operation of law in view of Section 16 of the U.P. Act No. 5 of 1982. 31. The last contention of the Additional Advocate General that the affidavit of the clerk of the Advocate in support of amendment application cannot be read or is mala fide is baseless allegation, which except for being a bald statement could not be supported by any justifiable reason or law. 32. 31. The last contention of the Additional Advocate General that the affidavit of the clerk of the Advocate in support of amendment application cannot be read or is mala fide is baseless allegation, which except for being a bald statement could not be supported by any justifiable reason or law. 32. The issue as to whether the institution in operation is a minority school or not, to be adjudicated by this Court of law as per the Division Bench judgment dated 24.8.2006 after the Committee of Management files its response is entirely a different issue vis-a-vis the insistence of the Secretary of the State Government that it shall continue to confer benefits of men only status on the school because of recommendation of the Committee dated 2.6.2004 and Government Order dated 9.6.2004 (which as already stated above, has been declared to be without authority of law by the Division Bench). The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Dinesh Kumar Gupta v. United India Insurance Company Limited and others, 2010(12) SCC 770 in paragraphs 15 and 16 are held as follows: 15. “Nevertheless, it would not be correct on behalf of the appellant to contend that the learned Single Judge was not authorised to initiate contempt proceeding against the appellant merely because he was sitting in a Single Bench although he might have been in a position to notice whether the alleged action at the instance of any party or anyone else who obstructed the cause of justice, amounted to contempt of Court of a Civil or Criminal nature and yet would be precluded from initiating suo motu contempt proceedings. The Contempt of Courts act, 1971 clearly postulates the existence of only the following preconditions before a person can be held to have committed civil contempt: (i) There must be a judgment or order or decree or direction or writ or other process of a Court; or An undertaking given to a Court; (ii) The judgment, etc. must be of the Court and undertaking must have been given to a Court; (iii) There must be a disobedience to such judgment, etc. or breach of such undertaking; (iv) The disobedience or breach, as the case may be, must be wilful. must be of the Court and undertaking must have been given to a Court; (iii) There must be a disobedience to such judgment, etc. or breach of such undertaking; (iv) The disobedience or breach, as the case may be, must be wilful. Hence, it would not be right to contend that even though the learned Single Judge might have found material which persuaded him to form an opinion that an contempt has been committed, yet the learned Judge had no authority or jurisdiction to initiate a proceeding for contempt against the person who indulged in such action. Thus we find no substance in the plea which has been raised on behalf of the appellant on this count. 33. Thus, the competence of the Single Judge to initiate suo motu contempt has been recognised by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. This Court on the basis of the findings recorded here-in-above finds that all the four conditions, as noted in paragraph 15 in the case of Dinesh Kumar Gupta (supra) exist in the facts of this case. 34. Therefore, following charges are framed against the Secretary, Shri Jitendra Kumar Gupta. (A) You have deliberately refused to Act in compliance with the Division Bench judgment of this Court dated 24.8.2006 passed in the case of Committee of Management, Inter College Dharaon District Chandauli (supra) i.e. Special Appeal No. 903 of 2006. (B) You have deliberately refused the compliance of the judgment of the Division Bench and have permitted the school to avail benefits of the minority status based on the recommendation of the Committee dated 2.6.2004 and Government Order dated 9.6.2004 despite the Division Bench judgment dated 24.8.2006 holding that State had no authority of law to confer minority status on the institution. (C) You have deliberately refused to Act in accordance with law despite the order passed by this Court on 25.3.2008 and dated 1.5.2008. Shri Jitendra Kumar Gupta, Secretary may therefore show-cause by 2.5.2011 as to why he may not be punished for contempt of the Court. Issue notice to private respondent fixing 2.5.2011 as the date. Steps be taken within one week. All respondents may file counter-affidavit by the next date. 35. Shri Jitendra Kumar Gupta, Secretary may therefore show-cause by 2.5.2011 as to why he may not be punished for contempt of the Court. Issue notice to private respondent fixing 2.5.2011 as the date. Steps be taken within one week. All respondents may file counter-affidavit by the next date. 35. In view of the fact that the Court is of the opinion that the order of the Government dated 9.6.2004 cannot confer any minority status on the school in question, it is provided that no further action shall be taken on the papers transmitted by the Committee of Management qua appointment on the post of Principal till the next date of listing. 36. List on 2.5.2011. —————