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Himachal Pradesh High Court · body

2011 DIGILAW 948 (HP)

State of H. P. v. Kuldeep Kumar @ Kullu

2011-03-05

R.B.MISRA, SANJAY KAROL

body2011
JUDGMENT Sanjay Karol, J. For an offence, which is alleged to have been committed on 3.4.1999, accused was put to trial. In terms of judgment dated 20.1.2000 passed by learned Sessions Judge, Chamba, in Sessions Case No. 26 of 1999 titled as State of H.P. vs. Kuldeep Kumar @ Kullu, accused stands acquitted of the charged offence. 2. It is the case of the prosecution that in the year 1999 prosecutrix (PW-7), daughter of Smt. Balo Devi (PW-8) was studying in 3rd standard in a school at Khadari. Prosecutrix was living with her mother and aunt, Smt. Dishu (PW-9) at village Kharothi, Police Station, Kihar, Distt. Chamba. Balo Devi and Dishu are sisters and married to the same person. Prosecutrix and her friend Saroji were studying in the same school. As usual for studying, on 3.4.1999 at about 5.00 P.M., prosecutrix had gone to the house of Saroji in the same village. Noticing that Saroji was away and prosecutrix was alone in the house, accused Kuldeep Kumar (brother of Saroji), aged 19 years carried the prosecutrix inside the room where he committed rape and sodomised her. While doing so he covered her mouth with his hand. After the incident prosecutrix came out crying from the room. She was bleeding. Her salwar was soiled with blood which also fell on the stones lying on the path outside the room. Soon thereafter, prosecutrix was seen crying by Smt. Dishu (PW-9) to whom she narrated the entire incident. Smt. Dishu immediately came home and informed Smt. Balo Devi about the same. Balo Devi rushed to meet the prosecutrix to whom also she narrated the entire incident. Matter was reported to the police by Smt. Balo Devi and FIR No. 34/99 (Ext.PF) dated 3.4.1999 was registered at Police Station, Kihar under Section 376 IPC. Inspector Rameshwar Thakur (PW 15) visited the spot and carried out investigation. Vide seizure memo (Ext.PN) he took into possession blood stained stones (Ext.P3) lying on the path in front of the door from where prosecutrix left the room in which the alleged crime took place. Accused who had absconded from his house was immediately not traceable anywhere. On 4.4.1999 prosecutrix was got medically examined through Dr. Madhu Kaushal (PW-10) to whom also she narrated the incident. Accused who had absconded from his house was immediately not traceable anywhere. On 4.4.1999 prosecutrix was got medically examined through Dr. Madhu Kaushal (PW-10) to whom also she narrated the incident. Since prosecutrix was in pain her final examination could not be completed, therefore she was sent for further management and final medical examination and opinion to the District Hospital at Chamba vide MLC (Ext.PG). At Chamba prosecutrix was got medically examined through Dr. Kamlesh Dogra (PW-11) to whom also she narrated the incident. After careful examination, vide MLC dated 4.4.1999 (Ext.PJ) Doctor opined that prosecutrix was subjected to both rape and sodomy. In order to determine her bony age, X-ray examination was conducted and on examination by Dr. V. K. Pathak (PW-3) and vide report (Ext.PD/1) it was opined that prosecutrix was less than 12 years of age. Investigating Agency took birth certificate (Ext.PA) from Sh. Hem Raj (PW-1) which showed that prosecutrix was born on 17.4.1991. Extract of the parivar register (Ext.PB) was also taken by the police from Sh. Karam Singh (PW-2), Development Officer, Gram Panchayat, Salooni. Clothes of the prosecutrix i.e. shirt (Ext.P1), salwar (Ext.P-2) and swab obtained from her private parts were collected by the police and sent for Chemical Analysis to FSL, Junga. As per reports of the Chemical Examiner (Ext.PK & Ext.PL) human semen and blood was on the salwar (Ext.P2) and human blood was on the shirt (Ext.P1) and blood stained stones. Semen was also there on the underwear of the accused. Accused who had absconded was staying with his friend at village Sohal, Police Station Dhariwal (Punjab). He was arrested on 7.4.1999 and got medically examined through Dr. Nagesh Verma who issued MLC (Ext.PC). With the completion of investigation challan was presented in the Court for trial. 3. Accused was charged for having committed offences punishable under Sections 376 and 377 IPC, to which he did not plead guilty and claimed trial. 4. In order to prove its case prosecution examined 15 witnesses. Statement of accused under Section 313 Cr.PC was also recorded in which he took the following defence : “I am innocent. I have been falselyimplicated in this case due to enmity.” However, he did not lead any evidence in support of his defence. 5. 4. In order to prove its case prosecution examined 15 witnesses. Statement of accused under Section 313 Cr.PC was also recorded in which he took the following defence : “I am innocent. I have been falselyimplicated in this case due to enmity.” However, he did not lead any evidence in support of his defence. 5. Trial Court observed that statement of the prosecutrix could not be recorded in the Court as she was not in a position to reply to most of the questions put to her. This fact however was not considered to be fatal to the prosecution case. However, Trial Court held that (i) even though prosecutrix had narrated the incident to her mother (PW-9) and aunt (PW-10) in the presence of other independent persons, such as Premo, Hanso etc. yet prosecution did not examine them. Only Premo was cited as a witness and even her statement was not recorded in the Court. Both PW-9 & P-10 being sisters and were married to the same person were interested witnesses. Non-examination of independent witnesses has rendered the prosecution case to be fatal; (ii) other witnesses had contradicted with regard to the exact place of crime and pendency of a criminal case against PW-9; (iii) prosecution was not able to link the accused to the blood and semen found on the clothes of the prosecutrix; (iv) Prosecution story was full of infirmities, inasmuch as place of crime was not shown to the police; (v) In any event no blood was found on the bed sheet and the mattress of the bed where prosecutrix was allegedly raped and sodomised by the accused. The chain of circumstance connecting the accused with the commission of offence was not complete. In effect prosecution could not prove the circumstances beyond reasonable doubt, pointing to the guilt of the accused. Consequently accused was acquitted of the charged offences, hence the present appeal. 6. In State of Rajasthan versus Om Prakash, (2002) 5 SCC 745 the Apex Court has held that:- “Cases involving sexual molestation and assault require a different approach – a sensitive approach and not an approach which a court may adopt in dealing with a normal offence under penal laws.” “Child rape cases are cases of perverse lust for sex where even innocent children are not spared in pursuit of sexual pleasure. It is a crime against humanity. It is a crime against humanity. In such cases, responsibility on the shoulders of the courts is more onerous so as to provide proper legal protection to these children. Their physical and mental immobility call for such protection. Children are the natural resource of our country. They are the country’s future. Hope of tomorrow rests on them. In our country, a girl child is in a very vulnerable position and one of the modes of her exploitation is rape besides other modes of sexual abuse. These factors point towards a different approach required to be adopted. It is necessary for the courts to have a sensitive approach when dealing with cases of child rape. The effect of such a crime on the mind of the child is likely to be lifelong. A special safeguard has been provided for children in the Constitution of India in Article 39.” 7. We shall first deal with the question of age of the prosecutrix. Sh. Hem Raj (PW-1) has proved certificate (Ext.PA) issued by the school showing the date of birth of the prosecutrix to be 17.4.1991. He clarified that the child was admitted in the school on 12.6.1996 and date of birth was entered on the basis of the certificate (of Birth & Death) which also was brought to Court. Sh. Karam Singh (PW-2) proved the abstract of copy of the Parivar Register (Ext.PB) wherein date of birth of the prosecutrix is also recorded as 17.4.1991. He also proved certificate (Ext.PC) issued under the Birth & Death Registration Act, 1969 which also records the date of birth of the prosecutrix to be 17.4.1991. In this case prosecution additionally got the radiological age of the prosecutrix determined through Dr. V. K. Pathak (PW-3) who opined that as per the medical opinion given by him (Ext.PD/1), based on medical record (Ext.PD/2), prosecutrix was less than 12 years of age. Prosecutrix was examined on 4.4.1999. Thus it stands proved on record that as on the date of alleged offence prosecutrix was 7 years 11 months and 16 days old. In fact, on record there is not much challenge on the point of her age. 8. Crime is alleged to have taken place on 3.4.1999 at about 4.30 P.M. Matter was reported to the police by the mother of the prosecutrix same day. Complainant had to cover some distance to reach up to the Police Post. In fact, on record there is not much challenge on the point of her age. 8. Crime is alleged to have taken place on 3.4.1999 at about 4.30 P.M. Matter was reported to the police by the mother of the prosecutrix same day. Complainant had to cover some distance to reach up to the Police Post. We may observe that the offence took place in the remotest corner of the State and parties come from rural back ground. Thus there has been no delay in reporting the matter to the police. 9. Police also got the prosecutrix examined at the earliest. She was first examined by the Medical Officer at the Primary Health Centre, Salooni on 4.4.1999 and later by the Medical Officer at District Hospital, Chamba. For proper appreciation, we feel their statements need to be reproduced in toto. 10. Dr. Madhu Kaushal (PW-10), Medical Officer, PHC, Salooni has deposed that:- “I am posted at PHC Salooni since December,1996. On 4.4.99, prosecutrix Anju whom I identify from her identification marks noted in the magines of the MIC, was brought to me for medical examination. An application was also presented by the police. I was told that there was alleged history of sexual intercourse against the will by Kuldeep S/O Sh. Hoshiar Singh. History given by the child was that she was studying with her friend Saroji in her residence (verandah) on 3.4.99 at about 4.30 PM. Saroji’s brother Kuldeep picked her up and took her into the room where he tried to do sexual intercourse and the child Anju was crying with pain. He put his hand over her mouth so that she could not be able to cry. Examination: On examination I found the general physical examination with the normal limits. Child was conscious, cooperative, well oriented to time, place and person. Height 123 cms. moderately built and moderately nourished. She had 24 teeth, no public hair, no axillary hair and breasts not developed. No marks of struggle except pin pointed abrasions over the pubis symphysis. Local examination: There was no seminal stains found on external genetalia, but clotted blood was present over the prenium and perinium region. Flackes of stool were present over the perianal region. Labia mazora was normal. Small tear was present over the labia minora near the clitoris Lt. side. Minora was congested and hyperemic. Local examination: There was no seminal stains found on external genetalia, but clotted blood was present over the prenium and perinium region. Flackes of stool were present over the perianal region. Labia mazora was normal. Small tear was present over the labia minora near the clitoris Lt. side. Minora was congested and hyperemic. Hymen could not be seen because of the pain and agony of the child. Anus was inflamed large tear was present over the perinial region at 5’0 clock position. Further examination could not be done because of the severe pain. As the child was having severe pain, so sample from vagina and anus could not be taken. So the case was referred to District Hospital, Chamba for further needful, manahement and final opinion. I issued MIC PG which is in my hand and bears my signatures. Before examining, I obtained the consent of the mother of the child and she had also put her thumb impression on the MIC. Injuries noticed over labia minora and anus could have been male sexual organ. Application moved by the police for examination of Anju is EX. Ph. I had not mentioned the diamensions of the injuries because the child was in severe pain. It is not essential, that such injuries will be caused by sexual organ only.” (Emphasis supplied) 11. Dr. Kamlesh Dogra (PW-11), Medical Officer, District Hospital, Chamba has deposed that:- “I am posted as Medical Officer, District Hospital, Chamba since 1995. Prosecutrix Anju was referred to DH Chamba by M.O Salooni. She was accompanied by her mother and lady police. After taking consent, I caused medical examination of the prosecutrix and my observations are as follows. History given by the child The girl said that she returned from the school at 3 PM and she took her meals at home and went to her friends house Saroja Devi. When she went to her friends house Saroja Devi to study which was in her neighbourhood around 4PM. Her friend went outside the house. When her brother picked her up from verandah and took her to his room i.e. on first floor she cried and screemed, but, he covered her mouth with his hands and then she noticed pain at her anal region. Her friend went outside the house. When her brother picked her up from verandah and took her to his room i.e. on first floor she cried and screemed, but, he covered her mouth with his hands and then she noticed pain at her anal region. As per narration made by her mother, she told that her sister told her that her daughter was being picked up by Kuldeep and was taken to his room where he removed her salwar and sodomised her. She found her clothes soiled with blood. On examination, child was found conscious, coherent to time and space, small framed thin built. Height was 4 ft. and weight was 12.5 kgs. She had 24 teeth. Heart NAD, chest clear. Per abdomen- NAD. No marks of violence anywhere on the body. No public hair, no axillary hair, breasts not developed, unmarried girl, menarchy not attained as yet. Local examination: No stains either blood or semen found over perineal or vulval region. No marks of violence seen. A small furuncle was seen on monspubis. Labia majora normal. No injury seen. Labia minora was congested and hyperaemic. Hymen intact. No tear, no discharge. Anal examination: External appearance-bruising plus, inflammation plus, soiled with feaces, after cleaning examined her. Tear at five’O clock position about 1.5 cms. Second tear at 11’O clock seen. ½ cms. Anal musculatere tone dilated irritable and tender to touch. Linear abrasion all around the anus. Digital examination- Loss of elasticity and tone of anus and admitted two fingers with discomfort. Linear abrasions varying in number and extending from anal margines to anus all around. There were no blood stains around the anus or pereinium. However, clothes were soiled with blood. Facial matter was present around the anus. Opinion It was consistent with entry of penis and correlate with history given by the child and mother. Stains and blood present on salwar were preserved and sent for chemical examination. Blue coloured shirt and white salwar with blood stains which the girl was wearing, were presented sealed and sealed packet handed over to the police for chemical examination. No public hair so not collected. The prosecutrix was referred to dental surgeon for dental age and the opinion of the dental surgeon was that the girl was about eight years of age. I issued MIC Ex. PJ, which is in my hand and bears by signatures. No public hair so not collected. The prosecutrix was referred to dental surgeon for dental age and the opinion of the dental surgeon was that the girl was about eight years of age. I issued MIC Ex. PJ, which is in my hand and bears by signatures. On its reverse, the dental surgeon had recorded his opinion as mark ‘A’. Congested and hyperemic vagina was due to the impact of penis. Similarly, injury on anus was caused by means of penis penetration. It is correct that there was injury in the vagina as the hymen was intact as there was no tear or discharge. It is wrong to suggest that such tears can be caused by hard object like small danda because in that case there would be multiple lacerations. I cannot say whether tears or abrasions can be caused by a small danda having soft surface.” (Emphasis supplied) 12. Shockingly accused has suggested that injuries were caused by insertion of a danda. Be that as it may be, undoubtedly prosecution has been able to prove that prosecutrix was subjected to sexual intercourse and sodomy. The question is by whom. 13. Noticeably Doctors have deposed the events as narrated by the prosecutrix to them. Importantly there is no cross-examination by the accused on this point. Their testimony goes unrebutted. We also find that their version in fact is duly corroborated by their observations made in the MLCs (Ext.PG & Ext.PJ) which reads as under: Ext.PG “Alleged history of sexual intercourse against the will by Kuldeep S/O Sh. Hoshiar Singh. History given by the child was that she was studying with her friend Saroji in her residence (verandah) on 3.4.99 at about 4.30 PM. Saroji’s brother Kuldeep picked her up and took her into the room where he tried to do sexual intercourse and the child Anju was crying with pain. He put his hand over her mouth so that she could not be able to cry.” Ext.PJ “History given by the child: I returned from the school at 3 PM and she took my meals at home. Then I went to my friends (Saroja Devi) house, to study with her which is in my neighbourhood around 4PM. My friend went outside the house. When her brother picked me up from verandah and took me to his room i.e. first floor. Then I went to my friends (Saroja Devi) house, to study with her which is in my neighbourhood around 4PM. My friend went outside the house. When her brother picked me up from verandah and took me to his room i.e. first floor. I cried and screemed, but, he covered my mouth with his hand and then I noticed pain at my anal region. Mother’s history - My sister told me that my daughter is being picked up by Kuldeep and was taken to his room where he removed her salwar and sodomised her. I found her clothes soiled with blood.” 14. Statements of the Doctors coupled with the medical evidence by itself would not be sufficient to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. It is just corroborative in nature. At this juncture we may clarify that while determining the culpability of the accused for the charged offence this fact has not weighed with us at all. 15. In the instant case prosecutrix did come to Court for examination. Court did put her certain questions but found her not to be in a position to understand most of the things and consequently decided not to examine her declaring her not fit to be a competent witness. We may add that Court had recorded its satisfaction and satisfied the test and principles envisaged under the provisions of Section 118 of the Evidence Act. Test laid down by the Apex Court in Rameshwar vs. The State of Rajasthan (AIR 1952 SC 54) stands fully satisfied in the instant case. 16. In Golla Yelugu Govindu vs. State of Andhra Pradesh (2008) 16 SCC 769, the Apex Court has reiterated its earlier view and has held as under:- “11. 6.Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (in short the 'Evidence Act') does not prescribe any particular age as a determinative factor to treat a witness to be a competent one. On the contrary, Section 118 of the Evidence Act envisages that all persons shall be competent to testify, unless the Court considers that they are prevented from understanding the questions put to them or from giving rational answers to these questions, because of tender years, extreme old age, disease-whether of mind, or any other cause of the same kind. A child of tender age can be allowed to testify if he has intellectual capacity to understand questions and give rational answers thereto. A child of tender age can be allowed to testify if he has intellectual capacity to understand questions and give rational answers thereto. This position was concisely stated by Brewer J in Wheeler v. United States (159 U.S. 523). The evidence of a child witness is not required to be rejected per se; but the Court as a rule of prudence considers such evidence with close scrutiny and only on being convinced about the quality thereof and reliability can record conviction, based thereon. (See Surya Narayana v. State of Karnataka (2001 (1) Supreme 1). 17. In Dattu Ramrao Sakhare v. State of Maharashtra (1997 (5) SCC 341) it was held as follows: '5. …..A child witness if found competent to depose to the facts and reliable one such evidence could be the basis of conviction. In other words even in the absence of oath the evidence of a child witness can be considered under Section 118 of the Evidence Act provided that such witness is able to understand the answers thereof. The evidence of a child witness and credibility thereof would depend upon the circumstances of each case. The only precaution which the Court should bear in mind while assessing the evidence of a child witness is that the witness must be a reliable one and his/her demeanour must be like any other competent witness and there is no likelihood of being tutored'. The decision on the question whether the child witness has sufficient intelligence primarily rests with the trial Judge who notices his manners, his apparent possession or lack of intelligence, and said Judge may resort to any examination which will tend to disclose his capacity and intelligence as well as his understanding of the obligation of an oath. The decision of the trial court may, however, be disturbed by the higher Court if from what is preserved in the records, it is clear his conclusion was erroneous. This precaution is necessary because child witnesses are amenable to tutoring and often live in a world of make beliefs. The decision of the trial court may, however, be disturbed by the higher Court if from what is preserved in the records, it is clear his conclusion was erroneous. This precaution is necessary because child witnesses are amenable to tutoring and often live in a world of make beliefs. Though it is an established principle that child witnesses are dangerous witnesses as they are pliable and liable to be influenced easily, shaped and moulded, but it is also an accepted norm that if after careful scrutiny of their evidence the Court comes to the conclusion that there is an impress of truth in it, there is no obstacle in the way of accepting the evidence of a child witness.” 18. In the absence of examination of the prosecutrix can the statements of other witnesses be considered and relied upon to examine the guilt of the accused or not, needs to be considered. 19. In State of Himachal Pradesh vs. Suresh Kumar (2009)16 SCC 697, the Apex Court was dealing with a case where the prosecutrix was ravished by the accused on 15.3.2000 which incident was narrated by the prosecutrix to her sister later during the day. She also narrated the incident to her parents the following day and to the Doctors after the incident. Court accepted the statement of the sister, the parents and the doctors while holding the accused guilty. Importantly, the Apex Court reversed the finding recorded by the High Court wherein it was held that the statement of the prosecutrix being minor was not worthy of credence. 20. In Jetha Ram vs. The State of Rajasthan (1978) 4 SCC 425, the Apex Court has held as under:- “11. The High Court also rightly rejected the view of the trial court that as the evidence regarding other accused were not accepted and the case of the conspiracy set up by the prosecution rejected, the evidence regarding the appellant cannot be accepted. The learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the evidence of P.Ws. 11 and 18 would indicate that they heard the name of the appellant being mentioned as one of the assailants at the time of the occurrence and repeated those names without actually seeing them. On a reading of the evidence, we are unable to accept the contention put forward by the learned counsel for the appellant. 11 and 18 would indicate that they heard the name of the appellant being mentioned as one of the assailants at the time of the occurrence and repeated those names without actually seeing them. On a reading of the evidence, we are unable to accept the contention put forward by the learned counsel for the appellant. It appears that the witnesses stated that they not only saw but also relied on the version given by the other witnesses. It may also be noted that even taking that the witnesses relied on the version given by the persons at the scene immediately after the occurrence it is admissible as a relevant fact under the Evidence Act.” 21. The Apex Court in Sukhar versus State of U.P., (1999) 9 SCC 507 has held as under: “6. Section 6 of the Evidence Act is an exception to the general rule whereunder the hearsay evidence becomes admissible. But for bringing such hearsay evidence within the provisions of Section 6, what is required to be established is that it must be almost contemporaneous with the acts and there should not be an interval which would allow fabrication. The statements sought to be admitted, therefore, as forming part of res gestae, must have been made contemporaneously with the acts or immediately thereafter. The aforesaid rule as it is stated in Wigmore's Evidence Act reads thus : "Under the present Exception [to hearsay] an utterance is by hypothesis, offered as an assertion to evidence the fact asserted (for example that a car-brake was set or not set), and the only condition is that it shall have been made spontaneously, i.e. as the natural effusion of a state of excitement. Now this state of excitement may well continue to exist after the exciting fact has ended. The declaration, therefore, may be admissible even though subsequent to the occurrence, provided, it is near enough in time to allow the assumption that the exciting influence continued." 22. Sarkar on Evidence (Fifteenth Edition) summarises the law relating to applicability of Section 6 of the Evidence Act thus : "1. The declarations (oral or written) must relate to the act which is in issue or relevant thereto; they are not admissible merely because they accompany an act. Sarkar on Evidence (Fifteenth Edition) summarises the law relating to applicability of Section 6 of the Evidence Act thus : "1. The declarations (oral or written) must relate to the act which is in issue or relevant thereto; they are not admissible merely because they accompany an act. Moreover the declarations must relate to and explain the fact they accompany, and not independent facts previous or subsequent thereto unless such facts are part of a transaction which is continuous. 2. The declarations must be substantially contemporaneous with the fact and not merely the narrative of a past. 3. The declaration and the act may be by the same person, or they may be by different persons, e.g., the declarations of the victim, assailant and by-standers. In conspiracy, riot &c. the declarations of all concerned in the common object are admissible. 4. Though admissible to explain or corroborate, or to understand the significance of the act, declarations are not evidence of the truth of the matters stated." 23. This Court in Gentela Vijayavardhan Rao v. State of A. P. [(1996) 6 SCC 241] considering the law embodied in Section 6 of the Evidence Act held thus: (SCC pp.246-47, para 15) “15.The principle of law embodied in Section 6 of the Evidence Act is usually known as the rule of res gestae recognised in English law. The essence of the doctrine is that a fact which, though not in issue, is so connected with the fact in issue "as to form part of the same transaction" becomes relevant by itself. This rule is, roughly speaking, in exception to the general rule that hearsay evidence is not admissible. The rationale in making certain statement or fact admissible under Section 6 of the Evidence Act is on account of the spontaneity and immediacy of such statement or fact in relation to the fact in issue. But it is necessary that such fact or statement must be a part of the same transaction. In other words, such statement must have been made contemporaneous with the acts which constitute the offence or at least immediately thereafter. But if there was an interval, however slight it may be, which was sufficient enough for fabrication then the statement is not part of res gestae." 24. In other words, such statement must have been made contemporaneous with the acts which constitute the offence or at least immediately thereafter. But if there was an interval, however slight it may be, which was sufficient enough for fabrication then the statement is not part of res gestae." 24. In another recent judgment of this Court in Rattan Singh v. State of H. P., (1997) 4 SCC 161 this Court examined the applicability of Section 6 of the Evidence Act to the statement of the deceased and held thus (SCC p.167, para 16) ".....................The aforesaid statement of Kanta Devi can be admitted under Section 6 of the Evidence Act on account of its proximity of time to theact of murder. Illustration 'A' to Section 6 makes it clear. It reads thus: ‘(a) A is accused of the murder of B bybeating him. Whatever was said or doneby A or B or the by-standers at thebeating, or so shortly before or after it as to form part of the transaction,is a relevant fact.’ (Emphasis supplied) Here the act of the assailant intruding into the courtyard during dead of the night, victim's identification of the assailant, her pronouncement that appellant was standing with a gun and his firing the gun at her, are all circumstances so intertwined with each other by proximity of time and space that the statement of the deceased became part of the same transaction. Hence it is admissible under Section 6 of the Evidence Act." 25. In Balram Prasad Agrawal versus State of Bihar and others, (1997) 9 SCC 338, the Apex Court reiterated the principle laid down in the case of J. D. Jain v. Management of State Bank of India, AIR 1982 SC 673: (1982) 1 SCC 143 wherein a Bench of three learned Judges speaking through Baharul Islam, J. in paragraph 10 of the Report has made the following observations : (AIR p. 676, para 10: SCC p.148, paras 21 and 22) “The word 'hearsay' is used in various senses. Sometimes it means whatever a person is heard to say; sometimes it means whatever a person declares on information given by someone else. (See Stephen on Law of Evidence). Sometimes it means whatever a person is heard to say; sometimes it means whatever a person declares on information given by someone else. (See Stephen on Law of Evidence). The Privy Council in the case of Subramaniam v. Public Prosecutor, (1956) 1 WLR 965 observed: ‘Evidence of a statement made to a witness who is not himself called as a witness may or may not be hearsay. It is hearsay and inadmissible when the object of the evidence is to establish the truth of what is contained in the statement. It is not hearsay and is admissible when it is proposed to establish by the evidence, not the truth of the statement but the fact that it was made. The fact that it was made quite apart from its truth, is frequently relevant in considering the mental, state and conduct thereafter of the witness or some other persons in whose presence these statements are made'.” 26. In Rameshwar (supra, the Supreme Court has held that the previous statement of the raped girl to her mother, immediately after the occurrence, is not only admissible and relevant as to her conduct, but also constitutes corroboration of her statement under the provisions of section 157 of the Evidence Act. In order to come to the aforesaid conclusions, illustration (j) to section 8 of the Evidence Act was relied upon. In that case, the victim, named Purni, was 7/8 years old. She was not administered oath, but was held to be competent witness and, therefore, duly examined and believed. 27. According to Smt. Balo Devi (PW-8) prosecutrix had been going to the house of Saroji, sister of the accused, for studying. Even on the fateful day she had gone there at about 5.00 P.M. Importantly this version is totally unrebutted. Accused has not cross-examined her on this aspect. While she was cooking meals at about 6.00 P.M., Smt. Dishu her husband’s co-wife told her to keep on cooking meals without caring for her daughter Anju who was badly bleeding. She then ran out and saw the prosecutrix weeping and her salwar soaked with blood. Mother of the accused who also was present told her that accused “has died for her”. She found the private parts of the prosecutrix to be badly injured. Prosecutrix told her that accused had taken her inside the room, opened her salwar and then raped her. Mother of the accused who also was present told her that accused “has died for her”. She found the private parts of the prosecutrix to be badly injured. Prosecutrix told her that accused had taken her inside the room, opened her salwar and then raped her. He also had intercourse in the anus. People had also gathered there. Accompanied by her brother-in-laws S/Sh. Chatro and Partapo, she took the prosecutrix to the Police Station at Kihar where report was lodged. Prosecutrix was medically examined and her clothes (Ext.P1 & Ext.P2) taken into possession by the police. While cross-examining this witness, accused has tried to impeach her credibility. Endeavour is to show that the witness is unreliable and her testimony not worthy of credence. Our attention was invited to the admission made by her to the effect that she did not disclose to the police the colour of the clothes worn by the prosecutrix and that prosecutrix was subjected to sodomy. It is argued that she has improved from her original statement made to the police. The contention needs to be rejected. Non disclosure of colour of the clothes would not make her testimony unworthy of credence. It is not even a fact in issue. We cannot loose sight of the fact that witness hails from the remotest corner of the State. She is illiterate, rustic and not familiar with the nuances of law. That prosecutrix was subjected to sodomy stands proved by medical evidence. This witness has clarified that on the asking of the police extra pair of clothes were taken as she was told that clothes originally worn by the prosecutrix would be required during investigation. She admits that at the time when prosecutrix narrated the incident to her, Hanso, Desho, Partapo and Dishu were present. Most importantly she states that Sh. Hoshiaru, father of the accused had accompanied her up to the Police Station. She denies the suggestion put by the accused that his father had stated that if his son was involved he would himself go and lodge the report. She denies the suggestion that a false case was planted against the accused. She clarifies that police had gone into the room in her presence but did not take into possession any bed sheet. She denies the suggestion that a false case was planted against the accused. She clarifies that police had gone into the room in her presence but did not take into possession any bed sheet. She states that she was not aware whether the bed-sheet on the bed was soaked with blood or not, but then it is no body’s case that bed sheet was soiled with blood. Importantly there is no cross-examination by the accused with regard to the presence of the prosecutrix in the house of the accused at the relevant time. We find her statement to be absolutely reliable and convincing. 28. Version of PW-8 stands corroborated by Smt. Dishu (PW-9). Undoubtedly both Balo Devi and Dishu are not only sisters but also married to the same person. They can be said to be interested witnesses but nonetheless that fact by itself would not render their testimonies to be unworthy of credence. We have minutely examined their statements. 29. For proper appreciation, statement of PW-9 is reproduced in toto: “Kumari Anju is the daughter of co-wife of my husband. We live jointly. In the month of Baisakh Kumari Anju had gone to the house of accused to study with Saroj. When Anju came back, I found on the date of occurrence that her clothes were smeared with blood. Anju had told me that accused took her in his lap and then blood started oozing out of her body. Again said that Anju said that accused tored her (FAAD DIYA). She did not tell me with what thing the accused torn. I told of this to Balo. Sh. Hoshiaru, father of the accused was in his school at that time. A good number of villagers had gathered there. Smt. Balo, mother of the prosecutrix is my sister. An excise case was made out against me previously. It is wrong to suggest that that case was made out at the instance of Hoshiaru, father of the accused. Anju met me on that day at about 6 PM. It had become dark. Anju met me at the gate of my house. The distance of house of the accused and our house can be covered in 15 minutes i.e as much is the distance of Chowgan from the court (about hundred yards). Anju had sustained injuries at both the places i.e vagina as well as anus. It had become dark. Anju met me at the gate of my house. The distance of house of the accused and our house can be covered in 15 minutes i.e as much is the distance of Chowgan from the court (about hundred yards). Anju had sustained injuries at both the places i.e vagina as well as anus. When I talked to Anju, nobody else was present. It is wrong to suggest that a false case has been made against the accused and that Anju had not disclosed anything to me.” 30. On the point of prosecutrix going to the house of the accused at the relevant time even this witness has not been cross-examined. Except for minor contradictions she has fully supported the prosecution version. Even though she admits that a case under the Excise Act was registered against her but denies that it was at the instance of Hoshiaru father of the accused. To our mind the statements of PW-8 & PW-9 are undoubtedly clear. Simply because they are closely related is no ground to discredit their testimony. The guilt of the accused stands proved beyond any shadow of doubt. 31. Court below disbelieved the statement of the two witnesses on the ground that there was contradiction with regard to registration of a case under the Excise Act against Dishu. In our view there is no contradiction at all. There was no reason for PW 8 to have learnt about the pendency of the case against her sister. In any event no details/ particulars of such case have been brought on record by the accused. Age difference between PW-8 and PW-9 is almost 15 years. PW-8 generally may not be aware about the pendency of such case. There is nothing on record to show that PW-8 had reasons to know about the same. Court below seriously erred in presuming that since both sisters were living in the same house, therefore, it was expected of PW-8 to know about the case. Be that as it may be, pendency of an excise case is not a fact in issue. Minor contradictions in their statements do not impeach their credibility or veracity rendering their testimonies to be unreliable and untrustworthy of credence. 32. Sh. Rameshwar Thakur (PW-15), Addl. Be that as it may be, pendency of an excise case is not a fact in issue. Minor contradictions in their statements do not impeach their credibility or veracity rendering their testimonies to be unreliable and untrustworthy of credence. 32. Sh. Rameshwar Thakur (PW-15), Addl. SP has categorically deposed that on 4.4.1999 he visited the spot of occurrence, including the room, and got prepared site plan (Ext.PM) through HC Budhi Parkash. He minutely observed the cot and found no blood stains either on the bed sheet or in the room. He found three blood stained stones lying on the path outside the room where crime took place. He also got the prosecutrix medically examined. Accused, who had fled away from the spot was later found at village Sohal, Police Station Dhariwal, Punjab. He recorded the statements of the witnesses present at the spot. Importantly he states that “after the occurrence, S/Shri Prem Lal and Des Raj had appeared before me in my office and submitted application alleging that father of the accused had threatened them for giving statement against them to the police. I had marked the complaint to SHO Kihar and I/C P.P. Salooni, for necessary action”. Importantly there is no cross-examination by the accused on this point. He clarified that he had visited the room where crime took place. 33. According to the accused police fabricated evidence by showing recovery of blood stained stones from the path. If no blood was found in the room or the cot then where was the question of clothes/stones being stained with blood. The argument being that if prosecutrix was bleeding profusely then obviously blood would have fallen either on the cot or on the floor in the room and not on the path outside the room. It is true that blood stained stones were picked up from the path outside the room. However this fact, in our considered view, would not make any difference. We see no reason as to why police would fabricate evidence against the accused. They do not harbour any animosity against him. None of the police officials had any grievance against the accused. One cannot loose sight of the fact that the child suffered injuries on her private parts. Upon medical examination it was found that she was bleeding. Absence of blood in the room would not render the prosecution version to be false. They do not harbour any animosity against him. None of the police officials had any grievance against the accused. One cannot loose sight of the fact that the child suffered injuries on her private parts. Upon medical examination it was found that she was bleeding. Absence of blood in the room would not render the prosecution version to be false. It cannot be fatal to the prosecution case. Site plan shows that the room opened right into the path and stones were recovered just after a short distance from the door. Prosecutrix might have bleed profusely at that point. Out of pain she may have stopped or rested there and blood might have got smeared with her clothes. 34. From the statements of S/Sh. Des Raj (PW-4), Balkrishan (PW-5), Prem Chand (PW-6), Jaiwant Raj (PW 12), Budhi Parkash (PW-13) and Rajinder Sharma (PW-14), it is quite apparent that the recovered sample and the exhibits collected by the Investigating Agency were properly sealed and not tampered with till the time of their examination by the Chemical Examiner. 35. Accused was medically examined and his MLC (Ext.PE) tendered in evidence as he admitted the same. There is no evidence to suggest that he was not able to perform sexual intercourse. 36. We may also note that on the question of arrest of accused there is slight contradiction in the statements of PW-13 & PW-15. According to PW-13, accused was found in the house of his friend at village Sohal, Police Station Dhariwal (Punjab) from where he was brought to the Police Station Kihar and handed over to SI/SHO Rajinder Sharma. This fact stands corroborated by Sh. Rajinder Sharma (PW-14) himself, but however according to Sh. Rameshwar Thakur (PW-15) accused was arrested in Punjab itself. We may only note that even this fact would not render the prosecution case to be fatal. Importantly presence of accused at Dhariwal is not disputed by him. There is no contradiction with regard to the date of arrest. Accused may not have been formally arrested in Punjab but he was brought back the same day. 37. We may also note that prosecution had to give up spot witnesses i.e. Geeta, Hans Raj, Des Raj and Prem Lal as they were won over by the accused. There is no contradiction with regard to the date of arrest. Accused may not have been formally arrested in Punjab but he was brought back the same day. 37. We may also note that prosecution had to give up spot witnesses i.e. Geeta, Hans Raj, Des Raj and Prem Lal as they were won over by the accused. We feel that prosecution may have rightly given up these witnesses for justifiable reasons as we have no hesitation in recording that accused had actually tried to interfere with investigation and trial. Uncontroverted statement of PW-15 to the effect that he had received complaint from Prem Lal and Des Raj clearly establishes this fact. 38. We also find that Court below seriously erred in coming to the conclusion that it was necessary for the prosecution to have examined independent witnesses. 39. The Apex Court in Bakhshish Singh v. The State of Punjab (AIR 1957 SC 904) was dealing with a case where person who had witnessed the occurrence and there was mention of their names in dying declaration were not examined on account of they were won over. The Apex Court held as under:- “Held, that this witness, if produced would have been no better than a suborned witness. He was not a witness “essential to the unfolding of the narrative on which the prosecution was based” and if examined the result would have been confusion, because the prosecution would have automatically proceeded to discredit him by cross-examination. No oblique reason for his non-production was alleged, least of all proved. There was therefore no obligation on the part of the prosecution to examine this witness. In the circumstances the Court would not interfere with the discretion of the prosecutor as to what witnesses should be called for the prosecution and no adverse inference under S.114 of the Evidence Act could be drawn against the State.” 40. Almost in identical situation the Apex Court in Ram Prasad & Ors. vs. The State of U.P. (1974) 3 SCC 388 has held as under:- “It is no doubt true that the prosecution is bound to produce witnesses who are essential to the unfolding of the narrative on which the prosecution is based. Almost in identical situation the Apex Court in Ram Prasad & Ors. vs. The State of U.P. (1974) 3 SCC 388 has held as under:- “It is no doubt true that the prosecution is bound to produce witnesses who are essential to the unfolding of the narrative on which the prosecution is based. Apart from that, it cannot be laid down as a rule that if a large number of persons are present at the time of the occurrence, the prosecution is bound to call and examine each and every one of those persons. The answer to the question as to what is the effect of the non-examination of a particular witness would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. In case enough number of witnesses have been examined with regard to the actual occurrence and their evidence is reliable and sufficient to base the conviction of the accused thereon, the prosecution may well decide to refrain from examining the other witnesses. Likewise, if any of the witnesses is won over by the accused party and as such is not likely to state the truth, the prosecution would have a valid ground for not examining him in court. The prosecution would not, however, be justified in not examining a witness on the ground that his evidence even though not untrue would go in favour of the accused. It is as much the duty of the prosecutor as of the court to ensure that full and material facts are brought on the record so that there may be no miscarriage of justice. The discharge of such a duty cannot be affected by the consideration that some of the facts if brought on the record would be favourable to the accused. In case the court finds that the prosecution has not examined witnesses for reasons not tenable or not proper, the court would be justified in drawing an inference adverse to the prosecution.” 41. This view stands reiterated in Shanker vs. State of U.P. (1975) 3 SCC 851. 42. In Habeeb Mohammad versus State of Hyderabad, A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 51 (Vol. 41) the Apex Court has held as under:- “It is the bounden duty of the prosecution to examine a material witness, particularly when no allegation has been made that, if produced, he would not speak the truth. 42. In Habeeb Mohammad versus State of Hyderabad, A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 51 (Vol. 41) the Apex Court has held as under:- “It is the bounden duty of the prosecution to examine a material witness, particularly when no allegation has been made that, if produced, he would not speak the truth. Not only does an adverse inference arise against the prosecution case from his non-prosecution as a witness in view of illustration (g) to section 114 of the Evidence Act, but the circumstances of his being withheld from the court casts a serious reflection on the fairness of the trial. AIR 1936 PC 289, Rel. on. AIR 1945 PC 42, Distinguished.” 43. However, subsequently in Vadivelu Thevar versus The State of Madras, A.I.R. 1957 S.C. 614 (Vol. 44) the Apex Court has held as under:- “11. In view of these considerations, we have no hesitation in holding that the contention that in a murder case, the court should insist upon plurality of witnesses, is much too broadly stated. Section 134 of the Indian Evidence Act, has categorically laid it down that “no particular number of witnesses shall, in any case, be required for the proof of any fact.” The legislature determined, as long ago as 1872, presumably after due consideration of the pros and cons, that it shall not be necessary for proof or disproof of a fact, to call any particular number of witnesses. In England, both before and after the passing of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, there have been a number of statutes as set out in Sarkar’s ‘Law of Evidence’ – 9th Edition, at pages 1100 and 1101, forbidding convictions on the testimony of a single witness. The Indian Legislature has not insisted on laying down any such exceptions to the general rule recognized in S. 134 quoted above. The section enshrines the well recognized maxim that ‘Evidence has to be weighed and not counted.” Our Legislature has given statutory recognition to the fact that administration of justice may be hampered if a particular number of witnesses were to be insisted upon. It is not seldom that a crime has been committed in the presence of only one witness, leaving aside those cases which are not of uncommon occurrence where determination of guilt depends entirely on circumstantial evidence. It is not seldom that a crime has been committed in the presence of only one witness, leaving aside those cases which are not of uncommon occurrence where determination of guilt depends entirely on circumstantial evidence. If the Legislature were to insist upon plurality of witnesses, cases where the testimony of a single witness only could be available in proof of the crime, would go unpunished. It is here that the discretion of the presiding judge comes into play. The matter thus must depend upon the circumstances of each case and the quality of the evidence of the single witness whose testimony has to be either accepted or rejected. If such a testimony is found by the Court to be entire reliable, there is no legal impediment to the conviction of the accused person on such proof. Even as the guilt of an accused person may be proved by the testimony of a single witness, the innocence of an accused person may be established on the testimony of a single witness, even though a considerable number of witnesses maybe forthcoming to testify to the truth of the case for the prosecution. Hence, in our opinion, it is a sound and well established rule of law that the court is concerned with the quality and not with the quantity of the evidence necessary for proving or disproving a fact. Generally speaking, oral testimony in this context may be classified into three categories, namely: (1) Wholly reliable. (2) Wholly unreliable. (3) Neither wholly reliable nor wholly unreliable. 12. In the first category of proof, the court should have no difficulty in coming to its conclusion either way – it may convict or may acquit on the testimony of a single witness, if it is found to be above reproach or suspicion of interestedness, incompetence or subornation. In the second category, the court equally has no difficulty in coming to its conclusion. It is in the third category of cases, that the court has to be circumspect and has to look for corroboration in material particulars by reliable testimony, direct or circumstantial. There is another danger in insisting on plurality of witnesses. Irrespective of the quality of the oral evidence of a single witness, if courts were to insist on plurality of witnesses in proof of any fact, they will be indirectly encouraging subornation of witnesses. There is another danger in insisting on plurality of witnesses. Irrespective of the quality of the oral evidence of a single witness, if courts were to insist on plurality of witnesses in proof of any fact, they will be indirectly encouraging subornation of witnesses. Situations may arise and do arise where only a single person is available to give evidence in support of a disputed fact. The court naturally has to weigh carefully such a testimony and if it is satisfied that the evidence is reliable and free from all taints which tend to render oral testimony open to suspicion, it becomes its duty to act upon such testimony. The law reports contain many precedents where the court had to depend and act upon the testimony of a single witness in support of the prosecution. There are exceptions to this rule, for example, in cases of sexual offences or of the testimony of an approver; both these are cases in which the oral testimony is, by its very nature, suspect, being that of participator in crime. But, where there are no such exceptional reasons operating, it becomes the duty of the court to convict, if it is satisfied that the testimony of a single witness is entirely reliable. We have therefore, no reasons to refuse to act upon the testimony of the first witness, which is the only reliable evidence in support of the prosecution.” 44. The decision in Vadivelu Thevar (supra) this view has been subsequently reiterated by the Apex Court in Amar Singh versus Balwinder Singh and others (2003) 2 SCC 518. 45. The decision in Habeeb Mohammad (supra) was considered by the Apex Court in State of U.P. and another versus Jaggo alias Jagdish and others, 1971 (2) SCC 42 and the Court held that:- “This Court in Habeeb Mohammad’s case (supra) referred to the observations of Jenkins, C.J., in Ram Ranjan Roy v. Emperor [ILR 42 Cal 422: 19 CWN 28: 27 IC 554] that the purpose of a criminal trial is not to support at all costs a theory but to investigate the offence and to determine the guilt or innocence of the accused and the duty of a public prosecutor is to represent the administration of justice so that the testimony of all the available eye-witnesses should be before the Court. Lord Roche in Stephen Senivaratne v. The King [AIR 1936 PC 289: 39 Bom LR 1: 164 IC 321] referred to the observations of Jenkins, C.J. and said that the witnesses essential to the unfolding of the narrative on which the prosecution is based must be called by the prosecution whether the effect of their testimony is for or against the case for the prosecution. That is why this Court in Habeeb Mohammad’s case (supra) said that the absence of an eye-witness in the circumstances of the case might affect a fair trial. On behalf of the appellant it was said that Ramesh Chand was won over and therefore the prosecution could not call Ramesh. The High Court rightly said that the mere presentation of an application to the effect that a witness had been won over was not conclusive of the question that the witness had been won over. In such a case Ramesh could have been produced for cross-examination by the accused. That would have elicited the correct facts. If Ramesh were an eye-witness the accused were entitled to test his evidence particularly when Lalu was alleged to be talking with Ramesh at the time of the occurrence.” 46. In the instant case the testimony of the prosecution witnesses, i.e. the mother and the aunt of the prosecutrix are found to be wholly reliable. Hence there was no need for the prosecution to have examined the other independent witness in whose presence the prosecutrix had narrated the incident. It is not the case of the prosecution either that these independent witnesses were actually witnesses to the occurrence of the incident. In the event of credible evidence already on record there was no need for the prosecution to have multiplied the number of witnesses. 47. We are taking this view by relying upon the ratio of law laid down by the Apex Court in Gurmej Singh and others versus State of Punjab, 1991 Supp (2) SCC 75. In the said report the Court has also held that dropping a witness on the specious plea that he was won over without laying the foundation therefor is generally to be frowned upon. But each case has to be considered on its separate facts. In the said report the Court has also held that dropping a witness on the specious plea that he was won over without laying the foundation therefor is generally to be frowned upon. But each case has to be considered on its separate facts. If the accused does not object to the statement of the Prosecutor to the effect that the witness was won over or that the accused does not take measure for examining such witness in the Court, the Court would not allow the accused, more so, at the stage of appeal, to take up the plea of trial being fatal due to non examination of a witness. 48. In State of Rajasthan vs. Om Parkash (2002) 5 SCC 745, the Apex Court held as under:- “14. In State of H.P. v Gian Chand [2000(1)SCC 71] Justice Lahoti speaking for the Benchobserved that the Court has first to assess the trustworthy intention of the evidence adduced and available on record. If the court finds the evidence adduced worthy of beingrelied on then the testimony has to be accepted and acted on though there may beother witnesses available who could have been examined but were not examined. 49. We find that on the question of incident the statements of PW-8, PW-9, PW-10 and PW-11 to be consistent. Statements of the witnesses examined in court undoubtedly prove the prosecution case beyond reasonable doubt. Witnesses are totally reliable, trustworthy and their testimonies worthy of credence. 50. Court below erred in presuming certain facts in favour of the accused. The approach is against the settled position of law. We refrain to say anything further than this. 51. It cannot be said that prosecution case is full of infirmities. Undoubtedly by leading clear, cogent, convincing and reliable material, prosecution has proved that (i) prosecutrix was present in the house of accused at the time when offence took place. There is no cross-examination to this effect; (ii) Accused committed act of rape and sodomy on the prosecutrix which also stands established beyond reasonable doubt from the testimonies of PW-8, PW-9, PW-10 & PW-11; (iii) Accused who had absconded was recovered from the house of his friend in Punjab where he was staying. 52. Nature of enmity, its gravity, grounds and reasons cannot be said to have been even prima facie established by the accused. 52. Nature of enmity, its gravity, grounds and reasons cannot be said to have been even prima facie established by the accused. There is nothing on record to suggest that prosecutrix or her family would falsely implicate the accused. Principle laid down in Om Parkash (supra) squarely applies in the instant case. 53. Identity of the accused is not in doubt and in dispute. Accused lived in the same village. He was well known to the prosecutrix and other witnesses. From the un-rebutted testimonies of the prosecution witnesses it stands established that prosecutrix was a frequent visitor to his house. Presence of his father at the police station is also not disputed. Victim is not habituated to sexual intercourse. 54. For all the aforesaid reasons, appeal is allowed. We have no hesitation in our mind that prosecution has been able to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt and accordingly we hold the accused guilty of having committed offences punishable under Sections 376 and 377 IPC. 55. While dealing with the issue on affording aid, assistance and help to the victim of rape the Apex Court in Delhi Domestic Working Women’s Forum versus Union of India and others, (1995) 1 SCC 14 issued the following directions:- “15. In this background, we think it necessary to indicate the broad parameters inassisting the victims of rape. (1). The complainants of sexual assault cases should be provided with legal representation.It is important to have someone who is wellacquainted with the criminal justice system.The role of the victim’s advocate would not only be to explain to the victim the nature ofthe proceedings, to prepare her for the caseand to assist her in the police station and incourt but to provide her with guidance as tohow she might obtain help of a differentnature from other agencies, for example, mindcounselling or medical assistance. It is important to secure continuity of assistanceby ensuring that the same person who lookedafter the complainant’s interests in the police station represent her till the end ofthe case. (2) Legal assistance will have to be provided at the police station since the victim of sexual assault might very well be ina distressed state upon arrival at the policestation, the guidance and support of a lawyerat this stage and whilst she was being questioned would be of great assistance toher. (2) Legal assistance will have to be provided at the police station since the victim of sexual assault might very well be ina distressed state upon arrival at the policestation, the guidance and support of a lawyerat this stage and whilst she was being questioned would be of great assistance toher. (3) The police should be under a duty toinform the victim of her right to representation before any questions were askedof her and that the police report should state that the victim was so informed. (4) A list of advocates willing to act inthese cases should be kept at the policestation for victims who did not have a particular lawyer in mind or whose own lawyerwas unavailable. (5) The advocate shall be appointed by theCourt, upon application by the police at theearliest convenient moment, but in order toensure that victims were questioned withoutundue delay, advocates would be authorised toact at the police station before leave of thecourt was sought or obtained. (6) In all rape trials anonymity of the victim must be maintained, as far as necessary. (7) It is necessary, having regard to theDirective Principles contained under Article38(1) of the Constitution of India to set upCriminal Injuries Compensation Board. Rapevictims frequently incur substantial financialloss. Some, for example, are too traumatizedto continue in employment. (8) Compensation for victims shall be awarded by the Court on conviction of theoffender and by the Criminal InjuriesCompensation Board whether or not a convictionhas taken place. The Board will take intoaccount pain, suffering and shock as well asloss of earnings due to pregnancy and the expenses of child birth if this occurred as aresult of the rape.” 56. We direct the State to immediately comply with the same and submit the action taken report within a period of three months from today before this Court. 57. We also feel that in the State there is no State sponsored victim support mechanism to deal with the emotional and physical trauma under which the victims are subjected to. We direct the State to consider setting up help centres to provide all sorts of support. Perhaps a panel of social workers proficient with law can be associated to give councelling to the victims in dealing with official agencies such as police or medical services. 58. We direct the State to consider setting up help centres to provide all sorts of support. Perhaps a panel of social workers proficient with law can be associated to give councelling to the victims in dealing with official agencies such as police or medical services. 58. Now the case be listed on 23/3/2011 for hearing the accused on the quantum of sentence on which date accused is directed to be present in the Court.