Judgment :- 1. Invoking the inherent jurisdiction of this Court under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code, the Petitioner has approached this Court with this Petition to quash the proceedings of the case in C.C. No.76 of 2010 pending on the file of the Judicial Magistrate No.1, Tirupattur, Vellore District. 2. The Petitioner is the accused in the case in C.C. No.76 of 2010. The Respondent is the Complainant. The Respondent had filed the Complaint to deal with the accused in accordance with the Proviso to S.138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. This Petition is filed by the Petitioner/Accused to quash the proceedings in C.C. No.76 of 2010 on the sole ground that the issuance of the legal notice would not by itself give rise to a cause of action for filing of the Criminal Complaint before the learned Judicial Magistrate No.1, Tirupattur, Vellore District. 3. The Respondent has alleged in his Complaint that the Petitioner had totally borrowed a sum of `49 lakhs on various dates and given an undertaking on 10.10.2009 that the debt would be paid back within six month’s time. When the amount wad demanded to be repaid, the Petitioner had issued a cheque bearing No.516262 on 05.04.2010 for the value of `49 lakhs drawn on Bank of Baroda at Thirupathi Branch. When the said cheque was presented in the Bank for encashment, it was bounced back on 07.04.2010 with an endorsement ‘Insufficiency of Funds’. Hence, a legal notice was issued to the Petitioner by the Respondent on 13.04.2010 calling him for payment of the cheque amount. Since, the amount was not paid, the Respondent has filed the Complaint on the file of the learned Judicial Magistrate No.1, Tirupattur, Vellore District. 4. Heard both sides. 5. Mr. C.T. Mohan, the learned Counsel appearing for the Petitioner, while advancing his arguments has submitted that the Petitioner had suitably replied to the legal notice issued on behalf of the Respondent denying all the allegations. He would also contend that apart from the Stone Crushing business, the Petitioner is also running a brick-kiln, Real Estate business and Auto Financing and that, he is financially well placed and as such, there was no necessity for him to borrow such a huge amount from the Respondent. 6. He would also contend that apart from the Stone Crushing business, the Petitioner is also running a brick-kiln, Real Estate business and Auto Financing and that, he is financially well placed and as such, there was no necessity for him to borrow such a huge amount from the Respondent. 6. The learned Counsel appearing for the Petitioner would further submit that the Respondent and the Petitioner are belonging to the same community and the Respondent is also the nephew of the Petitioner. 7. He has also added that in-fact on the request of the Respondent’s mother, the Petitioner had put the Respondent in employment in Civil Contractor, who was the customer of the Petitioner and due to misappropriation committed by the Respondent, the Petitioner had to bear the loss caused by the Respondent to the said Civil Contractor and thereafter, the Respondent was taken into employment with the Petitioner and he was paid salary as an employee under the Petitioner. 8. The Respondent had, in due course, gained confidence with the household persons of the Petitioner, which lead to the Respondent being sent to the customers of the Petitioner for collection of amounts due to the Petitioner. Between the years 2005 and 2009, he had fallen sick and had been bedridden. Taking undue advantage of this position, the Respondent had operated the business accounts of the Petitioner in the State Bank of India and ultimately, he had misappropriated and swindled the dues from the customer to the extent of `15 lakhs and when the Petitioner had found out the same, the Respondent had left the family for Bangalore. That on 25.03.2010, after the Respondent coming back from Bangalore, when the Petitioner had asked him for entire accounts to be submitted to the Income Tax Department, the Respondent had produced rough and vague accounts and promised to enter them in the Ledger Folio. But he had not done so. Instead, he has come forward with a Compliant under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act with false allegations as if the Petitioner had borrowed a sum of `49 lakhs from him. 9. The learned Counsel appearing for the Petitioner has submitted that the learned Judicial Magistrate No.1, Tirupattur, Vellore District, has no jurisdiction to entertain the Complaint as the cause of action was not arisen within the local jurisdiction of that Court. 9. The learned Counsel appearing for the Petitioner has submitted that the learned Judicial Magistrate No.1, Tirupattur, Vellore District, has no jurisdiction to entertain the Complaint as the cause of action was not arisen within the local jurisdiction of that Court. He has also contended that the issuance of the legal notice would not by itself give rise to a cause of action for filing such a Criminal Complaint. 10. He has also contended that it is only on receipt of such notice, the Accused may refuse to pay the amount and therefore, the Court on whose jurisdiction the offence has been committed will have jurisdiction to take cognizance of the offence. He has also contended that the Court derives of jurisdiction only when the cause of action arose within its jurisdiction and that the same cannot be conferred by any act of omission or commission on the part of the accused or Complainant. 11. Mr. C.T. Mohan, the learned Counsel appearing for the Petitioner has also contended that the Respondent had not at all made out any case against the Petitioner on the ground of jurisdiction for taking cognizance of the offence in the case in C.C. No.76 of 2010 against the well laid principles of the Apex Court as well as this Court. 12. In support of his arguments, he has placed reliance upon the decision in M/s. Harman Electronics (P) Ltd. & Anr. V. M/s. National Panasonic India Limited, AIR 2009 SC 1168 . 13. In that case, a Division Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, comprising Their Lordships Hon’ble Mr. Justice S.B. Sinha and Hon’ble Mr. Justice Cyriac Joseph, has explained the scope and application of Section 177 of Cr.P.C. as well as Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. 14. Section 177 reads as follows: “Section 177: Every offence shall ordinarily he inquired into and tried by a Court within whose local jurisdiction it was committed. The competency of a forum to take cognizance of an inquiry into, and trial of, an offence, as defined by S.2 of the Code, is determined by the place in which the offence may have been committed.” This ratio has been laid down in Arihant Ghee Agency v. Krishi Upaj Mandi Samiti, Jodhpur, 1999 Cr.L.J. 4045 (Raj). 15. The competency of a forum to take cognizance of an inquiry into, and trial of, an offence, as defined by S.2 of the Code, is determined by the place in which the offence may have been committed.” This ratio has been laid down in Arihant Ghee Agency v. Krishi Upaj Mandi Samiti, Jodhpur, 1999 Cr.L.J. 4045 (Raj). 15. It may also be relevant to take the assistance of Sections 178 and 179 of Cr.P.C. Section 178 reads as follows: (a) When it is uncertain in which of several local areas an offence was committed; or (b) where an offence is committed partly in one local area and partly in another; or (c) where an offence is a continuing one, and continues to be committed in more local areas than one; or (d) where it consists of several acts done in different local area, itmay be inquired into or tried by a Court having jurisdiction over any of such local area. 16. Section 179 enacts as follows: “When an act is an offence by reason of anything which has been done and of a consequence which has ensued, the offence may be inquired into or tried by a Court within whose local jurisdiction such thing has been done or such consequence has ensured.” 17. In Harman Electronics Private Limited case, AIR 2009 SC 1168 , while penning down the judgment on behalf of a Division Bench, His Lordship Hon’ble Mr. Justice S.B. Sinha in paragraph 19 and 21, has observed as follows: “19. Section 177 of the Code of Criminal Procedure determines the jurisdiction of a Court trying the matter. The Court ordinarily will have the jurisdiction only where the offence has been committed. The provisions of Sections 178 and 179 of the Code of Criminal Procedure are exceptions to Section 177. These provisions presuppose that all offences are local.” 18. In paragraph 21, His Lordship has referred the decision in Mosaraf Hossain Khan v. Bhagheeratha Engg. Ltd., 2006 (3) SCC 658 , has extracted the paragraph 30 of the judgment. “30. In terms of Section 177 of the Code of Criminal procedure every offence shall ordinarily be inquired into and tried by a Court within whose local jurisdiction it was committed. Section 178 provides for place of inquiry or trial in the following terms: “178. Ltd., 2006 (3) SCC 658 , has extracted the paragraph 30 of the judgment. “30. In terms of Section 177 of the Code of Criminal procedure every offence shall ordinarily be inquired into and tried by a Court within whose local jurisdiction it was committed. Section 178 provides for place of inquiry or trial in the following terms: “178. (a) When it is uncertain in which of several local areas an offence was committed, or (b) where an offence is committed partly in one local area and partly in another, or (c) where an offence is a continuing one, and continues to be committed in more local areas than one, or (d) where it consists of several acts done in different local areas. 19. From the above context, it is thus made clear that a Court derives jurisdiction only when the cause of action arose within its jurisdiction, the same cannot be conferred by any act of omission or commission on the part of the accused. 20. On coming to the given case on hand, the Respondent herein has filed the case in C.C. No.76 of 2010 before the learned Judicial Magistrate No.1, Tirupattur, Vellore District, for prosecuting the Petitioner/Accused under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. 21. On perusal of the Complaint filed by the Respondent under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act r/w under Section 200 of Cr.P.C., the following facts are being projected: 1. The Respondent/Complainant is residing at Cherlopalle Village, Pudipatla Post, Thirupathi Rural, Chittor District (A.P.). 2. The Petitioner/Accused resides at Cherlopalle Village, Pudipatla Post, Thirupathi Rural, Chithoor District (A.P.). 3. It is obvious to note here that both the Petitioner/Accused and the Respondent/Complainant are residing in the same village. 22. In the Complaint, the Respondent has stated that the Petitioner/Accused is the proprietor of “Sri Balaji Stone Crusher” firm, but he did not state as to where it is locate. As alleged in the Complaint, totally a sum of `49,00,000/- was borrowed by the Petitioner/Accused from the Respondent/Complainant. Out of the loan amount, it is alleged that as requested by the Petitioner/Accused, the Respondent/Complainant had paid a sum of `28,78,000/- to the Mcnally Sayaji Engineering Ltd., at Baroda, wherein the Petitioner/Accused had purchased the machineries for his firm through his Bank Account by way of cash transfer on the following dates: 23. Out of the loan amount, it is alleged that as requested by the Petitioner/Accused, the Respondent/Complainant had paid a sum of `28,78,000/- to the Mcnally Sayaji Engineering Ltd., at Baroda, wherein the Petitioner/Accused had purchased the machineries for his firm through his Bank Account by way of cash transfer on the following dates: 23. It is also alleged that the remaining balance of `20,24,000/-was received by the Petitioner/Accused on 10.10.2009. But the Respondent/Complainant has not stated as to where the amount was received by the Petitioner/Accused. At para 8, in order to prove the fact that the cause of action was arisen within the jurisdiction of the Judicial Magistrate No.1, Tirupattur, Vellore District, the Respondent/Complainant has stated that “Complainant Issued legal notice through his Counsel, who is having office at 128, Mahatma Gandhi Road, Tirupattur, which is well within the jurisdiction of Tirupattur, Vellore District.” 24. As observed by His Lordship Hon’ble Mr. Justice S.B. Sinha, in M/s. Harman Electronics (P) Ltd. & Anr. V. M/s. National Panasonic India Ltd., AIR 2009 SC 1168 , the only question, therefore, arises for consideration is as to whether sending of notice from Tirupattur, by the learned Counsel for the Respondent/Complainant, would give rise to a cause of action for taking cognizance of the offence under the Negotiable Instruments Act. 25. In this regard, this Court has thought it fit to refer paragraph 4 of the above cited decision: ”14. It is one thing to say that sending of a notice is one of the ingredients for maintaining the Complaint but it is another thing to say that dishonour of a cheque by itself constitutes an offence. For the purpose of proving its case that the Accused had committed an offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, the ingredients thereof are required to be proved. What would constitute an offence is stated in the main provision. The Proviso appended thereto, however, impose certain further conditions which are required to be fulfilled before cognizance of the offence can be taken. If the ingredients for constitution of the offence laid down in the provisions (a), (b) and (c) appended to Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act intended to be applied in favour of the Accused, there cannot be any doubt that receipt of a notice would ultimately give rise to the cause of action for filing a Complaint. If the ingredients for constitution of the offence laid down in the provisions (a), (b) and (c) appended to Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act intended to be applied in favour of the Accused, there cannot be any doubt that receipt of a notice would ultimately give rise to the cause of action for filing a Complaint. As it is only on receipt of the notice the accused at his own peril may refuse to pay the amount. Clauses (b) and (c) of the Proviso to Section 138 therefore must be read together. Issuance of notice would not by itself give rise to a cause of action but communication of the notice would.” 26. His Lordship has defined the meaning of the term ‘communication’ in the above cited decision with the assistance of the judgments: (1) In M/s. Dalmia Cement (Bharat) Ltd. v. M/s. Galaxy Traders & Agencies Ltd. & ors., 2001 (1) CTC 538 (SC) : AIR 2001 SC 676 . (2) In Black’s Law dictionary, (3) In State of Punjab v. Amar Singh Harika, AIR 1966 SC 1313 , and (4) The State of Punjab v. Khemi Ram, 1969 (3) SCC 28 . “For constitution of an offence under Section 138 of the Act, the notice must be received by the accused. It may be deemed to have been received in certain situations. The word ‘communicate’ inter alia means ‘to make known, inform convey, etc.” 27. In the present case, it is not disputed that the Petitioner/Accused had received the notice. Apart from this, it is evident from the Complaint that when the cheque in question was presented for encashment before the State Bank of India at Thirupathi on 5.4.2010, it was bounced back due to ‘Insufficiency of Funds’ on 9.4.2010. 28. As discussed in the foregoing paragraphs, it is clear that the legal notice alone was issued to the Petitioner/Accused from Tirupattur i.e., from the office of the learned Counsel for the Respondent/Complainant. 29. The learned Counsel for the Petitioner/Accused has also placed reliance upon the decision reported in T. Vinay Kumar v. M. Adithya Ram, 2001 (1) MWN (Cr.) DCC 91. In this case, the Petitioner had sought to quash the proceedings in C.C. No.210 of 2005, on the file of the XVI Metropolitan Magistrate, George Town, Chennai. The said Complaint was filed to punish the Accused under Section 138 of Negotiable Instruments Act. In this case, the Petitioner had sought to quash the proceedings in C.C. No.210 of 2005, on the file of the XVI Metropolitan Magistrate, George Town, Chennai. The said Complaint was filed to punish the Accused under Section 138 of Negotiable Instruments Act. It was contended in that Petition, that the entire transactions between the parties took place at Hyderabad and the Complainant, who is having an Office at Chennai, has issued a statutory notice under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, therefrom and initiated the Complaint case before the lower Court. In that case also, the decision in Harman Electronics (P) Ltd. v. National Panasonic India Ltd., 2009 DLT 156 (SC) : AIR 2009 SC 1168 was also referred to. After hearing both sides, the learned Single Judge of this Court has held that: “On a perusal of the Complaint, it does not disclose or reveal any cause of action at Chennai, except for the fact that the Complainant’s office is at Chennai and that the statutory notice was issued from there. Further, the Complaint itself reveals that the cheques giving rise thereto were drawn on a Bank at Secundrabad and that the same were presented for payment through a Bank at Hyderabad. Both are twin cities. With regard to the rulings of Apex Court relied on by either Counsel, it is seen that both the judgments, flow from benches of equal strength. The decision relied upon by the Counsel for the Petitioner, wherein it has been held that issuance of notice would not by itself, make out of a cause of action is the later one. Under such circumstances, this Court would follow the latter decision of the Apex Court and accordingly, holding that no cause of action, has arisen in Chennai. The proceedings in C.C. No.210 of 2005, on the file of the XVI Metropolitan Magistrate, George Town, Chennai stand quashed. 30. It may be also be relevant to lay emphasis on the decision reported in M.N. Adhikari and another v. Food Inspector, Kunnarakulam Municipality and another, AIR 1965 Kerala 295 (V52 C 106). 31. In this case, it is observed that: “Section 177 of the Code of Criminal procedure provides that every offence shall ordinarily be inquired into and tried by a Court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction it was committed. 31. In this case, it is observed that: “Section 177 of the Code of Criminal procedure provides that every offence shall ordinarily be inquired into and tried by a Court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction it was committed. Therefore, the competency of a forum to take cognizance of or to inquire into or try an offence as defined by Section 4 of the Code is determined by the place where the offence is committed. Offences are in their nature local and the jurisdiction of the Criminal Courts is also local. A Magistrate within whose jurisdiction an offence is committed is authorised under the Code to take cognizance of and to try the accused. A Magistrate has no power to try an accused for an offence committed wholly outside the limits of his jurisdiction. Before a person can be tried and convicted it is for the prosecution to establish that the Court which take cognizance of and tries has territorial jurisdiction.” 32. From the above context, it is made clear that a Magistrate has no power to try an accused for an offence committed wholly outside the limits of his jurisdiction and it is also the duty of the Respondent/Complainant herein to establish that the Court which takes cognizance of and tries him has territorial jurisdiction. 33. Countering the arguments advanced on behalf of the Petitioner/Accused, the learned Counsel appearing for the Respondent/Complainant, while advancing his arguments has made stress upon the proviso to Section 178 or Cr.P.C. and submitted that “as contemplated under Section 178 Cr.P.C., when the jurisdiction of the Court is uncertain as the cause of actions were arisen in different places and where an offence is committed partly in one local area and partly in another area, the Court which is having jurisdiction, over any of such local area can take cognizance of offence on the basis of the Complaint filed before that Court.” 34. In support of his arguments, he has also placed reliance upon the decision in K. Bhaskaran v. Sankaran Vaidhyan Balan and others, 1999 (3) CTC 358 : 1999 (7) SCC 510 : AIR 1999 (SC) 3782 : 1999 AIR SCW 3809. 35. In support of his arguments, he has also placed reliance upon the decision in K. Bhaskaran v. Sankaran Vaidhyan Balan and others, 1999 (3) CTC 358 : 1999 (7) SCC 510 : AIR 1999 (SC) 3782 : 1999 AIR SCW 3809. 35. In this case, the Apex Court has observed that: “The offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act can be completed only with the concatenation of a number of acts namely, (1) Drawing of the cheque, (2) Presentation of the cheque to the Bank, (3) Returning the cheque unpaid by the drawee Bank, (4) Giving notice in writing to the drawer of the cheque demanding payment of the cheque amount, (5) Failure of the drawer to make payment within 15 days of the receipt of the notice. It was opined that if five different acts were done in five different localities, any one of the Courts exercising jurisdiction in one of the five local areas can become the place of trial for the offence under Section 138 of the Act and the Complainant would be at liberty to file a Complaint Petition at any of those places.” 36. With regard to issuance of notice, it has also been held that: “On the part of the payee he has to make a demand by “giving notice” in writing. If that was the only requirement to complete the offence on the failure of the drawer to pay the cheque amount within 15 days from the date of such “giving”, the travails of the prosecution would have been very much lessened. But the legislature says that failure on the part of the drawer to pay the amount should be within 15 days “of the receipt” of the said notice. It is, therefore, clear that “giving notice” in the context is not the same as receipt of notice. Giving is a process of which receipt is the accomplishment. It is for the payee to perform the former process by sending the notice to the drawer at the correct address”. 37. This case in K. Bhaskaran v. Sankaran Vaidhyan Balan and another, 1999 (3) CTC 358 : 1999 (7) SCC 510 has also been fully discussed at length in the decision reported in M/s. Harman Electronics (P) Ltd. v. M/s. National Panasonic India Limited, AIR 2009 SC 1171. 38. 37. This case in K. Bhaskaran v. Sankaran Vaidhyan Balan and another, 1999 (3) CTC 358 : 1999 (7) SCC 510 has also been fully discussed at length in the decision reported in M/s. Harman Electronics (P) Ltd. v. M/s. National Panasonic India Limited, AIR 2009 SC 1171. 38. Having gone through the above said judgment and on considering the Provisos (a), (b) and (c) appended to Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, the Honourable Supreme Court has held that: “Issuance of notice would not by itself give rise to a cause of action.” 39. With great respect to the Hon’ble Apex Court, this Court is also of view that the issuance of notice would not by itself give rise to a cause of action for the Respondent/Complainant to file a Compliant under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, before the learned Judicial Magistrate No.1, Tirupattur, Vellore District. 40. The learned counsel for the Respondent/Complainant has also placed reliance upon the following decisions: 01. In Rajchand Tea Industries and ors. V. Judicial Magistrate Chhattisgarh and another, 2007 (3) CTC 705 (DB) : 2007 (2) Bankmann 172 . 02. In Asanammal kasim and another v. Ceat Financial Services Limited, Secunderabad and another, JDC 4549 (AP). 03. In K. Bhaskaran v. Sankaran Vaidhyan Balan and another, 1999 (3) CTC 358 : JDC 880 (SC). 04. In Narang Industries Ltd. & Anr. V. Ashok Leyland Finance Limited, 1998 (1) CTC 229 : JDC 1344 (Mad.) 41. This Court has carefully gone through the above decisions. As discussed in the earlier paragraphs, the statutory notice was given by the learned Counsel for the Respondent/Complainant from his office at Tirupattur, Vellore District. Hence, the issuance of notice alone will not give rise to a cause of action to maintain the Complaint before the learned Judicial Magistrate No.1, Tirupattur, Vellore District. The learned Judicial Magistrate No.1, Tirupattur, Vellore District, does not have territorial jurisdiction to take cognizance of the offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. 42. Keeping in view of this fact, this Court is inclined to quash the proceedings in C.C. No.76 of 2010 pending on the file of the learned Judicial Magistrate No.1, Tirupattur, Vellore District. 43. In the result, the Criminal Original Petition is allowed. The proceedings in C.C. No.76 of 2010 sending on the file of the leaded Judicial Magistrate No.1, Tirupattur, Vellore District stands quashed. 43. In the result, the Criminal Original Petition is allowed. The proceedings in C.C. No.76 of 2010 sending on the file of the leaded Judicial Magistrate No.1, Tirupattur, Vellore District stands quashed. It is made clear that the present order is passed without prejudice to the right of the Respondent/Complainant to prefer a fresh Complaint on the same cause of action before the appropriate Court and his seeking condonation of delay taking recourse to the Proviso to Section 142(b) of the Negotiable Instruments Act. Consequently, connected Miscellaneous Petition is closed.