Judgment :- 1. This Appeal is directed against the judgment and order dated 1.3.2010 passed in W.P.No.4192 of 2010, whereby the learned Single Judge dismissed the Writ Petition filed by the Appellant herein. Hence, the present Appeal. 2. The Appellant filed the above-mentioned Writ Petition seeking issuance of a Writ of Certiorarified Mandamus for quashing the order dated 4.11.2009 and for directing the Respondents to rectify the pay anomaly by re-fixing the pay of the Appellant on par with his junior one Mr. V. Ganesan with a consequential direction to pay the difference in pay fixation and pension. 3. The facts of the case lie in a narrow compass. The Appellant joined the services of the Respondent – Tamil Nadu Electricity Board as Cashier in the year 1969 and was promoted as Inspector of Assessment in the year 1980. He was further promoted as Revenue Supervisor in the and Assessment Officer in the year 2003. The Appellant superannuated from service on 30.6.2004. Before his retirement, he came to know that the pay of another employee by name Mr. V. Ganesan, junior to him and also retired, was re-fixed at the scale more than that of the Appellant. He immediately filed a representation on 11.3.2004 requesting the 2nd Respondent to rectify the pay anomaly. Though the representation was addressed to the 2nd Respondent, yet the Superintending Engineer, Tirunelveli Electricity Distribution Circle rejected the request of the Appellant stating that it was not feasible. The Appellant then field a detailed representation to the Superintending Engineer, Tirunelveli on 17.10.2005 and the said representation was forwarded by the said Superintending Engineer to the 2nd Respondent, who is the Competent Authority for taking appropriate action. The Senior Personnel Officer of the Board by his letter dated 25.9.2009 rejected the request of the Appellant stating that re-fixation of pay at Rs.9,750 with effect from 1.10.2003 is not feasible. The 2nd Respondent has also issued an order vide Memo dated 4.11.2009 finally rejecting the claim of the Appellant stating that the Appellant had been drawing lesser rate of pay than his junior prior to the date of his request for re-fixation of pay. The Appellant then challenged the said order by filing the above stated Writ Petition. 4. Learned Single Judge dismissed the Writ Petition mainly on the ground of delay. The Appellant then challenged the said order by filing the above stated Writ Petition. 4. Learned Single Judge dismissed the Writ Petition mainly on the ground of delay. According to the learned Single Judge if the request of the Appellant to rectify the anomaly in pay scale was not considered, he should have challenged the said order instead of filing a fresh representation in the year 2009. 5. We have heard the learned Counsel for the Appellant and also the learned Counsel for the Respondent – Electricity Board. 6. From the impugned judgment, it reveals that the Writ Petition was dismissed in the light of the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India v. M.K. Sarkar, 2010 (2) CWC 246 (SC) : 2010 (2) SCC 59. Hence, it would be appropriate to consider the facts of the case before the Supreme Court on the basis of which the Writ Petition was dismissed. In that case, their Lordships observed that the issue of limitation or delay or laches has to be considered with reference to the original cause of action and not with reference to the date on which an order is passed in compliance with a Court’s direction. In that case, the Respondent was in the railway service and was a subscriber to Contributory Provident Fund Scheme. The railway introduced the Pension Scheme on 16.11.1957 with a clause that those employees who were in service as on 1.4.1957 and those who joined between 1.4.1957 and 16.11.1957 shall have option to switch over to the Pension Scheme instead of continuing under the Contributory Provident Fund Scheme. Those who did not opt for Pension Scheme were given further opportunities to exercise their option. The Respondent though aware of the introduction of the Pension Scheme did not opt for the Pension Scheme and continued with the Contributory Provident Fund Scheme, and finally took voluntary retirement in the year 1976. Even on the date of his retirement, the option to shift to Pension Scheme was open, but the Respondent did not opt for the Pension Scheme, and received the Contributory Provident Fund dues on his retirement. It was only after more than 22 years after his retirement and after receiving his dues under the Contributory Provident Fund Scheme, he made a representation in the year 1998 requesting that he may be extended the benefit of the Pension Scheme. It was only after more than 22 years after his retirement and after receiving his dues under the Contributory Provident Fund Scheme, he made a representation in the year 1998 requesting that he may be extended the benefit of the Pension Scheme. The said request was not accepted. The Respondent then moved the Central Administrative Tribunal in the year 1999 seeking a direction to the Railway Administration to permit him to exercise the option to switch over to Pension Scheme. The Tribunal by its order dated 11.2.2004 disposed of the Application directing the Appellant to take a decision on the representation of the Respondent. The Chairman, Railway Board rejected the belated request of the Respondent for switching over to the Pension Scheme. The Respondent challenged the said order before the Tribunal. The Tribunal allowed the application of the Respondent and directed the Appellant to permit the Respondent to opt for Pension Scheme. The said order was challenged by the Appellant-Railway Board, which went up to the Supreme Court. On the facts of that case, the Supreme Court held that when a belated representation in regard to a “stale” or “dead” issue/ dispute is considered and decided, in compliance with a direction by the Court/Tribunal to do so, the date of such decision cannot be considered as furnishing a fresh cause of action for reviving the “dead” issue or time-barred dispute. 7. It is apparently clear that the facts of the case before the Supreme Court viz., M.K. Sarkar’s case (supra) was totally different from the facts of the present case. In the case before the Supreme Court, as noticed above, the Respondent did not exercise his option to switch over to the Pension Scheme and continued in the Contributory Provident Fund Scheme from 1957 to 1976, till he took voluntary retirement, and received all his dues under the Contributory Provident Fund Scheme, and thereafter, that too after the expiry of more than 22 years after his retirement, he made a representation requesting that the benefit of the Pension Scheme may be extended to him. Whereas in the instant case, the Appellant superannuated from service on 30.6.2004, and before his retirement, when he came to know that a representation with regard to pay anomaly of another employee viz., Mr. Whereas in the instant case, the Appellant superannuated from service on 30.6.2004, and before his retirement, when he came to know that a representation with regard to pay anomaly of another employee viz., Mr. V. Ganesan, who was junior to him, was rectified, he immediately filed a representation to the 2nd Respondent, who was the Competent Authority, but the same was rejected by one Superintending Engineer. The Appellant then submitted a detailed representation, which was forwarded to the 2nd Respondent, who finally rejected the same on 25.9.2009 stating that the request for rectification of pay anomaly cannot be accepted on the ground that the Appellant was drawing lesser salary than his junior prior to the date of request for such re-fixation of pay. The Appellant immediately filed the Writ Petition. In his Writ Petition, the Appellant has categorically stated that when the Board has considered the request for pay anomaly in respect of other similarly placed employees, there has been gross discrimination in the case of the Appellant. The Appellant further pleaded in the Writ Petition that the Respondent-Board had also rectified pay anomaly in the case of one S. Abdul Kaffur and V. Sivathanupillai, who were Assistant Executive Engineers working with the Respondent-Board. It was also stated in the Writ Petition that one A. Selvaraj, retired Assistant Executive Engineer also applied for rectification of pay anomaly, which was rejected by the Respondent-Board, but the rejection order on being challenged before this Court in W.P. No.15256 of 2008 the same was allowed and the Board was directed to re-consider his request. 8. Having regard to the aforesaid facts, we are of the view that the facts of the case, on the basis of which the ratio was laid down by the Supreme Court in M.K. Sarkar’s case, (supra), is totally different from the facts of the case on hand. Hence, the learned Single Judge ought not to have dismissed the Writ Petition following the decision in M.K. Sarkar’s case (supra). 9. In the case of Union of India v. Dhanwanti Devi, 1996 (6) SCC 44 their Lordships while considering the binding force of a decision observed as under: “10. Hence, the learned Single Judge ought not to have dismissed the Writ Petition following the decision in M.K. Sarkar’s case (supra). 9. In the case of Union of India v. Dhanwanti Devi, 1996 (6) SCC 44 their Lordships while considering the binding force of a decision observed as under: “10. Therefore, in order to understand an appreciate the binding force of a decision it is always necessary to see what were the facts in the case in which the decision was given and what was the point which had to be decided. No judgment can be read as if it is a statute. A word or a clause or a sentence in the judgment cannot be regarded as a full exposition of law. Law cannot afford to be static, and therefore, Judges are to employ an intelligent technique in the use of precedent………….” 10. In the case of Ambica Quarry Works v. State of Gujarat, 1987 (1) SCC 213 their Lordship’s observed – (para-18 at page-221) “18. ……….. The ratio of any decision must be understood in the background of the facts of that case. It has been said long time ago that a case is only an authority for what it actually decides, and not what logically follows from it……..” 11. Similarly, in the case of Bhavnagar University v. Palitana Sugar Mill (P) Ltd., 2003 (2) SCC 111 , the Supreme Court observed: (para-59 at page-130). “59. A decision, as is well known, is an authority for which it is decided and not what can logically be deduced therefrom. It is also well settled that a little difference in facts or additional facts may make a lot of difference in the precedential value of a decision.” 12. Coming to the case on hand, as noticed above, the Appellant claimed rectification of the pay anomaly on the ground that similarly situated employee, junior to him, made a representation for rectification of pay anomaly, which was corrected. Even the requests of the employees posted in the higher level for rectification of anomaly of pay have been accepted, but the request of the Appellant for similar relief was rejected not on the ground of delay, but on the ground that the same was not feasible. 13. In M.R. Gupta v. Union of India, 1995 (5) SCC 628 , a similar question arose before the Supreme Court for consideration. 13. In M.R. Gupta v. Union of India, 1995 (5) SCC 628 , a similar question arose before the Supreme Court for consideration. In that case, the employee joined the services of the State of Punjab as Demonstrator in the Government Polytechnic in 1967. Thereafter, he joined the services of the Railways in 1978. The employee claimed that the fixation of his pay on his joining service in the Railways was incorrect and that he was entitled to fixation of his pay after adding one increment to the pay which he would have drawn on 1.8.1978 in accordance with the Rules. The representation of the said employee was rejected and he approached the Administrative Tribunal for proper fixation of his pay. The Application was contested by the employer on the ground that it was time barred since the cause of action had arisen at the time of the initial fixation of his pay in 1978 or latest on rejection of his representation. The subsequent representation made by the employee for proper fixation of pay was immaterial for this purpose. Allowing the Appeal filed by the employee the Supreme Court observed that – “6. ……….The claim to be paid the correct salary computed on the basis of proper pay fixation, is a right which subsists during the entire tenure of service and can be exercised at the time of each payment of the salary when the employee is entitled to salary computed correctly in accordance with the rules. This right of a government servant to be paid the correct salary throughout his tenure according to computation made in accordance with the rules, is akin to the right of redemption which is an incident of a subsisting mortgage and subsists so long as the mortgage itself subsists, unless the equity of redemption is extinguished. It is settled that the right or redemption is of this kind. (See Thota China Subba Rao v. Mattapalli Raju, AIR 1950 FC 1 : 50 Bom LR 181 : 1950 (1) MLJ 752 ).” 14. After giving our anxious consideration on the facts of the case and the law discussed herein above, we have no hesitation in holding that the learned Single Judge has not correctly appreciated the law while dismissing the Writ Petition. Hence, the impugned judgment cannot be sustainable in law. 15. For the reasons stated above, this Appeal is allowed. After giving our anxious consideration on the facts of the case and the law discussed herein above, we have no hesitation in holding that the learned Single Judge has not correctly appreciated the law while dismissing the Writ Petition. Hence, the impugned judgment cannot be sustainable in law. 15. For the reasons stated above, this Appeal is allowed. The impugned order of the learned Single Judge is set aside. Consequently, the Respondents are directed to take a decision with regard to rectification of pay in respect of the Appellant herein. However, in the facts of the case there will be no order as to costs.