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2011 DIGILAW 968 (GAU)

Subash Das v. State of Tripura

2011-12-08

SUBHASIS TALAPATRA, UTPALENDU BIKAS SAHA

body2011
JUDGMENT S. Talpatra, J. 1. By this petition under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short "Cr.P.C."), the petitioners urge for a direction that the sentences passed in S.T. No. 22 (ST/S)/2004, dated 12.05.2005, which were confirmed by a Division Bench of this Court in common judgment and order dated 12.08.2011, as passed in Criminal Appeals Nos. 57 of 2005, 37 of 2008, 46 of 2008 and 80 of 2009, shall run concurrently instead of consecutively as directed. This petition having been filed under Section 482, Cr.P.C. read with Article 227 of the Constitution of India, is based on the provision of Section 31 of Cr.P.C. which provides limits of punishment of offence made up of several offences. Section 71 of the Indian Penal Code and runs as follows:-- 71. Limit of punishment of offence made up of several offences.--Where anything which is an offence is made up of parts, any of which parts is itself an offence, the offender shall not be punished with the punishment of more than one of such his offences/unless it be so expressly provided. [Where anything is an offence falling within two or more separate definitions of any law in force for the time being by which offences are defined or punished, or where several acts, of which one or more than one would by itself or themselves constitute, an offence/constitute when combined, a different offence, the offender shall not be punished with a more severe punishment than the Court which tries him could award for any one of such offences.] In view of Section 71, IPC, it has been urged that the direction to run the sentences consecutively is illegal and unsustainable therefor. 2. At the very outset, learned counsel for the petitioners was confronted with the question of maintainability of the petition. In reply, learned counsel relied on the decision of Bombay High Court in the matter of Satnam Singh Puransing Gill v. State of Maharashtra, as reported in 2009 Cr LJ 3781. Learned counsel for the petitioners laid much reliance on para 42 of Satnam Singh (supra), which is extracted hereunder: 42. A Division Bench of this Court in the case of Hariom alias Kalicharan Shriram & Gopal Agarwal alias Saxena v. The State of Maharashtra, 1994(2) Bom CR 219 : 1995 AIHC 489, had taken the view that the sentence would be directed to run consecutively. A Division Bench of this Court in the case of Hariom alias Kalicharan Shriram & Gopal Agarwal alias Saxena v. The State of Maharashtra, 1994(2) Bom CR 219 : 1995 AIHC 489, had taken the view that the sentence would be directed to run consecutively. Though the Bench did not rely upon any of the judgments of the Supreme Court of India it adopted the approach that was adopted in the case of Amavasai's case, AIR 2000 SC 3544 (supra) and directed that the Bench was adopting a midway approach and ordered the two sentences to run concurrently and third sentence to run consecutively: While adopting this approach the Bench specifically held as under;- In other words, where several sentences are passed against the same person, such sentences should run consecutively i.e. the one after the expiration of the other, 'unless the Court directs that they should run concurrently. Section 31 of the Criminal Procedure Code also enacts the rule that the sentences are to run consecutively unless the Court directs that they should run concurrently when a person is convicted on trial of several offences and several sentences are given. The discretion given to the Court under Sections 427(1) and 31 of the Criminal Procedure Code has to be exercised on sound judicial basis and judiciously. Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code vests in the High Court inherent powers to make such orders as may be necessary to secure ends of justice and to prevent injustice. The High Court has inherent powers to act ex debito justitiae to do real and substantial justice for administration of which alone the Court exists. Such inherent powers vested in the High Court are quite wide but at the same time it should be well remembered that in a case like the present one conflicting interests of an individual'. liberty and the safety and security of the citizens at large should be harmoniously settled. 3. From a simple reading of para 42 of Satnam Singh (supra), it appears that the said case was set up altogether in a different fact situation and the pertinent question was how discretion given to the Court under Section 427(1) and 31, Cr.P.C. has to be exercised on sound judicial basis and judiciously. 3. From a simple reading of para 42 of Satnam Singh (supra), it appears that the said case was set up altogether in a different fact situation and the pertinent question was how discretion given to the Court under Section 427(1) and 31, Cr.P.C. has to be exercised on sound judicial basis and judiciously. It is further emphasised there that Section 482, Cr.P.C. vests in the High Court inherent powers to make such orders as may be necessary, to secure ends of justice and to prevent injustice. Indisputably, the High Court has inherent powers to act ex debito justitiae to do real and substantial justice for administration of which alone the Court exists. Such inherent powers vested in the High Court are quite wide but at the same time it should be well remembered that in a case like the present one this kind of inherent power can hardly be exercised by the High Court. In Satnam Singh (supra), the accused was convicted under Sections 395 and397 of IPC and was sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for seven years and to pay a fine of Rs. 1,000/-, by the judgment of the Sessions Judge, Satara. While undergoing the sentence in the previous conviction, the accused was found guilty of an offence under Section 15 of the NDPS Act by the Special Judge, Amritsar, Punjab and was sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for two years with fine of Rs. 5,000/-. The accused preferred an appeal against the judgment of the Sessions Judge, but the same was, withdrawn. Thereafter, an application from the jail was moved, praying for issuance of a direction that the sentence in both the sentences may be ordered to run concurrently. At that point of time, question of jurisdiction, was raised and as a result the matter was referred to the Full Bench of the Bombay High Court. The Full Bench of the Bombay High Court while deciding the question of maintainability, remitted the said matter to the Single Judge of the said High Court for decision, with an observation that the power of the Court under Section 427(1) of the Code is not excluded and is available to be exercised by the concerned Court. The Full Bench of the Bombay High Court while deciding the question of maintainability, remitted the said matter to the Single Judge of the said High Court for decision, with an observation that the power of the Court under Section 427(1) of the Code is not excluded and is available to be exercised by the concerned Court. The Bombay High Court, in Satnam Singh (supra), emphasised that, application filed by the accused would have to be decided by the learned Single Judge in accordance with law keeping in view the enunciated principles. The jurisdiction of the Court would not be ousted only on the ground that the accused was involved in two different cases for committing the offences on different sets of facts. It is apparent from the said facts situation, the ratio of Satnam Singh (supra) cannot be applied in the present case inasmuch as the competent Division Bench of this Court by the judgment and order dated 12.08.2011, confirmed the judgment of conviction and sentences in S.T. No. 22(ST/S)/2004, as passed in Criminal Appeals Nos. 57/2005, 37/2008, 46/2008 and 80/2009 and also confirmed the direction of the learned Sessions Judge to run the sentences consecutively. For elucidation, the sentences are extracted hereunder: (i) to suffer rigorous imprisonment for ten years and also to pay a fine of Rs. 5,000/- by each of them and in default of payment of fine to undergo simple imprisonment for five months for the offence under Section 364 read with Section511, IPC, (ii) to suffer rigorous imprisonment for ten years and also to pay a fine of Rs. 5000/- by each of them and in default of payment of fine to suffer simple imprisonment for five months for commission of offence under Section 307 read with Section 34, IPC, (iii) to suffer rigorous imprisonment for life and also to pay a fine of Rs. 5000/- by each of them and in default of payment of fine to undergo simple imprisonment for five months for commission of offence under Section 302 read with Section 34, IPC, and (iv) to undergo rigorous imprisonment for six months for commission of offence under Section 27 of the Arms Act. All the sentences were directed to run consecutively. 4. After the judgment and order dated 12.08.2011, as passed in the said Criminal Appeals, this High Court has become functus officio. All the sentences were directed to run consecutively. 4. After the judgment and order dated 12.08.2011, as passed in the said Criminal Appeals, this High Court has become functus officio. Section 362, Cr.P.C. has provided a bar to alter the judgment. It provides that save as otherwise provided by the Code or by any other law for the time being in force, no Court, when it has signed its judgment or final order disposing of a case, shall alter or review the same except to correct a clerical or arithmetical error. 5. The prayer as made by the petitioners are not for correcting the clerical or arithmetical error. As such once the judgment is pronounced, the High Court has no jurisdiction to entertain a petition under Section482, Cr.P.C. read with Article 227 of the Constitution of India for revising the sentence viz. from running the sentences consecutively to concurrently. In this regard, the law has been crystalised that High Court has no power to alter its judgment in exercise of powers under Section 482, Cr.P.C. in view of the bar created by Section 362, Cr.P.C. The inherent powers cannot be utilised for enabling the Courts to alter or review its judgment by superseding the express provisions. If a review were intended by the Code there would have been a definite provision therefor in it. When the finality attaches to orders passed by the High Court in appeals, it is not open to the same High Court to alter or review the same. 6. In U.J.S. Chopra v. State of Bombay, as reported in AIR 1955 SC 633 , it has been held by the Supreme Court as under : I now pass on to Section 430 which is also relied on as furnishing a principle of finality which is supposed to control the operation of Section 439(6). Section 430 in terms applies to "judgments and orders" passed by an appellate Court. It has no application to "decisions or orders" made by the High Court in revision. It has been contended that the exception made in Section 430 in respect of cases provided for in Chap. 32 only exempts the judgments or orders of an appellate Court other than a High Court from the rule of finality embodied in, Section 430 because they are made revisable by the High Court under Section 439(1). It has been contended that the exception made in Section 430 in respect of cases provided for in Chap. 32 only exempts the judgments or orders of an appellate Court other than a High Court from the rule of finality embodied in, Section 430 because they are made revisable by the High Court under Section 439(1). Section 439(1) does not contemplate or permit judgments or orders made by the High Court in exercise of its original or appellate criminal jurisdiction to be revised by the High Court. As, therefore, the appellate judgments or orders of the High Court cannot under Section 439(1) be made the subject matter of any revision application, such appellate judgments or orders did not fall within the exception made in Section 430and were accordingly left subject to the rule of finality embodied therein. 7. The Orissa High Court in Ghanashyam Das v. Cuttack Municipality, as reported in 1978 Cr LJ 1310, held that: 6. Now the question arises whether this Court can review its order for payment of daily fine in exercise of its inherent powers under Section 482, Cr.P.C. The power of review is a creature of the statute. There is no provision in the Cr.P.C. which authorises a Criminal Court to review its judgment or order. The legislature has expressly provided for review of the judgment in the Civil P. C but no such provision finds place in the Cr.P.C. Under Article 137 of the Constitution the Supreme Court has been invested with an express power to review any judgment pronounced or order made by it while no such power has been conferred on the High Court. This Court cannot therefore entertain an application for review on the ground of discovery of new matter or evidence. It is not correct to say that if in any proceeding an Advocate fails to urge a certain question by misunderstanding of instruction given by the client or otherwise then the case will have to be reviewed under Section 482, Cr.P.C. The acceptance of such a position would militate against the finality of a judgment in a case which has been disposed of according to law. We are here concerned with the review of an appellate order of the High Court. We are here concerned with the review of an appellate order of the High Court. Section 393 of the new Cr.P.C. corresponding to Section 430 of the old Cr.P.C. provides that judgments and orders passed by an appellate Court upon an appeal shall be final, except in the cases provided for in Section 37 sub-section (4) of 5.384 of Chapter. The principle as to the finality of the criminal judgments has been recognised by the Supreme Court in Janardhan Reddy v. State of Hyderabad, AIR 1951 SC 217 : 1951-52 Cri LJ 736 wherein it was observed (at p.743 of Cri LJ:-- It is true that there is no such thing as the principle of constructive res judicata in a criminal case but there is such a principle as finality of judgments which applies to criminal as well as civil cases and is implicit in every system wherein provisions are to be found for correcting errors in appeal or in revision. Section 430 (5.393 new) Cr.P.C...... have given express recognition to this principle of finality..... In the case of U.J.S. Chopra v. State of Bombay, AIR 1955 SC 633 : 1955 Cri LJ 1410 their Lordships held that once a judgment has been pronounced by the High Court either in exercise of its appellate jurisdiction or its revisional jurisdiction no review or revision can be entertained against that judgment, and there is no provision in the Cr.P.C. which would enable even the High Court to review the same or to exercise revisional jurisdiction over the same. Thus it is clear that the inherent powers which are preserved to the High Court under Section 482, Cr.P.C. do not include power to review its judgment. 8. In Smt. Anjanamma v. State of Karnataka & Anr., as reported in Crimes 1989 (1) 99, the Karnataka High Court has reiterated almost the same principle, which is extracted hereunder: 4. While Mr. Nagesh learned counsel for the applicant-respondent No. 2, submitted that in the given facts and circumstances of the case, for no fault on the part of the applicant he having been denied of the opportunity of being heard, to meet the ends of justice, under inherent powers of the High Court under Section 482, Cr.P.C. it is permissible and proper to recall the order and give an opportunity of being heard the applicant, Mr. Ponnsppe, learned counsel appearing on the other side, as also Mr. Jedhav, learned High Court Government Pleader appearing for the State, submitted that in view of the provisions contained in Section 362, Cr.P.C. there being bar against review of such final order disposing of a case, the remedy of the applicant was elsewhere and not in this Court. Number of authorities have been cited on both sides. There is a conflict of opinions on the point in different High Courts. In the earlier decision brought to my notice in the case of Sankatha Singh v. State of U.P., AIR 1962 SC 1208 rendered by a Bench of three judges, their Lordships of the Supreme Court considering analogues provisions of Section 369 and Section 560(1)(a) of old Cr.P.C. held that such inherent powers cannot be exercised in view of the specific prohibition against altering and reviewing of the order of the Court and inherent powers cannot be exercised to do what the Code, specifically prohibits the Courts from doing. In case of Swarth Maht v. Dhermadeo, AIR 1972 SC 879 in somewhat similar situation, where appeal against acquittal was admitted in the Patna High Court and the notice was issued to the accused, although the accused appeared, but by mistake the names of the accused or their advocate was not shown in the cause list and the case was heard in their absence; the accused were convicted and the application made for re-hearing of the appeal was dismissed holding no opportunity was denied to them of being heard. When, the matter was taken to the Supreme Court, their Lordships of the Supreme Court held that if the name of the Advocate who appeared in the case was not shown, that would be a good reason to them that they had no notice of the case being posted for hearing and therefore when application is made by the party who were not heard, it would be an exercise of sound discretion if an opportunity is given to the party who is not heard and since no such opportunity was given, the conviction was set aside and the matter was remitted to the High Court to hear the appeal afresh. No such contention as now raised were either raised or considered in the said case. No such contention as now raised were either raised or considered in the said case. The question as now posed arose for decision in the case of State of Orissa v. Ram Chander Agarwal, AIR 1979 SC 87 . After considering analogous and equivalent provisions of Sections 369 and 561-A of the Old Cr.P.C. their Lordships of the Supreme Court have ruled that once a judgment has been pronounced by a High Court either in exercise of its appellate or its revisional jurisdiction, no review or revision can be entertained against that judgment as there is no provision in the Code which would enable the High Court to review the same or to exercise revisional jurisdiction. Proceeding further, their Lordships observed that the provisions of Section 369 (now Section 362) do not restrict the prohibition to the trial Court alone and the provisions in Section 369 are general in application and prohibit all Courts from altering or reviewing its judgment when once it has been signed and the provisions of Section 361-A (now Section 482) cannot be invoked for exercise of a power which is specifically prohibited by the Code. This view of law has been reiterated by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the case of Smt Sooraj Devi v. Pyare Lal, AIR 1981 SC 736 , wherein while convicting the accused, the High Court had directed to restore the possession of the house, to the complainant, a criminal miscellaneous application was then filed before the High Court under Section 482, Cr.P.C. for clarifying, by making a declaration that it was not binding on the applicant and it did not affect her possession, and the application was opposed an attempt was made to bring controversy in the description 'clerical or arithmetical error' : Considering the provisions of Section 482, Cr.P.C. and after referring to the earlier decision in the case of Sankatha Singh, their Lordships observed what was sought is not correction of clerical or arithmetical error, but a declaration that the High Court order did not affect her rights in the property and that direction to restore possession to Pyarelal is confined to that portion only of the house property respecting which the offence of trespass was committed so that she is not evicted from the portion in her possession, and thus in fact asked for adjudication of the right to possession alleged by her remains unaffected by the order of the High Court. Having considered the matter, their Lordships observed-- We are not satisfied that the controversy can be brought within the description "clerical or arithmetical error". A clerical or arithmetical error is an error occasioned by an accidental slip or omission of the Court. It represents that which the Court never intended to say. It is an error apparent on the face of the record and does not depend for its discovery on argument or disputation. An arithmetical error is a mistake of calculation, and a clerical error is a mistake in writing or typing. Further, repelling the contention that inherent powers of the High Court could be invoked under Section 482, Cr. P.C. notwithstanding the prohibition imposed by Section 362 to grant relief, their Lordships emphatically rejected the contention and observed;- Now it is well settled that the inherent power of the Court cannot be exercised for doing that which is specifically prohibited by the Code. And the decision in the case of Sankatha Singh (supra) was relied. P.C. notwithstanding the prohibition imposed by Section 362 to grant relief, their Lordships emphatically rejected the contention and observed;- Now it is well settled that the inherent power of the Court cannot be exercised for doing that which is specifically prohibited by the Code. And the decision in the case of Sankatha Singh (supra) was relied. The inherent powers of the Court are not even contemplated by the saving provisions contained in Section 362 and therefore the attempt to invoke that power cannot be availed. Such being the position of law as declared by their Lordships of the Supreme Court and also similar being the view taken by this Court in the case of Kencha v. State of Karnataka, ILR 1984 Kar. 2819, I do not think that the applicant can avail of the benefit of the provisions of Section 482, Cr.P.C. 9. In Mostt. Simrikhia v. Smt. Dolley Mukherjee alias Chhabi Mukherjee & Anr., as reported in 1990 Cri LJ 1599, the Supreme Court considered the said issue. In Mostt. Simrikhia (supra), their Lordships held : Section 362 of the Code expressly provides that no Court when it has signed its judgment or final order disposing of a case, shall alter or review the same except to correct a clerical or arithmetical error save as otherwise provided by the Code. Section 482 enables the High Court to make such order as may be necessary to give effect to any order under the Code or to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. The inherent powers, however, as much as controlled by principle and precedent as are its express powers by statute.If a matter is covered by an express letter of law, the Court cannot give a go-by to the statutory provisions and instead evolve a new provision in the grab of inherent jurisdiction. (emphasis added) 10. Almost a similar issue was considered by the Himachal Pradesh High Court in Senior Sub Judge, Dharamsala, Himachal Pradesh v. Ram Avtar Kansal, Executive Engineer, H.P. Housing Board, Dharamsala & Anr., as reported in 1991 Cri LJ 2432. It was held in that case that: 16. In State of Orissa v. Ram Chander Agarwala etc., AIR 1979 SC 87 : 1979 Cri LJ 33 the Supreme Court was dealing with a case under the Code of 1898. It was held in that case that: 16. In State of Orissa v. Ram Chander Agarwala etc., AIR 1979 SC 87 : 1979 Cri LJ 33 the Supreme Court was dealing with a case under the Code of 1898. In however, referred to Section 362 of the new Code. The view taken by the Supreme Court was that at page 40; 1979 Cri.LJ: Once a judgment has been pronounced by a High Court either in exercise of its appellate or its revisional jurisdiction, no review or revision can be entertained against that judgment as there is no provision in the Code which would enable the High Court to do so. In this judgment the Supreme Court referred to a number of its earlier judgments on the subject. It also said that Section 369 (equivalent to Section 362 of the new Code) was general in its application and prohibited the Court from altering or reviewing its judgment when once it had signed it and further that Section 561-A(equivalent to Section 482 of the new Code) could not be invoked for exercise of a power which was specifically prohibited by the Code. 11. In Hart Singh Mann v. Harbhajan Singh Bajwa & Ors., as reported in (2001) 1 SCC 169 , the Apex Court has dealt the issue quite substantively and held : 9. There is no provision in the Code of Criminal Procedure authorising the High Court to review its judgment passed either in exercise of its appellate or revisional or original criminal jurisdiction. Such a power cannot be exercised with the aid or under the cloak of Section 482 of the Code. This Court in State of Orissa v. Ram Chander Agarwala, (1979) 2 SCC 305 held (SCC p. 315, para 20) 20. Before concluding we will very briefly refer to cases of this Court cited by counsel on both sides. Talab Haji Hussain, AIR 1958 SC 376 relates to the power of the High Court to cancel bail. This Court in State of Orissa v. Ram Chander Agarwala, (1979) 2 SCC 305 held (SCC p. 315, para 20) 20. Before concluding we will very briefly refer to cases of this Court cited by counsel on both sides. Talab Haji Hussain, AIR 1958 SC 376 relates to the power of the High Court to cancel bail. The High Court took the view that under Section 561-A of the Code it had inherent power to cancel the bail, and finding that on the material produced before the Court it would not be safe to permit the appellant to be at large cancelled the bail, distinguishing the decision in Lala Jairam Das v. King-Emperor, AIR 1945 PC 94 and stated that the Privy Council was not called upon to consider the question about the inherent power of the High Court to cancel bail under Section 561-A. In Sankatha Singh v. State of U.P., AIR 1962 SC 1208 this Court held that Section 369 read with Section 424 of the Code of Criminal Procedure specifically prohibits the altering or reviewing of its order by a Court. The accused applied before a succeeding Sessions Judge for re-hearing of an appeal. The learned Judge was of the view that the appellate Court had no power to review or restore an appeal which has been disposed of. The Supreme Court agreed with the view that the appellate Court had no power to review or restore an appeal. This Court expressing its opinion that the Sessions Court had no power to review or restore an appeal observed that a judgment; which does not comply with the requirements of Section 367 of the Code may be liable to be set aside by a superior Court but will not give the appellate Court any power to set it aside itself and re-hear the appeal observing that 'Section 369 read with Section 424 of the Code makes it clear that the appellate Court is not to alter or review the judgment once signed, except for the purpose of correcting a clerical error : Reliance was placed on a decision of this Court in Supdt and Remembrancer of Legal Affairs W.B. v. Mohan Singh, (1975) 3 SCC 706 by Mr. Patel, learned counsel for the respondent wherein it was held that rejection of a prior application for quashing is no bar for the High Court entertaining a subsequent application as quashing does not amount to review or revision. This decision instead of supporting the respondent clearly lays down following Chopra case that once a judgment has been pronounced by a High Court either in exercise of its appellate or revisional jurisdiction, no review or revision can be entertained against that judgment as there is no provision in the Criminal Procedure Code which would enable the High Court to review the same or to exercise revisional jurisdiction. This Court entertained the application for quashing the proceedings on the ground that a subsequent application to quash would not amount to review or revise an order made by the Court. The decision clearly lays down that a judgment of the High Court on appeal or revision cannot be reviewed or revised except in accordance with the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code. The provisions of Section 561- A of the Code cannot be invoked for exercise of a power which is specifically prohibited by the Code. 10. Section 362 of the Code mandates that no Court, when it has signed its judgment or final order disposing of a case shall alter or review the same except to correct a clerical or an arithmetical error. The section is based on an acknowledged principle of law that once a matter is finally disposed of by a Court, the said Court in the absence of a specific statutory provision becomes functus officio and disentitled to entertain a fresh prayer for the same relief unless the former order of final disposal is set aside by a Court of competent Jurisdiction in a manner prescribed by law. The Court becomes functus officio the moment the official order disposing of a case is signed. Such an order cannot be altered except to the extent of correcting a clerical or an arithmetical error. The reliance of the respondent on Talab Haji Hussain case is misconceived. Even in that case it was pointed that inherent powers conferred on High Courts under Section 561-A (Section 482 of the new Code) has to be exercised sparingly, carefully and with caution and only where such exercise is justified by the tests specifically laid down in the section Itself. Even in that case it was pointed that inherent powers conferred on High Courts under Section 561-A (Section 482 of the new Code) has to be exercised sparingly, carefully and with caution and only where such exercise is justified by the tests specifically laid down in the section Itself. It is not disputed that the petition filed under Section 482 of the Code had been finally disposed of by the High Court on 7-1-1999. The new Section 362 of the Code which was drafted keeping in view the recommendations of the 41st report of the Law Commission and the Joint Select Committees appointed for the purpose, has extended the bar of review not only to the judgment but also to the final orders other than the judgment 12. In Mohd. Yaseen v. State of U.P., as reported in (2007) 7 SCC 49 , the Apex Court has again considered the scope and ambit of Section 482, Cr.P.C. for review or altering the judgment and order passed in the said issued was again fell for consideration before the Apex Court, wherein the Apex Court held: 13. In our view the learned Judge of the Madras High Court had fallen in error in passing the impugned order. The following questions-need to be considered by us: (I) Whether the High Court had become functus officio with the disposal of the criminal petition by the judgment and order dated 1st of March 2001? (II) Whether the High Court, in exercise of its inherent power under Section 482 of the Code can modify its earlier judgment and order? 14. Before we take up the questions for our decision, we may look into the law on the questions posed before us. 15. In the case of Hari Singh Mann v. Harbhajan Singh Bajwa & others, (2001) 1 SCC 169 , this Court held : There is no provision in the Code of Criminal Procedure authorizing the High Court to review its judgment passed either in exercise of its appellate or revisional or Original criminal jurisdiction. Such a power cannot be exercised with the aid or under the cloak of Section 482 of the Code. Section 362, Cr PC has extended the bar of review not only to judgment but also to the final orders other than the judgment. Such a power cannot be exercised with the aid or under the cloak of Section 482 of the Code. Section 362, Cr PC has extended the bar of review not only to judgment but also to the final orders other than the judgment. Section 362 is based on an acknowledged principle of law that once a matter is finally disposed of by a Court, the said Court in the absence of statutory provision becomes functus officio and is disentitled to entertain a fresh prayer for the same relief unless the former order is set aside by a Court of competent jurisdiction in a manner prescribed by law. The Court becomes functus officio the moment the official order disposing of a case is signed. Such an order cannot be altered except to the extent of correcting a clerical or an arithmetical error. 16. Yet in the case of Simrikha v. Dolley Mukherjee and Chhabi Mukherjee & Anr., (1990) 2 SCC 437 this Court held: The inherent power under Section 482 is intended to prevent the abuse of the process of the Court and to secure ends of justice. Such power cannot be exercised to do something which is expressly barred under the Code. If any consideration of the facts by way of review is not permissible under the Code and is expressly barred, It is not for the Court to exercise its inherent power to reconsider the matter and record a conflicting decision. If there had been change in the circumstances of the case it would be in order for the High Court to exercise its inherent powers in the prevailing circumstances and pass appropriate orders to secure the ends of justice or to prevent the abuse of the process of the Court Where there is no such changed circumstances and the decision has to be arrived at on the facts that existed as on the date of the earlier order the exercise of the power to reconsider the same materials to arrive at different conclusion is in effect a review which is expressly barred under Section 362. 17. 17. Keeping the principles as laid down by the aforesaid decisions of this Court in mind, let us now look to Section 362 of the Code which expressly provides that no Court which has signed its judgment and final order disposing of a case shall alter or review the same except to correct clerical or arithmetical error save as otherwise provided by the Court. At this stage the exercise of power under Section 482 of the Code may be looked into. 18. Section 482 enables the High Court to make such order as may be necessary to give effect to any order under the Code or to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. The inherent powers, however, as much are controlled by principles and precedent as are its express powers by statutes. If a matter is covered by an express letter of law the Court cannot give a go-by to the statutory provisions and instead evolve a new provision in the garb of inherent jurisdiction. 19. In the case of Smt. Sooraj Devi v. Pyare Lal & Anr., AIR 1981 SC 736 , this Court held that the inherent power of the Court cannot be exercised for doing that which is specifically prohibited by the Code." 20. Similar view was expressed in the case of Sankatha Singh v. State of U.P., (1962) Supp 2 SCR 81 in which it was held : It is true that the prohibition in Section 362 against the Court altering or reviewing its judgment is subject to what is "otherwise provided by this Code or by any other law for the time being in force". Those words however refer to those provisions only where the Court has been expressly authorised by the Code or other law to alter or review its judgment. The inherent power of the Court is not contemplated by the saving provision contained in Section 362 and, therefore the attempt to invoke that power can be of no avail. 21. As noted herein-earlier, Section 362 of the Code prohibits reopening of a final order except in the cases of clerical or arithmetical errors. The inherent power of the Court is not contemplated by the saving provision contained in Section 362 and, therefore the attempt to invoke that power can be of no avail. 21. As noted herein-earlier, Section 362 of the Code prohibits reopening of a final order except in the cases of clerical or arithmetical errors. Such being the position and in view of the express prohibition in the Code itself in the form of Section 362, exercise of power under Section 482 of the Code cannot be exercised to reopen or alter an order disposing of a petition decided on merits. 13. It has been well crystalised by the interpretation of the Apex Court that once a judgment has been pronounced by the High Court either in exercise of its appellate or its revisional jurisdiction, no review or revision can be entertained against that judgment as there is no provision in the Code enabling the High Court to do so. Even there is no scope to exercise the power under Section 482, Cr.P.C. to act ex debito justitiae inasmuch as the Court cannot give a go-by to the statutory provisions (Section 362, Cr.P.C.) and instead evolve a new vista. Since the judgments under reference have reached their finality and this High Court has become functus officio, the petition cannot be entertained and maintained for lack of jurisdiction. Accordingly, the petition stands dismissed.