JUDGMENT R. Kantha Rao, J 1. This criminal appeal is filed against the judgment dated 31.12.2007 passed by the Additional Metropolitan Sessions Judge-cum-III Additional Sessions Judge (Fast Track Court), at L.B.Nagar, Ranga Reddy District in S.C.No.176 of 2006. 2. The appellant was tried by the learned Additional Sessions Judge for the offences under Sections 498-A and 302 of IPC. He was found guilty for both the charges, convicted thereunder and was sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of two years and to pay a fine of Rs.1,000/-in default to suffer simple imprisonment for a period of three months for the offence under Section 498-A of IPC. He was further sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life for the offence under Section 302 of IPC. Both the substantive sentences passed against the appellant were directed to run concurrently. 3. Challenging the said order of conviction and sentence, the appellant preferred the present appeal. 4. The brief facts essential for considering the appeal may be stated as follows: PW-1-Naga Jagannadha Rao in whose house the appellant was residing as a tenant with his family lodged a report with PW-14-Inspector of Police, Malkajgiri Police Station on 08.02.2006 at 11.30 a.m. stating that he received information that the appellant killed his wife-Jyothy at his house. Basing on the said report, PW-14 registered a case in Crime No.54 of 2006 for the offence under Section 302 IPC. It is the version of the prosecution that 15 minutes after receiving the report from PW-1 at about 11.45 a.m., the appellant-Siddaiah went to the police station and submitted a petition to PW-14 stating that he killed his wife by inflicting injuries with knife as he was suspecting her fidelity and that she might have died due to the said injuries. With the said petition, the appellant himself surrendered before PW-14. Immediately, PW-14 entered the petition in general diary and took the appellant into custody. Thereafter, in pursuance of the statement made by the appellant, the appellant led PW-14, the mediators-PW-9 and Waseem (LW-13) to his house, showed the dead body of the deceased which was in a pool of blood. PW-14 prepared an observation report and seized M.O.1-sickle, blood stained bed sheet-M.O.2 and one white shirt-M.O.3 from the scene of offence under a cover of mediators’ report. PW-14 prepared an observation report and seized M.O.1-sickle, blood stained bed sheet-M.O.2 and one white shirt-M.O.3 from the scene of offence under a cover of mediators’ report. He then sent a requisition to the finger print Expert-PW-12 for collection of finger prints of the appellant which were found in the sewing machine and also to take the finger prints of the appellant for comparison and submitting a report. PW-14 also got photographed the scene of offence and after completing the investigation, he filed charge sheet against the appellant. 5. The prosecution in order to establish the guilt of the appellant, examined PWs.1 to 15, marked Exs.P-1 to P-12 and M.Os.1 to 5. The evidence of PW-1, the owner of the house in which the appellant was residing as tenant revealed his knowing about the appellant killing his wife and his lodging report with Malkajigiri police. The evidence of PW-2, the daughter of the appellant who was aged 13 years on the date of the incident and who was considered to be competent witness by the learned magistrate by preliminary examination disclosed that while she was in school on the date of the incident, she was informed by the teacher about her father killing her mother, her proceeding to her house and observing the dead body of her mother. Her evidence also further revealed that her father used to quarrel with her mother frequently. PW-5 is the brother of the deceased. His evidence before the trial Court disclosed that the appellant was harassing the deceased suspecting her fidelity, the appellant putting forward a proposal to. PW-5 to marry his younger sister and on refusal by PW-5, the appellant subjecting the deceased to harassment. The evidence of PW-6, the niece of the deceased was to the effect that whenever the deceased came to their house, he used to inform her about the harassment caused by the appellant suspecting her fidelity. Her evidence further reveals that she and her husband visited the house of the appellant, requested him not to harass the deceased and treat her properly. Her evidence also discloses that the deceased informed her that the appellant was threatening her to kill if she reveals the harassment caused to her to anybody. PW-7 is the elder sister of the deceased. Her evidence also discloses that the deceased informed her that the appellant was threatening her to kill if she reveals the harassment caused to her to anybody. PW-7 is the elder sister of the deceased. Her evidence discloses that the appellant put-forward a proposal to her younger brother Vishwanadham to marry the younger sister of the deceased which was not accepted by her younger brother and also the fact that the appellant used to harass the deceased by suspecting her character. Her evidence further reveals that she and her other family members requested the appellant many times not to harass the deceased and treat her properly, but, the appellant did not mend his behaviour. PW-8 is the junior paternal uncle of the deceased. His evidence discloses that prior to the deceased marrying the appellant, the appellant was discarded by his first wife being unable to bear the harassment caused by the appellant, they thought that after the marriage with the deceased, the appellant would change his behaviour. His evidence further reveals that whenever he visited their house, the deceased informed them about harassment caused to her by the appellant by suspecting her character. 6. PW-9 is a mediator. His evidence discloses that on being summoned by the police, he went to Malkajgiri Police Station, by then the appellant was present there, the appellant in pursuance of his statement to the Inspector of Police, led them to his residential house, in the second floor of the building, the police opened the doors and found the dead body of the deceased with bleeding injuries on the head and neck. His evidence further discloses that they found the blood stained sickle M.O.1 lying underneath the cot and also the blood stained bed sheet and blood stained shirt M.Os.2 and 3. According to him, the police prepared an observation report and seizure report and seized M.Os.1 to 3 under the cover of seizure report. 7. PW-10 is the owner of the house in which the appellant resided as tenant in her house prior to residing as tenant in the house of PW-1. The evidence of PW-10 reveals that the appellant used to quarrel with his wife by suspecting her character and because of his behaviour, she told the appellant to vacate the house and thereafter, the appellant vacated the house and shifted to the house of PW-1. 8. The evidence of PW-10 reveals that the appellant used to quarrel with his wife by suspecting her character and because of his behaviour, she told the appellant to vacate the house and thereafter, the appellant vacated the house and shifted to the house of PW-1. 8. PW-12 is the Finger Prints Expert who worked in Cyberabad Commissionerate. His evidence discloses that on receiving the requisition from PW-14, the Inspector of Police, he proceeded to the scene of offence at 1 p.m. on 08.02.2006, examined the surroundings of the place where the dead body was lying and found blood stained finger prints on the sewing machine which was in the right corner of the room, he took photographs of the finger prints on the sewing machine, subsequently on 10.02.2006 he received specimen finger prints and palm prints of the appellant from the Inspector of Police, Malkajgiri and on examination, he found that the finger prints found on the sewing machine and the finger prints sent by the Inspector of Police are identical. His report is marked as Ex.P-5. The comparison chart prepared by him is marked as Ex.P- 6. PW-13 is the Associate Professor, Forensic Medicine in Osmania Medical College at the relevant time. The post mortem examination in this case was conducted by Dr.G.Damodhar, an Assistant Professor in Department of Forensic Medicine, Gandhi Medical College along with PW-13. The prosecution marked the post mortem report as Ex.P-7 through PW-13 in which multiple cut injuries were found on the head and neck of the deceased. PW-13 stated in his evidence that the injuries found on the body of the deceased could be caused with a sickle like M.O.1. 9. PW-14 is the Inspector of Police, Malkajgiri Circle at relevant time. He is the investigating Officer. He spoke about PW-1 going to the police station at 11.30 a.m. on 08.02.2006, submitting a report about the murder of the deceased, his registering the case basing on the said report. He deposed that subsequently, the appellant came to the police station voluntarily surrendered before him and submitted a petition stating that he inflicted injuries with sickle on the body of the deceased. He deposed that subsequently, the appellant came to the police station voluntarily surrendered before him and submitted a petition stating that he inflicted injuries with sickle on the body of the deceased. He further deposed about arrest of the appellant in the presence of the mediators, the appellant making a disclosure statement before him, leading him the mediators and the other police personnel to the residential house situated at Anandbagh where the deadbody of the deceased was found. He also spoke about observing the scene of offence, getting the scene of offence photographed, issuing requisition to the finger print expert and recovering M.O.1 sickle under cover of seizure report and obtaining the report from the finger print expert. 10. Basing on the aforesaid evidence, the learned trial Court convicted the appellant for the offences punishable under Sections 498-A and 302 of IPC and sentenced him to punishment as mentioned above. 11. We have heard Sri C.Padmanabha Reddy, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellant and the learned Additional Public Prosecutor appearing for the State. 12. Learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellant would contend that except some evidence showing that the appellant was harassing the deceased suspecting her fidelity, there is no other incriminating material against the appellant showing his involvement in the commission of the offence. He would further contend that no written requisition was issued by the investigating officer to the finger print expert and also in the absence of any such written requisition, the evidence relating to the comparison of the finger prints which were said to be available at the venue of the offence basing on the sample collected by the investigating officer, the report and opinion of the finger prints expert cannot be taken into consideration. Thus, according to the learned counsel, the learned trial Court erroneously convicted the appellant and the judgment passed by the trial Court is liable to be set aside in this appeal. 13. On the other hand, the learned Additional Public Prosecutor representing the State would submit that the prosecution could be able to establish the circumstances relied on and the circumstances are conclusive and they are enough to record a conviction against the appellant which was rightly done by the learned trial Court and therefore, the conviction and sentence passed against the appellant have to be confirmed in this appeal. 14. 14. The motive of the appellant for committing the offence has been relied on by the prosecution as one of the circumstances. According to the prosecution, the appellant who became addicted to drinking was harassing the deceased by suspecting her fidelity. This fact has been spoken to by several witnesses whose evidence was referred in the foregoing paragraphs. The witnesses include the family members of the appellant and the deceased and the landlord of the house in which the appellant was residing as tenant. Basing on the evidence referred above forthcoming in this case, we are of the view that the appellant had enough and strong motive to do away with the deceased. Thus, the prosecution could be successfully able to establish the motive part in proof of the guilt of the appellant. 15. The important and strong circumstance relied upon by the prosecution is the factum of the appellant going to the Police Station, Malkajgiri within 15 minutes after the incident and informing about killing of his wife by inflicting sickle injuries. However, by the time, the appellant proceeded to the police station, PW-1 had already lodged a report with the police. Therefore, the information furnished by the appellant before PW14 about the occurrence cannot be said to be the F.I.R. The petition submitted by the appellant to the police setting out the facts regarding the occurrence is not an F.I.R. and the said petition is a statement made by the accused to the police during the course of the investigation and is inadmissible in evidence since it is hit by Section 162 of Cr.P.C. 16. However, the crucial issue is the act of the appellant proceeding to the police station within 15 minutes after the occurrence which reveals his subsequent conduct and it is relevant and admissible in proof of his guilt under Section 8 of the Indian Evidence Act. Here what is stated by the appellant in the petition may be a statement made during the course of the investigation which is hit by Section 162 of Cr.P.C. But, the act of his going to the police station, approaching PW-14 to convey the information about the occurrence is the subsequent conduct of the appellant which is admissible against him under Section 8 of the Indian Evidence Act. The evidence of PW-14, Inspector of Police that the appellant at 11.45 a.m. on 08.02.2006 came to the police station and submitted a petition to him is admissible against the appellant as disclosing the subsequent conduct of the appellant. This is a very strong circumstance in proof of the guilt of the appellant. 17. There is absolutely no reason to doubt the testimony of PW-14, the investigating officer on the aspect that the appellant came to him at 10.45 a.m. on the date of the incident to convey the information about the death of his wife. When the said act of the appellant going to the police station and submitting the petition is believed, it is for the appellant to offer a reasonable and acceptable explanation as to how his wife died. Crucially in this case, the defence version of the appellant is total denial. He denied even going to the police station and surrendering before PW-14. Therefore, the explanation offered by the appellant is ex facie false and it is an additional circumstance on which the prosecution can rely to prove the guilt of the appellant. 18. Soon-after the appellant surrendered before PW-14, the appellant led PW-14 and mediators to his house and showed the dead body of his wife with bleeding injuries. In pursuance of his statement earlier made to the investigating officer, the sickle, the weapon of offence (M.O.1), the blood stained bed sheet (M.O.2) and blood stained shirt (M.O.3) were recovered by PW-14 in the presence of mediators. This part of evidence so far it relates to the showing of the dead body of the deceased and M.Os.2 and 3 blood stained clothes is relevant and admissible against the appellant. Thus, the prosecution in this case also proved the recovery aspect against the appellant. 19. The foremost among the circumstances relied upon by the prosecution is the result of comparison of finger prints as borne out from the evidence of PW-12, the finger prints expert. His report and evidence before the Court and the comparative chart prepared by him revealed that the finger prints collected by the investigating officer, the sewing machine at the venue of the offence and the sample of finger prints sent to the finger print expert are proved to be identical. His report and evidence before the Court and the comparative chart prepared by him revealed that the finger prints collected by the investigating officer, the sewing machine at the venue of the offence and the sample of finger prints sent to the finger print expert are proved to be identical. It is true that PW-14, the investigating officer admitted in his evidence that he did not issue requisition in writing to PW-12, the finger prints expert. But the evidence of PW-12, the finger prints expert clearly reveals that on the requisition of investigating officer, he took the finger prints from the scene of offence and subsequently he compared them with the finger prints which were sent by the investigating officer and submitted his report. There is no hard and fast rule that every requisition by the investigating officer to an expert during the course of investigation shall be in writing. Any report submitted by the expert on oral requisition by the investigating officer does not become valueless or inadmissible. The evidence of PW.12 as well as PW.14 clearly reveals that on the requisition issued by PW.14 only, PW.12, the finger prints expert took the finger prints of the appellant at the venue of offence and compared with those specimen finger prints which were sent by the investigating officer. His report Ex.P.5 and comparative chart prepared by him, which is marked as Ex.P.6 clearly indicate that the analysis and report given by the finger prints expert is only pursuant to the requisition issued by the investigating officer and the entire process did take place during discharge of the official duties of PWs.12 and 14 and the law presumes that the said process had validly been taken place. Therefore, we are not in acceptance with the contention urged by the learned senior counsel that the report of the finger prints expert cannot be relied on the mere technical objection that the requisition issued by the investigating officer to the finger prints expert is not in writing. 20. Therefore, we are not in acceptance with the contention urged by the learned senior counsel that the report of the finger prints expert cannot be relied on the mere technical objection that the requisition issued by the investigating officer to the finger prints expert is not in writing. 20. Before parting with the judgment and expressing our final verdict in this appeal, we wish to refer the judgment of the Supreme Court In STATE OF PUNJAB v. KARNAIL SINGH ( (2003) 11 SCC 271 )wherein the Supreme Court explained the concept of benefit of doubt in the following terms: “Exaggerated devotion to the rule of benefit of doubt must not nurture fanciful doubts or lingering suspicion and thereby destroy social defence. Justice cannot be made sterile on the plea that it is better to let hundred guilty escape than punish an innocent. Letting guilty escape is not doing justice according to law. [See: Gurbachan Singh v. Satpal Singh and Others [ AIR 1990 SC 209 ]. Prosecution is not required to meet any and every hypothesis put forward by the accused. [See State of U.P. v. Ashok Kumar Srivastava [ AIR 1992 SC 840 ]. A reasonable doubt is not an imaginary, trivial or merely possible doubt, but a fair doubt based upon reason and common sense. It must grow out of the evidence in the case. If a case is proved perfectly, it is argued that it is artificial; if a case has some flaws inevitable because human beings are prone to err, it is argued that it is too imperfect. One wonders whether in the meticulous hypersensitivity to eliminate a rare innocent from being punished, many guilty persons must be allowed to escape. Proof beyond reasonable doubt is a guideline, not a fetish. [See Inder Singh and Anr. v. State (Delhi Admn.) ( AIR 1978 SC 1091 )]. Vague hunches cannot take place of judicial evaluation. "A judge does not preside over a criminal trial, merely to see that no innocent man is punished. A judge also presides to see that a guilty man does not escape. Both are public duties." (Per Viscount Simon in Stir/and v. Director of Public Prosecution (1944 AC (PC) 315) quoted in State of U.P. v. Anil Singh ( AIR 1988 SC 1998 ). Doubts would be called reasonable if they are free from a zest for abstract speculation. A judge also presides to see that a guilty man does not escape. Both are public duties." (Per Viscount Simon in Stir/and v. Director of Public Prosecution (1944 AC (PC) 315) quoted in State of U.P. v. Anil Singh ( AIR 1988 SC 1998 ). Doubts would be called reasonable if they are free from a zest for abstract speculation. Law cannot afford any favourite other than truth. (See: Shivaji Sahebrao Bobade and Anr. v. State of Maharashtra ( 1974 (1) SCR 489 ), State of U.P. V. Krishna Gopal and Anr. ( AIR 1988 SC 2154 ), and Gangadhar Behera and Ors. v. State of Orissa ( 2002 (7) Supreme 276 ).” 21. Keeping the principles laid down by the Supreme Court relating to the concept of benefit of doubt and also keeping in mind the principles governing the proof of guilt of the accused by circumstantial evidence, we wish to state that the prosecution in this case as discussed above by us in the forgoing paragraphs proved that the appellant who was suspecting the fidelity of the deceased who is his wife had enough and strong motive to kill her. His approaching PW.14, the investigating officer with a petition within 15 minutes after the occurrence in the absence of any reasonable explanation from him as to the cause of the death of his wife is a strong circumstance against the appellant arising out of his conduct subsequent to the occurrence. On his statement, the investigating officer and the mediators proceeded to his house which is the venue of the offence, where they found the dead body of the deceased and the blood stained sickle, blood stained bed sheet and blood stained shirt. The finger prints available at the venue of the offence were found to be identical with the finger prints of the appellant subsequently taken by the investigating officer. All these circumstances are strong enough and they only point towards the guilt of the appellant. The appellant did not offer any explanation to the above circumstances proved against him. The non-explanation by the accused and his defence at the trial, which is of total denial, furnish additional circumstance in proof of his guilt. The circumstance in our view enable us to arrive at a definite conclusion that the appellant alone is the author of the crime and nobody else. The non-explanation by the accused and his defence at the trial, which is of total denial, furnish additional circumstance in proof of his guilt. The circumstance in our view enable us to arrive at a definite conclusion that the appellant alone is the author of the crime and nobody else. The circumstances proved by the prosecution in this case lead no doubt of any sort which is consistent with the hypothesis of innocence of the appellant. As rightly held by the trial Court, the prosecution is able to prove the guilt of the appellant beyond reasonable doubt by highly convincing, reliable and cogent circumstantial evidence. The order of conviction and sentence passed by the trial Court against the appellant do not call for any interference in this appeal. 22. For the foregoing reasons, we confirm the conviction and sentence passed by the trial Court against the appellant and dismiss the appeal.