Judgment : The defendants in O.S.No.9 of 2002 in the Court of the Senior Civil Judge, Kandukur are the appellants. They feel aggrieved by the decree, dated 02.02.2010, passed by the trial Court in that suit and dismissal of A.S.No.55 of 2010, dated 07.07.2011, by the Court of the II Additional District Judge, Ongole. 2. Respondent No.1 herein filed the suit for declaration of title and recovery of possession in respect of the suit schedule properties, comprising of 5 items of landed property of about Acs.2.25 cents at different places and a plot of 320 square yards. The case stated by respondent No.1 was as under: 3. One Sri Ravuri Kotareddy had a son by name Mallareddy, who, in turn, was married to Venkata Subbamma. Mallareddy predeceased Kotareddy. Venkata Subbamma filed O.S.No.911 of 1934 in the Court of the District Munsif, Kanigiri against her father-in-law for maintenance. During the pendency of the suit, Kotareddy died and his wife Kotamma was brought on record as defendant No.2. A compromise was entered into, in which the suit schedule properties herein were given to Venkata Subbamma. Through a Will, dated 09.05.1991, Venkata Subbamma bequeathed the suit schedule properties to respondent No.1, who is the daughter of her sister. She became absolute owner and possessor after death of Venkata Subbamma on 02.01.1995 4. It was pleaded that the appellants, who are the lineal descendants of the daughter of Kotareddy, forcibly evicted her from the properties. 5. The appellants filed a written statement opposing the suit. According to them, application for compromise filed in O.S.No.911 of 1934 was dismissed on 10.07.1935 and there was no compromise decree at all. They stated that certain items of property that were given to Venkata Subbamma for enjoyment during her life time have reverted to the lineal descendants of Kotareddy after her death. 6. The trial Court decreed the suit and the appeal preferred by the appellants was dismissed. 7. Sri M.Ram Mohan, learned counsel for the appellants, submits that the sole basis for respondent No.1 to claim title and to seek recovery of possession of the suit property was the alleged compromise decree in O.S.No.911 of 1934 and though she failed to prove the existence of such a decree, the trial Court and the lower appellate Court have accepted her case. The learned counsel further submits that the record clearly discloses that an application filed for compromise in that suit was dismissed. It is urged that mentioning of certain facts in the notice issued on behalf of the appellants, cannot constitute the basis for the claim of respondent No.1. 8. Sri P.Ravi Kiran, learned counsel for respondent No.1, on the other hand, submits that the entitlement of Venkata Subbamma to share the properties from the family is not at all in doubt and that the appellants themselves acknowledged the existence of a compromise between Venkata Subbamma and her mother-in-law Kotamma, while issuing Ex.A2. 9. The suit was filed by respondent No.1 as indigent person. The trial Court framed the following issues for its consideration: 1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for declaration of his title in ‘A’ schedule property? 2. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for possession of ‘A’ schedule? 3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for mesne profits? 10. On behalf of respondent No.1, P.Ws.1 to 4 were examined and Exs.A1 to A5 were filed. On behalf of the appellants, D.Ws.1 to 4 were examined and Exs.B1 to B3 were filed. The suit was decreed and in A.S.No.55 of 2010, the lower appellate Court framed the following two points for its consideration: 1. Whether the plaint ‘A’ schedule properties were given to Ravuri Venkata Subbamma towards her pre-existing right of maintenance and whether the limited rights given to her enlarged into absolute estate by virtue of Section 14 (1) of the Hindu Succession Act? 2. Whether the plaintiff has got rights in the schedule properties and is entitled for recovery of possession and mesne profits as prayed for? 11. Both the points were answered in favour of respondent No.1. It is, no doubt, true that the burden to prove her title to the suit schedule properties rested squarely upon respondent No.1. She is not a member of the family, which originally owned the said properties. Her claim was through a Will said to have been executed by her maternal aunt, Venkata Subbamma. It is a matter of record that Venkata Subbamma instituted O.S.No.911 of 1934 in the Court of the District Munsif, Kanigiri against her father-in-law for maintenance. Though she pleaded that a compromise decree was passed therein, she has not filed any document in relation thereto. It is a matter of record that Venkata Subbamma instituted O.S.No.911 of 1934 in the Court of the District Munsif, Kanigiri against her father-in-law for maintenance. Though she pleaded that a compromise decree was passed therein, she has not filed any document in relation thereto. It is only the appellants that have filed the plaint, written statement and a petition for compromise, marked as Exs.B1 to B3. Their specific plea that the compromise petition was dismissed, virtually stood proved with the failure on the part of respondent No.1, to file any copy of the order or decree. 12. If the matter were to have rested at that, things would have been different altogether. The appellants themselves got issued Ex.A2 on 27.12.1990 when Venkata Subbamma was alive. In that notice, they have stated that a compromise was affected between Venkata Subbamma and her mother-in-law, Kotamma, during the pendency of O.S.No.911 of 1934. Though they have not stated that any compromise decree was passed, they did admit that there was a compromise. The relevant portion of the notice reads as under: “That No.1 of you married to one Ravuri Mallareddy who is none other than the lonely son of the said Kotareddy and he predeceased his father Kotareddy, that No.1 of you filed a suit in O.S.No.911 of 1934 on the file of the District Munsif’s Court, Kanigiri, for maintenance against Ravuri Kotareddy, and his wife Ravuri Kotamma after the demise of her husband Mallareddy. Subsequently, No.1 of you compromised with Ravuri Kotamma wife of Kotareddy as Kotareddy died during the pendency of the said suit. In pursuance of the said compromise affected between No.1 of you and Ravuri Kotamma who was the second defendant in the said suit, this notice schedule properties have been given to No.1 of you, with limited life-interest, towards her maintenance during her lifetime, and after her demise, the notice schedule properties should go either to Ravuri Kotamma or to her legal heirs. As such, No.1 of you does not have any right of alienation of this notice schedule properties in any manner to anybody.” 13. Respondent No.1 and her husband were also shown as addressees in the notice. It is not necessary that the compromise must be through an order of the Court. There cannot be a better proof than the admission of a fact in issue by the defendant in a suit. Respondent No.1 and her husband were also shown as addressees in the notice. It is not necessary that the compromise must be through an order of the Court. There cannot be a better proof than the admission of a fact in issue by the defendant in a suit. Though the plea of the appellants was that only life interest was created in Venkata Subbamma, Ex.A2 discloses an admission on their part about the compromise through which the properties mentioned in the notice have accrued to Venkata Subbamma. Assuming that life interest alone was created in her favour, it stood enlarged by operation of Section 14 (1) of the Hindu Succession Act (for short ‘the Act’). 14. Once it emerged that Venkata Subbamma had acquired rights in the suit schedule properties initially through a compromise with her mother-in-law and thereafter, by operation of Section 14 (1) of the Act, she was entitled to exercise rights of ownership vis-à-vis the said properties. Respondent No.1 based her claim to the suit schedule properties on a Will, marked as Ex.A5, executed by Venkata Subbamma. She has examined the scribe and attestors of the Will. The appellants are not able to point out any suspicious circumstances. The trial Court and the lower appellate Court have taken the correct view of the matter. This Court does not find any substantial question of law. 15. Hence, the second appeal is dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.