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Madhya Pradesh High Court · body

2011 DIGILAW 981 (MP)

Ghanshyam v. Subhashchandra

2011-08-24

ABHAY M.NAIK

body2011
ORDER Abhay M. Naik, J. 1. This revision petition has been submitted by the tenant against the order of eviction passed by the Court of Rent Controlling Authority, Indore on 08.04.2011 in Eviction Case No. A-90 (7) 8 / 09-10. 2. Admitted facts of the case are that the revisionist is a tenant of respondent in the suit shop comprised in House No. 33 situated in Morsali Gali, Ward No. 9, Indore, on rent at the rate of Rs. 530/- per month. Respondent has been retired from the services of Municipal Corporation, Indore on 30.06.2004 as Head Clerk. Eviction of tenant has been claimed by the respondent for the bona fide need of his major son, namely, Kamlesh to start the business of jewelery. Landlord/respondent submitted an application for eviction under Section 23-A (b) of the MP Accommodation Control Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) with the allegations that he and/or Kamlesh does not have any other alternative vacant nonresidential accommodation for the purpose of business in the city of Indore. The application for eviction was opposed on the ground that Kamlesh is running a cosmetic business with his wife in shop situated in Bakhtawar Ram Nagar, Indore. It is further stated that the landlord/respondent has got vacated various other premises from time to time and has re-let them. 3. Learned Rent Controlling Authority, after recording the evidence, has held that revisionist is a tenant of the landlord/respondent in the suit shop. He has further held that the landlord/respondent bona fide needs suit shop for his son Kamlesh's business. It has also been found that there is no other alternative non-residential suitable accommodation available with the landlord or Kamlesh. Accordingly, the application for eviction stood allowed by the impugned order dated 08.04.2011; hence, this revision. 4. Only point advanced before this Court is that the landlord/respondent is a retiree from the Municipal Corporation, Indore, and therefore, he does not fall within the category of landlords specified in Section 23-J of the Act. Reliance for this purpose has been placed on the decision of this Court in the case of Mohan Das v. Deven Das [1994 (1) MLJR 259]. 5. Learned counsel appearing for the landlord/respondent has supported the impugned order. 6. Reliance for this purpose has been placed on the decision of this Court in the case of Mohan Das v. Deven Das [1994 (1) MLJR 259]. 5. Learned counsel appearing for the landlord/respondent has supported the impugned order. 6. At this juncture, I feel it appropriate to reproduce Section 23-J of the Act, which defines landlord for the purpose of Chapter III-A of the Act:- 23-J. Definition of landlord for the purposes of Chapter III- A. For the purposes of this Chapter 'landlord' means a landlord who is- (i) a retired servant of any Government including a retired member of Defence Services: or (ii) a retired servant of a company owned or controlled either by the Central or State Government; or (iii) a widow or a divorced wife; or (iv) physically handicapped person; or (v) a servant of any Government including a member of defence services who according to his service conditions, is not entitled to Government accommodation on his posting to a place where he owns a house or is entitled to such accommodation only on payment of penal rent on his posting to such a place. 7. Crucial question in this case is whether the 'landlord' falls in Clause (ii), which takes within it's sweep a retired servant of a company owned or controlled either by the Central or State Government. The case of Mohan Das (supra) was decided by a learned Single Judge of this Court who has held in paragraph 8 that Municipal Corporation employee cannot be said to be government servant and that being so, such employee will not be covered within the definition of Section 23-J of the Act. Obviously, municipal employee cannot be treated as an employee of State Government or Central Government. Question before this Court is whether the landlord in the present case, being a retiree from Municipal Corporation, Indore may be treated as retired servant of a company owned or controlled by the State Government. For this purpose, this Court is required to examine the meaning which is provided to the expression 'company' in Section 23-J (ii) of the Act. This question came up for consideration before Division Bench of this Court in the case of Ranjit Narayan Haksar v. Surendra Verma [ 1995 MPLJ 21 ]. Learned Division Bench has observed:- 11. For this purpose, this Court is required to examine the meaning which is provided to the expression 'company' in Section 23-J (ii) of the Act. This question came up for consideration before Division Bench of this Court in the case of Ranjit Narayan Haksar v. Surendra Verma [ 1995 MPLJ 21 ]. Learned Division Bench has observed:- 11. The question for consideration is which is the meaning attributed to the expression 'company' in section 23J (ii) of the Act. A brief reference to the legislative history is instructive. M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 as it originally stood did not contain any special provision for the benefit of any category of landlords. The Act was amended in 1964 introducing section 20A enabling an expeditious or special remedy to members of armed forces of the Union or member of the family of a deceased member of such forces. Section 20AA was introduced in 1981 extending the benefit to the retired Government employees and members of the family of deceased retired Government employees. Sections 20A and 20AA were deleted and Chapter III (a) was introduced without section 23-A (ii) in 1981 making the special benefit available to all categories of landlords. Section 23-J was incorporated in 1985 defining expression 'landlord' for the purpose of the chapter and thereby limiting the benefit only to such specified categories of landlords. 12. The statement of objects and reasons accompanying the amending Bill does not explain the reason for introducing clause (ii) of section 23-J of the Act. Therefore, we shall look at the scheme of the Act and the scheme underlying Chapter IIIA to find out the purpose of the amendment 13. The general provisions relating to eviction viz. section 12 onwards of the Act serves to restrict the grounds of eviction which can be invoked by a landlord in a suit in a civil Court. The purpose of Chapter IIIA is to provide expeditious remedy to certain categories of landlords on whom restrictions are imposed by section 12 of the Act. This purpose is sought to be achieved by changing the forum and substituting a right of revision to High Court for the right of appeal and second appeal which is otherwise available. The purpose of Chapter IIIA is to provide expeditious remedy to certain categories of landlords on whom restrictions are imposed by section 12 of the Act. This purpose is sought to be achieved by changing the forum and substituting a right of revision to High Court for the right of appeal and second appeal which is otherwise available. Section 23-J specifies certain categories of landlords, namely, a retired servant of any Government including a retired member of defence services, a retired servant of a company owned or controlled either by the Central or State Government, a widow or a divorced wife, physically handicapped person etcetera. It was thought that widows, divorced women and physically handicapped persons should not be driven to the necessity of going through the elaborate procedure followed in civil Courts and that more expeditious remedy should be available to them. The same view was taken in regard to other categories viz. retired government servants, retired servants of Government owned or controlled company and certain categories of the Government employees. They were or continue to be public servants instruments through which the State acts for public benefit. In the generality of such servants, transfer is an incident of service and this factor may inhibit meritorious candidates entering such services. Meritorious candidates may own buildings or they may construct buildings while in service. If they are to face the prospect of not securing possession of their building at the time of retirement or their posting in places where the buildings are situated, they may render the employment unattractive. The Legislature therefore thought it necessary to give special treatment to landlords of buildings who belong to these special categories. 14. From such legislative perspective, there could not be any discrimination between retired employees of Government owned or controlled companies, or corporation. Of course we are not called upon to decide if section 23-J (ii) if understood as being applicable only to companies incorporated under the Companies Act, 1956 will violate Article 14 of the Constitution. Nevertheless in considering the legislative intent, regard must be had to the equality clause in the Constitution in case of an ambiguity. We sought the assistance of learned counsel in finding the possible reasons for treating retired employees of companies under the Indian Companies Act and statutory corporation differently. Nevertheless in considering the legislative intent, regard must be had to the equality clause in the Constitution in case of an ambiguity. We sought the assistance of learned counsel in finding the possible reasons for treating retired employees of companies under the Indian Companies Act and statutory corporation differently. The only reason suggested at the bar is that the corporations are more in number and larger in size and have large number of employees and the legislature did not desire to extend the benefit of Chapter IIIA to such a large number of landlords to the detriment of the tenants. This reason is not sound in view of section 23- J (i) which includes the very large number of retired Government employees in the definition of landlord. There is nothing in the language or context of section 23-J (ii) indicating any intention to give a restricted meaning to the expression 'company'. The legislature did not refer to the Companies Act in section 23-J (ii) and did not specifically exclude statutory corporation. The expression 'company' has been used in its general legal sense and takes in Government owned and controlled statutory Corporations. We hold that retired employee of a Government owned or controlled statutory corporation is a landlord as defined in section 23-J (ii) of the Act. Shri S.S. Garg, learned counsel appearing for the revisionist contended that the case of Ranjit (supra) was in respect of landlord who had retired from the MP State Road Transport Corporation, whereas the case of Mohan Das (supra) is in respect of Municipal Employee. Therefore, matter may be referred to a larger bench. 8. This Court is not impressed with this contention because learned Division Bench has clearly concluded that retired employee of Government owned or controlled statutory Corporation is a landlord as defined in Section 23-J (ii) of the Act. Undoubtedly, Municipal Corporation is statutory Corporation on account of its constitution by virtue of Section 7 of the MP Municipal Corporation Act, 1956. Chapter XXXIV of the Act contains various provisions of the State Government for having control on it. Thus, it cannot be denied that the Municipal Corporation is statutory Corporation and is controlled by the State Government. Undoubtedly, Municipal Corporation is statutory Corporation on account of its constitution by virtue of Section 7 of the MP Municipal Corporation Act, 1956. Chapter XXXIV of the Act contains various provisions of the State Government for having control on it. Thus, it cannot be denied that the Municipal Corporation is statutory Corporation and is controlled by the State Government. This being so, it is held that retired employee of Municipal Corporation is a landlord as defined in Section 23-J (ii) of the Act and law laid down by the Single Bench in the case of Mohan Das (supra) stands impliedly overruled in view of the aforesaid observation of division bench. 9. In the result, I do not find any force in the civil revision, which is hereby dismissed with no order as to costs. C. c. as per rules.