Judgment : 1. The parties herein are referred to as arrayed in the suit. 2. The short point that arises for consideration in this second appeal is, “Whether a tenant, who is dispossessed from the premises, is entitled for a decree, for re-induction into possession”. 3. The 1st respondent filed O.S.No.789 of 1988 in the Court of Principal Junior Civil Judge, Rajahmundry, against the appellants and respondents 2 to 5 (defendants 2 to 6) for the relief of declaration that it is the statutory tenant, in respect of the plaint schedule property and that it be restored to possession of the leasehold premises. It was pleaded that under a lease agreement dated 01.08.1992, the suit schedule premises were given on rent of Rs.100/-, per month, by late Kanchumarthi Lakshmi Narasimha Rao, husband of defendant No.2 and father of defendants 3 to 5. A sum of Rs.2,000/- is said to have been paid as advance. It was also pleaded that in August, 1988, the plaintiff agreed to purchase the property, from defendants 2 to 5, but with an ulterior motive, the latter refused to receive rents and that necessitated sending of the rents for the months of June and July by way of demand drafts. After referring to the other developments, the plaintiff pleaded that when he left for Bombay and Surat on 13.10.1988 for purchase of goods, the defendants broke open the lock and obstructed the employees of the plaintiff from entering the shop. 4. A notice was issued by him and a reply thereto was received. He stated that apart from loosing possession forcibly, he has also sustained heavy loss, on account of the unlawful dispossession. 5. The 1st defendant filed the written statement, denying the allegations. According to him, there was no relationship of landlord and tenant, much less there was any forcible dispossession. They pleaded that the premises were vacant for a long time and that they were sold in favour of the 6th defendant, who, in turn, executed an agreement in favour of the 1st defendant, and thereafter, the property was partitioned among defendants 1 to 5, in the year 1980. The 6th defendant was said to be the lessee in the year 1988. Separate written statements were filed by defendants 2 to 4, on the one hand, and the 5th defendant, on the other hand. 6. The 6th defendant was said to be the lessee in the year 1988. Separate written statements were filed by defendants 2 to 4, on the one hand, and the 5th defendant, on the other hand. 6. The trial Court decreed the suit through its judgment, dated 22.01.1998. Aggrieved thereby, the appellants herein, defendants 1 and 7 filed A.S.No.29 of 1998 in the Court of V Additional District Judge (Fast Track Court), West Godavari. The appeal was dismissed on 10.12.2003. Hence, this second appeal. Heard learned counsel for the appellants and learned counsel for the 1st respondent. 7. The suit was filed for two-fold relief of the declaration of status of the plaintiff as lessee and for restoration of his leasehold rights, i.e. he be re-inducted into possession of the property. The trial Court framed two issues, namely, 1. Whether the lease agreement dt.1-8-82 is true and valid? 2. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to the declaration and injunction as prayed for?” 8. On behalf of the plaintiff, PWs.1 to 5 were examined and Exs.A.1 to A.19 were filed. On behalf of the defendants, DWs.1 to 4 were examined and Exs.B.1 to B.19 were filed. The suit was decreed and in A.S.No.29 of 1998 filed by the appellant, the lower Appellate Court framed the following point for its consideration: “Whether the plaintiff is entitled for declaration that he is the statutory tenant and that he is entitled to recover possession of the plaint schedule property?” and answered it in the positive. 9. The declaration prayed for by the plaintiff was that he is a statutory tenant. He did not mention the statute under which he is entitled to be declared as tenant. Assuming that he was referring to the A.P. Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1960 (for short ‘the Act’), he did not state as to how he is entitled to be inducted into possession. 10. The Act regulates the rights of the tenants, on the one hand, and the owner of the property, on the other hand, in respect of certain category of buildings, depending on their location and the extent of land. Even if it is to be assumed that the suit schedule property is covered by the provisions of the Act, the plaintiff could have claimed any rights vis-à-vis the property, if only he was in possession thereof. Even if it is to be assumed that the suit schedule property is covered by the provisions of the Act, the plaintiff could have claimed any rights vis-à-vis the property, if only he was in possession thereof. Admittedly, he was not in possession of the property. The Act does not contain any provision, which directs that a tenant covered by its provisions is entitled to be re-inducted into possession, in case he was wrongfully evicted. Unless such a provision exists, the question of the plaintiff being re-inducted into possession, does not arise. 11. Here it is necessary to take note of provisions of certain enactments, which provide for such facility. For instance, the A.P. (Telangana Area) Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1950 (for short ‘the Tenancy Act), mandates that if a protected tenant is dispossessed from the land in question, he is entitled to be put back in possession in case proceedings under Section 32 of the Tenancy Act are initiated. No such provision is contained in the Act. Therefore, the whole basis on which the suit was instituted, was untenable and there was no justification on the part of the trial Court to decree the suit or for the lower Appellate Court in dismissing the appeal. This important aspect was not taken into account. 12. Therefore, the Second Appeal is allowed by answering the substantial question of law mentioned above, viz., “Whether in the absence of any specific provision of law, a plaintiff in a suit can seek the relief of re-induction into possession of a property, as regards which, he has no title?”, in the negative. When the relief of even perpetual injunction cannot be granted against a true owner, the question of passing a decree to dispossess him, does not arise. The decree passed by the trial Court and the one passed by the lower Appellate Court upholding the decree of the trial Court, are set aside. 13. There shall be no order as to costs.