Judgment :- 1. Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and the learned counsel for the respondent regarding maintainability of the application. 2. The present petitioner had earlier approached this Court by way of Criminal Revision Petition No.2084/2010. The same was dismissed on merits by an order of this Court dated 18.8.2010. The same was carried by way of a Special Leave Petition before the Apex Court. The Apex Court has disposed of the Special Leave Petition, as withdrawn in Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No.561/2011 dated 31.1.2011 in the following terms. “The Special Leave Petition is dismissed as withdrawn. It is needless to observe that the petitioner is entitled to avail such remedy as may be available to him in law.” 3. The present application is filed pursuant to the said order. It is sought to be contended that by virtue of the above order the petitioner is entitled to raise an additional ground that the trail Court having taken exception to the non production of the envelope which contained the notice issued to the accused though there was an endorsement by the postal authorities to the effect that it was duly served on the accused and that the same not having been produced did not weaken the case of the complainant, since there is a presumption under Section 27 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, that notice was duly served on the respondent by virtue of the endorsement issued by the postal authorities. This in addition to the other grounds which were already raised in the earlier petition, are sought to be canvassed. 4. The learned counsel for the respondent has raised strong objection to the maintainability of the present application. The learned counsel would submit that this Court having dismissed the earlier petition, by the present petitioner, there is a bar under Section 362 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as Cr.P.C., for brevity) to entertain the present application on whatever grounds, since it would tantamount to a review of the earlier order of this Court. In this regard he would place reliance on a three Judge bench judgment of the Apex Court in the case of State of Kerala vs. M.M.Manikantan Nair, AIR 2001 Supreme Court 2147. 5. In this regard he would place reliance on a three Judge bench judgment of the Apex Court in the case of State of Kerala vs. M.M.Manikantan Nair, AIR 2001 Supreme Court 2147. 5. The learned counsel for the petitioner would insist that by virtue of the Supreme Court having provided that the petitioner may avail of such remedy available to him, the only remedy available is to prefer the present application and therefore he would pray that the present application be considered. 6. However, from a reading of Section 362 of the Cr.P.C., which indicates that, save as provided by the Cr.P.C., or any other law for the time being in force, when once a Court has signed its judgment and final order, disposing of a case, it shall not alter or review the same, except to correct a clerical or arithmetical error. In the present case on hand there is no provision in the Cr.P.C. by which this application could be entertained in spite of the earlier petition of the present petitioner being dismissed and that having attained finality. There is no other law which provides for such entertainment of the present application. The mere observation of the Apex Court that the petitioner may avail of such remedy that may be available to him is not referable either to the provisions of Cr.P.C., or to any other law. Therefore the interpretation of the scope of Section 362 of the Cr.P.C. as laid down in Manikanta Nair’s case supra is clear and covers this case 0on all fours. 7. The facts of that case were that the respondent therein had been accused along with another for offences punishable under Sections 120-B, 409,468,471 and 477 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 and Section 13(1)(c) read with Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. The allegation was that while he was working as Secretary of a Gram Panchayat along with the other accused, who was the Head Clerk of the Panchayat, he had committed criminal conspiracy to misappropriate the funds of the Panchayat which was earmarked for construction of waiting sheds. Tribal training centres etc.. The respondent was initially placed under suspension and subsequently allowed to retire from service on attaining the age of superannuation. Tribal training centres etc.. The respondent was initially placed under suspension and subsequently allowed to retire from service on attaining the age of superannuation. A Criminal Petition was filed under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. before the High Court of Kerala seeking quashing of the criminal proceedings, on the ground that there was no sanction to prosecute him as required under Section 122 of the Kerala Panchayat Act. That petition was dismissed by a learned single Judge of the High Court on the ground that there was no proper sanction to prosecute the respondent and a prima facie case was made out. Subsequently, a miscellaneous petition was filed in the above criminal case by the respondent for clarification of the said order. The same learned Judge allowed the same, holding that there was no proper sanction from the competent authority and therefore no cognizance could be taken. The State being aggrieved had approached the Apex Court. The Apex Court held as follows: “6.) The code of Criminal Procedure does not authorise the High Court to review its judgment or order passed either in exercise of its appellate, revisional or original jurisdiction. Section 362 of the Code prohibits the Court after it has signed its judgment or final order disposing a case from altering or reviewing the said judgment or order except to correct a clerical or arithmetical error. This prohibition is complete and no criminal Court can review its own judgment or order after it is signed. By the first order dated 31.5.2000, the High Court rejected the prayer of the respondent for quashing the criminal proceeding. This order attained its finality. By the impugned order, the High Court reversed its earlier order and quashed the criminal proceeding for want of proper sanction. By no stretch of imagination it can be said that by the impugned order the High Court only corrected any clerical or arithmetical error. In fact the impugned order is an order of review, as the earlier order was reversed, which could not have been done as there is no such provision under the Code of Criminal Procedure, but there is an interdict against it. In fact the impugned order is an order of review, as the earlier order was reversed, which could not have been done as there is no such provision under the Code of Criminal Procedure, but there is an interdict against it. 7.) This Court in Hari Singh Mann v. Harbhajan Singh Bajwa, (2001) 1 SCC 169 : (2000 AIR SCW 3848: AIR 2001 SC 43 :2001 Cri.LJ 128), held that Section 362 of the Criminal Procedure Code mandates that no Court, when it has signed its judgment or final order disposing of a case shall alter or review the same except to correct a clerical or an arithmetical error and that this section is based on an acknowledged principle of law that once a matter is finally disposed of by a Court, the said Court in the absence of a specific statutory provision becomes functus officio and disentitled to entertain a fresh prayer for the same relief unless the former order of final disposal is set aside by the Court of competent jurisdiction.” 8. In the light of the above authoritative ruling there is no hesitation in holding that the present application is not maintainable and is accordingly rejected.