JUDGMENT 1. - The petitioner is aggrieved by the order dated 26-10-2010, passed by Juvenile Justice Board, Kota, whereby the learned Board has denied the benefit of bail to the petitioner. The petitioner is also aggrieved by the order dated 18-11-2010, passed by Special Judge, Women Atrocities & Dowry Cases, Kota, whereby the learned Judge had upheld the order dated 26-10-2010.The brief facts of the case are that FIR No.505/2010 was registered at Police Station Mahaveer Nagar, Kota, for the offences under Sections 452, 323, 341, 147, 376 and 120B IPC. The petitioner was arrested. On arrest, the petitioner moved bail application under Section 12 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000 ('the Act' for short). Vide order dated 26-10-2010, the bail application was dismissed. The petitioner preferred appeal under section 52 of the Act, before the learned Special Judge, Women Atrocities & Dowry Cases, Kota. The learned Special Judge, also dismissed the appeal and confirmed the order dated 18-11-2010. Hence, this petition. 2. Mr. Abdul Rahim Khan, the learned counsel for the petitioner, has vehemently contended that Section 12 of the Act is mandatory in its nature, therefore, the petitioner is entitled to be released on bail. 3. On the other hand, learned Public Prosecutor has strenuously contended that Section 12 of the Act is not mandatory in its nature, but is merely directory. Secondly, that the petitioner is an accused for having committed an offence under Section 376 IPC. If the allegations levelled against the petitioner, and other co-accused are taken on their face value, the case falls under Section 376 (2) (g) IPC. Thirdly, in case of gang-rape, if the rapist were to be released by this court, it would be travesty of justice. Hence, the benefit of bail should not be granted to the petitioner. 4. Heard learned counsel for the parties,and perused the impugned orders. 5. Section 12 of the Act, is as under:- 12. Thirdly, in case of gang-rape, if the rapist were to be released by this court, it would be travesty of justice. Hence, the benefit of bail should not be granted to the petitioner. 4. Heard learned counsel for the parties,and perused the impugned orders. 5. Section 12 of the Act, is as under:- 12. Bail of juvenile.- (1) When any person accused of a bailable or non-bailable offence, and apparently a juvenile, is arrested or detained or appears or is brought before a Board, such person shall, notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974) or in any other law for the time being in force, be released on bail with or without surety or placed under the supervision of a Probation Officer or under the care of any fit institution or fit person but he shall not be so released if there appear reasonable grounds for believing that the release is likely to bring him into association with any known or expose him to moral, physical or psychological danger or that his release would defeat the ends of justice. (2) When such person having been arrested is not released on bail under sub-section (1) by the officer incharge of the police station, such officer shall cause him to be kept only in an observation home in the prescribed manner until he can be brought before a Board. (3) When such person is not released on bail under sub-section (1) by the Board it shall, instead of committing him prison, make an order sending him to an observation home or a place of safety for such period during the pendency of the inquiry regarding him as may be specified in the order. A bare perusal of the Section clearly shows that the Section clearly uses the words "but he shall not be released". These words clearly indicate that Parliament never meant Section 12 to be mandatory in nature. In fact, Parliament has carved out three circumstances, in which grant of bail can be denied to a juvenile. Therefore, the contention that the Section is mandatory in nature, is highly misplaced. 6. The words "would defeat the ends of justice" need to be interpreted. The "ends of justice" is not one way street only to be looked at from the point of the accused. Therefore, the contention that the Section is mandatory in nature, is highly misplaced. 6. The words "would defeat the ends of justice" need to be interpreted. The "ends of justice" is not one way street only to be looked at from the point of the accused. "Justice" would also need to be interpreted from the point of view of the victim as well. The prosecutrix who alleges that she has been subjected to gang-rape, would be shocked and dismayed on knowing that the alleged rapist have been granted bail. Such a grant of bail to accused would not only shake her psychologically, but may also jeopardise her physical safety. Moreover, in case bail were to be granted in a case of gangrape, even the conscience of the Society would be shaken at its very foundation. After all, the Society expects that it would not be exposed to the peril of the rapist who go scott free. Therefore, considering the ends of justice of the victim, this Court is not inclined to grant bail to the petitioner. 7. For the reasons, mentioned above, this court does not find any perversity or illegality in the impugned orders. The revision petition, being devoid of merit, stands dismissed.Revision dismissed *******