JUDGMENT : V.G. Sabhahit, J. Heard on I.A. No. I/06. 2. In view of the averments made in the application we hold that sufficient cause is made out for condonation of delay of three days in filing this appeal. Accordingly, the delay is condoned. I.A. No. I/06 is allowed. 3. This appeal it filed by the respondents in W.P. Nos. 46277 and 52330/03 being aggrieved by the order dated 19.8.2005 passed in W.P. Nos. 46277 and 52330/03 wherein the learned Single Judge of this Court has quashed the orders passed by the appellants herein as per Annexures-"F, G, H end J" in W.P. No. 46277/03 and Annexures--"E and F" in W.P. No. 52330/03 under Sections 7-Q end 14-B of the Employees Provident Fund and Miscellaneous Provisions act, 1952 (hereinafter referred to as "EPF" Act). 4. The material facts leading to the filing of this appeal are as follows:-- The respondent herein is a Textile Spinning Mills having employed 146 permanent workmen and in the business for the last 37 years. Due to recession in the texttile industry, the respondent faced financial crises and was unable to clear dues towards the ESI and PF contribution and the amounts payable to the creditors. the loss of the company got accumulated to the tune of Rs. 2,02,67,767,00 as on 31.3.2003 and hence, they were constrained to approach the Board for Industrial and Financial Reconstruction (hereinafter referred to as 'BIFR'). The said application was registered and the respondent was declared as a sick industry under the provisions of Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985 (for short referred to as "SICA Act"). The respondent submitted a rehabilitation scheme. In the schema submitted, the respondent. accepted the employer's dues payable under the provisions of the EPF Act for the period from May 2001 to May 2003 in a sum of Rs. 16,94,478.00. The Regional Provident Fund Commissioner-II was also a party before the BIFR and to the order, agreed to receive the above aid amount by way of 60 installments payable for five years at the rate of 8% interest per annum. It is submitted by the learned counsel appearing for the parties that the respondent has paid the PF dues amounting to Rs. It is submitted by the learned counsel appearing for the parties that the respondent has paid the PF dues amounting to Rs. 16,94,478.00 in 60 installments spread over a period of five years at the rate of 8% interest per annum However, during the pendency of the implementation of the scheme, the appellants herein proceeded to pass orders under Sections 7-Q end 14-B of the EPF Act at per Annexures-"E and F" claiming interest and penal damages for belated payments of PF dues. As per Annexure-"E" demand was made to the tune of Rs. 3,84,992.00 and the respondent was intimated that the said amount has to be paid within 15 days from the date of receipt of the order and any failure in remittance of the interest within the stipulated period will entail the respondent Sable for penal action as per the provisions of the EPF Act and the schemes framed there under for recovery of damaged. As per Annexure-"F", which is the order dated 4.11.2003, the respondent has been levied the penal damages and has been directed to pay a sum of Rs. 11,70,993.00 being damages for belated payments and the respondent was intimated to pay the said amount under the head "Penal Damages" within 15 days from the date of receipt of the said order failing which action will be taken to recover the same u/s 8B to 8G of the EPF Act without further notice. Being aggrieved by the said orders passed by the appellants herein under Sections 7Q and 14B of the EPF act, the respondent filed writ petitions contending that the writ petitioner had already approached the BIFR under SICA Act and a scheme has been formulated wherein the PP Commissioner had agreed to receive the PF dues of Rs. 16,94,478.00 in 60 installments spread over a period of five years at the rate of 8% interest per annum When once the BIFR has framed the rehabilitation scheme, which has been accepted by the P.F. Commissioner and has not made any grievance regarding the amount to be paid to the P.F. Commissioner in a sum of Rs. 16,94,478.00 in 60 installments spread over a period of five years at the rate of 8% interest per annum, no orders could be passed under Sections 7Q and 14B of the EPF Act, which is punitive in nature that too without obtaining consent of the BIFR. 16,94,478.00 in 60 installments spread over a period of five years at the rate of 8% interest per annum, no orders could be passed under Sections 7Q and 14B of the EPF Act, which is punitive in nature that too without obtaining consent of the BIFR. The appellants herein resisted the writ petitions. The learned Single Judge having heard the arguments of the learned counsel for the parties and scrutinising the material an record and following the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in Ralliwolf Limited Vs. The Regional Provident Fund Commissioner-I, for Maharashtra and Goa and Others, (2001) 1 BOMLR 235 relied upon by the learned counsel for the respondent and having regard to the nature of the order that is passed in the present case has held that the appellants had no jurisdiction to pass the orders under Sections 7Q and 14B of the EPF Act without obtaining the permission of the BIFR and the orders are punitive in nature and therefore, the orders are unsustainable and accordingly quashed the orders and allowed the writ petitions by order dated 19.8.2005. Being aggrieved by the order of the learned Single Judge in dismissing the writ petitions, this appeal is filed by the respondent in the writ petition. 5. Heard the learned counsel for the appellants and the respondent. 6. The learned counsel appearing for the appellants submitted that though the appellants have accepted the scheme, which has been formulated and have agreed to receive the PF due in a sum of Rs. 16,94,476.00 in 60 installments spread over a period of five years at the rate of 8% interest per annum, and though the said amount has been paid, since there is delay in remittance of the said amount interest and penal damages have been imposed under Sections 7Q and 14B of the EPF Act. The impugned orders at Annexures-"E and F" cannot be said to be punitive in nature as no coercive steps are taken by merely issuing the said orders. Only when coercive steps torn sought to be taken, the provisions of Section 22(1) of the SICA Act would apply and that the consent of the BIFR would be taken while executing the order. Only when coercive steps torn sought to be taken, the provisions of Section 22(1) of the SICA Act would apply and that the consent of the BIFR would be taken while executing the order. He further submitted that the order, as it is, as per Annexures-"E and F" does not attract the provisions of Section 22(1) of the SICA Act and therefore, the learned Single Judge was not justified in quashing the orders passed by the appellants, which were impugned in the writ petitions. 7. The learned counsel for the respondent has argued in support of the order passed by the learned Single Judge and having taken us through the order passed by the learned Single Judge submits that the orders ore punitive in nature. It is not open to the appellants to contend that orders are not punitive in nature and that the consent of the BIFR is not taken before passing the orders is not in dispute. When once the scheme hoe been formulated and the same has been supervised by the BIFR the appellants herein have no jurisdiction to pass the orders as per Annexure-"F and F" under Sections 7Q and 14B of the EPF Act, which is punitive in nature. Apart from the judgments relied upon by the learned Single Judge for passing the impugned order in favour of the respondent, he has also relied upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Jay Engineering Works Ltd. Vs. Industry Facilitation Council and Another, AIR 2006 SC 3252 wherein the Supreme Court has held that when once the Scheme has been formulated and the some is being implemented by the BIFR, the authorities would be ceased of the matter. The relevant Paragraphs 33 to 35 ere extracted hereunder:- 33. In NGEF Ltd. Vs. Chandra Developers Pvt. Ltd. and Another, (2005) 8 SCC 219 , interpreting sub-section(4) of Section 20 of SICA, it was hold: It is difficult to accept the appearing on behalf of the respondents that both the Company Court and BIFR exercise concurrent jurisdiction. If such a construction is upheld, there shall be chaos and confusion. A company declared to be sick in terms of the provisions of SIC, continual to be sick unless it is directed to be wound up. Till the company remains a sick company having regard to the provisions of Sub-Section (4) of Section 20. If such a construction is upheld, there shall be chaos and confusion. A company declared to be sick in terms of the provisions of SIC, continual to be sick unless it is directed to be wound up. Till the company remains a sick company having regard to the provisions of Sub-Section (4) of Section 20. BIFR alone shall have jurisdiction as regards sale of its assets till an order of winding up is passed by a Company Court. 34. It was farther held: Section 32 of SICA contains a non-obstante clause stating that provisions thereof shall prevail notwithstanding anything inconsistent with the provisions of the said Act and of any rules or schemes made there under contained in any other law for the time being in force. It would bear repetition to state that in the ordinary course although the Company Judge may have the jurisdiction to pass an interim order in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction or otherwise directing an applicant by the Company sought to be wound up, but keeping in view the express provisions contained in Sub-Section(4) of Section 20 of SICA such a power, in our opinion, in the Company Judge is not available.(See BPL Ltd.) We may, however, observe that the opinion of the Division Bench in BPL Limited to the effect that the winding-up proceeding in relation to a matter arising out of the recommendations of BIFR shall commence only on passing of an older of winding up of the Company may not be correct. It may be true that no formal application is required to be filed for initiating a proceedings u/s 433 of the Companiens Act as the recommendations therefore are made by BIFR or AAIFR, as the owe may be, and, thus, the date on which such recommendations are made, the Company Judge applies its mind to initiate a proceeding relying on or on the basis thereof, the proceeding for winding up would be deemed to have been started: but there cannot be any doubt whatsoever that having regard to the phraseology used in Section 20 of SICA that BIFR is the authority proprio vigore which continues to remain as custodian of the assests of the Company till a winding-up order is passed by the High Court. 35. In ICICI Bank Ltd. Vs. 35. In ICICI Bank Ltd. Vs. Sidco Leathers Ltd. and Others, AIR 2006 SC 2088 the law is stated in the following terms: The non obstante nature of a provision although may be of wide amplitude, the interpretative process thereof must be kept confined to the legislative policy. Only because the dues of the workmen and the debt due to the secured creditors are treated pari passu with each other, the same by itself, in our considered view, would not lead to the conclusion that the concept of inter se priorities amongst the secured creditors had thereby been intended to be given a total go-by. A non obstante clause must be given effect to, to the extent the Parliament intended and not beyond the same. 8. The learned, counsel for the appellant has relied upon the decision of the Madras High Court in Essorps Mills Limited vs. Central Provident Fund Commissioner and others (2001 II ILJ 24) in support of his contention that in view of statutory remedy of appeal being available, the writ petition is not maintainable. 9. We have given careful consideration to the arguments advanced by the learned counsel appearing for the parties and scrutinized the material on record in the light of the principles laid down in the decisions relied upon by the learned counsel for the respondent. 10. The material on record would clearly show that admittedly, the respondent herein, has approached the BIFR since the company was in financial difficulties and was unable to pay the dues to the creditors and the is also not in dispute that a Scheme has been formulated, a copy of which has been produced in the writ petition as per Annexure-"C" dated 7.7.2003 wherein the appellants who were also parties to the proceedings before the BIFR have agreed to receive the P.F. dues amounting to 16.94 lakhs in 60 monthly installments spread over a period of five years at 8% interest. The said scheme has been accepted and is not appealed to by the appellants herein. The said scheme has been accepted and is not appealed to by the appellants herein. Section 22(1) of the SICA Act states that no proceedings for winding up of the industrial company or for execution, distress of the like against any of the properties of the industrial company or for the appointment of a receiver in respect thereof (and no suit for the recovery of money or for the enforcement of any security against the industrial company or of any guarantee in respect of any loans or of any guarantee in respect of any loans or advance granted to the industrial company shall He or be proceeded with further, except with the consent of the Board or, as the case may be, the Appellate Authority. The fact that appellants have not obtained consent of the BIFR before passing the orders at Annexures-"E and F" is not disputed. However, it is contended by the learned counsel appearing for the appellants that Section 22(1) has no application and the order passed, as it is, is only an order calculating the interest and penal damages and no punitive action is taken and that consent would be taken at the appropriate stage for executing the order. It to not possible to accept the contention of the learned counsel for the appellants that the orders at Annexures-"E and F" are not punitive in nature as the said coders clearly commands that the writ petitioner should pay interest and penal damages as per the demand at Annexures "E and F" failing which steps would be taken for recovery of the amounts without further nonce under Sections 8B to 8G of EPF Act Section 8B to 80 of the EPF Act deals with recovery of dues towards PF Contribution including power to sell the property belonging to the company and the impugned orders at Annexures-"E and F" are issued stating that without further notice, such coercive steps would be taken. The orders do not spell out that the orders are only for determination of interest and penal damages and that it will not be executed without the consent of the BIFR. Therefore, the contention of the learned counsel appearing for the appellants that the orders at Annexures-"E and F" are not punitive in nature cannot be accepted. The orders do not spell out that the orders are only for determination of interest and penal damages and that it will not be executed without the consent of the BIFR. Therefore, the contention of the learned counsel appearing for the appellants that the orders at Annexures-"E and F" are not punitive in nature cannot be accepted. As rightly held by the learned Single Judge when once it is held that Annexures-"E and F" are hold to be punitive in nature, the provisions of Section 22(1) of the SICA Act gets attracted and as admittedly no consent is obtained the orders cannot be sustained and are liable to be quashed. There is no merit in the contention of the teamed counsel for the appellants that the respondent-writ petitioner has alternative remedy of filing appeal before BIFR for having levied interest and penal damages. Since the orders passed at Annexures-"E and F" are wholly without jurisdiction, the learned Single Judge has rightly held that the respondent-writ petitioner cannot be relegated to the appellate Authority. Accordingly, we hold that the appeal is devoid of merits as the order passed by the learned Single Judge does not suffer from any error or illegality so as to call for interference in this infra-Court appeal and pass the following:- The Appeal is dismissed. However, the dismissal of this appeal shall not preclude the appellants from taking action in accordance with law.