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2011 DIGILAW 995 (AP)

P. Osuramma v. P. Ramachandra

2011-11-14

L.NARASIMHA REDDY

body2011
Judgment : On 16-05-1997, the husband of the appellant boarded a van bearing No. AP 02 T 5850, owned by the 1st respondent, insured with the 2nd respondent, together with three bags of rice and three bags of cement at Anantapur to go to Marur village. A fare of Rs.50/- for each bag is said to have been paid. The vehicle turned turtle near Chinna Vanka village. The husband of the appellant received serious injuries and was shifted to a hospital at Anantapur and after 7 days, he was shifted to Hosmat Hospital, Bangalore for expert treatment. He died on 02-06-1997 while undergoing treatment. The appellant filed O.P. No.97 of 1998 before the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal – cum Additional District Judge, Anantapur, claiming a sum of Rs.1,30,000/- as compensation. It was pleaded that the deceased was aged 55 years at the time of his death and that he was earning Rs.3,000/- per month. The 1st respondent remained ex parte and the 2nd respondent alone contested the matter. The 2nd respondent contended that the deceased was traveling in a goods vehicle. Through its order, dated 28-11-2004, the Tribunal awarded an amount of Rs.1,11,400/-towards compensation with interest at 9% per annum against the 1st respondent alone. 2. The learned counsel for the appellant submits that the evidence on record clearly discloses that the deceased was travelling along with three bags of rice and three bags of cement and the said items deserved to be treated as goods and not luggage. He contends that the Tribunal proceeded on the assumption that the rice and cement also needs to be treated as luggage and thereby exonerated the 2nd respondent. Learned counsel submits that the correct multiplier was not applied. 3. Learned counsel for the 2nd respondent, on the other hand, submits that there was no proof that the deceased was travelling with any goods, and assuming that the load of three bags of rice and three bags of cement was owned by him, that does not answer the description of ‘goods’. Learned counsel further submits that the Tribunal has discussed the matter at length, with reference to the decided cases, and no interference is warranted. 4. On behalf of the appellant, PWs.1 and 2 were examined and Exs.A-1 to A-4 were filed. On behalf of the 2nd respondent, RW-1 was examined and the Insurance policy was marked as Ex.B-1. Learned counsel further submits that the Tribunal has discussed the matter at length, with reference to the decided cases, and no interference is warranted. 4. On behalf of the appellant, PWs.1 and 2 were examined and Exs.A-1 to A-4 were filed. On behalf of the 2nd respondent, RW-1 was examined and the Insurance policy was marked as Ex.B-1. The fact that the accident occurred on account of the rashness and negligence on the part of the driver of the van, and that the deceased died out of the injuries received therein, is not in dispute. The finding recorded by the Tribunal in that regard is not challenged by the 2nd respondent. The dispute is about the quantum of compensation and the liability, or otherwise of the 2nd respondent, to pay the compensation. 5. So far as the quantum is concerned, the Tribunal arrived at a proper conclusion as to the loss of dependency of the appellant to the extent of 24,000/- per year, after deducting 1/3rd of the income of the deceased. Multiplier 4.27 was applied on the basis of the judgment of this Court in Bhagawan Das v. Mohd. Arif ( 1987 (2) ALT 137 ). In the recent past, the Parliament added Second Schedule to the Motor Vehicles Act and according to that, the multiplier for a person aged 55 years, is 11. There is no reason why the multiplier be not applied. The compensation, which the appellant would be entitled to if the said multiplier is applied, would far exceeded the amount claimed by her. Therefore, it is held that the appellant is entitled for the amount claimed by her, but with interest at 7% p.a. 6. Now it needs to be seen as to whether there was obligation on the part of the 2nd respondent to pay the compensation. The specific case of the appellant was that the deceased was travelling with three bags of rice and three bags of cement. That fact was substantiated with the evidence of PW-2, who too was carrying similar items along with him in the same vehicle. The Tribunal proceeded on the assumption that even if the deceased was travelling with the material referred to above, that would constitute luggage but not goods. 7. That fact was substantiated with the evidence of PW-2, who too was carrying similar items along with him in the same vehicle. The Tribunal proceeded on the assumption that even if the deceased was travelling with the material referred to above, that would constitute luggage but not goods. 7. The expression of word ‘goods’ is defined under Section 2 (13) of the Motor Vehicles Act as under: “2 (13) "goods" includes live-stock, and anything (other than equipment ordinarily used with the vehicle) carried by a vehicle except living persons, but does not include luggage or personal effects carried in a motor car or in a trailer attached to a motor car or the personal luggage of passengers travelling in the vehicle” 9. The definition is partly inclusive and partly exclusive. It takes in its fold, but excludes substances like live-stock or anything carried in a vehicle, luggage or personal effects carried in a motor vehicle. 3. 10. The expression ‘luggage’ or ‘personal effects’ are not defined anywhere in the Act. It is not at all difficult to differentiate the luggage from ‘goods’. In the Chambers Dictionary ‘chattel’ and ‘goods’ are treated as synonymous with each other and their meaning is furnished as under: “Any kind of property which is not freehold, distinguished further into chattel-real and chattels-personal, the latter being personal moveables (plate, furniture, etc), the former including leasehold interests.—chattel house (in the West Indies) a movable wooden house; chattel mortgage (N Am) a mortgage on moveable personal property; goods and chattels all personal moveable possessions [OFr chattel, from LL captale, from L capital, etc, property, goods].” 10. ‘Luggage’, on the other hand, is explained in the same dictionary as the trunks, suitcases and other baggage of a traveller. The emphasis in the context of describing ‘luggage’ is on the utility in the course of travel. These are articles or substances that are essential for a person, when he is on the travel. They may include the clothes or the other items such as soaps and limited quantity of eatables and certain materials of daily utility. ‘Goods’, on the other hand, have no relevance for the use by a person, while traveling. The only purpose of carrying them in a vehicle is to transport or shift them from one place to another. Once certain articles do not constitute luggage, they need to be treated as goods irrespective of the quantity. ‘Goods’, on the other hand, have no relevance for the use by a person, while traveling. The only purpose of carrying them in a vehicle is to transport or shift them from one place to another. Once certain articles do not constitute luggage, they need to be treated as goods irrespective of the quantity. Rice and Cement can not be treated as luggage since they are not used or utilized by a person in the course of his travelling. 11. The Tribunal relied upon the judgment of this Court in Cheekati Nageswar Rao v. G. Rama Rao and another ( 2004 (5) ALD 395 ). A perusal of the said judgment discloses that the observations were made mostly on account of there not being proper evidence on the point of controversy. However, certain observations were made without any reference to the decided cases or relevant provisions of law, relating to the facts of the case. 12. The evidence of PW-1 is clear to the effect that the deceased was traveling with rice and cement. Once, those items cannot be treated as luggage, the inescapable conclusion is that they are goods. Since they were being carried in a vehicle classified as a Goods vehicle, the 2nd respondent is liable to pay the compensation. 13. Therefore, the appeal is allowed directing that: (a) The appellant shall be entitled to be paid compensation of Rs.1,30,000/- with interest at 7% per annum; and (b) That the respondents 1 and 2 shall be jointly and severally liable to pay the compensation.