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Jharkhand High Court · body

2011 DIGILAW 995 (JHR)

Manju Singh @ Baby v. Shanti Devi

2011-11-14

R.R.PRASAD

body2011
Judgment 1. The sole plaintiff-Kedar Nath Sahu filed a suit for eviction of the defendant-Jagdish Singh from a suit premises being building/structure and the land appertaining to Khata No. 74, Plot Nos. 137 and 138 corresponding to Holding No. 24/A of Ward No. 11- B situated at Madhukam, P.S.–Sukhdeonagar, District– Ranchi on the ground of bona fide requirement of the suit premises for setting up business for two son-in-laws and also on the ground of sub-letting it to different persons. Thus, said suit for eviction was filed under Section 11(i) (c) as well as under Section 11(i) (a) of the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act (for short the Act).Subsequently, an amendment in the plaint was brought on 3.2.1989, whereby certain facts concerning bona fide requirement were added. When the written statement was filed on behalf of the defendant, another amendment was brought on 7.12.1990, whereby one more ground available for eviction under Section 11(i) (d) of the Act was pleaded, whereby eviction was sought on the ground of default in making payment of rent from October, 1986 to January, 1987. Consequently, decree for arrears of rent for the aforesaid period was also sought to be passed. Again on 15.12.1992, another amendment was bought, whereby eviction was sought under the general law on the basis of title over the suit premises and thereby the value of the suit was assessed at Rs. 20,000/- and the Ad valorem Court Fee was paid. 2. The case of the defendant made out in the written statement as also in the additional written statement is that there has been no relationship of landlord and tenant between the defendant and the plaintiff and that the plaintiff does not have any title or ownership over the suit premises. 20,000/- and the Ad valorem Court Fee was paid. 2. The case of the defendant made out in the written statement as also in the additional written statement is that there has been no relationship of landlord and tenant between the defendant and the plaintiff and that the plaintiff does not have any title or ownership over the suit premises. Further case is that the suit land was Parti Low land having ditches which was filled up and buildings/structures were made over the land by the defendant and got the water and electric connection and then started an industry in the name and style as “Jagdish Engineering Works” over which the defendant is in continuous uninterrupted possession since 1964 in assertion of his own right without any let, hindrance, claim or demand by or from the plaintiffs or any other persons and in this manner, the defendant has perfected his title by remaining in possession openly and adversely for more than the statutory period to the knowledge of all concerns including the plaintiff. 3. The number of issues were framed including the issue of relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties as well as the issue relating to right, title and interest of the plaintiff over the suit premises as also the issue relating to adverse possession of the defendant over the suit premises. The plaintiff as well as the defendant adduced oral as well as documentary evidences in support of their cases. The plaintiff did adduce in evidence registered deed of sale (Ext. 1) under which one Mostt. Sahidan had conveyed right, title and interest of the land bearing Plot No. 136 to one Laxmi Narain Sahu, brother of the plaintiff. The registered deed (Ext. 1/b) was also adduced in evidence under which Ex-landlord had made settlement of the land bearing Plot No. 137 in favour of said Laxmi Narain Sahu. Certified copy of the deed of partition (Ext. 1/a), whereby suit land, bearing Plot Nos. 136 and 137 given to share of the plaintiff, was also adduced in evidence. That apart, other documents such as Rent Receipts (Ext. 2–2/a) Municipal Tax Receipts (Ext. 5–5/b) were also adduced. Similarly, the defendant also adduced documentary as well as oral evidences for proving the case of adverse possession. In course of time, the sole plaintiff as also the defendant died and hence, their heirs and legal representatives were substituted. 4. That apart, other documents such as Rent Receipts (Ext. 2–2/a) Municipal Tax Receipts (Ext. 5–5/b) were also adduced. Similarly, the defendant also adduced documentary as well as oral evidences for proving the case of adverse possession. In course of time, the sole plaintiff as also the defendant died and hence, their heirs and legal representatives were substituted. 4. The trial court after taking into account the evidences brought on record did find that the plaintiffs failed to prove the relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties and that the plaintiffs even failed to prove their title over the land, in question, whereas the defendant succeeded in proving that he is coming in continuance uninterrupted possession in assertion of his rights since the year 1964 and thus has acquired indefeasible title thereto and has perfected it by remaining in possession openly and adversely to the knowledge of all concerns including the plaintiffs. While coming to such conclusion, it was held that though the plaintiffs on the basis of sale deed (Ext. 1) have claimed title over the land but they have failed to produce Hukumnama by which Mostt. Sahidan had acquired right, title and interest over the suit of Plot No. 136 who subsequently is said to have transferred the land under Ext. 1 to Laxmi Narain Sahu, brother of the original plaintiff-Kedar Nath Sahu, and that Ext.-1/b, under which it was claimed that the Ex-landlord had made settlement of Plot No. 137 in favour of the original plaintiff’s brother, does not bear the signature of the settlee and thereby the said deed never conferred any title to the settlee and that Ext.-1/a, certified copy of the deed of partition, under which it was claimed that the suit plots came to the share of the original plaintiff, had never been proved legally and as such, it is not worth consideration. Thus, the suit was dismissed. 5. Being aggrieved with the judgment and decree, the plaintiffs– respondents preferred an appeal. 6. Thus, the suit was dismissed. 5. Being aggrieved with the judgment and decree, the plaintiffs– respondents preferred an appeal. 6. While the matter was pending for hearing, an amendment was brought on 23.3.1998, whereby it was pleaded that the plaintiffs have acquired through registered deed of settlement dated 1.9.1947, registered deed of sale dated 23.3.1947 and registered deed of partition dated 2.2.1957 and thereby relief was sought that a decree for recovery of possession be passed with respect to the suit property and that the plaintiffs be put into Khas possession thereto after dispossessing the defendant there from. 7. The Appellate Court formulated the following points for consideration:- (i) Whether the plaintiffs (appellants) have been able to prove their title over the suit premises? (ii) Whether the defendant has been able to prove acquisition of title of suit premises by adverse possession? (iii) Whether the defendant is a tenant of the plaintiffs or trespasser in the suit premises? (iv) Whether the judgment and decree under appeal legally requires any interference by the first appellate court? (v) Whether the appellants are entitled to get any relief as prayed for? 8. The Appellate Court reversed the finding given by the trial court that the plaintiffs failed to establish the right, title and interest over the suit land by holding that Ext.-1, under which Mostt. Sahidan has transferred the land bearing Plot No. 136 to the brother of the original plaintiff, is a genuine document and that it had never been denied that the Ex-landlord had not settled Suit Plot No. 136 through Hukumnama in favour of Mostt. Sahidan and as such, non-production of Hukumnama hardly weakens the case of the plaintiffs and that Ext.1/b, under which Ex-landlord had settled the land bearing Plot No.137 to the brother of the plaintiffs, is also a genuine document which though does not bear the signature of the settlee but the content of it shows that it was bilateral endeavour of both the parties by which the deed of settlement (Ext.-1/b) came into existence and as such, absence of signature of settlee hardly matters and it does not affect the factum of transfer of land from the transferor to transferee. It was also held that though the deed of partition (Ext. It was also held that though the deed of partition (Ext. 1/a) was not proved in accordance with law but the oral and documentary evidences are there which go to prove that the land in question had come to the share of the plaintiff in partition. Thus, it was held that the plaintiffs do have right, title and interest over the suit land. At the same time, the court after taking into account the oral as well as documentary evidences did hold that the defendants have failed to prove that their possession over the suit premises ever became hostile against the plaintiffs i.e. against the true owners of the suit premises. However, it was held that the plaintiffs have failed to prove that there was relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties and that the plaintiffs have let out the suit premises to the defendant. Since the Appellate Court did find that the plaintiffs have been able to prove the right, title and interest over the suit land, which had been occupied by the defendant, the defendant was directed to vacate the suit premises and to hand over the vacant possession to the plaintiffs-appellant . Thus, the suit was decreed in the aforesaid term. Being aggrieved with that judgment and decree, this appeal has been preferred by the defendant –appellant At the time of admission, following substantial questions of law have been framed:- (i) Whether the findings of the lower appellate court reversing the finding of the trial court on the issue of plaintiffs’ title and decreeing the suit as a full fledged title suit, although the plaintiffs’ suit was originally for eviction under the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act is perverse? (ii) Whether on amendment of the plaint at the appellate stage the defendant was not given any opportunity to defend and file her additional written statement and, if so, whether the decree passed by the lower appellate court on the basis of the amended plaint can be sustainable in law? (iii) Whether the finding of the lower appellate court on the defendant’s case of adverse possession was based on an erroneous consideration of the evidence and materials on record and therefore perverse? (iv) Whether the suit is barred under Section 65 of the Limitation Act and the finding of the appellate court in this regard is sustainable? Regarding Issue No.–1 : 9. (iv) Whether the suit is barred under Section 65 of the Limitation Act and the finding of the appellate court in this regard is sustainable? Regarding Issue No.–1 : 9. Admittedly, originally suit was filed for eviction of the defendant from the suit premises on the ground of personal necessity and sub-letting, which grounds are available to the landlord for eviction under Section 11 (i)(a) and 11 (i)(c) of the Act. Subsequently, one more ground of default as provided under Section 11(i)(d) of the Act was added by way of amendment dated 7.12.1990. In course of time, when the defendant filed written statement, it was denied that the plaintiff does have title over the suit land. Thereupon amendment was made in the plaint on 15.12.1992, whereby it was pleaded that the plaintiff is claiming relief of eviction on the basis of his title under the general law. Learned trial court on consideration of the case of the parties and the evidences adduced on their behalf did find that the plaintiff has failed to prove the relationship of landlord and tenant in between the parties and hence, it was held that the plaintiff is not entitled to relief for eviction of the defendant on any of the grounds taken for eviction. At the same time, since the plaintiff had claimed eviction of the defendant from the suit premises under the general law by virtue of having right, title and interest over the suit land, learned trial court did go into the question of title and found that the plaintiff has even failed to prove his right, title and interest over the suit land. This finding was reversed by the appellate court and hence, the defendant -appellant has filed this appeal. 10. Mr. This finding was reversed by the appellate court and hence, the defendant -appellant has filed this appeal. 10. Mr. Lal, learned counsel appearing for the appellant, submits that both, the trial court as well as the appellate court, did find that the plaintiff failed to prove the relationship of landlord and tenant in between the parties and hence, he relief, sought for, for eviction on the ground of personal necessity, default and sub-letting was denied but the appellate court passed the order of eviction after going into the matter relating to title of the parties over the suit land though the learned trial court has incidentally gone into the matter of title and thereby did not find right, title and interest of the plaintiff over the suit land but the appellate court went into the matter relating to title full fledgedly which he did without having any jurisdiction, as the court dealing with the suit for eviction brought under the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act exercises a limited jurisdiction conferred under that Act and is not supposed to exercise jurisdiction as conferred to a civil court under the general law and, therefore, the judgment and decree passed by the appellate court for eviction of the defendant from the suit premises is quite illegal. Learned counsel in support of his submission has referred to a decision rendered in the case of Rejendra Tiwary Vs. Basudeo Prasad Agrawal (AIR 2002 SC 137) holding therein that once both the courts came to the conclusion that the relationship of landlord and tenant did not exist between the parties, further enquiry into title of the parties having regard to the nature of the suit and the jurisdiction of the court was unwarranted. It was pointed out that similar view was reiterated by this court in the case of Mostt. Badama Devi Vs. Ram Lakshman Sharma { 2002 (2) JLJR 1 }. 11. It was pointed out that similar view was reiterated by this court in the case of Mostt. Badama Devi Vs. Ram Lakshman Sharma { 2002 (2) JLJR 1 }. 11. Learned counsel further submits that even if the Ad valorem Court Fee has been paid by the plaintiffs but it never gives any jurisdiction to the court as the averment made and relief sought for determined that the suit was filed for eviction under the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act and not under the general law and as such, the decree passed by the appellate court for eviction under the general law is against the ratio laid down in the case of Ram Narain Prasad and another Vs. Atul Chander Mitra and others { 1994 (4) SCC 349 }. 12. As against this, Mr. Rahul Gupta, learned counsel appearing for the respondents, submits that it is true that originally suit for eviction was brought under the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act but by way of amendment dated 15.12.1992, the plaintiff claimed eviction under the general law by claiming right, title and interest over the suit land and even the Ad valorem court fee was paid. Thus, once that was done, suit gets converted from the suit under the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act to suit under the general law and that amendment will relate back to the date of institution of the suit and, therefore, the trial court has framed an issue with respect to plaintiffs’ right, title and interest over the suit property and got it decided not incidentally rather in full fledged manner but wrongly came to conclusion that the plaintiff does not have right, title and interest over the suit property and hence, it was set aside by the appellate court and under these situations, the ratio laid down in Rajendra Tiwary’s case (supra) is not applicable in the instant case. 13. I do find substance in the submission made on behalf of the respondents. 13. I do find substance in the submission made on behalf of the respondents. Admittedly, the suit for eviction had initially been brought under the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act but subsequently the plaintiff by way of amendment sought for eviction under the general law by claiming that he does have title over the suit premises and in that event, even the issue with respect to title of the plaintiff was framed and the trial court as well as the appellate court in order to decide the issue dealt with the matter extensively by taking into account each and every documentary as well as oral evidences and in that event, it cannot be said that the court had limited jurisdiction to deal with the matter of eviction under the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act. Therefore, the ratio laid down in Rajendra Tiwary’s case (supra) is not applicable in the instant case. The fact of that case was that the plaintiffs had brought a suit for eviction on several grounds available under the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act. The trial court as well as appellate court did find that there was no relationship of landlord and tenant between the plaintiffs and defendant. When the plaintiffs challenged the order before the Patna High Court, appeal was allowed taking the view that an equitable decree of eviction could be passed against the defendant on the basis of title of the plaintiffs and, therefore, the Court remanded the case to the first appellate court on the ground that it did not record any finding on the question of title of the parties. That order was challenged before the Hon’ble Supreme Court. In the facts and circumstances, as stated above, it was held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court as under:- “7. It is evident that while dealing with the suit of the plaintiffs for eviction of the defendant from the suit premises under clauses (c) and (d) of sub-section (1) of Section 11 of the Act, courts including the high court were exercising jurisdiction under the Act which is a special enactment. The sine qua non for granting the relief in the suit, under the Act, is that between the plaintiffs and the defendant the relationship of ‘landlord and tenant’ should exist. The sine qua non for granting the relief in the suit, under the Act, is that between the plaintiffs and the defendant the relationship of ‘landlord and tenant’ should exist. The scope of the enquiry before the Courts was limited to the question: as to whether the grounds for eviction of the defendant have been made out under the Act. The question of title of the parties to the suit premises is not relevant having regard to the width of the definition of the terms ‘landlord’ and ‘tenant’ “in clauses (f) and (h) respectively of Section 2 of the Act”. 8. Inasmuch as both the trial court as well as first appellate court found that the relationship of “landlord and tenant” did not exist between the plaintiffs and the defendant , further enquiry into the title of the parties, having regard to the nature of the suit and jurisdiction of the court was unwarranted.” 14. It may be worthwhile to note here that after the amendment was made seeking relief of eviction under the general law and payment of the Ad valorem court fee, nature of suit never remains confined to a suit for eviction under the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act and as such, the court had every jurisdiction to deal with the matter relating to title of the plaintiff and hence, the court rightly exercised his jurisdiction by going into the matter relating to title of the plaintiff over the suit land. Thus, this question accordingly is decided. Regarding Issue No. 2: 15. Mr. Lal, learned counsel for the appellants, submits that at the appellate stage, amendment was made in the plaint, whereby it was pleaded that as to how they acquired the suit land and thereby relief was sought for a decree for recovery of possession but no opportunity was given to the defendants-appellants to file their additional written statement, though the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Gurdial Singh Vs. Raj Kumar Aneja {AIR 2002 (SC) 1003} has said that the amendment of plaint should be attended with opportunity to the defendant to amend her written statement and the right of defendant should be duly safeguarded and hence, in this situation, the decree passed by the appellate court for eviction is quite unsustainable and is fit to be set aside on this score only. 16. 16. As against this, learned counsel for the respondents submits that earlier to the amendment made at the appellate stage, three amendments had already been made before the trial court where in absence of any order passed by this Court giving opportunity to the defendant to file additional written statement, additional written statement was filed by the defendant. When amendment was made at the appellate stage, the defendant never took objection at any point of time though it remained pending before the appellate court for about nine years but now at this stage this objection is being taken when the decision went against the defendant which has no substance at all, as under the circumstances, it can easily be taken that the appellants had waived their rights to file written statement. Learned counsel in support of his submission has referred to a decision rendered in a case of Bahrein Petroleum Co. Ltd. Vs. P.J. Pappu { AIR 1966 SC 634 }. 17. It be reiterated that the suit for eviction was brought on the ground available under the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act. When a written statement was filed, the defendant denied the title of the plaintiff over the suit land. Thereupon, an amendment was brought, whereby relief for eviction was sought for under the general law by virtue of title being claimed by the plaintiff over the suit land. Thereafter, the plaintiff adduced the documentary evidence through which he had acquired right, title and interest over the suit land. 18. However, learned trial court for the reasons recorded by him found that the plaintiff has failed to prove title over the suit land. When appeal was preferred against the judgment and decree passed by the trial court, an amendment was made, whereby it was pleaded that the suit property was acquired through registered deed of settlement dated 1.9.1947, registered deed of sale dated 23.3.1947 and registered deed of partition dated 2.2.1957. When appeal was preferred against the judgment and decree passed by the trial court, an amendment was made, whereby it was pleaded that the suit property was acquired through registered deed of settlement dated 1.9.1947, registered deed of sale dated 23.3.1947 and registered deed of partition dated 2.2.1957. Since those documents had already been adduced in evidence before the trial court, the defendant may not have thought it proper to file any additional written statement and that they never took any objection for nine years and took chances for the verdict to come and only when it went against the defendant, this objection is being taken which is only to be noticed to be rejected in view of the ratio laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Bahrein Petroleum Co. Ltd. (supra) wherein it has been held as follows:- “If the defendant allows the trial court to proceed to judgment without raising the objection as to the place of suing and takes the chance of a verdict in his favour, he clearly waives the objection and will not be subsequently permitted to raise it. It is even possible to say that long and continued participation by the defendant in the proceeding without any protest may, in an appropriate case amount to waiver of the objection.” 19. Thus, the decree passed by the appellate court does not get affected adversely in any manner. Learned appellate court having found the right, title and interest of the plaintiffs over the suit land passed order of eviction of the defendant. The plaintiffs’ case of title over the suit land bearing Plot Nos. 137 and 138 appertaining to Khata No. 74, Holding No. 24-A of Ward No. 11-B situated at Madhukam, P.S.–Sukhdeonagar, District– Ranchi is based upon registered deed of settlement of Plot No. 137 dated 1.9.1949 (Ext. 1/b) and also upon registered sale deed dated 23.8.1947 (Ext. 1) relating to Plot No. 136 by which documents the land had been transferred to Laxmi Narain Sahu, brother of original plaintiff-late Kedar Nath Sahu who got the land in his share in a family partition deed dated 2.2.1957 (Ext. 1/a). Both the documents (Ext. 1/b and Ext. 1) were taken into evidence by virtue of it being 30 years old documents. Through registered sale deed date 23.8.1947 (Ext. 1), the land measuring 29 decimals of Plot No. 136 was transferred by Mostt. 1/a). Both the documents (Ext. 1/b and Ext. 1) were taken into evidence by virtue of it being 30 years old documents. Through registered sale deed date 23.8.1947 (Ext. 1), the land measuring 29 decimals of Plot No. 136 was transferred by Mostt. Sahidan to Laxmi Narain Sahu. Said transferor-Mostt. Sahidan had acquired title over the suit land through Hukumnama dated 15.12.1942. The transferor by executing Ext-1 transferred all her right, title and interest over the land and had delivered the possession to the transferee. The defendant-appellant had never challenged the title of transferor-Mostt. Sahidan still learned trial court did hold that the sale deed (Ext. 1) did not confer any right, title and interest over the suit land to the transferee as Hukumnama was not brought on record which proposition was quite illegal and hence, learned appellate court has rightly held that the finding given by the learned trial court in rejecting the title of the plaintiffs over Plot No.136 is quite erroneous. 20. So far Plot No. 137 is concerned, the plaintiffs derived right and title through registered deed of settlement dated 1.9.1949 (Ext. 1/b) which was executed by the Ex-landlord in favour of Laxmi Narain Sahu. The said document was held to be void by the learned trial court, as the said document (Ext. 1/b) never bears the signature of the transferee. That finding was found to be contrary to the ratio laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in a case of Rajendra Pratap Singh Vs. Rameshwar Prasad ( AIR 1999 SC 37 ), wherein it has been held that if an instrument is signed by one party, it does not mean that both parties have not executed it together rather the requirement of the provision as contained in Section 107 of the Transfer of Properties Act is that the execution of lease through a registered instrument shall be joint endeavour of both lesser and lessee. Learned appellate court after taking notice of the fact that the possession of land having been given to the transferee and the document, produced by the plaintiffs which was in their custody, goes to show that the registered deed of settlement was acted upon and as such the deed was outcome of common endeavour of the settler and settlee, whereby right, title and interest was transferred to settlee- Laxmi Narain Sahu. The land of both plots according to the case of the plaintiffs-respondents, came to his share by virtue of partition. In support of that, certified copy of the registered deed of partition (Ext.-1/b) was adduced in evidence. Since that document was not proved in accordance with the provision as laid down under Section 65 of the Evidence Act, it was discarded wholly, but the learned trial court did not take into account the other documents supporting the case of the plaintiffs of partition. It is the case of the plaintiffs that the land on being given to the share of the original plaintiff-Kedar Nath Sahu, he got his name mutated in the Circle Office as well as in the office of Ranchi Municipal Corporation. In support of it, Ext-10, a correction slip, issued in the name of original plaintiff, as well as Ext-2 and Ext.-2/a, rent receipts, issued by the Circle Officer, were produced. That apart, Ext.-5 series, Municipal Tax Receipts, which were produced, also bear the name of Kedar Nath Sahu. The case of the original plaintiff of partition further gets support from an order- sheet of a proceeding initiated under Section 71 of the Chhota Nagpur Tenancy Act in Case No. 402/1980-81 for restoration against Laxmi Narain Sahu. In that proceeding, original plaintiff-Kedar Nath Sahu was added as a party who paid compensation to the person who had brought the case under the provision of Chhota Nagpur Tenancy Act. Under these situations, learned appellate court has rightly held that even if a registered partition deed (Ext. 1/b) is ignored, original plaintiff has been able to prove his case that the land of both plots having come to his share in a family partition has acquired right, title and interest over the aforesaid land. Thus, the decree passed by the learned trial court never suffers from any illegality. Thus, Issue No. 2 is accordingly decided. Regarding Issue Nos. 3 and 4: 21. The suit brought by the original plaintiff for possession of immovable property is based on the title, whereas the defendant had claimed adverse possession over the suit land and, therefore, the suit would be governed under Section 65 of the Limitation Act under which it must be filed within 12 years from the date when the possession of the defendant becomes adverse to the plaintiffs. 22. 22. It is the case of the defendant, as has been made out in the written statement, that the suit land was vacant piece of land. It was a low land full of ditches. The defendant occupied the suit land and thereafter constructed building over the same at his own cost. He also installed water pipe connection and electric connection. The defendant is in possession over the suit plot since 25 years. The defendant is the absolute owner of the suit property and is coming in continuous uninterrupted possession in assertion of his own right since the year 1964 and has acquired an indefeasible title thereto. Even if there is any defect in his title, the same has been perfected by remaining in possession openly and adversely for more than statutory period to the knowledge of all concerns including the plaintiffs. 23. It is well settled that the adverse possession must be adequate in continuity in publicity and extent and a plea is required at least to show when possession become adverse so that the starting point of limitation against the party affected can be found. A peaceful, open and continuous possession as engraved in the maxim nec vi, nec clam, nec precario has been explained by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in a case of Karnataka Board of Wakf Vs. Government of India {(2004) 10 SSC 779} in the following terms :- “Physical fact of exclusive possession and the animus possidendi to hold as an owner in exclusion to the actual owner are the most important factors that are to be accounted in cases of this nature. Plea of adverse possession is not a pure question of law but a blended one of fact and law. Therefore, a person who claims adverse possession should show; (a) on what date he came into possession, (b) what was the nature of his possession, (c) whether the factum of possession was known to the other party, (d) how long his possession has continued, and (e) his possession was open and undisturbed. 24. A person pleading adverse possession has no equities in his favour. Since he is trying to defeat the rights of the true owner, it is for him to clearly plead and establish all facts necessary to establish his adverse possession”. 25. 24. A person pleading adverse possession has no equities in his favour. Since he is trying to defeat the rights of the true owner, it is for him to clearly plead and establish all facts necessary to establish his adverse possession”. 25. Here in the instant case, as has been found by the appellate court, the starting point of adverse possession i.e. the date as to when the paper owner got dispossessed has not been established. In this regard, it be stated that the defendant in his pleading has come forward with the case that he came in possession over the suit land in the year 1964 and got a boundary wall erected. In his evidence, he said that Rs. 4 lakhs were spent. Subsequently, he constructed altogether 44 rooms and four sheds on the suit plot at his own costs of Rs. 8 lakhs but the learned trial court keeping in view the status of original defendant did find that he was not in financial possession in the year 1964 to spend Rs. Four lakhs. 26. It be stated that he had disclosed in his evidence that loan was taken by the bank for constructing boundary wall but not a single chit of paper was produced. Similarly, not a single chit of paper was produced in support of his case that Rs. 8 lakhs were spent in constructing rooms and sheds and further original defendant-Jagdish Singh failed to examine his brother in support of his assertion that he had taken financial help from his brother. 27. Thus, it has rightly been held that the aforesaid plea of construction of boundary wall in the year 1964 and subsequently construction of sheds and rooms over the suit plot cannot be accepted. 28. That apart, the evidences in respect of starting point of possession are at variance. It be stated that according to the original defendant-Jagdish Singh (D.W.15A), he came in possession over the suit land in the year 1964 but D.Ws. 5, 9 and 11 have stated in their evidences that original defendant-Jagdish Singh has been in possession since the year 1966-67 where a Garage was there, whereas D.Ws. 8 and 13 have gone to say that they have been seen Garage over the suit plot since the years 1970 and 1976-77 respectively. 5, 9 and 11 have stated in their evidences that original defendant-Jagdish Singh has been in possession since the year 1966-67 where a Garage was there, whereas D.Ws. 8 and 13 have gone to say that they have been seen Garage over the suit plot since the years 1970 and 1976-77 respectively. D.W. 14, the then Branch Manager, S.B.I., Pandra Branch, Ranchi has stated that he inspected the premises in the year 1984 and that the building and machinery has been hypothecated to the bank in the year 1984. Even if this assertion is accepted, it will hardly go in favour of the defendant, as the suit had been filed in the year 1987 well within the period of 12 years. So far documentary evidences are concerned, those have been dealt with by the learned appellate court separately, whereby it has been found that those documents are not helpful to the defendant. Ext-A–the certified copy of the extract of the register relating to electric connection has been adduced showing that electric connection in the said premises was given in the suit premises in September, 1968 and the address, which has been shown, is as Jagdish Singh, Ratu Road, Shashtri Chowk, Ranchi, but admittedly it never bears number of plots and hence, it cannot be connected with a suit plot particularly when the defendant admittedly had her own residential house in Ratu Road. Ext-B, which has been drawn on the basis of Ext-A, though bears the plot number but Ext-A never contains the plot number and as such, it has rightly been discarded by the learned appellate court. Other documents including Exts.-A and B, adduced by the plaintiffs, relate to Jagdish Auto Engineering Works, Ratu Road, Ranchi but those documents never bear the plot number and, therefore, it has rightly been held by the learned appellate court that those documents are related to fact that “Jagdish Auto Engineering Works” is existing at Ratu Road, Ranchi but it never goes to prove that Jagdish Auto Engineering Works is situated over the suit plot. 29. 29. Going further in the matter, it be recorded that it has been pleaded by the defendant that he perfected his title by remaining in possession openly and adversely for more than statutory period to the knowledge of all concerns including the plaintiff but the original defendant-Jagdish Singh (D.W. 15A) in his evidence at Paragraph-17 has categorically said that he was not knowing who the real land owner was. In that view of the matter, it can easily be said that he did not have the requisite animus, that is to say the requisite intention to possess (animus possidendi), whereas as per ratio laid down in a case of Karnataka Board of Wakf (supra), one of the requirements was that the factum of possession must be known to the other party. In this respect, I may refer to a case of Anjanappa V. Somalingappa (2006) 7 SCC 570 }, wherein it has been held in Paragraph 21 as follows:- “The High Court has erred in holding that even if the defendants claim adverse possession, they do not have to prove who is the true owner and even if they had believed that the Government was the true owner and not the plaintiffs, the same was inconsequential. Obviously, the requirements of proving adverse possession have not been established. If the defendants are not sure who would be true owner the question of their being in hostile possession and the question of denying title of the true owner do not arise. Above being the position the High Court’s judgment is quite unsustainable.” 30. Thus, in view of the statement made by the original defendant-Jagdish Singh that he was not knowing who the real owner was and that no other witnesses adduced on behalf of the defendant say about the real owner, the defendant cannot be said to have had possession adverse to the true owner. Regarding being had to all these aspects of the matter, stated above, I do find that learned appellate court has rightly rejected the case of adverse possession of the defendant. 31. Thus, I do not find any merit in this appeal and hence, this appeal is dismissed. 32. Consequently, the order and judgment passed by the appellate court is hereby affirmed.