Judgment Pinaki Chandra Ghose, ACJ. This writ appeal is directed against the order dt.28.9.2010 passed by the Hon'ble Single Judge, in W.P. No.8231 of 2005. Respondent -writ petitioner filed the writ petition to declare the action of the respondents in not adjusting the import energy during the months of August 202 and November 2003 against the banked energy of the writ petitioner and raising the bills for the said two months against the petitioner, as arbitrary, illegal and without jurisdiction. The facts of the case briefly are as follows. Respondent -writ petitioner, which is an integrated sugar factory with co-generation of power, was sanctioned 8 Mega Watts (MW) bagasee cogeneration plant at its sugar factory by NEDCAP vide sanction letter dt.7.4.1997. The petitioner was permitted for captive consumption of 3 MW during the season and 1.2 MW during off-season. The sugar mill with 3 MW power generation went operational on 22.11.1997. Subsequent thereto, 5 MW power generator was added and commissioned on 9.6.1999. The season for sugar crushing factory commences from the first week of December and ends in April of the succeeding year. During such crushing season, the writ petitioner consumes around 3 MW of power for crushing and auxiliary needs. During off-season, it consumes around 1.2 MW of power. It is not in dispute that that the A.P. Transmission Corporation (hereinafter referred to as 'the TRANSCO') was also receiving power supply through the grid of the petitioner cogeneration plant supplied under the power purchase and wheeling agreement dt.29.1.2000 entered into between the petitioner and the TRANSCO and the petitioner was entitled to sell its excess power to third parties through the transmission and distribution systems of the TRANSCO. The TRANSCO had a right to charge from the petitioner company for such utilization of their system. The petitioner company was also entitled to bank the excess energy after meeting the captive consumption and third party sales with the TRANSCO, as a result whereof and in accordance with the provisions of the Power Purchase & Wheeling Agreement dt.29.1.2000, the petitioner and the TRANSCO were bound by the clauses in the agreement and thereby agreed to give bills as per the terms of the agreement. It appears that the Chief General Manager of the TRANSCO by letter dt.9.11.2004 addressed to the petitioner, issued C.C. bills for the excess of import energy supplied by Southern Power Distribution Company of A.P. Limited (APSPDCL) over the export energy by the petitioner during the months of August, 2002 and November, 2003. The case of the appellants -respondents is that in spite of the bills raised, the respondent writ petitioner did not pay the bills and the appellants had a right in terms of the said agreement that if such payment is not made, services to the scheduled consumers of the writ petitioner will be disconnected by the appellants. The writ petitioner has received a combined bill for August, 2002 and November, 2003 with huge surcharge from the Senior Accounts, Officer APSPDCL on 22.12.2004. Under these circumstances, the petitioner filed a representation dt.5.1.2005 to the Chairman and the Managing Director of the TRANSCO requesting his intervention to resolve the problem cropped up at that point of time. Subsequently, the Chief General Manager (Expr.) on 10.3.2005 addressed a letter to the petitioner directing them to pay the amounts raised in the said bills along with the surcharge within seven days from the date of receipt of the letter, failing which the wheeling of the delivered energy of the petitioner will be stopped from the billing month of March, 2005 and all the live services to the scheduled consumers will be disconnected. Hence, the writ petition was filed. According to the petitioner, as pointed out before the Hon'ble Single Judge, it is not bound to pay the said surcharge bills which were raised on it and requested for setting aside of the said bills. The appellants – respondents filed a counter affidavit before the Hon'ble Single Judge and while denying the allegations made in the writ petition, they stated that in accordance with the agreement dt.29.1.2000 only scheduled consumers are entitled to draw the allocated energy to them whereas for the purpose of captive consumption, the question of reverting back to the generator, even if it is surplus, is not permissible. The Hon'ble Single Judge, after considering the terms of the agreement, came to the conclusion that whenever there is excess production of energy unallocated, the same shall be accepted by the TRANSCO for the purpose of banking, and further the banking of energy shall be allowed of any energy delivered during the 12 months of any year for captive consumption or for the sale to third party sale/scheduled consumers. In the back drop of such opinion formed, the Hon'ble Single Judge came to the conclusion that Section 86(1)(f) of the Act Electricity Act, 2003 (for short, 'the Act') contemplates that the dispute between the generating company and the TRANSCO/licensees can be referred to arbitration, and not otherwise, and thereby held that co-generating company and generating company are separate. Under these circumstances, His Lordship was pleased to set aside the bills, which were raised by the appellants -respondents against the appellant -respondent, and allowed the writ petition. Being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the said order dt.28.9.2010 passed by the Hon'ble Single Judge, the respondents in the writ petition filed this appeal. Sri O. Manohar Reddy, learned Standing Counsel appearing for the appellants, drew our attention to the relevant clauses of the said agreement and further submitted before us as per Section 86(1)(f) of the said Act generating company, includes co-generating company. He further drew our attention to the definitions of 'generating company' under Section 2(28) of the said Act, and 'co-generation' under Section 2(12) of the Act, which read as under. 2(28). "generating company" means any company or body corporate or association or body of individuals, whether incorporated or not, or artificial judicial person, which owns or operates or maintains a generating station. 2(12). "Cogeneration" means a process which simultaneously produces two or more forms of useful energy (including electricity). We have further took note of meaning of the 'generate' which has been defined under Section 2(29) of the Act and it appears that generate means to produce electricity from generating station for the purpose of giving supply to any premises or enabling a supply so to be given. Further more, the meaning of 'generating station' has been defined under Section 2(30) Act, which reads as follows: 2(30). Further more, the meaning of 'generating station' has been defined under Section 2(30) Act, which reads as follows: 2(30). "generating station" or "station" means any station for generating electricity, including any building and plant with step-up transformer, switch-gear, switch yard, cables or other appurtenant equipment, if any, used for that purpose and the site thereof; a site intended to be used for a generating station, and any building used for housing the operating staff of a generating station, and where electricity is generated by water-power, includes penstocks, head and tail works, main and regulating reservoirs, dams and other hydraulic works, but does not in any case include any sub-station. After going through the definitions as pointed out by Sri Manohar Reddy and the clauses of the said agreement entered into between the parties, we do not have any hesitation to hold that the writ petitioner also generates electricity and would come within the meaning of sub-sections (28) as well as (29) of Section 2 of the Act. It cannot be brushed aside from our mind that the 'generating' means to produce electricity from a generating station for the purpose of giving supply to others. It may be the statutory or scheduled consumers, but it has to be accepted that the supply meaning thereby of electricity and nothing else and therefore petitioner would come within the meaning of generating company which include the meaning of co-generation. Therefore, we are of the view that the opinion expressed by the Hon'ble Single Judge, that the co-generating company cannot come within the purview of the generating company as defined, cannot be accepted by us. It is settled law that if there are any disputes between the parties as in the present case, the same have to be referred under Section 86(1)(f) of the Act, 2003, which reads as under: 86. Functions of State Commission.-(1) The State Commission shall discharge the following functions, namely: - (a) to (e) ... ... ... It is settled law that if there are any disputes between the parties as in the present case, the same have to be referred under Section 86(1)(f) of the Act, 2003, which reads as under: 86. Functions of State Commission.-(1) The State Commission shall discharge the following functions, namely: - (a) to (e) ... ... ... (f) adjudicate upon the disputes between the licensees and generating companies and to refer any dispute for arbitration; A reading of the above Section would make it clear that adjudication of the dispute should be made through mechanism provided under the Act and in our opinion too, on the given facts, the dispute on hand would also be attracted and would come within the purview of Section 86(1)(f) of the Act, and the observation in this regard by the Hon'ble Single Judge cannot be accepted by us for the reasons given by us in the preceding paragraphs of our judgment. We therefore hold that the dispute between the parties with regard to the said bills in the matter has to be adjudicated upon in terms of Section 86 (1)(f) of the Act. Learned counsel for the respondent -writ petitioner has relied upon a judgment of the Supreme Court in Krishan Lal v. Food Corporation of India (2012) 4 SCC 786 ) in support of his case. In our considered opinion, the facts and circumstances of the present case do not help the writ petitioner to get any benefit out of the said judgment. Learned counsel for the respondent -writ petitioner, in particular relied upon paragraph 18 of the said judgment, which specifically stipulates that alternative remedy for adjudication of disputes cannot be a ground nor can be pressed into service at a belated stage and accordingly rejected by the Court noticing specifically that the SLP after admission was awaited decision, for ten years. In the circumstances, in our opinion, that decision cannot be of any help to the writ petitioner. Under these circumstances, we set aside the order so passed by the Hon'ble Single Judge and we direct the appellants herein to refer the dispute under Section 86(1)(f) of the Act, to the appropriate authority in terms of the said Section. In the circumstances, in our opinion, that decision cannot be of any help to the writ petitioner. Under these circumstances, we set aside the order so passed by the Hon'ble Single Judge and we direct the appellants herein to refer the dispute under Section 86(1)(f) of the Act, to the appropriate authority in terms of the said Section. We only make it clear that since bills raised against the writ petitioner have been set aside by the Hon'ble Single Judge, with regard thereto, status quo shall be maintained until the matter is finally adjudicated by the authority in terms of Section 86(1)(f) of the Act. The writ appeal is accordingly allowed. No costs.