Judgment :- Tarun Kumar Gupta, J. This second appeal is directed against judgment and decree dated 30th March, 2006 passed by learned Judge 3rd Bench, City Civil Court at Calcutta in Title Appeal No.107 of 2004 affirming the judgment and decree dated 9th of September, 2004 passed by learned Chief Judge, Small Causes Court, Calcutta in Title Suit No.1277 of 2000. The respondent No.1 Sunita Sen and one Dineswar Sen, the predecessor-ininterest of respondent Nos. 2 to 5 being joint owners and landlords of the suit premises filed said suit for eviction against the present appellant defendant tenant on the ground of default and reasonable requirement. The appellant defendant contested said suit filing a written statement denying material allegations of the plaint and contending inter alia that he was not a defaulter and that present accommodation of the plaintiffs were more than sufficient and that they did not reasonably require the suit premises for their own use and occupation. Learned Trial Court framed several issues including an issue on the ground of default and another issue on the ground of reasonable requirement of the suit premises. Though learned Trial Court granted relief to the defendant tenant under Section 17(4) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956 but passed a decree of eviction on the ground of reasonable requirement of the suit premises for use and occupation by owner landlords. During pendency of the suit in the Trial Court Dineswar Sen died and his heirs and legal representatives namely defendant No.2 series were brought on record. The appellant tenant preferred an appeal which was also dismissed on contest by the impugned judgment and decree. At the time of admission of this second appeal the following substantial questions of law were formulated. 1. Whether the learned courts below committed substantial error of law in passing a decree for eviction on the ground of reasonable requirement by totally overlooking the Commissioner’s report which disclosed that there were at least six bed rooms apart from another room measuring 10.06 ft X 13 ft which is allegedly used as kitchen; 2. Having regard to the number of members of the families of the plaintiffs, whether the learned courts below committed substantial error of law in passing a decree for reasonable requirement by not at all considering even the question of partial eviction of the appellant; 3. Having regard to the number of members of the families of the plaintiffs, whether the learned courts below committed substantial error of law in passing a decree for reasonable requirement by not at all considering even the question of partial eviction of the appellant; 3. In view of the fact pleaded in the application under Order XLI Rule 27 of the Code of Civil Procedure indicating that all the three daughters of the plaintiff No.2 are married, whether it can be said that the plaintiffs reasonably require the suit property for their own use and occupation even if they were married during the pendency of the suit or even prior to institution of the suit. At the time of admission of this second appeal the appellant tenant filed said application being CAN No.7861 of 2006 praying for taking note of subsequent events and for production of additional evidence on the grounds that respondent (O.P. Nos. 3 and 4) namely Jayanti Sen alias Seal and Smt. Babita Sen alias Dutta were married after passing the decree of the learned Trial Court and that they were residing in their matrimonial house. The respondents filed written objection alleging that respondent O. P. No.4 got married on 14th July, 2004 i.e., during the pendency of the suit and that respondent O.P. No.3 got married on 17th November, 2005 i.e., during pendency of the appeal before the Lower Appellate Court and as such those were not subsequent events to the passing of the impugned judgement and decree by learned Lower Appellate Court. It was further alleged that in spite of said marriage respondent O.P. No.3 was running a coaching centre in the suit house and that she also requires to stay in the suit house with her husband to look after her ailing mother i.e., respondent O.P. No.2. It was further alleged in said affidavit in opposition that the respondent O.P. No.4 even after marriage still runs a business from the suit premises having trade licence and that requirement of the plaintiffs did not diminish on account of said marriages. The appellant tenant filed another application under Order 41 Rule 27 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CAN No.6989 of 2008) for taking note of subsequent events and production of additional evidence. The appellant tenant filed another application under Order 41 Rule 27 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CAN No.6989 of 2008) for taking note of subsequent events and production of additional evidence. In said petition it was alleged that during pendency of this case the tenants namely Haripada Majumder and Rabindranath Bhowmick handed over vacant possession of their respective ground floor shop rooms in the suit house to the respondent landlords who instead of taking those shop rooms in their khas possession and using the same for their alleged requirement let out the same to new tenants namely Mrs. Indrani Gupta who is running a ladies beauty parlour since March, 2008 and to one Dilip Jaiswal who was running a business of food since August, 16, 2007. The respondents filed a written affidavit in opposition against said application alleging that both the shop rooms measuring about 9 ft. X 6 ft. each were situated in the ground floor road side having entrance from road and were not suitable for using for residential purposes and that eviction suit was filed on the ground of own use and occupation for only residential purposes and that said shop rooms were not at all suitable for being used for residential purposes. The appellant tenant filed an affidavit in reply to said affidavit in opposition alleging inter alia that the size of the shop rooms were 13 ft. X 10 ft. each and not 6 ft. X 9 ft. each and that letting out of these two rooms to new tenants during pendency of the suit only shows that the respondent landladies had no further requirement of rooms for their own use and occupation. The respondents landlords, however, filed one application in the nature of exception to the affidavit in reply alleging that the measurement of those rooms were not 10 ft. X 13 ft. and that those were measured 6 ft. X 9 ft. and that those shop rooms having no entrance inside the suit house and having entrance only on the road, were not suitable for being used for residential purposes. Mr. Amal Krishna Saha, learned counsel for the appellant tenant, submits that the report of the Advocate Commissioner (Ext.10) revealed that the respondent landlords were in possession of eight rooms other than bath and privies. According to him, the size of the rooms were big enough to serve more than one purpose. Mr. Amal Krishna Saha, learned counsel for the appellant tenant, submits that the report of the Advocate Commissioner (Ext.10) revealed that the respondent landlords were in possession of eight rooms other than bath and privies. According to him, the size of the rooms were big enough to serve more than one purpose. Mr. Saha next submits that in view of subsequent marriage of all three daughters of respondent No.2 namely respondent Nos. 3 to 5 their requirement of having one bed room each has evaporated and that they may stay in the drawing cum guest room at the time of their occasional visit in the suit house. Mr. Saha next submits that though it was claimed in the amended plaint that respondent No.4 wants a separate room for running her father’s business and respondent No.3 also requires a room for running her coaching centre but in the affidavit in opposition filed in connection with application being CAN No.6989 of 2008 it was specifically stated in para 8 of said application that eviction suit was instituted on the ground of own use and occupation for only residential purposes and that those shop rooms which were vacated by the erstwhile tenants and let out to new tenants were not fit for being used for residential purposes. According to Mr. Saha after said assertion in the written objection supported by affidavit there is no further scope for considering any requirement of the respondent landlords either for running coaching centre by respondent No.3 or for having a room for running business by respondent No.4. He further submits that present available accommodation of the respondent landladies as came out from the undisputed report of the learned Advocate Commissioner (Ext.10) is more than sufficient to satisfy the genuine need of the landladies. Accordingly, he prays for dismissal of this appeal. Mr. Bidyut Kumar Banerjee, learned senior counsel appearing for the respondent landladies, on the other hand, submits that road side shop rooms which were let out to new tenants during pendency of this case were not suitable for residential purpose as those shop rooms had no entrance towards inside the suit house and had rather entrance on the road side. According to him, said road side shop rooms having entrance only towards roads cannot be used for residential purposes particularly by ladies. He next submits that said road side shop rooms measuring about 9 ft. According to him, said road side shop rooms having entrance only towards roads cannot be used for residential purposes particularly by ladies. He next submits that said road side shop rooms measuring about 9 ft. X 6 ft. each were not also suitable for running a coaching centre or for running a business. His further contention is that married daughters being co-owners of the suit house have independent right of residence in the suit house and hence requirement of three bed rooms for three married daughters were not at all unjustified. Mr. Banerjee next submits that requirement of plaintiff No.1 (respondent No.1) and original plaintiff No.2 (predecessor-in-interest of respondent Nos. 2 to 5) were projected separately in the plaint and that they were separate in mess and it came out from Commissioner’s report that out of eight rooms two were used as kitchens and two were used as Thakur Ghars and that considering this aspect it is palpable that the remaining accommodation was not at all sufficient to cater the projected requirement of the landladies. In this connection Mr. Banerjee refers a case law reported in (1996) 5 SCC page 344 (Meenal Eknath Kshirsagar vs. Traders & Agencies and another) to impress upon this Court that landlord is entitled to comfortable living. He also submits that landlord is the best judge as to how he will use his premises and that the Court cannot squeeze landlord’s requirement. In support of his contention he refers a case law reported in (2000) 1 SCC page 679 (Ragavendra Kumar vs. Firm Prem Machinery & Co.). Mr. Banerjee next submits that concurrent findings of fact should not be disturbed during hearing of the second appeal by acting as a third court of fact finding. In this connection he refers a case law reported in (2007) 1 SCC page 546 (Gurdev Kaur and others vs. Kaki and others) to elaborate the scope of interference under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure. I have considered the submissions made by learned counsels of the parties as well as the case laws referred by them. In a case of eviction of a tenant on the ground of reasonable requirement of the suit premises by the landlord for his and his family members’ own use and occupation, the landlord has to establish that his requirement is a genuine one. In a case of eviction of a tenant on the ground of reasonable requirement of the suit premises by the landlord for his and his family members’ own use and occupation, the landlord has to establish that his requirement is a genuine one. The landlord has to establish something more than a mere desire but certainly less than absolute necessity. Whether landlord reasonably requires the suit premises or not is certainly a question of fact. Admittedly, both the courts below came to concurrent findings of fact that the landladies reasonably required the suit premises for their own use and occupation. However, said concurrent findings of fact of learned courts below cannot be interfered by a court of second appeal unless it is shown that the same was based on no evidence or based on extraneous matters. Again, admittedly an appeal is a continuation of the suit. So, the reasonable and bona fide requirement of the landlord must subsist till disposal of the second appeal. As such, subsequent events, if any, touching the bona fide requirement of the landlord is required to be considered by the Court of appeal. The requirements of the plaintiffs as projected in the plaint after amendment were as follows:- One bed room for respondent No.1 Smt. Sunita Sen; one room for her maid servant; one bed room for respondent No.2 (plaintiff No.2 a); three bed rooms for three daughters of plaintiff No.2 a; one dining room; one guest cum parlour; one coaching room for being used by Jayanti Sen and an office room for running business by Babita Sen and one room for their servant Subrata Maity. So as per said projection the respondent plaintiffs require as many as 11 (eleven) rooms. It came out from the averments made in the application being CAN No.6989 of 2008 and connected papers that admittedly during pendency of the appeal two road side shop rooms were vacated by two erstwhile tenants and those were relet to new tenants. Though there was a dispute as to the exact size of those two shop rooms but it was specifically averred in the affidavit in opposition by the respondent landladies that those two shop rooms having no door opening inside the suit house and having only doors on the public pathway were not suitable for being used for residential purposes. Though there was a dispute as to the exact size of those two shop rooms but it was specifically averred in the affidavit in opposition by the respondent landladies that those two shop rooms having no door opening inside the suit house and having only doors on the public pathway were not suitable for being used for residential purposes. In the affidavit in opposition it was specifically averred that the suit was filed for requirement of the suit premises only for residential purposes. As such, said averments in the affidavit in opposition gave a go by to the original claim of requirement of one coaching room by Jayanti Sen and one office room by Babita Sen. This departure is not unexplainable as by this time both Babita and Jayanti have been married. As such, as on date the respondent plaintiffs do not require any accommodation either for running coaching class or for running an office. Admittedly, all the three daughters of respondent No.2 are also cosharers of the suit house. As such, their requirement of one bed room each in the suit house if not as dependent daughter of their father Dineshwar Sen since deceased but as co-sharers of the suit house cannot be said to be unjustified. It appears from the report of the learned Advocate Commissioner (Ext.10) that the respondent landladies are in possession of eight rooms of moderately large size. It is true that from the evidence of Smt. Sunita Sen (P.W.1) as well as from the report of learned Advocate Commissioner it came out that the respondent plaintiffs were using two rooms as kitchens and two rooms as Thakur Ghars, one each for the family of respondent No.1 Smt. Sunita Sen and other for the family of respondent No.2 to 5. As it was averred that said two families of the landladies were separate in mess, learned Courts below accepted the requirements of two kitchens and two Thakur Ghars for the two sets of families of landladies. But said requirements of two kitchens and two Thakur Ghars were not projected either in the original plaint or even in the amended plaint. The requirement of even a single Thakur Ghar was not projected in the plaint. The evidence beyond pleadings is not entertainable. But said requirements of two kitchens and two Thakur Ghars were not projected either in the original plaint or even in the amended plaint. The requirement of even a single Thakur Ghar was not projected in the plaint. The evidence beyond pleadings is not entertainable. As learned courts below relied on said evidence of requirement of two kicthens and two Thakur Ghars by the plaintiff landladies it amounted to basing judgment on no evidence and / or extraneous matters. Out of the eight rooms as depicted in the learned Advocate Commissioner’s report (Ext.10) five can be used as bedrooms. Remaining three rooms can conveniently be used as kitchen, drawing cum guest room and dining. Even if two families of the owner landladies were separate in mess, there was no bar to use one kitchen by the two families. This is more so when no requirement for separate kitchen for the two families was projected either in the original plaint or even in the amended plaint. Thakur Ghar is not a must in a Hindu family. In most of the families idols are placed inside a room which is being used for other purposes also. As no requirement of Thakur Ghar was projected in the plaint, there is no question of considering one separate room to be used as Thakur Ghar. As some of the rooms are quite big having size of 20 ft. X 13 ft. and 19.6 ft. X 13 ft. the accommodation of the maid servant of respondent plaintiff No.1 Sunita Sen and male servant of respondent No. 2’s family who happens to be son of Sunita Sen’s maid servant, can easily be accommodated in those rooms or in the drawing room, dining room or in any other room. Learned counsels of both sides made arguments against partial eviction of the tenant. Learned counsels for the appellant tenant opposed said proposal on the ground that present requirement was sufficient to cater the need of the respondent landladies. Learned counsels for the respondent landlady, on the other hand, opposed any suggestion of partial eviction of the appellant tenant on the ground that landladies being female they cannot be asked to share tenanted portion with a family of the appellant defendant having male members in his family. However, in view of the discussions as made above it appears that the accommodation available to the respondent landladies substantially satisfies their requirement. However, in view of the discussions as made above it appears that the accommodation available to the respondent landladies substantially satisfies their requirement. Keeping in mind the principles of “live and let live” I am of the opinion that in the facts and circumstances of the case there is no need of passing any order of partial eviction of the appellant tenant from any portion of his tenanted premises. Accordingly, I find and hold that the impugned judgement and decree of eviction in view of the admitted subsequent events as well as evidence on record, are not sustainable in law. As a result, the appeal is hereby allowed on contest but without costs. The applications are hereby disposed of accordingly. The impugned judgment and decree are hereby set aside.