JUDGMENT U.B. Saha, J. 1. The appellants herein were convicted for an offence under Section 364A IPC and sentenced to suffer imprisonment for life and to pay a fine of Rs. 15,000/- each, id., to suffer further R.I. for another three years and also convicted under Section 27 of the Arms Act and further sentenced to suffer R.I. for five years and to pay a fine of Rs. 5,000/- each, i.d., to suffer further R.I. for one year. The principal sentence shall run concurrently. Fine money, if realized, shall be given to the abducted person, i.e., P.W. 4 Chitta @ Chitra @ Chitta Ranjan Das. Being aggrieved by the aforesaid conviction and sentence passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Belonia, South Tripura on 3.1.2000 in Sessions Trial 37 (ST/B) of 1999, the appellants have preferred the instant appeal. 2. Heard Mr. R. Datta, learned Counsel appearing for the appellants as well as Mr. R.C. Debnath, learned P.P. In-charge appearing for the respondent State. 3. The background facts in a nutshell are as follow: P.W. 4, Chitta Ranjan Das, on 23.11.1998, at about 10.00/10.30 a.m., while he was serving tea to his customers in his tea stall cum grocery shop at Kalacherra market, an interior of the State of Tripura, at that time, two unknown persons belonging to the tribal community wearing gamchha (long cotton napkin) and half-pant one having pistol and dao (sharp edged weapon) and the other having a carbine (STC) in hand, entered his shop and threatened the market people on the point of fire arms riot to move and also to open fire in case of any resistance and ultimately abducted Chitta Ranjan Das from his shop. Then they proceeded towards the road of the Jackfruit orchard. On the way, they also tried to take away one Pradip Nandi, (P.W. 6), but he somehow escaped from the clutch of them. There were two/three other persons in the shop of P.W. 4 and when they tried to resist them, those extremists intimidated them of dire consequences. In the long run, the extremists took the P.W. 4 to an unknown destination and wrongfully confined him for 16/17 days. They also demanded a huge ransom. Thereafter, the family of P.W. 4 procured money after disposal of all their family properties and also collected some amount from villagers on subscription and paid the ransom to the miscreants. In the long run, the extremists took the P.W. 4 to an unknown destination and wrongfully confined him for 16/17 days. They also demanded a huge ransom. Thereafter, the family of P.W. 4 procured money after disposal of all their family properties and also collected some amount from villagers on subscription and paid the ransom to the miscreants. Subsequently, on 17th day, P.W. 4 was released from the captivity of the miscreants and he returned home. 4. On 23.11.1998 at about 10.45 a.m., a telephonic information was received by Santirbazar police station from an unknown person that one Chitta Das of Kalacherra was abducted by armed miscreants from Kalacherra market. The said information was recorded as GD. No. 608 in the Santirbazar PS and then S.I., Nityananda Sarkar (P.W. 9) rushed to Kalacherra village. While he reached Kalacherra, one Uttam Das, a brother-in-law of P.W. 4 submitted a written F.I.R. and on the basis of the said FIR, the police registered a case being Santirbazar PS Case No. 78 of 1998 under Section 364A of the IPC and Section 27 of the Arms Act. On being entrusted, P.W. 9 started investigation, prepared hand sketch map of the place of occurrence, examined available witnesses and also recorded their statements under Section 161 Cr. PC. He also raided the house of the accused persons as their names were divulged from the statement made by the witnesses examined, but they could not be arrested as they were found absconding. Finally, the investigating authority filed charge sheet against the accused appellants for commission of offence punishable under Section 364A of IPC and Section 27 of the Arms Act showing the accused appellants absconders. 5. The learned SDJM, Belonia upon receipt of the police report had taken cognizance and issued warrant of arrest against both the accused appellants who were absconding. 6. On the strength of the warrant issued, the accused appellant Sanjit Reang was arrested and produced before the Court on 13.6.1999 and the accused Pashuram Reang on 28.6.1999 and thereafter the case was committed to the Court of Sessions being offence is a session's triable one. 7. 6. On the strength of the warrant issued, the accused appellant Sanjit Reang was arrested and produced before the Court on 13.6.1999 and the accused Pashuram Reang on 28.6.1999 and thereafter the case was committed to the Court of Sessions being offence is a session's triable one. 7. The learned Additional Sessions Judge, Belonia, South Tripura after hearing the parties and on perusal of the evidence as well as materials on record, framed the charges against the accused appellants for commission of offence punishable under Section 364A of the IPC and Section 27 of the Arms Act to which the accused appellants pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. 8. In the course of the trial, the prosecution examined as many as nine witnesses to prove its case and also adduced some documents. Out of nine witnesses as; examined by the prosecution, P.W. 4 is the victim, i.e., the abducted person and the starred witness of the occurrence. P.W. 1 Sri Uttam Das is the person who had lodged the FIR. P.W. 2 Sri Ananta Reang was present in the shop of P.W. 4 as a customer at the time of alleged incident. P.W. 3 Smt. Basanti Das is the wife of P.W. 4 who stated that her husband was abducted at the gun point and thereafter her husband was released only when a huge ransom was paid to the extremists. P.W. 5 Sri Sridam Das is the younger brother of P.W. 4. P.W. 6 Sri Pradip Nandi, a co-villager, whom was also attempted to be abducted by the extremists and ultimately, got saved. P.W. 7 Sri Aditya Reang is an owner of another tea stall in the said Kalacherra market and one of the witnesses of the alleged incident P.W. 8 is also a shop keeper in the said market. P.W. 9, Sri Nityananda Sarkar, SI is the IO of the case. Out of the aforesaid witnesses, prosecution has declared hostile to P.W. 2, 7 and 8. They were cross-examined by both the prosecution as well as defence. On closure of the prosecution evidence, the accused appellants were examined under Section 313 CrPC and also called upon for producing their respective defence, but they declined to adduce any evidence in their defence. Their case is of total denial of the prosecution story. 9. They were cross-examined by both the prosecution as well as defence. On closure of the prosecution evidence, the accused appellants were examined under Section 313 CrPC and also called upon for producing their respective defence, but they declined to adduce any evidence in their defence. Their case is of total denial of the prosecution story. 9. At the trial, question came up before the learned trial Judge to decide as to whether P.W. 4 was abducted by the accused appellants at the point of fire arms and kept in detention with threat to cause his death or hurt in order to compel his family to pay a ransom for his release and thus the accused appellants committed offence under Section 364A of the IPC read with Section 27 of the Arms Act. 10. Learned trial Court after visiting on the evidence of prosecution witnesses and the documents exhibited, ultimately found the accused appellants guilty for commission of offence under Section 364A IPC as well as Section 27 of the Arms Act and consequent thereto, convicted and sentenced them as stated supra. Hence the present appeal. 11. Mr. Datta, learned Counsel for the accused appellants while urging for setting aside the order of conviction and sentence as impugned in the instant appeal would contend that the present appellants are not FIR named accused who were arrested after filing of the charge sheet and there was no attempt on the part of the prosecution for their identification by way of TI parade. 12. He has also submitted that the trial Court did not frame charge as per model form prescribed and that the accused appellant were first time identified in the dock at the time of trial and basing on such identification for the first time in the Court, a person cannot be convicted, as such identification is an afterthought. In support of his aforesaid contention, he placed reliance on a decision of the Apex Court in Sukhbir Singh & Anr. Vs. State of Punjab, 2011 Cri. L.J. 2336, particularly, para-6 of the said report. In support of his aforesaid contention, he placed reliance on a decision of the Apex Court in Sukhbir Singh & Anr. Vs. State of Punjab, 2011 Cri. L.J. 2336, particularly, para-6 of the said report. More so, there is no evidence that the accused appellants by themselves or through their agent asked for any ransom, rather the case of the prosecution is that the accused appellants demanded money through third person and after negotiation through the middle man and on payment of money; the P. W 4 was released from the alleged captivity of the extremists and that third person/middleman was neither produced nor examined by the prosecution. Such non-examination of third person or middleman itself creates a doubt regarding the payment of ransom and thus the present accused appellants were involved in the alleged occurrence, Mr. Datta contends. 13. It has again been submitted by Mr. Datta that P.W. 2 and P.W. 8 who are allegedly to be the eye witnesses of the occurrence ultimately could not identify the accused appellants for which they were declared hostile by the prosecution. 14. His another submission was before this Court is that P.W. 4 is the best person to identify the extremists who abducted him for getting the alleged ransom, but P. W 4 in his statement before the Court stated that in a place where he was kept in detention, he could only learn the names of the accused appellants as extremists, but from whom he had learnt those names, he did not disclose and in his cross-examination, he specifically stated that the accused persons were not present in that place where he was kept confined last time before his release. Nowhere in his statement, he stated that these two accused appellants had abducted him, Mr. Datta contended. 15. He again contended that the alleged letter, which was received from the extremists for giving them ransom of Rs. 3 lacs, and on the basis of which., the villagers collected subscription and paid Rs. 45,500/- as ransom and P.W. 4 was released from the captivity, was also not produced before the trial Court. Datta contended. 15. He again contended that the alleged letter, which was received from the extremists for giving them ransom of Rs. 3 lacs, and on the basis of which., the villagers collected subscription and paid Rs. 45,500/- as ransom and P.W. 4 was released from the captivity, was also not produced before the trial Court. As such, the story of receiving letter, collecting money on subscription by the villagers and paying money as ransom to the extremists for release of P. W 4 is also not proved by direct evidence which creates a doubt for which also the prosecution case has to be dis-believed. 16. He further contended that some of the prosecution witnesses stated that they had learnt the names of the accused appellants from the local people, but hone of those local people were examined. Not only that, no arm has been seized from the custody of the accused persons. Placing reliance on the statement of the accused appellant Pashuram Reang recorded under Section 313 CrPC, he also submits that the learned trial Court while examining the said accused appellant did not put question on the disclosure of the names by the witnesses who had stated that at the time of alleged occurrence, the appellant wearing gamchha with a carbine and the other wearing half-pant with a dao and pistol in hand came in front of the shop of the P. W 4, rather the question was put in general. As a result, the alleged appellants could not get opportunity to answer those questions properly, though they denied the same. 17. He also raised a question regarding question No. 11 put to the appellant Pashuram in 313 statement wherein the trial Court recorded that it transpires from the evidence that after kidnapping R W. 4, he gave a letter demanding Rs. 3 lacs as ransom and then Rs. 45,500/- was given by way of selling whatever the family of the kidnapped person, i.e., the P.W. 4, had and by raising subscription locally and P. W 4 was released/set free. But from where the trial Court got those evidences, when none of the prosecution witnesses stated that letter demanding Rs. 3 lacs was either written or given by the accused appellant Pashuram Reang. But from where the trial Court got those evidences, when none of the prosecution witnesses stated that letter demanding Rs. 3 lacs was either written or given by the accused appellant Pashuram Reang. Thus, such 313 statement is also against the prescription of law, for which itself also, the accused appellants are entitled to get the benefit of doubt and consequent thereto, an acquittal. 18. He further contended that as regards the statement of Sanjit Reang recorded under Section 313 CrPC, same wrong committed by the learned trial Court and in support of his aforesaid contention, he placed reliance on a judgment of this Court in Ratan Lal Banik Vs. State of Tripura, 2012 (2) GLT 252 : (2012) 2 GLR 896. 19. Mr. Debnath, learned Addl. P.P. while supporting the order of conviction and sentence passed by the learned trial Court and countering the submission of Mr. Datta, would contend that this is not a case of an offence committed by a normal habitual offender in the society, but by a group of extremists powered by arms who were fighting against the nation and committing offence for collecting ransom by way of abduction of the innocent people to fulfill their aims. Thus, it would not be proper for this Court to assess the evidence of the witnesses of the prosecution like other criminal cases. 20. He further urges that the area where the occurrence took place was an extremists infested area and at the relevant time, a reign of terror was throughout the State by arm extremists like the accused appellants. Even if those extremists were known to the people of the locality, they could mot open their mouth due to fear psychosis and on a belief that those extremists will create more reign of terror in the locality which would cause more harm to the local people and due to such fear psychosis, P.W. 2 and P.W. 8 did shift from their earlier statement and thus declared hostile. In their first time statements before the police, they divulged the real truth wherein they also named the present accused appellants which was proved by the IO of the case while deposing before the Court. Thus, the evidences of those witnesses have to be considered along with their previous statement, Exhbt. In their first time statements before the police, they divulged the real truth wherein they also named the present accused appellants which was proved by the IO of the case while deposing before the Court. Thus, the evidences of those witnesses have to be considered along with their previous statement, Exhbt. 2 and 3 which corroborate the substantive evidence of other witnesses in respect of involvement of the accused relating to the abduction of P.W. 4 and payment of ransom, on receipt of which, P.W. 4 was released from the captivity and also identified them. In support of his aforesaid contention, he has placed reliance in Tarun Bora @ Alok Hazarika Vs. State of Assam, 2002 Cri. L.J. 4078, wherein the Apex Court noted, inter alia, 28. It is quite but natural that in a prevalent situation, obtaining in the area surcharged with the insurgency activities, striking a terror and fear psychosis in the mind of the people, the investigating Officer would definitely find difficulties to collect sufficient corroborative evidence. Witnesses will be reluctant to come to the Court to depose or appear before the Investigating Officer to give statement for fear of reprisals. Rerety, one comes across any corroborative evidence in such type of offence. This would be no ground to throw away otherwise trustworthy evidence of prosecution witnesses. In the facts and circumstances of the present case, as adumbrated above, coupled with the credible and trustworthy statement of P.W. 1 Bhola Kakati, the prosecution has established its case. It must be remembered that the statement-in-chief of P.W. -1 remained unimpeached. We have no reason to doubt the creditworthy evidence of Bhola Kakati-P.W. 4, apart from the other lending circumstances as discussed above. 21. It must be remembered that the statement-in-chief of P.W. -1 remained unimpeached. We have no reason to doubt the creditworthy evidence of Bhola Kakati-P.W. 4, apart from the other lending circumstances as discussed above. 21. He further submits that there is no doubt that a person cannot be convicted on the basis of the first time identification in the dock normally in a case, but when there is abnormal situation due to extremist activities like the case in hand and more so, the present accused appellants were admittedly absconders and they were arrested after filing of the charge sheet and thus there was no scope on the part of the prosecution witnesses to identify these accused persons before the trial Court and in a case where extremists are involved, it is the duty of the Court to consider the prosecution evidence in an exceptional manner than the normal way of assessing the evidence. 22. His another submission was that the P.W. 4 in his statement specifically stated that the persons armed with Dao and pistol entered into his (P.W. 4) shop and enquired about him by his name to which P.W. 4 replied to them that he was the said person, i.e., Chitta Das, and at once those armed persons directed him to go with them or else, they would shot him and out of fear, he proceeded with them and for about 6/7 hours he had to walk inside the forest and was shifted from one place to other place. Thus, the story of the prosecution regarding abduction of P.W. 4 is proved, as the victim himself narrated the story before the Court and he has also stated that he could learn the names of the accused appellants who abducted him while he was in captivity. Therefore, the person from whom he learnt the names of the accused appellants could not be disclosed and thus examined, as they were admittedly the members of the group of the extremists and the present appellants were also identified by P.W. 4 in the dock at the time of trial. Thus, the evidence of P.W. 4 is believable and to be considered with the aid of the statements of other witnesses from which it would be clear that it was the accused appellants who had committed the offence. As such, the prosecution has fully proved its case. Thus, the evidence of P.W. 4 is believable and to be considered with the aid of the statements of other witnesses from which it would be clear that it was the accused appellants who had committed the offence. As such, the prosecution has fully proved its case. Hence, there is no question of setting aside the order of learned trial Court and acquitting the present appellants. 23. To attract the provisions of Section 364A of the Cr. P.C. which are required to be proved are: (i) That the accused kidnapped or abducted the person. (ii) And kept him under detention after such kidnapping, or abduction and (iii) The kidnapping or abduction was for ransom. Unless these three ingredients are proved, an offence under Section 364A cannot be established. 24. For proper consideration of the submission of the learned Counsel for the parties, now we shall proceed to examine the evidence on record on the basis of which the appellants were convicted by the trial Court. 25. P.W. 1 Sri Uttam Das is the brother-in-law of P.W. 4, who lodged the FIR with the police station stating inter alia that on 23.11.1998, at about 9-30/10 a.m., he was in front of the shop of P.W. 4 at Kalacherra market and at that time, two young men belonged to tribal community, one wearing a napkin (gamchha) armed with a pistol and a dao and another a half pant armed with a carbine in hand abruptly appeared in the shop of P. W 4 and alarmed them with a threat not to move and, accordingly, he surrendered. He has also stated that those two tribal youths aimed pistol and carbine towards P.W. 4 and thereafter abducted him. On the way back, they also tried to kidnap Pradip Nandi, P.W. 6, but he somehow escaped. At that time, nobody could move to protect P.W. 4 as they aimed at them with their fire arms stating that if anybody would move, they would open fire. Somebody of the village thereafter reported the said incident to the police. The police officer then came to their village that he reported the incident in writing and the same was treated as FIR. He has further stated that the miscreants kidnapped his brother-in-law for ransom and they demanded money through third person and after negotiation through middleman and on payment of Rs. The police officer then came to their village that he reported the incident in writing and the same was treated as FIR. He has further stated that the miscreants kidnapped his brother-in-law for ransom and they demanded money through third person and after negotiation through middleman and on payment of Rs. 60,000/-70,000/-, his brother-in-law (P.W. 4) was released from the captivity though his brother-in-law was in custody of those extremists for about 17 days. The accused persons who abducted his brother-in-law were not known to him by name, but he had found them face to face and ultimately identified them in the dock and identifying the accused appellant Sanjit Reang, he stated that he found him with a pistol and dao in his hand and accused appellant Parshuram Reang with a carbine in his hand. He also stated that since their place is an interior area, it is extremely affected by the extremists. Therefore, they are afraid of them. In his cross, he has stated that after about 10/20 minutes, he met with Pradip Nandi (P.W. 6) who told him about the incident, but Pradip Nandi did not tell him the names of the miscreants. This witness has also denied the suggestion given by the defence. 26. P.W. 2 Ananta Reang has also stated in his statement that he was present in the shop of P.W. 4 while two extremists armed with Dao and fire arms entered into the shop of P.W. 4 and threatened him to open fire unless he would go with them and on gun point, they abducted P.W. 4. He also stated that out of those two tribal boys; one was wearing a napkin (gamchha) and the other a half pant, but he could not identify them. But at that stage, this witness was declared hostile by the prosecution and by way of cross-examination, he was confronted with his earlier statement recorded under Section 161 Cr. P.C. wherein it was recorded that 'at the time suddenly I found Parshuram of Debipur and Sanjit Reang of Kathalia wearing a napkin and a half pant and one armed with a carbine and the other armed with a pistol and a dao entered into the shop of Chitta Das (P.W. 4) and Sanjit Reang aimed pistol to Chitta Das and putting him under fear of being killed abducted him from the shop. Myself and others who were in the shop tried to prevent the miscreants but Parshuram showing carbine threatened us that if anybody take any attempt to move, they would fire and kill them and thereafter they left towards east.' But he denied to have mentioned the names of the accused persons in his 161 statement. That portion of his statement before the IO was marked by the trial Court as Exhibit 2 for proving the same by the 10. He has also denied the suggestion of the prosecution that out of fear of the accused persons, he has suppressed the truth. 27. P.W. 3, Smt. Basanti Das, wife of P.W. 4, has stated that her husband was abducted by the extremists on 23.11.1998 from their shop at about 10 a.m. and their area is seriously affected by the extremists. She has also stated that her husband was abducted on gun point and she was reported that her husband would be released only in the event of payment of ransom and being they are very poor, the villagers collected subscription and after payment of money, on 17/18th day her husband was recovered. As this witness did not implicate the accused appellants, the defence declined to cross-examine her. 28. P.W. 4 Chitta Ranjan Das is the person who was abducted. He has narrated the prosecution story in detail, stating, inter alia, that on 23.11.1998, while he was in his tea stall at Kalacherra market and was engaged in selling tea, at that time, two armed extremists belonging to tribal community came in front of his shop-one was with a pistol and a dao and the other was armed with a carbine. The young man armed with carbine was standing in front of his shop and was threatening others and the other armed with dao and pistol entered inside his shop and enquired to him as to who was Chitta Das to which he replied that he was Chitta Das. The armed young man at once pointed pistol on his head and directed to go out of the shop and proceed with them, otherwise he would be shot dead. Nobody came out to prevent those miscreants out of fear. They dragged him out of his shop and ultimately abducted him. The armed young man at once pointed pistol on his head and directed to go out of the shop and proceed with them, otherwise he would be shot dead. Nobody came out to prevent those miscreants out of fear. They dragged him out of his shop and ultimately abducted him. Thereafter, for 6/7 hours he had to walk with those miscreants inside the forest and in the evening, they took him in a tong house (a house where normally tribal people reside) in the interior area and for two/three days, he was kept there. Thereafter, he was shifted to some other place. He has also stated that he was kept in custody of the extremists for about 15/16 days and thereafter, they released him at Kathal Bagan area. While he was in the captivity of the extremists, five persons were always guarding him and on being released by the extremists, he on foot came back to his home. On reaching home, he fell seriously ill and was treated at the hospital in Santirbazar. He has further stated that in that place where he was kept, he could learn the names of the miscreants who abducted him as Sanjit Reang and Parshuram Reang and he duly identified both the accused persons present in the dock. In his cross-examination, he has specifically stated that the accused persons were not present in the place where he was last kept confined. They also did not escort him while he was released. 29. P.W. 5 Sridam Das is the younger brother of P.W. 4 who has stated that on 23.11.1993 while working in his house, he heard hue and cry towards the market and some people were saying that Chitta Das was being kidnapped. Then they rushed to the market and found many people-both tribal and Bengalee of the locality, gathered there and were telling that Chitta Das was kidnapped by the miscreants on gun point. He has also stated that some of the local people who gathered there were also saying that Sanjit Reang and Parshuram Reang abducted his brother. He has also stated that Sanjit Reang and Parshuram Reang are known in the locality as the cattle lifter and the abductor of the people for ransom, but he does not know them personally. After abduction of his brother, the extremists sent a letter to them for giving them a ransom of Rs. He has also stated that Sanjit Reang and Parshuram Reang are known in the locality as the cattle lifter and the abductor of the people for ransom, but he does not know them personally. After abduction of his brother, the extremists sent a letter to them for giving them a ransom of Rs. 3 lacs. But being they are very poor, they have sold their house and disposed of their house-hold cattle and other properties and also collected subscSriptions from, the; villagers and ultimately paid to the miscreants Rs. 45,500/-. Thereafter, on 16th day, his brother was released from the captivity. 30. P.W. 6, Pradip Nandi, has stated almost the same story as narrated by other witnesses, but more specifically stated that while he was just passing through the road by the side of Kalacharra market, at that time, he found two young men, both belonged to tribal community, one armed with a pistol and a dao and the other armed with a carbine in hand, were dragging Chitta Das and when they saw him, they pointed pistol and carbine aiming him and directed him to accompany them. On being extremely frightened, he proceeded with them following their directions, but after going to some extent, they enquired about his name. When he told his name, they directed him to go back. Thereafter, he ran away from the spot. He has also stated that many people of the locality-both Bengalee and tribal, gathered at the place of occurrence and some people belonging to tribal community told that the miscreants were Sanjit Reang and Parshuram Reang. But they were not known to him prior to that day. He learnt the names from the local people and identified the accused appellants in the dock. He has also stated that out of fear, he did not disclose the names of the extremists at the very moment just after the abduction. In his cross, he has denied the suggestion of the defence that the accused Sanjit Reang and Parshuram Reang, who were present in the dock, did not try to kidnap Chitta Das. 31. P.W. 7 Aditya Reang, a co-shop keeper of the said market, in his statement admitted the fact of abduction of P.W. 4 by two tribal young boys, but did not disclose their names though in his earlier statement, he has implicated the present appellants. 31. P.W. 7 Aditya Reang, a co-shop keeper of the said market, in his statement admitted the fact of abduction of P.W. 4 by two tribal young boys, but did not disclose their names though in his earlier statement, he has implicated the present appellants. As a result, the prosecution declared him hostile but he was confronted with his earlier 161 statement stating, inter alia, that he personally knew both the extremists as Parshuram Reang of Debipur and Sanjit Reang of Kathaliacharra, but he denied to have made such statements to the 10. The said portion of his statement was marked as Exhibit-3 subject to proof by 10. As this witness was declared hostile by the prosecution, the defence declined to cross-examine him. 32. P.W. 8 Tapan Debbarma, another co-shop keeper of P.W. 4, has also narrated the story in the same way like P.W. 7 and as he has shifted from his earlier statement, he was also declared hostile by the prosecution. In his cross, he has stated that when he was examined by Daroga babu, at that time, he was in his tea stall and preparing tea for the customers and found Parshuram Reang of Debipur and Sanjit Reang of Kathaliacherra were abducting Chitta Das of Kalacherra market on the point of pistol and was proceeding towards the road leading to the Kathal Bagan (jackfruit orchard). He himself and other people of the market tried to rescue Chitta Das, but Sanjit Reang threatened them with a carbine that if anybody of them tried to prevent them they would kill them firing from the firm arm. In his cross, he has stated that he did not tell Daroga babu anything like that and he also did not know Parshuram Reang and Sanjit Reang by name and face. 33. The trial Court at this stage put him a question why he had made a contradictory statement about the identity of the accused persons and how he liked to explain it, upon which this witness answered that he could not identify the miscreants. At that time, the trial Court observed, inter alia, that this witness appeared to be under fear and was not looking towards the accused dock. 34. At that time, the trial Court observed, inter alia, that this witness appeared to be under fear and was not looking towards the accused dock. 34. P.W. 9 S.I. Nityananda Sarkar is the I.O. of the case who in his statement has stated that on 23.11.1998, he had received telephonic information from an unknown person that one Chitta Das of Kalacherra was abducted by armed extremists from Kalacherra market. That information was entered as G.D. entry No. 608 dated 23.11.1998 of Santirbazar Police Station and being directed by the O.C. of the said police station, he rushed to Kalacherra with staff. When he reached Kalacharra market, one Uttam Das (P.W. 1) submitted before him a written complaint which disclosed a cog. offence. Therefore, he started investigation on the spot He visited the place of occurrence as shown by the complainant, P.W. 1, and prepared a hand sketch map. He also recorded the statement of P.W. 2 Ananta Reang and P.W. 7 Aditya Reang, which were marked as Exhibit-2 and 3 respectively. 35. Section 364A has been introduced in the Penal Code by virtue of amendment of the Act 42 of 1993 and the purpose of introduction was given as under: Kidnappings by terrorists for ransom, for creating panic amongst the people and for securing release of arrested associates and cadres have assumed serious dimensions. The existing provisions of law have proved to be inadequate as deterrence. The Law Commission in its 42nd Report has also recommended a specific provision to deal with this menace. It was necessary to amend the Indian Penal Code to provide for deterrent punishment to person committing such acts and to make consequential amendments to the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973. 36. The Law Commission in its 42nd Report has also recommended a specific provision to deal with this menace. It was necessary to amend the Indian Penal Code to provide for deterrent punishment to person committing such acts and to make consequential amendments to the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973. 36. On plain reading of the objects and reasons of the amendment shows that law making authority in dealing with kidnapping for ransom a crime which called for a deterrent punishment, even in a case where the kidnapping had not resulted in the death of the victim and from various statistic it reveals that kidnapping for ransom has become a lucrative and common phenomenon in the country which needed to be dealt in the harshest possible manner, but at the same time, it is the duty of the Court to see whether the persons implicated in an offence under Section 364A is really involved in the matter and if involved, whether there is any direct substantial evidence against the persons implicated unless the substantial evidence is there, the Court should not be over enthusiastic while dealing with such a case. 37. In a criminal case, obviously always mathematical proof may not be possible, but prosecution is bound to prove its case by adducing evidence so that a reasonable man can come to a conclusion, inter alia, that the story of prosecution is plausible one. Suspicion regarding involvement of an accused, what so may be high that cannot be the basis for a conviction unless it is methodically proved that the accused is involved with the alleged incident. 38. The Apex Court in a catena of decisions noted that mere physical description of the accused by the witness would not be sufficient for conviction unless such an accused is properly identified and the identification at the first time in the dock is also deprecated by the Apex Court though there is no flexible rule regarding the mode of identification. 39. In Sukhbir Singh & Anr. (supra), the Apex Court while considering the argument advanced by the learned Counsel for the parties where in the FIR, the accused have been described as two Sikh youth aged about 25-30 years old wearing kurta pajamas and on the basis of that FIR, the accused were arrested by the police and they were identified for the first time in the Court. Their Lordship of the Apex Court while considering such identification first time in the dock noted that the physical description of the appellants given in the FIR would fit millions of youth in Punjab, and could not by itself pin the murder on them and that the prosecution has also not come out with the steps in the investigation which had led to their Identification as primary assailants. It is further noted that it was, in this back ground, obligatory on the part of the prosecution to have produced Sub-Inspector Pyara Singh who could have testified to the steps in the investigation made by him which had enabled him to identify the appellants as the killers and that was also not done. The Apex Court in that case further noted that there is absolutely no evidence other than the identification in the Court made long after the incident. According to the Apex Court, there is no flexible rule that an identification made in the first time in the Court is always to be ruled out of consideration, but the broad principle is that in the background there is no other evidence against the accused on identification in Court made long after the event is clearly not acceptable. 40. The Apex Court also distinguished in that case, the case of Malkhansingh & Ors. Vs. State of M.P., 2003 (5) SCC 746 : ( AIR 2003 SC 2669 ) wherein a prosecutrix, a victim of a gang rape, had herself identified some of the accused for the first time in the Court on which the Apex Court opined that the identification was acceptable as a good piece of evidence. 41. Thus, it can be said that even first time identification in the Court can also be acceptable depending upon the facts situation of a case. In the instant case, admittedly, the present accused appellants were absconders and while they were absconding, the Investigating Officer submitted the charge sheet. The prosecution also proved regarding the facts of abduction of P. W 4 and the facts relating to keeping him in the captivity, i.e., in the custody of the extremists and there was no scope for the prosecution to go for earlier identification of the accused appellants by way of T.I. parade or any other means. The prosecution also proved regarding the facts of abduction of P. W 4 and the facts relating to keeping him in the captivity, i.e., in the custody of the extremists and there was no scope for the prosecution to go for earlier identification of the accused appellants by way of T.I. parade or any other means. Hence, the case of Sukhbir Singh (supra) is distinguishable and not an absolute law regarding identification of an accused. 42. P.W. 4 has, in his statement, specifically stated that where he was kept in the captivity, these two accused appellants were not present there and also did not state that these two accused appellants abducted him, rather his statement before the trial Court was that he had learnt the names of these two accused appellants while he was in captivity and first time identified the accused appellants in the dock. 43. P.W. 6 a also identified the accused persons for the first time in the dock by way giving some explanation that out of fear, he did not disclose the names of the accused appellants at the very moment after abduction of P.W. 4. This explanation given by this witness cannot be brushed aside considering the facts that the area where the incident took place was an extremists' infested area and thus, we are unable to accept the submission of Mr. Datta fully regarding first time identification in the dock. First time identification of the accused in the dock can also be acceptable depending upon the facts and circumstances of a case. 44. Regarding the submission of Mr. Datta on the question of statement recorded under Section 313 CrPC, we have considered the judgment passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court (one of us, Sana J.) in Ratan Lal Banik Vs. State of Tripura, 2012 (2) GLT 252 : (2012) 2 GLR 896, wherein it was held that there is no doubt that aim and object of Section 313, Cr. P.C. is to provide fair and proper opportunity to the; accused for explaining circumstances appearing against him and questioning must be done in such a manner and in such a way which even an ignorant and illiterate person can appreciate and understand, the questions put by the learned trial Court as mentioned above cannot be treated as simple as required. P.C. is to provide fair and proper opportunity to the; accused for explaining circumstances appearing against him and questioning must be done in such a manner and in such a way which even an ignorant and illiterate person can appreciate and understand, the questions put by the learned trial Court as mentioned above cannot be treated as simple as required. While questioning, the learned trial Court should put the evidence of the witnesses separately indicating which witness implicated the accused and more so, the same should be done in a very simple manner, not with complex question so that the accused can understand the same and give proper answer to it. 45. On perusal of the statement recorded under Section 313 Cr. P.C., it appears that the trial Court put the question in a very casual manner, inter alia, that it transpires from the evidence of witness No. 4 that after kidnapping, you made the witness walk for 6/7 hours and thus took him to a tong hut at an unknown place inside the jungle, and kept him confined/apprehended there for 2/3 days, and later you took him from there to another place and kept him there, and 15/16 days later, on taking ransom, you set the witness free near the jackfruit orchard and from there, the witness came on foot to his own house about 7 miles away and became sick. Have you got anything to say in this respect? 46. P.W. 4 nowhere has stated in his statement that the accused appellants abducted him and took him in a Tong hut at an unknown place inside the jungle and that they took ransom from the family of P.W. 4. It also appears that the learned Trial Court in one of the questions asked the accused appellants, inter alia, that it transpires from the evidence of the witnesses as well as on the basis of Exbt. 2 and 3 that you and the other accused person kidnapped Chitta Das and witnesses No. 1, 4 and 6 identified you in the Court. Have you got anything to say in this respect? Accused answered-False statement. 47. From the aforesaid questions, even a prudent person would not be in a position to understand what is Exbt. 2 and 3 and what is the content therein. Thus, according to this Court, this type of complex question should not be put to an accused. Have you got anything to say in this respect? Accused answered-False statement. 47. From the aforesaid questions, even a prudent person would not be in a position to understand what is Exbt. 2 and 3 and what is the content therein. Thus, according to this Court, this type of complex question should not be put to an accused. The question should be explained in such a manner that an accused can understand the same easily and also can answer properly. Thus, according to this Court, this type of recording statement under Section 313 Cr. P.C. cannot be accepted by a Court of law as the same did not provide any opportunity to the accused to answer the question and thus, the submission of Mr. Datta that the questions put by the trial Court to the accused appellants at the time of recording the statement under Section 313 CrPC are vague in nature has; some force. 48. In State of W.B. Vs. Mir Mohammad Omar & Ors., (2000) 8 SCC 382 , referred by Mr. Debnath, the Apex Court noted as under: 31. The pristine rule that the burden of proof is on the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused should not be taken as a fossilized doctrine as though it admits no process of intelligent reasoning. The doctrine of presumption is not alien to the above rule, nor would it impair the temper of the rule. On the other hand, if the traditional rule relating to burden of proof of the prosecution is allowed to be wrapped in pedantic coverage, the offenders in serious offences would be the major beneficiaries and the society would be the casualty. 32. In this case, when the prosecution succeeded in establishing the afore-narrated circumstances, the court has to presume the existence of certain facts. Presumption is a course recognized by the law for the court to rely on in conditions such as this. 33. Presumption of fact is an inference as to the existence of one fact from the existence of some other facts unless the truth of such inference is disproved. Presumption of fact is a rule in law of evidence that a fact otherwise doubtful may be inferred, from certain other proved facts. 33. Presumption of fact is an inference as to the existence of one fact from the existence of some other facts unless the truth of such inference is disproved. Presumption of fact is a rule in law of evidence that a fact otherwise doubtful may be inferred, from certain other proved facts. When inferring the existence of a fact from other set of proved facts, the court exercises a process of reasoning and reaches a logical conclusion as the most probable position. The above principle has gained legislative recognition in India when Section 114 is incorporated in the Evidence Act. It empowers the court to presume the existence of any fact which it thinks likely to have happened. In that process the court shall have regard to the common course of natural events, human conduct etc. in relation to the facts of the case. 49. There is no doubt that the prosecution can prove its case in such a way from which a Court on presumption can come to an inference to the existence of one fact from the existence of some other facts and then such presumption of fact is obviously a rule in law of evidence and the Court can also act on it. But while the Court has to act on presumption, then the Court has to act with greater caution and accept the plea of presumption basing on evidence to ensure that justice alone is done. In the instant case, P.W. 4 and 6 admittedly identified the accused in the dock for the first time. More so, though the statements of P.W. 2 and 7, the hostile witnesses, recorded by the IO (P.W. 9) under Section 161 Cr. P.C. were proved, but the same alone cannot be the basis for conviction, as P.W. 2 in his cross by prosecution has specifically stated that he did not state to the Investigating Officer, P.W. 9, regarding the statement as recorded under Section 161 CrPC wherein he had stated that he had found Parshuram of Debipur and Sanjit Reang of Kathalia wearing a napkin and a half pant and one armed with a Carbine and the other armed with a pistol and a dao entered into the shop of Chitta Das and Sanjit Reang aimed pistol to Chitta Das and putting him under fear of being killed abducted him from the shop. P.W. 7 also in his cross by the prosecution stated, inter alia, that he did not state to P.W. 9 that he personally knew both the extremists as Parshuram Reang of Debipur and Sanjit Reang of Kathaliacherra. Thus, Exbt. 2 and 3 are nothing but the evidence of the police officer who has conducted the investigation. 50. The evidence of police officer cannot be treated untrustworthy always, but after careful consideration and scrutiny, whenever the evidence of a police officer inspires confidence of the Court and such evidence is found reliable, then that can be the basis of conviction even in absence of some independent evidence of the locality subject to the same is corroborated by other evidences. P.W. 4 as well as P.W. 6 nowhere in their statements gave any explanation how and when they came to know the name of the accused. Therefore, it is very difficult on the part of the Court to infer the existence of facts from the evidence of the prosecution and come to a logical conclusion that the present accused are involved with the abduction of P.W. 4. 51. It is settled position of law that always the presumption cannot be raised against the accused either of facts or any evidence, which can be the basis for conviction. The Court is to consider the evidence as a whole as available on record while deciding a case. Hence, we are unable to contribute to the presumption as pointed out by the prosecution which is not based on legal evidence. The case of the prosecution would have been totally different, if the P.W. 2 and P.W. 7, the hostile witnesses, as well as P.W. 4 and P.W. 6, could have identified the accused persons before trial was initiated. 52. In the case of Tarun Bora (supra), the accused Tarun Bora was identified by the persons who were abducted and his name was mentioned in the FIR itself. Not only that, he was also identified by P.W. 1 of that case, Bhola Kakati, the person abducted. 52. In the case of Tarun Bora (supra), the accused Tarun Bora was identified by the persons who were abducted and his name was mentioned in the FIR itself. Not only that, he was also identified by P.W. 1 of that case, Bhola Kakati, the person abducted. There is no doubt that the Investigating Officer found some difficulties to collect sufficient corroborative evidence in connection with a case arisen from an area surcharged with the insurgency activities, as there would be some sort of fear psychosis in the mind of people, but that itself would not allow the prosecution for non-production of materials like arms which allegedly used at the time of occurrence and when a charge has been made under Section 27 of the Arms Act. Therefore, the case of Tarun Bora (supra) has no direct bearing in the case at hand. Decision in a criminal case by the Apex Court cannot be always treated as precedent as the Apex Court normally decides a criminal case considering the facts involved in that case. More so, except P.W. 6 and Exbt. 2 and 3, i.e., first time statements of the hostile witnesses, almost all the witnesses have stated that they learnt the names of the accused appellants from the local people, but none of those local people were examined. It is the admitted position that when a person discloses certain facts to another person and if that person discloses facts heard by him before a Court, his evidence is admissible, but the fact which is disclosed by the first person to the latter person is not admissible being the same is hearsay evidence. 53. In the instant case also, the evidence of P.W. 1, 3 and 5 cannot be accepted so far implication of the present accused appellants are concerned. We have already stated that when the P.W. 4 has specifically stated in his statement that the accused persons were not available in the place where he was kept in the captivity, in that case, it would be difficult to connect the accused appellants with the payment of ransom for releasing him from the captivity. We have already stated that when the P.W. 4 has specifically stated in his statement that the accused persons were not available in the place where he was kept in the captivity, in that case, it would be difficult to connect the accused appellants with the payment of ransom for releasing him from the captivity. In view of the above, the prosecution fails to prove that the demand for ransom was made by the accused appellants and the ransom was also paid either to the accused appellants or to their agent as none of the witnesses stated in their statement who has paid ransom and to whom. Thus story of payment ransom is doubtful one and unless the same is proved or established, then Section 364A of the IPC cannot be attracted. In the result, we find it difficult to accept the charge under Section 364A of the IPC against the accused appellants. But on detailed scrutiny of the evidence of prosecution witnesses, particularly the evidence of P.W. 6 and P.W. 4 read with Exbt. 2 and 3, it cannot be said that the accused appellants are involved in the abduction of P.W. 4 as discussed above. 54. For the reasons stated above, according to us, there is deficiency in the case of prosecution so far identification and involvement of the accused persons are concerned, as the prosecution failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt with the help of its witnesses. More so, the local persons from whom the P.W. 1, 3 and 5 came to know the names of the accused persons were also not examined as witness. On cumulative reading and appreciation of the entire evidence on record, we are of the opinion that certain legal and factual presumption as pointed out by the prosecution cannot be the basis for conviction in absence of any supporting evidence for such presumption. Thus, the appellants are entitled to get the benefit of doubt for the reasons as stated supra. The view we have taken, it is not necessary on part to deal with other legal questions as raised before us. In the result, we set aside the judgment and order dated 3.1.2000 passed by the learned Addl. Sessions Judge, Belonia and South Tripura in S.T. 37 CST/B) of 1999 and consequent thereto, the appellants are acquitted. The appeal is allowed. In the result, we set aside the judgment and order dated 3.1.2000 passed by the learned Addl. Sessions Judge, Belonia and South Tripura in S.T. 37 CST/B) of 1999 and consequent thereto, the appellants are acquitted. The appeal is allowed. The appellants, namely, Sanjit Reang and Parshuram Reang, are directed to set at liberty unless they are wanted in any other case. Send down the L.C. records. Appeal allowed