Hon'ble BHAGWATI, J.—Challenge in the instant intra court appeal is to the order dated 2nd March, 2009, whereby the learned Single Judge allowed the writ petition of the petitioner-respondent no.1 and held him entitled to the benefit of selection scale with effect from 25th January, 1992, the date on which the selection scale became due to the petitioner-respondent no.1. 2. Shorn of unnecessary details, the facts giving rise to this appeal, succinctly stated are that the petitioner-respondent no.1, having educational qualification of M.A., B.Ed. Was initially appointed on the post of Teacher Grade-III on 6th October, 1977 in Gyan Jyoti Senior Higher Secondary School, Sri Karanpur, District Sri Ganganagar. Thereafter he was promoted to the post of Teacher Grade-II vide order dated 26th May, 1992 subject to the production of original certificate of I.G.D. (Intermediate Grade Drawing) Examination. The appellant submitted a representation to the appellant-Managing Committee of Gyanjyoti School stating that he was having the requisite qualification of M.A., B.Ed., but the condition of producing the original certificate of I.G.D. Was uncalled for. Despite that the appellant-respondent no.2 cancelled his promotion order dated 26th May, 1992 vide order dated 10th July, 1992 merely on the ground that he had failed to produce the original certificate of I.G.D. examination. The petitioner-respondent no.2 reiteratedly stated before the appellant that the certificate of IGD for promotion on the post of Teacher Grade-II was not at all required and yet, arbitrarily, he was reverted to the post of Teacher Grade-III.The appellant-respondent no.2 also did not grant the selection scale to the petitioner-respondent no.1. The petitioner-respondent no.1 submitted an application before the Rajasthan Non Government Educational Institutions Tribunal (here-in-after to be referred to for short as “Tribunal”) against reversion order and for providing benefit of selection pay-scales after completion of 9, 18 and 27 years of service under Circular dated 25.1.1992 issued by the State Government. The Tribunal allowed the prayer of providing the benefit of selection pay-scale, but declined to grant the arrears of selection pay – scale with effect from the date of entitlement and further declined to provide the benefit of promotion on the post of Teacher Grade-II. Aggrieved with the said order of the Tribunal, the petitioner-respondent no.1 filed a writ petition in the High Court, which was decided by the learned Single Judge in his favour. Aggrieved with the said order of the Tribunal, the petitioner-respondent no.1 filed a writ petition in the High Court, which was decided by the learned Single Judge in his favour. Dissatisfied with the order of the learned Single Judge, the appellant has preferred this intra-court appeal after 703 days of the expiry of period of limitation. 3. The appellant is found to have filed an application under Section 5 of Limitation Act, whereby he has beseeched to condone the delay of 703 days in filing the instant appeal. 4. Learned counsel for the appellant reiterating the grounds taken in the application canvassed that during the pendency of the writ petition, learned counsel asked the appellant not to come in the court on each date of hearing and asked him that he shall be called to appear as and when required and on 2nd March, 2009, the writ petition came to be decided, but his counsel did not inform him about the decision of the writ petition and the appellant came to know about the decision of the writ petition only when he was served with the notice of executing court on 25th January, 2011. Learned counsel further canvassed that he filed an appeal soon after he got the information about the decision of the writ petition. Hence, the delay in filing the appeal deserves to be condoned. 5. E Converso, learned counsel for the petitioner-respondent no.1 has vehemently opposed the submissions put forth by the learnead counsel for the appellant and contended that the cause shown in filing the appeal after the expiry of 703 days of limitation per-se seems to be ridiculous and no one can believe that the counsel of the appellant must not have informed him about the decision of the writ petition even in two years. The reason shown by the appellant is not easily acceptable. Hence, merely on the ground of delay in filing the appeal, the appeal deserves to be dismissed. 6. Having reflected over the submissions made at the bar and carefully scanned the relevant material on record, a bird's eye view of some of the decisions of Hon'ble Apex Court throwing light on the question of limitation needs to be taken into consideration. 7. 6. Having reflected over the submissions made at the bar and carefully scanned the relevant material on record, a bird's eye view of some of the decisions of Hon'ble Apex Court throwing light on the question of limitation needs to be taken into consideration. 7. It is relevant to record that the Hon'ble Apex Court in plethora of cases has consistently deprecated the practice of filing writ petitions and appeals after inordinate delay of the expiry of period of limitation. 8. In the case of Postmaster General and others vs. Living Media India Limited and Another reported in (2012) 3 Supreme Court Cases 563, the Hon'ble Apex Court hammered the appellant-Government Department, who filed the Special Leave to Appeal after an inordinate delay of 427 days of the expiry of period of limitation and posed a burning question as to why should the delay be condoned mechanically because the Government or a wing of Government was a party before them? The Hon'ble Apex Court observed that the Government Department cannot claim that they have a separate period of limitation. The law of limitation undoubtedly binds everybody including the Government. Since the Government Department miserably failed to give any acceptable and cogent reason sufficient to condone a huge delay, the Hon'ble Apex Court dismissed the appeal in limine merely on the ground of delay. The Hon'ble Apex Court relied upon some other judgments of its own court, which are cited hereto. 9. In the case of CWT vs. Amateur Riders Club reported in 1994 Supp. (2) SCC 603, the Hon'ble Apex Court observed thus: “3...... Having regard to the law of limitation which binds everybody, we cannot find any way of granting relief. It is true that the Government should not be treated as any other private litigant as, indeed, in the case of the former the decisions to present and prosecute appeals are not individual but are institutional decisions necessarily bogged down by the proverbial red tape. But there are limits to this also. Even with all this latitude, the explanation offered for the delay in this case merely serves to aggravate the attitude of indifference of the Revenue in protecting its common interests. But there are limits to this also. Even with all this latitude, the explanation offered for the delay in this case merely serves to aggravate the attitude of indifference of the Revenue in protecting its common interests. The affidavit is again one of the stereotyped affidavits making it susceptible to the criticism that the Revenue does not seem to attach any importance to the need for promptitude even where it affects its own interest.” 10. In the case of Pundlik Jalam Patil vs. Jalgaon Medium Project reported in (2008) 17 SCC 448, the Hon'ble Apex court held as under: “17.... The evidence on record suggests neglect of its own right for long time in preferring appeals. The court cannot enquire into belated and stale claims on the ground of equity. Delay defeats equity. The Court helps those who are vigilant and 'do not slumber over their rights'.” 11. After referring various earlier decisions, taking very lenient view in condoning the delay, particularly on the part of the Government and Government undertaking, the Hon'ble Apex Court observed as under: “29. It needs no restatement at our hands that the object for fixing time-limit for litigation is based on public policy fixing a life span for legal remedy for the purpose of general welfare. They are meant to see that the parties do not resort to dilatory tactics but avail their legal remedies promptly. Salmond in his Jurisprudence states that the laws come to the assistance of the vigilant and not of the sleepy.” 12. Similarly in the case of S.S. Balu and Another vs. State of Kerala and Others reported in (2009) 2 Supreme Court Cases 479, the Hon'ble Apex Court held that the delay defeats equity and relief can be denied on the ground of delay alone even though relief is granted to other similarly situated person who approached the court in time. The Hon'ble Apex Court further observed, “it is now a trite law that where the writ petitioner approaches the High Court after a long delay, relief prayed for, may be denied to them on the ground of delay and laches irrespective of the fact that they are similarly situated to the other candidates, who obtained the benefit of the judgment.” 13. Adverting to the facts of the instant case, it is revealed that the cause shown in filing the instant appeal after 703 days of the expiry of period of limitation in the application does not seem to be plausible and acceptable. E Contra, the explanation furnished in filing the appeal after an inordinate delay of 703 days is not found to be based on any cogent and acceptable reasoning. Hence, on account of there being insufficient cause for filing the appeal with inordinate delay of 703 days of expiry of the period of limitation, which is found not to have been properly explained, we find no merit in I.A. No. 10383 dated 6.4.2011 filed under Section 5 of Limitation Act and the same stands dismissed accordingly. On account of dismissal of I.A. No. 10383 dated 6.4.2011, the instant appeal also deserves to be dismissed on the ground of delay alone. 14. However, even if we look at the merits of the case, the learned Single Judge having discussed and critically analyzed all the facts and circumstances in the light of the Government Circular ad-longum arrived at a conclusion that the benefit of selection scale on completion of 9, 18 and 27 years of service would be admissible to the petitioner-respondent no.1 also as was available to the Government servants. The controversy as to whether the benefit of selection pay scale is available to the employees of Non Government Educational Institutions or not, stood resolved by a judgment of this Court delivered in the case of S.R. Higher Secondary School and Another vs. Rajasthan Non Government Educational Institutions Tribunal, Jaipur and 23 others reported in Western Law Cases (Raj.) 2002 (3) 586 = RLW 2003(1) Raj. 530, wherein it was held that as per Section 29 of the Rajasthan Non Government Educational Institutions Act, 1989 and Rule 34 of the Rajasthan Non Government Educational Institutions (Recognition, Grant-In-Aid and service conditions etc.) Rules, 1993, the teachers working even in Non Governmental Institutions would also be entitled to selection scale as was payable to the teachers working in Government schools. The State Government approached the Supreme Court by way of Special Leave to Petition, wherein the Non Government Educational Institutions also represented. The State Government approached the Supreme Court by way of Special Leave to Petition, wherein the Non Government Educational Institutions also represented. Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Rajasthan & Another vs. Senior Higher Secondary School, Lachhmangarh and others reported in (2005) 10 SCC 346 = RLW 2005(4) SC 3040 upheld the Division Bench judgment, but in sofar as claim of the Non Government Educational Institutions for Grant-In-Aid against payment of selection grade was concerned, it was directed that it should not be claimed as a matter of right, but opportunity was given to such institutions to represent the Government. In the light of the judgments of this Court as also of the Hon'ble Apex Court, the learned Single Judge held the petitioner-respondent no.1 entitled to the benefit of selection scale with effect from 25th January, 1992, the date on which scale became due to the petitioner-respondent no.1. The impugned order of the learned Single Judge is found to be just and proper and based on sound and cogent reasoning. It suffers from no infirmity and thus, the same warrants no intervention. 15. For the reasons stated above, the intra-court appeal not only fails on the ground of delay alone, but stands dismissed on the ground of merit also. 16. Consequent upon the dismissal of intra-court appeal, the stay application, filed herewith does not survive and the same also stands dismissed accordingly.