R.K. GUPTA. — This is an appeal preferred under section 18 of the SRFAESI Act, 2002 challenging the order passed by the DRT on 9th November, 2011 in S.A. No. 184/2010, whereby the Securitisa-tion Application preferred by the Appellant has been dismissed. The facts leading to the present case are that the present Appellant is the guarantor and for the purpose of recovery of the loan of borrower the Appellant stood as guarantor and the property in question was mortgaged with the Respondent No. 1- Bank. Since the borrower has not paid the dues of the Bank, therefore, the property of the guarantor was put to auction. 2. Before proceeding with the auction, a notice under Sec. 13 (2) of the SRFAESI Act, 2002 was issued by the Bank on 22nd May, 2009 claiming the dues for a sum of Rs. 5,01,515/- plus interest. The said amount was not deposited by the Appellant, therefore, the Bank proceeded to take the notional possession of the property. Thereafter, the property of the Appellant being the guarantor was put to auction. The auction took place on 13th February, 2010. The said property was purchased by the auction purchaser for a sum of Rs. 6,55,000/- and the sale was also confirmed on 24th April, 2010; Thereafter, the sale certificate was issued in favour of the auction purchaser. 3. The Appellant preferred the Se-curitisation Application challenging the sale notice dated 13th January, 2010 and the confirmation of sale of the property before the DRT. Before filing the Securitisation Application the Appellant also preferred a writ petition before the Hon'ble High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, which was registered as Writ-C No. 8143 of 2010. The said petition was finally disposed off by the Division Bench on 17th February, 2010 with a direction to the Petitioner to deposit the entire amount in terms of the notice under Sec. 13 (2) of the SRFAESI Act, 2002. Three, weeks time was also allowed by the Hon'ble High Court and the Hon'ble High Court further directed that till such period no coercive measures will be taken against the Petitioner. Three, weeks time was also allowed by the Hon'ble High Court and the Hon'ble High Court further directed that till such period no coercive measures will be taken against the Petitioner. It was also directed that in the event of default in payment of the amount as directed, the protection so given shall cease to operate and it will be open for the Respondent to immediately proceed to recover the entire amount to which Petitioner undertakes not to object. 4. The Securitisation Application was preferred by the Appellant on 16th November, 2010. The Tribunal was of the opinion that since the application preferred by the Appellant was barred by time and it was not preferred within 45 days from the date of confirmation of the auction, which : was confirmed on 24th April, 2010 therefore, the objection was taken that 1 the Securitisation Application was treated barred by time. With regard to this, the Hon'ble Division Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court, Jabalpur in Writ Petition No. 2393/2011 (Seth Banshidhar Kedia Rice Mills Pvt. Ltd. v. State Bank of India), decided on 5th September, 2011 has taken a view that the provisions contained under section 18 of the SRFAESI Act, 2002 does not empower the Tribunal to condone the delay and Sec. 5 of the Limitation Act does not apply. On the basis of the said judgment while holding the additional charge of DRAT, Delhi, this Tribunal has taken the view in Misc. Appeal No. 290/2011 in T.S.A. No. 1/2010 (Delhi-11) decided on 4th October, 2011 Dena Bank v. Vinedale Distilleries Limited, that the said judgment is also applicable with regard to the Securitisation Application so preferred under section 17 of the SRFAESI Act, 2002. Section 17 of the SRFAESI Act, 2002 also does not empower the Tribunal to condone the delay. In detail reasons have been discussed by this Tribunal in Appeal No. R-34/11 Anjuman Interio & Ex-terio v. Authorized Officer, State Bank of India, decided on 18th October, 2011. 5. Section 17 of the SRFAESI Act, 2002 also does not empower the Tribunal to condone the delay. In detail reasons have been discussed by this Tribunal in Appeal No. R-34/11 Anjuman Interio & Ex-terio v. Authorized Officer, State Bank of India, decided on 18th October, 2011. 5. The D.R.T. has already condoned the delay in preferring the application by recording the reason and the Respondents have not challenged the said findings by opposing the facts in relation to the condonation of delay, therefore, the present Appeal being filed by the guarantor in whose favour the Tribunal has condoned the delay, the order passed by the Tribunal with regard to condonation of delay cannot be interfered. 6. With regard to the merits of the case, the claim was submitted by the Appellant before the Tribunal by virtue of section 13 (8) of the SRFAESI Act, 2002. There is remedy available to the owner of the property for redemption of the property and to this submission, the Tribunal held that since the property has already been sold and the sale certificate has already been issued on 24th April, 2010, therefore the remedy available as per section 13 (8) of the SRFAESI Act, 2002 is not applicable to the Appellant. 7. It is submitted on behalf of the Appellant that the interpretation of section 13 (8) of the SRFAESI Act, 2002 has not properly been appreciated by the Tribunal. On behalf of the Respondent it is contended that the Tribunal has rightly interpreted the same to refuse the right of redemption which was alleged to have been available in favour of the Appellant by virtue of section 13 (8) of the SRFAESI Act, 2002. 8. Before considering the rival submission of the parties, it would be appropriate to refer hereinbelow the section 13 (8) of the SRFAESI Act, 2002, which reads as under: "13(8) If the dues of the secured creditor together with all costs, charges and expenses incurred by him are tendered to the secured creditor at any time before the date fixed for sale or transfer, the secured asset shall not be sold or transferred by the secured creditor, and no further step shall be taken by him for transfer or sale of that secured asset." 9. Reading of section 13 (8) states that right of redemption shall be available in favour of the borrower against the secured creditor, if the dues of secured creditor together with all costs, charges and expenses incurred by him are tendered to the secured creditor at any time before the date fixed for "sale or transfer", the secured assets shall not be "sold or transferred" by the secured creditor and no steps shall be taken by him for transfer or sale of that secured assets. 10. On the basis of the aforesaid, it was contended on behalf of the Respondents that in the present case by issuance of sale certificate in favour of the auction purchaser on 24th April, 2010, the sale is confirmed and absolute rights are transferred in favour of the auction purchaser, therefore, section 13 (8) of the SRFAESI Act, 2002 will have no application. To substantiate the same, learned Counsels for the Respondents have relied upon the judgment passed by the Hon'ble High Court, Madras in K. Chidambara Manickam v. Shdkeena 2007 Mad. L.J. 6-488. 11. On behalf of the Appellant it is contended that the Hon'ble High Court, Madras in para No. 10 of the said judgment has specifically stated that the right of redemption would be available in favour of the owner of the property before the "sale or transfer" but in the said judgment the word "sale" has only been interpreted and in the instant case no question was agitated with regard to the word "transfer", which is also used by the Legislature alongwith the word "sale" or "transfer" and for this it is stated that the said judgment does not apply to the facts and circumstances of the case. 12. Rule 9 (9) of the Security Interest (Enforcement) Rules, 2002 provides that the authorized officer shall deliver; the property to the purchaser free from encumbrances known to the secured creditor on deposit of money as specified in sub-rule (7). 12. Rule 9 (9) of the Security Interest (Enforcement) Rules, 2002 provides that the authorized officer shall deliver; the property to the purchaser free from encumbrances known to the secured creditor on deposit of money as specified in sub-rule (7). Sub-rule (7) of Rule 9 provides that where the immovable property sold is subject to any encumbrances, the authorized officer may, if he thinks fit, allow the purchaser to deposit with him the money required to discharge the encumbrances and any interest due thereon together with such additional amount that may be sufficient to meet the contingencies or further cost, expenses and interest as may be determined by him. 13. On the basis of the aforesaid, what is further required after issuance of sale certificate by virtue of Rule 9 (9) that physical possession of the property sold in the auction is also to be delivered by the authorized officer. The word "transfer" has not been defined in the SRFAESI Act, 2002. Since in the present case the word "transfer" is also to 'be understood with reference to the context of transfer of the immovable property, therefore, the word "transfer of property" as defined under section 5 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 has to be understood with reference to the present case. Section 5 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 defines the word "transfer" with reference to the immovable property and accordingly, it means that the transfer of the property from one living person to another living person. Therefore, the word "transfer" is understood with reference to the Rule 9 (9) that even after the sale of the property and even after the issuance of sale certificate physical possession of the property is also to be handed over by the authorized officer to the auction purchaser. 14. The Legislature has used two distinct words in sub-section (8) of section 13 of the SRFAESI Act, 2002 such as "sale or transfer". Then word "sale" alone has not to be given effect in the context of the present claim of the SRFAESI Act, 2002, but both the words have to be given full meaning. It is not for the Courts to ignore any word used by the Legislature for interpreting the provisions of the statute. Then word "sale" alone has not to be given effect in the context of the present claim of the SRFAESI Act, 2002, but both the words have to be given full meaning. It is not for the Courts to ignore any word used by the Legislature for interpreting the provisions of the statute. Every word used in the statute has to be given the full force until it is found by the Court hat any word used of any kind would do the violence with the object of the Act or would destroy the meaning of the whole of the section or the purpose, of the Act, then such words are to ignored. 15. On the basis of the aforesaid, his Tribunal has to see as to why the Legislature has used two different words in relation to the right of redemption granted in favour of the owner of the property, whose property is put to auction. No doubt the "sale" is to be followed by the issuance of the sale certificate in favour of the auction purchaser confers absolute right in favour of the auction purchaser, but just to ascertain the legislative intent to the word also used "transfer" in sub-section (8) of Sec. 13 of the SRFAESI Act, 2002, then these two words are to be given the meaning for its full enforcement of the right of redemption in favour of the owner of the property. 16. This is to be seen that every "transfer" is not a sale and every "sale" is not a transfer. The word "transfer" has a wide meaning, than the word "sale" and therefore, when the Legislature has used the word "sale" or "transfer", then this has to be understood that there should be actually not only sale but also there should also be de facto transfer of property and if both the eventualities have taken place as enumerated in sub-section (8) of section 13 of the SRFAESI Act, 2002, then right of redemption is not available in favour of the owner of the property against such sale. Right of redemption would only be available either before the "sale" or before the "transfer". Right of redemption would only be available either before the "sale" or before the "transfer". There is no dispute in the present case that the Appellant being a guarantor and owner of the property which was put to auction has already paid full dues of the Bank during the pendency of the Securitisation Appeal preferred by the Appellant. Before its full payment by the Appellant at the stage of Appeal, there was no de facto transfer of the property from the possession of the owner to the auction purchaser and thus right of redemption according to this Tribunal would continue to be in favour of the owner of the property. In this regard it would also be pertinent to ascertain the intention of the Legislature that when the right of redemption is made available, then the right carries in favour of the owner of the property whose property is put to auction and a right for redemption is also conferred only upon payment of full dues to the secured creditor and therefore, just to adjudicate the valuable right of redemption which was made available by virtue of section 13 (8) of the SRFAESI Act, 2002, the Legislature has again given two stages for the such owner who is to be deprived from his property. These two stages are reflected from appreciating the meaning of two words i.e. "sale" or "transfer". If the intention of legislation would have been that only the right of redemption is available before the stage of sale of the property, then the Legislature would not lave also used the word "transfer". The sale of the property confers dejure rights in favour of the auction purchaser, but the word "transfer" being de jure transfer would also be the stage available to the owner of the property for exercising the right of redemption. In this reference, the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in B. Arvind Kumar v. Government of India, 2007 Mad. In this reference, the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in B. Arvind Kumar v. Government of India, 2007 Mad. L.J. 6-329 is relevant, where the Apex Court in the light of section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act has held that sale confers the absolute right of ownership and title on the properly, but by virtue of section 13 (8) Of the SRFAESI Act, 2002, when this Tribiinal has also to give the force to the word "transfer", then the sale has to be separated from the word "transfer" and thus according to this Tribunal, mere sale by Itself though confirms a title on the auction purchaser, but the question with regard to the right of redemption, if it is to be understood in the context of section 13 (8) of the SRFAESI Act, 2002, then another stage for redemption will also be available before the transfer and not after the transfer of the property. Thus, De-jure transfer and De-facto transfer both are to be taken into the account for the purpose of interpreting the right of redemption as provided by the Legislature by virtue of section 13 (8) of the SRFAESI Act, 2002, in favour of the owner of the property. 17. At no point of time it is the) grievance of the Bank in the present easel that any further amount is required to be paid by the Appellant. The Bank also accept that no physical possession or de facto possession has been handed over to the auction purchaser. Under theses circumstances and for the reasons as stated above, I am inclined to hold that even before the "sale" or before the "transfer" the right of redemption at any stage and at any time as described by the Legislature under section 13 (8) of the SRFAESI Act, 2002 would be available and since the Appellant in the present case has already liquidated all the charges and debt, therefore, right of redemption of the Appellant by virtue of sub-section (8) of section 13 of the SRFAESI Act, 2002 cannot be defeated and he will have right to redeem the property. 18. In view of the aforesaid, I am inclined to allow the present Appeal and set aside the order passed by the Tribunal. Since the right of redemption as exercised has also been pleaded, therefore, the auction sale set aside. 18. In view of the aforesaid, I am inclined to allow the present Appeal and set aside the order passed by the Tribunal. Since the right of redemption as exercised has also been pleaded, therefore, the auction sale set aside. Appeal is allowed. The Bank shall return the amount of auction purchaser with simple interest @ 12% per annum within 30 days from the date the copy of this order is received. 19. A copy of this order be supplied to the parties as well as to the DRT concerned as per law. Appeal Allowed. _____________